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Idandas Phagunmal Asnani v. Sukthankar (S.E), Municipal Commissioner, And Others

Bombay High Court
Apr 6, 1972
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a municipal employee appointed as an overseer in July 1948, after promotions and transfers, was assigned to work in the loan works construction branch, Byculla. He was transferred on 1 October 1962 and assigned specific works including laying a 6-inch water-main on Peder Road. In January 1963 he received a circular informing him to be present for a preliminary inquiry scheduled for 29 January 1963 (the text contains a date typographical inconsistency showing 29 January, 1968 in one place but the sequence shows inquiries and notices in 1963–1965). On 15 October 1963 he was served with a chargesheet dated 11 October 1963 and accompanying documents. The petitioner alleges that the inquiry was held in his absence and that principles of natural justice were violated; after cross-examination of witnesses he filed a statement of defence. A show-cause notice dated 3 February 1965 informed him that certain charges were held proved and asked why he should not be dismissed. An order dated 5 October 1965, with prior approval of the standing committee under S. 83(2)(a) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, dismissed him from municipal service.

The petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash the orders of dismissal and to be reinstated with continuity of service and back salary and all attendant rights and privileges. The court was asked to review the validity of the dismissal order and to grant the reliefs claimed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petition, as framed under Article 226, is maintainable by a dismissed municipal employee who was employed under the municipal corporation (i.e., whether the employee is entitled to seek quashing of dismissal and reinstatement under Article 226 rather than being limited to ordinary contractual remedies).
  2. Whether the breach of procedural rules or rules of natural justice in a departmental/municipal enquiry (including any breach of rules made under the relevant municipal statute) renders the dismissal void and entitles the employee to reinstatement with back salary, or whether the remedy is limited to a declaration that the dismissal was wrongful and salary in lieu of notice.
  3. Whether the statutory power to dismiss conferred by provisions such as S. 83 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act carries with it an implied duty to act judicially (i.e., to observe the principles of natural justice in a manner that elevates the relationship beyond a pure master-and-servant contract).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (Sri M. O. Chinoy)

  • A preliminary objection was raised that the petition as framed was not maintainable by a municipal employee: the relationship between the municipal authority and the employee was essentially master-and-servant and the employee could not seek the reliefs claimed under Article 226.
  • Submitted that the power to appoint (S. 80-A) implies the power to dismiss vested in the same authority, relying on Rayarappan v. K.V. Madhav Anne and the General Clauses Act (S.16) as support for that principle.
  • Relied on an unreported Full Bench decision (Second Appeal No. 576 of 1961, dated 9 November 1971) which held that breach of municipal rules entitles the dismissed municipal servant only to a declaration of wrongful dismissal and salary in lieu of notice, not to reinstatement or past salary; urged that that decision governed the present case and concluded the matter.
  • Cited several reported decisions (e.g., Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi; Ratilal Chhaganlal v. Dhari District Municipality; Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai; Lekh Raj Khurana v. Union of India) as authority supporting the preliminary objection and the limitation of remedies where the relationship is master-and-servant.

Petitioner’s Arguments (Sri Nadkarni)

  • Contended that the Full Bench decision (referred to by respondents) is distinguishable because that judgment dealt with violations of rules whereas the present case involves inquiry procedures violative of a section of the Act (S. 83), and where the statute itself implicitly requires adherence to principles of natural justice the case is not a mere master-and-servant matter.
  • Argued that where a statute confers the power of dismissal (S. 83), the nature of that statutory power takes the case out of the ordinary master-and-servant category and imposes a duty to act judicially (i.e., to observe natural justice), entitling the petitioner to relief beyond mere declaration and notice pay.
  • Relied on authorities (including Ridge v. Baldwin and Manekji v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay) to support the contention that where an office or statutory function is involved, remedies under public law (such as certiorari) may be available.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rayarappan v. K.V. Madhav Anne [1949 F.C.R. 667] Supports the proposition that the authority which appoints may implicitly have the power to dismiss (relying on S.16 of General Clauses Act). The court accepted Sri Chinoy's submission as "clearly right" in view of this decision and relied on it in concluding that the appointing authority's power implies power of dismissal.
University Council of Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Linus Silva [(1965) 1 W.L.R. 77] (Privy Council) Holds that a teacher with an appointment to a university was in the ordinary sense a servant; where dismissal arises from ordinary contractual relationship the remedy is damages not certiorari; rejected the proposition that statutory power alone creates a duty to act judicially. The court treated this decision as a "complete answer" to the petitioner's contention that statutory dismissal power implies a duty to act judicially; it was relied upon to support the preliminary objection and the master-and-servant characterization.
Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244] Cited by respondents as authority supporting their preliminary objection. The court listed this decision among those that "clearly support" the respondents' preliminary objection and relied on it as part of the body of authority limiting remedies where employment is of a master-and-servant character.
Ratilal Chhaganlal v. Dhari District Municipality [(1971) 1 SCC 307] Cited by respondents as authority supporting their preliminary objection. Included by the court among decisions that back the position that a municipal employee's remedies are limited and that the case is to be treated as master-and-servant for purposes of relief.
Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai [(1971) 2 SCC 192 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828] Cited by respondents; also used in the opinion to distinguish Ridge v. Baldwin. Used by the court as supportive authority for the preliminary objection and for distinguishing Ridge v. Baldwin on its facts.
Lekh Raj Khurana v. Union of India [(1971) 1 SCC 780] Cited as supporting the preliminary objection. Placed by the court among the decisions that favor respondents' contention that the petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs claimed under Article 226 in the circumstances.
Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 A.C. 40] Formulates three classes of dismissal (master-servant; office held during pleasure; office where something against a man required to warrant dismissal) and applied principles of natural justice to a chief constable's dismissal. The court distinguished Ridge v. Baldwin as not being on all fours with the present case because Ridge did not involve an ordinary master-and-servant relationship; therefore it was of no assistance to the petitioner on the preliminary objection.
Manekji v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay [32 Bom. L.R. 463] Earlier decision addressing a municipal officer's suit for wrongful dismissal and the adequacy of the enquiry; held at one stage that standing committee was a domestic tribunal whose decision could be challenged if principles of natural justice were disregarded. The court held that Manekji is "no longer good law" and is impliedly overruled by the Full Bench unreported decision; thus it rejected reliance on Manekji by the petitioner.
Unreported Full Bench — Second Appeal No. 576 of 1961 (dated 9 November 1971) Answered (1) breach of municipal rule does not have same consequence as breach of Art. 311, and (2) where dismissed in breach of such rule the employee is entitled only to a declaration of wrongful dismissal and salary for notice period, not reinstatement or past salary; classified dismissals into four categories. The court treated the Full Bench's propositions as binding and decisive. It relied on the Full Bench to conclude that the petitioner's relationship was master-and-servant and that he was not entitled to reinstatement or arrears of salary; the Full Bench thereby governed the outcome on maintainability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps, based strictly on the material presented in the opinion:

  1. The court first noted that the petition raised numerous factual questions; exercising its discretion, the court indicated it would decline to grant relief solely on those factual grounds but considered the respondents' preliminary objection regarding maintainability.
  2. The court identified and referred to the relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (notably S. 64(3)(b), S. 80-A(2) and S. 83(1) and proviso (a) to S. 83(2)), explaining that the executive power vests in the Municipal Commissioner and that the Commissioner appoints municipal officers and servants within prescribed pay limits. Section 83(1) permits dismissal/punishment for breach of departmental rules and misconduct; proviso (a) requires previous approval of the standing committee for dismissal of officers earning above Rs. 400 per month.
  3. The court observed that while the Act does not expressly grant rule-making power to the Commissioner, S. 83(1) implicitly provides for departmental rules; accordingly departmental enquiry procedures framed in the Manual of Departmental Enquiries (Rule 22) require quasi-judicial proceedings and observance of principles of natural justice in good faith.
  4. The court evaluated Sri Chinoy's primary submission that the appointing authority's power to appoint (S. 80-A) implies power to dismiss, and that S. 83 merely clarifies which authority possesses dismissal power. The court accepted this submission as correct, relying on Rayarappan (which interprets the effect of S.16 of the General Clauses Act) to support the proposition.
  5. The court then considered the Full Bench unreported decision which had specifically addressed a similar question under the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, and had concluded (a) breach of a municipal rule does not equate to breach of Article 311; (b) where dismissal violates municipal rules the remedy is limited to a declaration of wrongful dismissal and salary for the notice period, not reinstatement or arrears; and (c) the Full Bench had classified dismissals into four categories and concluded that some dismissals (where statutory mandatory obligations are breached) are null and void, whereas breaches of mere rules yield only limited remedies.
  6. The court found that the Full Bench's four propositions (including that municipal servants should not be treated differently from private employees and that the contract is essentially master-and-servant in character where no statutory office or status is involved) were binding and applicable, and that under those propositions the present petitioner's relationship with the municipal authorities was an ordinary master-and-servant contract.
  7. The court also relied on the Privy Council decision in University Council of Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Linus Silva to reject the petitioner's contention that statutory dismissing power (S. 83) by itself creates a duty to act judicially giving rise to public-law remedies such as certiorari. The Privy Council's reasoning that ordinary contractual relationships remain master-and-servant despite statutory regulation was considered persuasive and supportive of the preliminary objection.
  8. The court examined and distinguished Ridge v. Baldwin (House of Lords), observing that Ridge involved a relationship not of ordinary master-and-servant and therefore was not applicable to the facts at hand; the court further held that the older local decision of Manekji was no longer good law and had been impliedly overruled by the Full Bench.
  9. On the basis of these statutory readings and authorities, the court concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to the reliefs claimed (reinstatement with continuity of service and back salary) because his employment relationship was an ordinary master-and-servant relationship and remedies were therefore limited.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the dismissal was rejected; he is not granted reinstatement, back salary, or continuity of service. The petition was dismissed with costs.
  • Legal consequence indicated by the court: The court treated the relationship between the petitioner and the municipal authority as an ordinary master-and-servant relationship. In such cases (absent a statutory office/status or a breach of a mandatory statutory obligation) the appropriate relief for procedural irregularity in municipal enquiries is limited—under the Full Bench view relied upon—generally to a declaration of wrongful dismissal and salary in lieu of notice rather than reinstatement and arrears.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion applies and follows existing authorities (including the cited Full Bench decision and Privy Council authority) rather than announcing a new legal principle; the court explicitly regards Manekji as no longer good law because it is impliedly overruled by the Full Bench decision.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the material and statements contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what the opinion itself states.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by a dismissed municipal employee to quash and set aside the orders of dismissal passed against him and to reinstate him with back-salary and continuity of service and all rights, benefits and privileges as if the said order of dismissal had not been passed.

2. The facts of the petitioner's case are that the petitioner was appointed as an overseer in the service of respondent 3 corporation sometime in July 1948 and after certain promotions and proceedings to which it is unnecessary to refer, he was transferred on 1 October, 1962 to the loan works construction branch, Byculla, and was assigned the work of laying the 6 inches water-main in the proposed footpaths on either side of Peder Road in addition to other works in progress elsewhere. In January 1963 he was informed by a circular that he should remain present for a preliminary inquiry against him on 29 January, 1968, which was to be held by the Executive Engineer of the municipal corporation. On 15 October, 1963 the petitioner was served with a chargesheet, dated 11 October, 1963, which was accompanied by a statement of allegations and a copy of the preliminary inquiry and other documents. In Para. 18 of the petition it is stated that on 7 March, 1964, he was surprised when he was called at the municipal office and served with a letter of that date in which it was stated that the petitioner had failed to remain present at the inquiry which had, therefore, been held in his absence and he was directed to intimate to the enquiry officer whether he wished to cross-examine any of the witnesses. In Para. 20 of the petition the petitioner has averred that the enquiry officer had violated the principles of natural justice by holding the enquiry behind his back. In Para. 23 of the petition it is stated that after the cross-examination of witnesses, the petitioner filed his statement of defence, and by a show-cause notice, dated 3 February, 1965, signed by respondent 2, the petitioner was informed that respondent 1, after considering the report of the enquiry officer and the evidence on record, had held certain charges to have been proved against the petitioner and the petitioner should show cause why he should not be dismissed from municipal service in view of those charges proved against him. On 5 October, 1965, the petitioner received an order informing him that respondent 1 had passed orders with the previous approval of the standing committee required under S. 83(2)(a) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act that the petitioner be dismissed from municipal service.

3. The validity of the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner has been sought to be challenged in the present petition on numerous grounds which raise several questions of fact, and in exercise of the discretion which I have in the matter I would decline to grant any relief to the petitioner on that ground alone, but I do not propose to confine my judgment to the same. Sri M.O Chinoy, on behalf of the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection as to whether the petitioner who is a municipal employee can maintain the petition as framed. It may at once be clarified that it is not the case of the petitioner anywhere in the petition that he holds any office or status as such and it may be pointed out that in the very first paragraph of the petition he has claimed only to be an employee of respondent 3 corporation. For the purpose of disposing of the preliminary objection raised by Sri Chinoy, I must first refer to the relevant sections of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. Under Sub-sec. (3)(b) of S. 64 of that Act, the executive power of the corporation vests in the Municipal Commissioner, and under S. 80-A(2) of the said Act, the power of appointing municipal officers and servants whose minimum monthly salary exclusive of allowances does not exceed Rs. 500 vests in the Municipal Commissioner. Section 83(1) of the Act enacts that every municipal officer or servant may be dismissed or otherwise punished for breach of “departmental rules” or discipline or for carelessness, unfitness, neglect of duty or other misconduct by the authority by whom he was appointed. Proviso (a) which is part of Sub-sec. (2) of the saidsection lays down that no officer whose monthly emoluments exceed Rs. 400 can be dismissed by the Commissioner “without the previous approval of the standing committee”, and it is not disputed that the case of the present petitioner would fall within the said proviso. Curiously enough, the Act does not confer any express rule-making power on the Municipal Commissioner but the said S. 83(1) by clear implication provides for departmental rules being framed by him and pursuant to that power (read with the power implicit in S. 64 of the said Act) the Municipal Commissioner has framed certain rules which by Chap. II thereof provide for the holding of what have been headed as “departmental enquiries” in the Manual of Departmental Enquiries. Rule 22 thereof prescribes that the proceedings in a departmental enquiry are of a quasi-judicial nature and the authority holding it must act according to definite rules and procedure and observe the principles of natural justice in good faith.

4. The first proposition canvassed by Sri Chinoy on behalf of the municipal authorities was that the power of appointment contained in S. 80-A implies the power to dismiss in the same authority which makes the appointment, and in support of that proposition he has relied upon the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Rayarappan v. K.V Madhav Anne [1949 F.C.R 667], in which that proposition has been laid down in connexion with the Court's power to appoint a receiver under order XL, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In doing so the Federal Court relied upon S. 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and it may be mentioned that an identical provision is to be found in S. 16 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, which would be applicable to the present case. It is the contention of Sri Chinoy that when S. 83 lays down that every municipal officer or servant could be dismissed by the authority who appointed him it is merely reaffirming the power which is implicit in the very appointment of such officer by that authority and not conferring a new power. Sri Chinoy has submitted that for the sake of clarity the legislature has in S. 83 enacted which is the officer who has the power to dismiss a municipal officer or servant. In my opinion, that submission of Sri Chinoy is clearly right in view of the decision of the Federal Court in Rayarappan v. K.V Madhav Anne (vide supra) relying on the provisions of S. 16 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904.

5. Sri Chinoy has next submitted that the present petition is not maintainable in view of the unreported decision of a Full Bench of this Court, dated 9 November, 1971, in Second Appeal No. 576 of 1961 in so far as it seeks to quash the orders of dismissal passed against the petitioner and to seek reinstatement with back-salary and other benefits and privileges. The Full Bench was concerned in the said case with a suit brought by a sanitary inspector employed by the Sangamner municipality which was governed by the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, challenging the order of dismissal and seeking to recover arrears of salary, damages, etc., on the ground that the order that was passed against the plaintiff-appellant in the said case was in violation of the principles of natural justice contained in rule 177 of the rules of the said municipality and was, therefore, void and illegal. The trial Court granted a declaration to the plaintiff that his dismissal was wrongful but declined to grant him any further declaration or any other benefits other than a month's salary in lieu of notice and that decree was confirmed in first appeal by the Assistant Judge, Ahmednagar. On a second appeal being filed in this Court the matter was referred by a Division Bench to a Full Bench for its opinion on the following two questions:

(1) Whether a breach of a rule regarding an enquiry into the conduct of a municipal servant before his dismissal from employment entails the same consequence as a breach of provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution?

(2) If a municipal servant is dismissed in breach of such a rule, what would be the relief to which he would be entitled?

The Full Bench answered the first question in the negative and the second question by stating that a municipal servant dismissed in breach of a rule relating to an enquiry would be entitled only to a declaration that his dismissal was wrongful and to salary for the period of notice, but neither to reinstatement in service nor to arrears of salary on the basis that the dismissal was void and illegal. After referring to S. 184 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, dealing with the mode and conditions of appointment, punishment or dismissal of a municipal officer or servant, the Full Bench referred to the rules framed under S. 46 of the said Act and thereafter dealt with various decisions relating to the points which had been referred to it. The Full Bench ultimately laid down that on an examination of the various decisions discussed by it, cases of dismissal of servants would fall into four classes, viz.,

(1) cases in which persons employed under the Union or a State are dismissed in violation of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution;

(2) cases in which an industrial worker was dismissed in violation of the provisions of an industrial law;

(3) cases of dismissal from service of a person who was entitled to an office or status under a statute by an order which affects that office or status; and

(4) cases in which a statutory body acts either in breach of the statute or in breach of the rules and regulations framed under the statute.

The Full Bench proceeded to state that as far as the last category was concerned the decision would depend on a consideration of the question as to whether the order passed by the statutory body was one in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by the statute or was in breach of a mere rule or regulation relating to the conditions of service. The Full Bench held that in the former case the order of dismissal would be null and void and not merely wrongful and as a consequence the employee would be entitled to be reinstated in service and to past salary but in the latter case, the employee would be entitled only to a declaration that the dismissal was wrongful and to damages by way of salary for the period of notice. The Full Bench then held that the case before them was one of a purely master and servant relationship in which the master was under no statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which he could make with his servants or the grounds on which he could dismiss them and was under no statutory obligation by reason of which he could not terminate the services of his employees except by complying with such an obligation. The Full Bench, therefore, held that by not complying with rule 177 of the rules framed under S. 46 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, which provided for a reasonable opportunity of being heard in defence the municipal authorities in the said case had undoubtedly acted irregularly in the exercise of that jurisdiction but the consequence was only that the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that the order of dismissal was wrongful and to salary for the period of notice. Sri Chinoy has contended that the said decision of the Full Bench concludes the matter as far as his preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present petition is concerned and I must hold that the relationship as between the petitioner and the municipal authorities was purely a master and servant relationship and the petitioner was not entitled to either of the reliefs claimed by him in this petition and the petition as framed was, therefore, not maintainable.

6. Sri Nadkarni has on the other hand, contended that the decision in the Full Bench case is distinguishable in so far as the said judgment only deals with the effect of violation of rules and regulations but does not deal with an inquiry that is violative of a section of the Act, viz., S. 83 in the present case, in which in his opinion the power to act according to the principles of natural justice is clearly implicit. It is the contention of Sri Nadkarni that whenever there is a statutory power of dismissal as contained in S. 83 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act it takes the cases out of the master and servant relationship. It is true that the judgment of the Full Bench in the said case deals only with the effect of violation of the relevant rules framed under the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901. I must, however, assume that the Full Bench had in mind and had considered the relevant provisions of that Act also having regard particularly to the fact that S. 184 thereof has actually been referred to in its judgment. Moreover, as Sri Chinoy has rightly pointed out, the Full Bench has in its judgment laid down four broad propositions in the face of which it is impossible to accept Sri Nadkarni's contention. Those propositions are:

(1) that it is wrong to treat the case of a municipal servant on a footing different from that of a private employee;

(2) that though the municipality is a statutory body the contract of service between it and its employees is essentially a contract between master and servant;

(3) that in the case before the Full Bench which was purely one of a master and servant relationship, the master was under no statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which he could make with his servants or the grounds on which he could dismiss them; and

(4) the appointment of the appellant before them was neither to an office nor to a status.

Having regard to these four clear propositions formulated by the Full Bench by which I am bound and with which I respectfully agree, it must be held that the contract of employment between the petitioner before me and the municipal authorities was an ordinary contract between master and servant and the petitioner is not entitled to maintain this petition for either of the reliefs claimed by him. Moreover, there is a decision of the Privy Council, which, in my opinion, provides a complete answer to the way in which Sri Nadkarni sought to distinguish the decision in the Full Bench case to which I have just referred. That decision of the Privy Council was in the case of University Council of Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Linus Silva [(1965) 1 W.L.R 77], in which the services of the respondent who was a lecturer in Economics in a university had been terminated by the Vice-Chancellor under the powers conferred upon him by S. 18(e) of the university statute, and the respondent applied to the Supreme Court of Ceylon for appropriate writs to quash that order of termination contending that, as was not disputed, he had not been told of the nature of accusations against him nor had he been afforded an opportunity of being heard in his own defence. Section 18 (e) of the university statute enacted that subject to the provisions of the Act and of the statutes, regulations and rules, the council shall have and was to perform the powers and duties therein enumerated, Cl. (e) of which related to the appointment of officers and also conferred power to suspend or dismiss any officer or teacher on grounds of incapacity or unfitness. The said case was, therefore, clearly a case where the power of dismissal contained in S. 18(e) the university statute was similar to that contained in S. 83 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, and appears, as Sri Chinoy has rightly contended, to be on all fours with the present case. The Privy Council held (at p. 79) that the law was well-settled that if, where there was an ordinary contractual relationship of master and servant, the master terminated the contract, the servant could not obtain an order of certiorari but could only pursue his claim for damages if he was wrongfully dismissed. The very contention which Sri Nadkarni has raised was urged before the Privy Council (at p. 88), viz., that if someone had the power to determine what the rights of an individual are to be then a duty to act judicially arises simply from the nature of the power. The Privy Council rejected that submission as too wide, observing that no case was cited before it in which an order of certiorari had been made directing the quashing of an order of dismissal of a servant. The Privy Council held (at p. 90) that a teacher who had an appointment with the university was in the ordinary sense a servant of the university, and the circumstances that the university was established by statute and was regulated by statutory enactments contained in the Act did not involve that contracts of employment which were made with teachers and which were subject to the provisions of S. 18(e) thereof were other than ordinary-contracts of master and servant. In my opinion this decision of the Privy Council affords a complete answer to Sri Nadkarni's contention and it is not really necessary for me to refer to any of the other decisions that were cited by Sri Chinoy in the course of his arguments. I may, however mention some of those decisions which clearly support the preliminary objection raised by Sri Chinoy. They are the decisions in the case of Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation, Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1244, Paras 20. and 23 : 1970-I L.L.J 32]; Ratilal Chhaganlal v. Dhari District Municipality [(1971) 1 SCC 307 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 749, Para. 2]; Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai†. [(1971) 2 SCC 192 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1828, Paras. 4, 5 and 12 : 1971-I L.L.J 496]; and Lekh Raj Khurana v. Union Of India† [(1971) 1 SCC 780 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 2111, Para 7].

7. I must, however, deal with two decisions which were strongly relied on by Sri Nadkarni. The first of them was the decision of the House of Lords in the well-known case of Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 A.C 40]. The appeal before the House of Lords arose out of the purported dismissal of the appellant from the office of the chief constable in the Brighton police force. The appellant claimed that his purported dismissal was illegal and void and that he continued to be the chief constable of Brighton and also claimed payment of salary from the date of his purported dismissal, viz., 7 March, 1958. Alternatively, he claimed a declaration that he was entitled to a pension of a certain amount for the term of his natural life from 7 March, 1958. That claim was dismissed by the trial Court and the dismissal thereof was confirmed by Court of Appeal. A further appeal to the House of Lords succeeded on the ground that the rules of natural justice had not been observed. The said case is, however, clearly distinguishable in so far as Lord Reid in delivering his judgment formulated (at p. 65) three classes into which cases of dismissal fell, viz.,

(1) the dismissal of a servant by his master;

(2) the dismissal from an office held during pleasure; and

(3) the dismissal from an office where there must be something against a man to warrant his dismissal.

He then proceeded to state that the law regarding master and servant was not in doubt and that there could not be any specific performance of a contract of service and the master could terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none. He further laid down that if the master did so in a manner not warranted by the contract he had to pay damages for breach of contract, but that the case before him did not fall within that class because the chief constable was not the servant of the watch committee or of any one else but fell within the third of the classes, formulated (at p. 66) by him. The case of Ridge v. Baldwin (vide supra) was, therefore, clearly a case where the relationship was not purely a relationship of master and servant as in the present case and can be clearly distinguished on that ground. In fact that is how the case of Ridge v. Baldwin (vide supra) was distinguished by Shelat, J., in his judgment (Para. 5) in the case of Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai†. [(1971) 2 SCC 192 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1828 : 1971-I L.L.J 496] (vide supra). The case of Ridge v. Baldwin (vide supra) is, therefore, of no assistance whatsoever to the petitioner as far as the preliminary objection raised by Sri Chinoy in the present case is concerned.

8. The next decision on which Sri Nadkarni strongly relied was that in the case of Manekji v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay [32 Bom. L.R 463]. That was a case of a suit filed by the Assistant Health Officer of the Bombay Municipal Corporation for damages for wrongful dismissal. It was alleged that the enquiry held by the Commissioner was ex parte and gave him no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or of being adequately heard. Kemp, J., dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to ask the Court to revise the decision of the standing committee and the Municipal Commissioner and that the plaintiff had been given every opportunity of meeting the charge levelled against him. On a letters patent appeal being filed, the same was dismissed by the Division Bench on the ground that the plaintiff had had a full and fair opportunity of having his case heard before the standing committee and that the relationship between the parties was not the ordinary relationship of master and servant but the plaintiff had a right to challenge the decision on facts in a Court of law. The main ground upon which the appellant relied was that he had a right, as in an ordinary case as between master and servant, to challenge the decision on facts in a Court of law. Alternatively, it was contended that even if the standing committee was a domestic tribunal constituted by the Act to determine those matters and that normally their decision would be final, if it disregarded the principles of natural justice then that decision could be challenged in a Court of law. Marten, C.J, held (at p. 469) that in the case before them the standing committee was constituted by the statute to be a domestic tribunal and that it was never intended by the statute to retain the ordinary law regulating the dismissal of a servant by his master, and to the same effect was the view taken by Blackwell, J. (at p. 479). I am afraid that view is no longer good law and the decision in Manekji case (vide supra) as far as the proposition is concerned, is impliedly overruled by the unreported decision of the Full Bench which has been discussed by me above. Manekji case (vide supra) is, therefore, no longer good law and cannot be availed of by Sri Nadkarni and I must uphold the preliminary objection of Sri Chinoy on behalf of the respondents. I hold that the petition, as framed, is not maintainable in view of the fact that the relationship between the petitioner and the municipal authorities was the ordinary relationship of master and servant.

9. In the result, both on the ground stated in the preceding paragraph, as well as on the ground that, in the exercise of my discretion, I would not grant the relief on the grounds stated in Para. 46 of the petition in which several questions of fact have been raised, I must dismiss this petition with costs.