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Jivanlal Damodardas Wani v. Narayan Ukha Sali
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff purchased a property originally owned by Dwarkadas Vithaldas through a registered sale deed dated March 30, 1964. The defendant was a tenant occupying part of the ground floor of this property. The plaintiff terminated the tenancy by a notice to quit dated September 28, 1967, and subsequently filed a suit on January 3, 1968, to eject the defendant. The defendant filed a written statement on March 14, 1968, disputing the plaintiff's title and asserting that Kamlabai, the wife of Dwarkadas, was the actual owner. On August 7, 1969, the defendant applied to add Kamlabai as a party-defendant to the suit. The Civil Judge (J.D), Shahada, by order dated October 8, 1969, granted this application on the ground that Kamlabai had “some interest” in the property and was thus a necessary party. The plaintiff sought revision of this order before the higher Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Kamlabai is a necessary party to the suit under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether the addition of Kamlabai as a party without the plaintiff's concurrence was justified.
- The proper exercise of judicial discretion in adding parties to a suit under the relevant procedural provision.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum [1958] A.I.R S.C 886 | Judicial discretion under O. I, r. 10 CPC; requirement of direct interest for party addition | Reinforced that addition of parties is a matter of judicial discretion and that the party must have a direct interest in the subject-matter. |
| Virbhadrappa Shilvant v. Shekabai, 1938 41 Bom. L.R 249 | Requirement of plaintiff's concurrence for adding parties as a general rule | Held binding and emphasized the plaintiff’s dominus litis status, limiting addition without plaintiff’s consent to exceptional cases. |
| Banarsi Dass v. Panna Lal [1969] A.I.R Punj. 57 | Distinction between necessary and proper parties; addition without plaintiff's consent only if necessary party | Supported the principle that only necessary parties (not mere proper parties) can be added without plaintiff’s concurrence. |
| Rupam Pictures v. Chagmlal, 1069 72 Bom. L.R 827 | Real owner as a proper party, not a necessary party, in suits by benamidar | Used to illustrate the distinction between proper and necessary parties in property suits. |
| Daitari Prasad v. Umakanta [1971] A.I.R Ori. 44 | Definition of necessary party as one whose rights are affected and whose presence is essential for effective adjudication | Applied to clarify the criteria for necessary party status under O. I, r. 10(2). |
| Sampatbai v. Madhusingh [1960] A.I.R M.P 84 | Same as above - necessary party criteria | Reinforced the interpretation of necessary party under procedural law. |
| Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons, Ltd. [1956] 1 All E.R 273 | Same as above - necessary party criteria | Supported the legal principle concerning necessary party status and effective adjudication. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by outlining the broad discretionary power under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to add parties necessary for effective adjudication. It reviewed relevant precedents to establish that addition of parties without the plaintiff's consent is an exceptional measure, reserved only for necessary parties—not mere proper parties. The Court then examined the facts, noting that the only basis for adding Kamlabai was vague and unsupported assertions in the defendant’s written statement. There was no documentary evidence or clear indication that Kamlabai had any direct interest or ownership rights in the property. The Court emphasized that the mere allegation of adverse possession or being a landlord without substantiation did not suffice. Since Kamlabai had not asserted any right herself and no proof showed her as a necessary party whose rights would be affected, the Court found the lower Court’s exercise of discretion to add her as a party to be unreasonable. Consequently, the Court held that the revision was justified and set aside the order adding Kamlabai as a party.
Holding and Implications
The Court set aside the order dated October 8, 1969, and dismissed the defendant's application to add Kamlabai as a party to the suit.
The direct consequence is that Kamlabai will not be a party to the suit, and the defendant’s attempt to include her on the basis of unsubstantiated claims failed. The Court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs in both Courts. No new precedent was established; rather, the decision reaffirmed existing principles regarding the addition of necessary parties under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the exercise of judicial discretion therein.
Vimadalal, J.:— This is an application to revise an order passed by the Civil Judge (J.D), Shahada, dated October 8, 1969, granting an application by the defendant that one Kamlabai be added as a party to this suit.
2. The facts of the plaintiff's case are that the property in question originally belonged to one Dwarkadas Vithaldas, from whom the plaintiff purchased it by a registered sale deed dated March 30, 1964. The defendant was a tenant occupying a part of the ground floor of the said property and the plaintiff by his notice to quit dated September 28, 1967 terminated that tenancy and filed the present suit on January 3, 1968 to eject the defendant. On March 14, 1968 the defendant filed a written statement contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff had no title to the said property and that the owner thereof was Kamlabai, the wife of the said Dwarkadas from whom the plaintiff claimed to have purchased the property. The defendant thereafter on August 7, 1969 made an application that the said Kamlabai be added as a party-defendant to this suit, and the learned Judge by his order dated October 8, 1969 under revision took the view that it was clear from the contention in the pleadings that Kamlabai had “some interest” in the suit property and was, therefore, a necessary party to the suit, that if Kamlabai was added as a party-defendant to the suit no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff, and that the defendant's application for the addition of Kamlabai as a party-defendant to the suit should, therefore, be granted. It is from that order that the plaintiff has approached this Court in revision. The application made by the defendant for the addition of the said Kamlabai is undoubtedly an application under O. I, r. 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the terms of which are very wide and empower the Court to add any person as a party to a suit, either on the application of one of the parties, or even suo motu, if in its opinion that person ought to have been joined or his presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The wide terms of O. I, r. 10(2) have given rise to several conflicting decisions of various Courts in regard to its interpretation, but having considered the various authorities that were cited before me in the course of the hearing of this revision application, I think the following propositions emerge therefrom:
(1) The question of addition of parties under O. I, r. 10, Civil Procedure Code, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case (Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum . [1958] A.I.R S.C 886, paras. 7, 18 and 14.);
(2) In a suit relating to property like the present one, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should be shown to have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation (Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, paras. 8 and 13);
(3) In exercising its discretion under O. I, r. 10, Civil Procedure Code, the Court would not “ordinarily” add a party without the concurrence of the plaintiff. (Virbhadrappa Shilvant v. Shekabai . 1938 41 Bom. L.R 249, at p. 256.). I am bound by that decision of a Division Bench of this Court and I respectfully agree with the same because the plaintiff is the dominus litis as far as the litigation in question is concerned. From this it would follow that it is only in exceptional cases that a party would be added as a party-defendant to the suit without the concurrence of the plaintiff (Banarsi Dass v. Panna Lal . [1969] A.I.R Punj. 57., para. 9);
(4) The Court would add a person as a party-defendant to a suit without the concurrence of the plaintiff to that suit only where the party sought to be added is a necessary party as distinguished from a mere proper party. This is the view which a single Judge of the Punjab High Court has taken in the case of Banarsi Dass v. Panna Lal cited above, after considering the various authorities on the point, and it is a view with which I am in agreement. Since a person can be joined as a party-defendant to a suit without the concurrence of the plaintiff only in exceptional cases, the only line that the Court can draw to distinguish the ordinary rule from an exceptional case would be to distinguish between a “proper party” and a “necessary party”. This distinction has been recognised in O. I, r. 10, Civil Procedure Code itself. It has been held by a single Judge this Court that a real owner is not a necessary party to a suit by the benamidar but is only a proper party (Rupam Pictures v. Chagmlal . 1069 72 Bom. L.R 827.);
(5) A necessary party is, as has been stated in O. I, r. 10(2), Civil Procedure Code, itself, a party whose addition is absolutely necessary in order to enable the Court to adjudicate effectually and completely on the matter in controversy between the parties. That has been interpreted, in my opinion rightly, to mean that no decree could be passed in the suit without affecting the rights of the party who is sought to be added and the presence of that party is necessary for an effectual adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. It is only when both those conditions are fulfiled that a party could be said to be a necessary party to a suit (vide Daitari Prasad v. Umakanta . [1971] A.I.R Ori. 44.; Sampatbai v. Madhusingh . [1960] A.I.R M.P 84. and Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons, Ltd. . [1956] 1 All E.R 273.);
(6) In all the decisions cited above the application to be added as a party was made by the party himself who was sought to be added and Mr. More on behalf of the appellant sought to distinguish those cases on that ground. In my opinion, however, if such party is a necessary party, as stated above, it makes no difference as to who makes the application for the addition of such party, and indeed, under the very wide terms of O. I, r. 10(2), Civil Procedure Code, the Court may even add such party suo motu.
3. Having regard to the legal propositions formulated above I must now proceed to consider whether, on the facts of the present case, Kamlabai is a necessary party to this suit in the sense, (1) that any decision in this suit is bound to affect her rights, and (2) that her presence is necessary to effectually adjudicate upon the questions involved in this suit. There is nothing before the Court, apart from certain bare statements made by the defendant in the written statement filed by him, to show that Kamlabai has a direct interest in the subject-matter of this litigation or, for the matter of that, that she has any right at all in the property in question which would be affected by the decision given in this suit. I have had the written statement in this case officially translated and have perused the same carefully, and I find that there is no statement in the written statement that the property stands or has ever stood in the municipal and/or government records in the name of Kamlabai. The written statement only contains vague statements referring to her as “the landlord”, and to her having rented out portions of the property and recovered rents. The written statement no doubt contains, in para. 3 thereof, an averment that Kamlabai is the owner of the said property by adverse possession, because of those acts, and because she has, according to the defendant, been in possession of that property, but those averments have no value at all when it is remembered that Kamlabai was, after all, the wife of the said Dwarkadas Vithaldas in whose name, according to the plaintiff, the property-stood at all material times, particularly when Kamlabai herself does not say so and has not come forward to assert any right or title to the property in question. It is difficult to conceive of a case in which a third person can set up and prove a title by adverse possession in Kamlabai by reason of the acts alleged. It is significant indeed that not a single receipt given by Kamlabai for the rent alleged to have been recovered by her has been produced to show in whose name and 011 whose behalf rents were recovered and the receipts given. I, therefore, hold that, on these bare and baseless averments in the written statement of the defendant, it has not been shown that Kamlabai has any direct interest, or for the matter of that, any interest at all, in the property in question, and the lower Court has exercised its discretion unreasonably in ordering her to be added as a party to this suit. I am, therefore, entitled to interfere in revision with the exercise of that discretion by the lower Court.
4. In the result, I make the rule absolute and set aside the order dated October 8, 1969 passed by the learned Civil Judge (J.D), Shahada, in this case, and order that the defendant's application for amendment of the plaint by the addition of Kamlabai be dismissed.
5. The defendant must pay the plaintiff's costs in both the Courts.
6. Rule made absolute.
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