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P.B Bhat v. V.R Thakkar

Bombay High Court
Jul 27, 1971
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Factual and Procedural Background

The case involves the examination of the first plaintiff, who deposed about an interview with plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3, a broker, and defendants regarding proposed terms for conducting businesses of Femina Stores and Meghdoot Restaurant under a conducting agreement with an option to purchase. The plaintiffs' written agreement (annexture ‘A’ to the plaint) included a clause stating the transaction was subject to a conduct-cum-sale agreement to be executed within a month. Defendants objected to oral evidence regarding this clause under sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, asserting that the written contract barred such evidence. The court was called upon to decide on the admissibility of oral evidence concerning this clause.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether oral evidence is admissible to prove statements or terms contained in a written contract under sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  2. Whether the concluding clause in annexture ‘A’—stating the transaction was subject to a conduct-cum-sale agreement within a month—is a "term" of the contract or a condition precedent to the formation of the contract.
  3. The scope and application of proviso (6) to section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret documents in relation to existing facts.
  4. The relevance and applicability of English law principles and prior Indian case law to the interpretation of such contractual clauses and evidentiary rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiffs)

  • Section 91 bars oral evidence only regarding the “terms” of a contract already formed, and the clause in question is not a term but a condition precedent or expression of desire, thus oral evidence should be admissible.
  • Explanation 3 to section 91 supports the distinction between terms and conditions precedent.
  • Under proviso (6) to section 92, oral evidence is admissible to show the circumstances in which the clause was inserted, to clarify how the language relates to existing facts.

Respondent's Arguments (Defendants)

  • The clause in annexture ‘A’ is a term of the contract, and thus oral evidence is inadmissible under sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Proviso (6) to section 92 should be limited to cases governed by sections 93 to 98 and does not allow extrinsic evidence in this case.
  • Relied heavily on the Privy Council decision in Harichand v. Govind to support the rejection of oral evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatasubbiah Chetty v. Govindarajulu Naidu, 1907 I.L.R 31 Mad. 45 Oral evidence admissible to show contracting parties where not expressly mentioned in written contract; distinction between terms of contract and other facts. Supported the view that "terms" in sections 91 and 92 relate only to provisions of an existing contract, not to conditions precedent or external facts.
The Belapur Co. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Farming Corporation, 1968 74 Bom. L.R 216, [1969] A.I.R Bom. 231 Clarified the scope of sections 91 to 98 of the Evidence Act, especially proviso (6) to section 92, regarding admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret documents. Provided a detailed framework for when extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous or doubtful language in documents without contradicting terms.
Harichand v. Govind, [1923] A.I.R P.C 47, S.C 25 Bom. L.R 531 Held that oral evidence to contradict or vary terms of a written contract is inadmissible under section 92 of the Evidence Act. The court found this precedent was based on a concession and did not regard it as definitive on the present issue regarding proviso (6) of section 92.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the language and legal meaning of “terms” in sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. It held that these sections apply only to terms of a contract already in existence and legally enforceable, not to conditions precedent to the formation of a contract. The clause in annexture ‘A’ stating the transaction was subject to a conduct-cum-sale agreement within a month was found to be either a condition precedent or a mere expression of desire, and thus not a “term” of the contract.

The court relied on dictionary definitions and authoritative contract law texts (Anson, Chitty) to distinguish between “terms,” “conditions,” and “representations,” concluding that the clause in question falls outside the scope of “terms” as used in the Evidence Act.

Regarding proviso (6) to section 92, the court accepted the appellant’s argument that extrinsic oral evidence is admissible to show the circumstances in which the clause was inserted and to clarify its meaning in relation to existing facts, provided it does not contradict or vary the written terms. The court referred to its prior judgment in The Belapur Co. Ltd. case, which summarized the principles governing admissibility of such evidence.

The court rejected the defendants’ contention that proviso (6) should be narrowly construed and distinguished the Harichand case, noting that the Privy Council’s ruling was based on procedural concessions and does not control the present issue. The court emphasized the necessity of interpreting the parties’ true intention, especially when the language of the document is ambiguous or capable of multiple meanings.

In conclusion, the court overruled the objection to admitting oral evidence to explain the clause, finding that such evidence is admissible under proviso (6) to section 92 to determine the true effect of the transaction.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the clause in annexture ‘A’ is not a “term” of the contract within the meaning of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, and therefore, oral evidence is admissible to explain the circumstances and meaning of that clause under proviso (6) to section 92.

This decision permits the plaintiffs to lead oral evidence to clarify the nature and intention behind the clause conditioning the contract on a further written agreement. It directly affects the admissibility of evidence in this case but does not establish a new precedent beyond the established interpretation of the Evidence Act’s provisions on extrinsic evidence and contract formation conditions.

Show all summary ...

Vimadalal, J.:— Whilst the first plaintiff was being examined in chief by Mr. Laud and was deposing to an interview between himself and plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 accompained by a broker named Narayandas Budhwani and defendant No. 1 and one Chandrakant Thakore, he deposed to the terms which were offered by defendant No. 1 in regard to the businesses of Femina Stores and Meghdoot Restaurant which were proposed to be taken by the plaintiffs under a conducting agreement, along with an option to purchase the same. Plaintiff No. 1 deposed that after those terms were proposed, there was a discussion which went on for about half-an-hour. Plaintiff No. 1, was then put a question, “What happened then?” At that stage Mr. Shah on behalf of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 raised an objection to the effect that, in view of the plaintiffs' own case in para. 7 of the plaint that the agreement in question had been reduced into writing in the form of annexture ‘A’ to the plaint, no oral evidence could be permitted to be given having regard to the provisions of ss. 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. I have heard counsel on both sides at considerable length on the question of admissibility. Mr. Laud's contention on that question was twofold. First, he contended that s. 91 barred the leading of oral evidence in cases in which a contract had been reduced into Writing only in regard to the “terms” of that contract, and the statement contained in the concluding part of annexture ‘A’ to the plaint that the transaction was subject to an agreement to conduct-cum-sale being entered into within a month cannot be said to be a term of the contract between the parties. Mr. Laud pointed out that all the other statements contained in annexture ‘A’ to the plaint were terms of the contract which were in conformity with the oral contract pleaded in para. 6 of the plaint. For that purpose, Mr. Laud also relied on Explanation 3 to s. 91 of the Evidence Act. The second contention of Mr. Laud was that he was in any event entitled to lead oral evidence for the purpose of showing the circumstances in which the provision relating to the execution of an agreement within a month came to be inserted in annexture ‘A’ to the plaint under proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Evidence Act which permits any fact to be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.

2. I will now proceed to deal with the first contention of Mr. Laud. I may state at the very outset that neither counsel has cited any authorities before me, except authorities in the nature of standard works and a dictionary to show what is the precise legal connotation of the expression “terms” in relation to a contract. Turning first to the plain language of ss. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, in my opinion, when those sections refer to the terms “of” a contract they necessarily postulate that there is a contract in existence, some of the statements contained in which are in the nature of terms.

3. As a matter of plain language and grammatical construction I have, therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the expression “terms” of a contract in s. 91, and the corresponding expression in s. 92, have no application to a statement contained in a writing which is in the nature of a condition precedent to the very formation of that contract. It is the contention of Mr. Shah himself that the concluding words of annexture ‘A’ to the plaint are in the nature of a condition precedent to the very formation of the contract, and that condition not having been fulfilled, no contract ever came into existence. As against that, it is the case of Mr. Laud for the plaintiffs that the statement contained in the concluding words of annexture ‘A’ is a mere expression of a desire as to how the transaction was to go through. In either view of the matter, therefore, it cannot be said to be a term of the contract. In Murray's English Dictionary (1919 edn.) the expression “term” is given as having several meanings, some of which have relation to the concept of a period of time with which we are not concerned. One of the meanings which, however, is applicable to the present case is given as “limiting condition”, and the plural of the expression “term” is given as having the meaning of conditions or stipulations limiting what is proposed to be granted or done. It is then stated that the expression is rarely used in the singular, and the meaning of the expression when used in the singular is stated to be “that which is so required or demanded, a condition or pre-requisite of something.” The expression “terms” in the plural, therefore, means according to Murray's Dictionary, a condition or stipulation which limits what is to be granted or done, and, in my opinion, therefore, it cannot apply to something which is in the nature not of a limitation of what is to be done under a contract, but of a condition precedent to the very formation of the contract. In distinguishing between “representations” and “terms” in relation to a contract, Anson on the Principles of the English Law of Contract (22nd edn.) at p. 114 appears to give to the expression “term” the meaning of representations or assurances intended to be an integral part of the agreement. This again would, in my opinion, show that it can have no application to a statement or representation which is in the nature of a condition precedent to the very formation of the contract. At pp. 119-120 Anson deals with the distinction in the law relating to sale of goods between a condition and a warranty, but that, I am afraid, is not of much assistance for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the expression “terms” used in ss. 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. In dealing with the question of classification of terms, Chitty on Contracts (23rd edn.) Vol. I, p. 279 para. 595 also deals with the distinction between conditions and warranties and the statements made in that paragraph are, therefore, also not of direct assistance for the purpose of determining the point of admissibility with which I am dealing. This much would, however, follow from the way in which the distinction between conditions and warranties has been dealt with, both in Anson as well as in Chitty, that the expression “terms” connotes both conditions as well as warranties, and that contracts are normally made up of a number of terms, some of which are regarded as major or essential terms and are, therefore, called conditions, and others are regarded as of minor importance and, therefore, called warranties. From this also, it would follow that the expression “terms” applies to provisions contained in contracts which have already come into existence and are legally enforceable. The proposition that ss. 91 and 92 are not applicable to just anything and everything that is contained in a written contract does not really need authority, but if authority were needed, it is to be found in the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Venkatasubbiah Chetty v. Govindarajulu Naidu . 1907 I.L.R 31 Mad. 45. where it was held that oral evidence was admissible to show that the party liable on the contract contracted for himself and as the agent of his partners, and that such partners are liable to be sued on the contract though no allusion is made to them in the written contract. In that connection, referring to ss. 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was stated in the judgment (at p. 47) that the question as to who the contracting parties were was not one of the “terms of a contract” within the meaning of those sections. I hold that the expression “terms” in ss. 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act must relate to statements, assertions or representations contained in a written contract which relate to the subject-matter of the contract and to something to be done or not to be done under the contract, and has no application to a provision in the nature of a condition precedent to the very existence or formation of a contract. On that ground alone, therefore, the objection raised by Mr. Shah to the admissibility of oral evidence for the purpose of showing the circumstances in which that provision came to be inserted in the writing annexture “A” to the plaint must be rejected, and it is really not necessary for me to deal with the second ground which is urged by Mr. Laud to repel that objection. I will, however, briefly deal with the same also, as it has been argued at some length.

4. The real question which arises in connection with the same is in regard to the scope and application of proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Evidence Act. It has been contended by Mr. Shah on behalf of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 that the said proviso must be limited in its application to cases which fall within one or other of the sections of Chapter VI of the Evidence Act which follow that proviso, viz., ss. 93 to 98 thereof. The scope of ss. 91 to 98 of the Indian Evidence Act, including proviso (6) to s. 92, has been considered by me in the case of The Belapur Co. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Farming Corporation* . 1968 74 Bom. L.R 216, at pp. 257-258, S.C [1969] A.I.R Bom. 231. in which, after considering various authorities on the point, I have summarised the legal position in the following terms:

“The propositions that emerge from a consideration of these authorities on the subject are as follows: (1) Cases in the English Courts of Chancery have no application to the law of India as laid down in the Indian Evidence Act. (2) In view of the provisions of s. 91 of the Evidence Act, no extrinsic evidence, oral or documentary, can be admitted to prove the terms of a contract, grant or other disposition of property, except the document itself or secondary evidence of its contents when admissible under the relevant provisions of that Act, and the court must find out the expressed intention of the parties. The fundamental rule of construction is to ascertain the intention from the words used in the document which is considered to be the written declaration of the mind of the author. (3) If the words are clear in expressing that intention and the language applies to existing facts, extrinsic evidence is not admissible for construing the deed or for ascertaining the real intention of the parties e.g, surrounding circumstances cannot be considered with a view to holding that a document which is, on the face of it, a sale deed was intended to operate as a mortgage. (4) If, however, the words are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly, or in other words, there is some doubt as to what the words mean or how they are to be applied to the circumstances of the writer or to the facts existing at the time when the document was executed, extrinsic evidence is admissible, both under proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Evidence Act as well as in English law. In such cases, extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose of finding out the meaning of the words which have actually been employed, or what is same thing, in order to translate the language of the document by assigning a definite meaning to terms capable of such explanation or by connecting them with the proper subject-matter, or in other words, for the purpose of throwing light on the meaning of the words used with a view to arrive at the true effect of the transaction to which the document relates. The whole object in such cases is to place the Court as near as may be, in the position of the parties to the document. (5) The subsequent conduct of the parties is, however, not relevant or admissible for the purpose of construing a written document. (6) If the language employed in the document is ambiguous, the question of the admissibility or otherwise of extraneous evidence would be regulated by the provisions of ss. 93 to 98 of the Evidence Act. The plain meaning of the word “ambiguous” is, obscure, or of double meaning (Concise Oxford Dictionary). (7) In view of s. 92 of the Evidence Act, oral evidence can, in no event, be admitted to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of the document, as far as the parties to that document are concerned.”

5. I have also held (page 259) that proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Evidence Act is not an exception to the rule laid down in the main part of the section, as a proviso normally is, but is a substantive provision which itself lays down the law relating to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence as an aid to the construction of a document in cases in which it is necessary to find out how the document is related to existing facts. I have further held that it has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of the document with which the main part of s. 92 deals, and does not take away or qualify anything that would, but for that proviso, have fallen within the substantive portion of that section. The position in regard to proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Evidence Act, in view of what I have held in Belapur Co's case is, that extrinsic evidence is admissible under that proviso for the purpose of finding out the meaning of the words which have actually been employed, or what is the same thing, in order to translate the language of the document by assigning a definite meaning to terms capable of such explanation with a view to arrive at the true effect of the transaction in question in cases in which the words used are such that one might suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly, or in other words, there is some doubt as to what the words mean or how they are to be applied to the circumstances of the writer or to the facts existing at the time when the document was executed. The words “subject to an agreement to conduct-cum-sale to be entered within a month” used in the concluding part of annexture “A” to the plaint in the present case are capable of two possible meanings: one, that the execution of a written agreement within a month was a condition precedent to the very formation of the contract, and the other, that it is the mere expression of a desire as to how the transaction was to go through. It is true that in English law the words “subject to a contract in writing” or equivalent words have generally been construed by Courts in England to mean that the agreement is of no legal effect until a written document is executed (Chitty on Contracts (23rd Edn.) Vol. I, p. 79, and Anson on the Principles of the English Law of Contract (22nd Edn.) pp. 53-54 and Cheshire on the Law of Contract (7th Edn.) p. 33. That, however, is not an inflexible rule. In fact, in the passage from Cheshire where this point is dealt with it is stated (at p. 33), “Unless there is cogent evidence of a contrary intention, the Courts construe these words so as to postpone the incidence of liability till a formal document has been drawn up and signed;” and (at p. 34), “The task of the courts is to extract the intention of the parties both from the terms of their correspondence and from the circumstances which surround and follow it, and the question of interpretation may thus be stated. Is the preparation of a further document a condition precedent to the creation of a contract or is it an incident in the performance of an already binding obligation?” Referring to an observation of Lord Wright it is further stated in Cheshire (at p. 36) that judges would always seek to implement and not to defeat reasonable expectations though they could not invent a contract which the parties had been too idle to make for themselves. It is, therefore, clear that the position in English Law is that even in cases in which the expression used in a signed document is “subject to a written contract” or other equivalent expression, it would be open to the Court, and indeed, it would be its duty, to extract the intention of the parties and to see whether there is cogent evidence to indicate that the parties intended a binding contractual obligation to come into existence even before a formal document was executed. It was sought to be contended by Mr. Shah that, whatever might be the position in English law, the powers of the Court in that behalf would be limited in this country by the statutory provisions of ss. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, but I see no reason why they should be so limited in view of the terms of proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Evidence Act which is, inter alia, intended to meet precisely such a situation. In fact, as indicated in my judgment in Belapur Co.'s case (p. 258), the position in regard to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence under proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Evidence Act as well as in English law appears to be the same. Mr. Shah on behalf of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 relied strongly on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Harichand v. Govind . [1923] A.I.R P.C 47, S.C 25 Bom. L.R 531. where a question very similar to the question before me arose before the Privy Council, the plaintiff-purchaser contending that the two documents which formed the foundation of the suit constituted a completed contract and the defendant-vendor urging that it was only in the nature of a provisional agreement conditional on the preparation of a formal document. In the trial Court, the defendant had attempted to tender some oral evidence to show what actually took place when the parties entered into the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff, but the trial Judge had refused the application in a single sentence in these words, “I reject that evidence; irrelevant and inadmissible.” The Privy Council took the view that the ruling of the learned trial Judge was right and that under s. 92 of the’ Indian Evidence Act the evidence sought to be led was rightly rejected. It is, however, clear from the judgment of the Privy Council that statement in the judgment was based practically on a concession made in the course of the arguments before it, for it has been stated (at p. 48, col. 2) that no attempt was made on appeal to take exception on behalf of the defendant to that part of the trial Judge's order. It is for that reason that, with that brief observation, the Privy Council did not think it necessary to refer further to that point. Under these circumstances, I do not consider the decision of the Privy Council in Harichand's case on which Mr. Shah has relied as his “trump card”, to be a decision on the point which arises before me. In the event of my being wrong in the view which I have taken above, viz., that the statement contained in the concluding part of annexture “A” to the plaint is not one of the “terms” of the contract between the parties. I would still hold extrinsic evidence to be admissible under proviso (6) to s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act for the purpose of showing the circumstances in which the said writing came to be prepared and executed, and this statement found place therein, with a view to arrive at the true effect of the transaction to which the document relates. I, therefore, overrule Mr. Shah's objection.