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Mahadeo Keshav Langarkar v. Shamrao Balwant Kesarkar

Bombay High Court
Jul 31, 1970
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Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from a suit filed by the respondent (plaintiff) seeking possession of the western half share of house No. 611 at Vadgaon. The house originally belonged to Tatoba Laxman Pise, who sold his undivided half share to defendant No. 1 on March 14, 1958. The defendants were in possession of the entire house as tenants since 1953. Tatoba later sold the remaining half share to the plaintiff on March 8, 1960. The defendants refused to partition the house, leading the plaintiff to seek equitable partition and possession of the western half.

The defendants contested the suit, claiming Tatoba had no saleable interest on March 8, 1960, and that they had agreements with Tatoba and another co-owner, Nivritti Haval, entitling them to possession. They asserted equity of part performance under these agreements and argued the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser without notice.

The Civil Judge found that the plaintiff proved the March 8, 1960 sale deed, Tatoba had only half share at that time, defendant No. 1 was entitled to protect possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, and the plaintiff was estopped from suing due to predecessor contracts. The suit was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the dismissal, holding the defendants’ equity of part performance was not enforceable against the plaintiff, who was a bona fide purchaser without notice. The defendants then filed this second appeal challenging that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff had notice (actual or constructive) of the defendants’ equity of part performance under the agreements with Tatoba and Haval, thereby affecting the applicability of the proviso to Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
  2. Whether the defendants, in possession under contracts partially performed, are entitled to protection against a subsequent purchaser like the plaintiff under Section 53A.
  3. The legal effect of possession by defendants and the duty of enquiry imposed on the plaintiff as a purchaser regarding such possession and rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • Tatoba had no saleable interest on March 8, 1960, as he had earlier agreements with defendants and Haval covering the entire house.
  • They were in possession since 1953 and had equity of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • The plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser without notice because the defendants’ possession and published notice should have put the plaintiff on inquiry.
  • Section 3 Explanation II of the Transfer of Property Act imputes notice to a purchaser of the title of the person in actual possession, thus the plaintiff had constructive notice of defendants’ rights.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the defendants’ contracts or part performance thereof.
  • The defendants’ possession as tenants since 1953 did not convey notice of any change in character of possession or of the equity of part performance.
  • The improvements made by defendants (tap-water connection, bath-room) were insufficient to constitute notice of part performance.
  • The constructive notice under Section 3 Explanation II applies only to title, not to equitable interests such as contracts of part performance under Section 53A.
  • The published notice in the newspaper ‘Pudhari’ was not proved to be known to the plaintiff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tiloke Chand v. Beattie & Co. [1926] A.I.R Cal. 204 Open possession by a tenant constitutes constructive notice not only of tenancy but also of collateral agreements in absence of enquiry by transferee. The court applied this principle to hold that the plaintiff had constructive notice of defendants’ equitable interest due to their possession.
Md. Aslam Khan v. Feroze Shah [1932] A.I.R P.C 228 Knowledge of facts that would put a transferee on inquiry negates the status of transferee without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The court used this precedent to support that a transferee who fails to inquire about possession is deemed to have notice of prior contracts.
Ramkrishna v. Mahadei [1965] A.I.R Pat. 467 Equitable interests and contracts in part performance affect subsequent purchasers with notice. Referenced to affirm that equitable interests under contract and possession protect defendants against the plaintiff’s claim.
Baburam, Bag v. Madhab Chandra Pollay 1913 I.L.R 40 Cal. 565 Occupation by tenant affects transferees who take with notice of tenant’s rights and imposes duty to inquire. Used to emphasize that possession by defendants imposed a duty on plaintiff to inquire about their rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the defendants’ possession under contracts with Tatoba and Haval constituted equity of part performance protected under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. It held that the plaintiff, as a subsequent purchaser, was deemed to have constructive notice of the defendants’ equitable interest due to their actual possession as per Explanation II of Section 3 of the Act.

The court rejected the District Judge’s finding that the plaintiff had no notice, emphasizing established legal principles that possession by a tenant or party in part performance puts a transferee on inquiry. The plaintiff’s failure to make any enquiry about the defendants’ rights amounted to wilful abstention, thus imputing notice of the contract or part performance.

The court relied on authoritative precedents to show that possession is notice not only of tenancy but also of collateral agreements, and that a transferee cannot claim to be without notice if they fail to inquire. The court concluded that the proviso to Section 53A protecting bona fide purchasers without notice did not apply to the plaintiff.

Consequently, the defendants’ possession must be protected, and the plaintiff could not recover possession of the house.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed. The decree passed by the District Judge in favor of the plaintiff is set aside, and the decree of the Civil Judge dismissing the plaintiff’s suit is restored with costs.

The direct effect is that the defendants retain possession of the entire house under the protection of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act due to their equity of part performance. The plaintiff, having failed to make enquiry and being deemed to have notice, cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice. No new precedent is set; the decision reaffirms established principles regarding constructive notice and protection of possession under Section 53A.

Show all summary ...

Vaidya, J.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent to obtain possession of western half share out of house No. 611 situated at Vadgaon in Ichalkaranji Taluka. According to the plaintiff, the house originally belonged to one Tatoba Laxman Pise. On March 14, 1958, Tatoba sold his undivided half share in the house to defendant No. 1. The defendants were, however, in possession of the entire house as tenants since 1953. On March 8, 1960, Tatoba sold the remaining half to the plaintiff under a registered sale deed. The defendants were not willing to make an actual partition of the house. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed in the suit for an equitable partition of the house and possession of the western half of the house. The defendants resisted the suit contending that on March 8, 1960, Tatoba had no saleable interest in the suit property; hence, the plaintiff could not maintain the suit. They further alleged that on January 24, 1958, Tatoba had entered into an agreement with the defendants to sell the entire house to them and they were in possession of the house since then in pursuance of that agreement. As it transpired later that one Nivritti Haval had half share in the entire house, they entered into an agreement with Haval on October 18, 1958 to purchase the remaining half share in the house. They had, in the meanwhile, got a registered sale deed executed by Pise in respect of his half share on March 14, 1958, as stated by the plaintiff. Thus the defendants claimed to be in possession of the half share sold by Tatoba under the sale deed dated March 14, 1958 and the remaining half share under the agreement dated January 24, 1958 entered into with Tatoba and the agreement dated October 18, 1958 entered into with Haval and claimed equity of part performance against any transferee with notice of their possession. They further stated that Haval entered into an agreement with the defendants and thereafter transferred his share to Tatoba Pise and hence Haval had lost all interest in the property and Tatoba was bound to convey the property to the defendants under the original agreement dated January 24, 1958. They submitted that the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser without notice of the above transactions between the defendants and the said Tatoba and Haval and hence, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover possession of the house from the defendants. The learned Civil Judge framed the necessary issues and on considering carefully the documentary and oral evidence in the case found

(1) that the plaintiff proved the sale deed executed by Tatoba in his favour on March 8, 1960,

(2) that Tatoba had only half share in the suit property at the time of the said sale deed dated March 8, 1960,

(3) but that defendant No. 1 (though the findings in this behalf have been recorded by the learned Judge in a confused way by referring to both the defendants, it appears he meant defendant No. 1) was entitled to protect his possession of the whole house under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, and

(4) that the plaintiff was estopped from bringing his suit in view of the contracts entered into by his predecessor-in-title with defendant No. 1.

2. He, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs by his judgment and decree dated July 25, 1961. Peeling aggrieved by the said decision, the plaintiff carried an appeal in the Court of the District Judge at Kolhapur and the learned District Judge reversed the decree on the ground that although the defendants were entitled to the equity of part performance under s. 53A against Tatoba and Haval, that equity was not available against the plaintiff because the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the contracts or of the part performance thereof. In view of this finding, the learned District Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit.

3. The said decree is challenged in the above second appeal by the defendants and it is urged by Mr. Hombalkar, the learned counsel for the defendants, that the learned District Judge erred in law in holding that the plaintiff had no notice of the equity of part performance in favour of the defendants. The finding of the learned District Judge that the defendants fulfilled all the requirements of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and were entitled to protection of their possession under the said s. 53A is a finding which cannot be assailed by the plaintiff. The finding is recorded by the learned District Judge after carefully considering all the relevant agreements and the requirements of s. 53A and Mr. Joshi, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, has not been able to point out any error in that finding. Mr. Joshi, however, submitted that the learned District Judge was quite right in further holding that the facts of the case attracted the operation of the proviso to s. 53A which runs as follows:

“Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”

4. The learned District Judge reversed the finding recorded by the learned Civil Judge on this point observing as follows:

“…Here again, if we remember the fact that the Defendants were occupying the house since 1953 as tenants, the fact that they continued in possession in part performance of the contract can hardly be known to a third person. After all, it was a change in character of possession. And therefore, unless there is something more on the part of the Defendants to show this change in character or possession, it would be extremely difficult to hold that the third person could have knowledge of the fact that the Defendants were continuing in part performance of the contract with Nivritti Haval. It is true that admittedly the Defendants have taken tap-water connection and have also constructed a bath-room. But even assuming that these improvements were made by the Defendants in part performance of the contract, the question is whether the Plaintiff would be said to have had the notice of it. The notice contemplated under the proviso to Section 53-A is not of improvements, but of the part performance of the contract. But there is nothing on the record to show that at the time the Plaintiff purchased this house from Tatoba Pise he knew that the Defendants had made these improvements, much less can it be said that he had the knowledge that the Defendants had made these improvements in part performance of the contract. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the Defendants have failed to prove that the Plaintiff had the notice either of the contract between them and Nivritti Haval or of the part performance thereof.”

5. It may also be noticed that the defendants relied on a notice published in a daily newspaper known as ‘Pudhari’ dated March 4, 1960 and contended that the publication must have come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The learned District Judge rejected this contention on the ground that there was nothing on the record to show that ‘Pudhari’ was in circulation in Vadgaon and there was also nothing on the record to suggest that the plaintiff had any opportunity to know about this notice.

6. However, it appears that the attention of the learned District Judge was not drawn to the definition contained in s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the material portion of which runs as follows:

“‘a person is said to have notice’ of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.

Explanation I.—…

Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.

Explanation III.—…”

7. Reliance is placed by Mr. Hombalkar for the appellant on the terms of Explanation II. He contended that the defendants being admittedly in possession of the entire suit house, in view of the said Explanation II, the plaintiff should be deemed to have notice of the contracts between defendant No. 1 and Totoba and Haval; and in any event, it was his duty to make a proper enquiry about the rights of the defendants who were in possession of the property before purchasing the property; and he having failed to do so, he must be said to have had notice of the equities in favour of the defendants within the meaning of that definition.

8. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he made any enquiry with the defendants about the rights, if any, which they had in the property. But Mr. Joshi tried to repel this argument by contending that the constructive notice imputed to the purchaser under Explanation II is only in respect of ‘title’ and not in respect of any equity such as a contract to purchase the property or part performance referred to in the proviso to s. 53A. Mr. Joshi's contention is, however, contrary to well established principles of law regarding constructive notice. The principle stated by Rankin, J. in Tiloke Chand v. Beattie & Co. . [1926] A.I.R Cal. 204, at p. 211.—which, of course, was a case decided prior to the amendment of the definition of notice in s. 3—will apply to the facts of this case; and that principle is as follows:

“In this case there was a tenant upon the property and his open possession is notice not only of the immediate terms of his tenancy but of collateral agreements as well, in the absence of all enquiry by the transferees.”

9. The principle was also adopted in illustration 3 to s. 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877; and the section is re-enacted in s. 19(6) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, though the illustration has been omitted. In Md. Aslam Khan v. Feroze Shah . [1932] A.I.R P.C 228., while dealing with the said s. 27(6) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the Privy Council laid down:

“Where a transferee has knowledge of such facts which would put him on inquiry which if prosecuted would have disclosed a previous agreement, such transferee is not a transferee without notice of the original contract within the meaning of the exception in section 27(b).”

10. In my judgment, the use of the word ‘title’ in Explanation II does not mean that the general principles with regard to constructive notice embodied therein will not be applicable to the notice referred to in the proviso to s. 53A. From the illustration to. 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 referred to above and from the above decision of the Calcutta High Court, it is clear that the word ‘title’ as used in the Explanation II means not only a completed title in accordance with law but also includes an equitable interest which a transferee may acquire in any property by virtue of, and under the contract of transfer. A subsequent purchaser of an immovable property would be affected with notice of the interest of a tenant who is in possession of the property in part performance of an unregistered agreement with the lessor and consequently with notice of such agreement, and would not succeed in defeating the tenant's claim to retain possession under the protection given to him by s. 53A of the Act. Reference in this connection may be made to Ramkcrishna v. Mahadei . [1965] A.I.R Pat. 467.

11. In the aforesaid Tiloke Chand's case also there was a tenant in possession. During the pendency of the lease, the tenant advanced Rs. 7,800 to the landlord on a verbal agreement that the money was to be spent on repairs and repaid by the landlord by giving credit to the tenant for monthly rents as they became due. Some time later, the mortgagee of the property obtained a decree against the landlord for sale on the mortgage, purchased the house at the Court sale and gave notice to the tenant to quit. It was held by Sanderson C.J and Rankin, J. that the mortgagee was not entitled to evict the tenant on that notice because the possession of the tenant was constructive notice to the mortgagee not only of his tenancy but also of the agreement under which he was entitled to remain in possession until the end of August 1923 as the landlord had agreed to allow the tenant to remain in possession of the premises till that time when he borrowed from the tenant Ks. 7,800.

12. As stated by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Baburam, Bag v. Madhab Chandra Pollay . 1913 I.L.R 40 Cal. 565, at p. 569.

“…the occupation of property by a tenant ordinarily affects one who would take a transfer of that property with notice of that tenant's rights, and if he chooses to make no inquiry of the tenant, he cannot claim to be a transferee without notice.”

13. In view of these principles, it was the duty of the plaintiff to make an enquiry with the defendants as to what their rights were. As the plaintiff admittedly failed to make any enquiry in respect of the rights of the defendants in the said house, it must be held that he had notice of the contract or part performance thereof; and hence, in my opinion, the learned District Judge erred in law in holding that the proviso to s. 53A was attracted in this case. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was a transferee for consideration, who had no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof within the meaning of that proviso, because the defendants were in possession of the house and it was incumbent on the plaintiff to make proper enquiry into their rights before getting a sale of the half share in the property in his favour.

14. For these reasons, the defendants must succeed because under s. 53A, defendant No. 1 having contracted with Tatoba and Haval to purchase the property, must be continued in possession of the suit house in part performance of the contract; and defendant No. 1 being ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, neither Tatoba nor Haval or the plaintiff, who claims under Tatoba, can deprive the defendants of the possession of the suit house.

15. In the result, the decree passed by the learned District Judge is set aside and the decree passed by the Civil Judge is restored.

16. Appeal allowed with costs throughout.

17. Appeal allowed.