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Diwalibai Damjibhai Bhatti And Others v. Jaikumar Gopaldas Jain And Others

Bombay High Court
Feb 21, 1969
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are two widows of Damjibhai and his two minor sons, Liladhar and Champalal, who together were occupying certain premises in Amravati town. The landlords (opponents) filed an application on 2-12-1964 seeking permission to terminate the tenancy under Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order.

Proceedings were adjourned and fixed for hearing on 27-1-1966. On that date counsel for the landlords informed the Rent Controller that Damjibhai had died; a nephew, Sureshchandra, was present and informed the Court of the death. The matter was adjourned; the petitioners were brought on record and noticed for appearance and evidence on 14-2-1966. On 14-2-1966 an advocate appeared for the petitioners and filed a written statement; the matter was adjourned to 23-2-1966 for evidence.

On 23-2-1966 neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared. The Rent Controller closed the case for orders on 28-2-1966 and proceeded ex parte, passing an order (on 28-2-1966) granting the landlords permission to terminate the tenancy to the prejudice of the petitioners.

On 28-3-1966 the petitioners filed an application to set aside the ex parte order, alleging that petitioners 1 and 2 were illiterate, belonged to the Gujrathi community and did not customarily appear in public, and that petitioners 3 and 4 were minors below 12 years; they contended they had relied on their counsel and, in their absence and for want of signatures, counsel could not act.

The landlords opposed the application, raising a preliminary objection based on a Nagpur High Court decision (1953 Nag LJ (Notes) 211), contending such an application was not tenable. The Rent Controller heard arguments (on 28-5-1966) and rejected the application on 6-6-1966 without holding an inquiry or admitting evidence to substantiate the petitioners' claims. The Rent Controller relied on 1953 Nag LJ (Notes) 211 and also treated the decision in 1962 Nag LJ 180 (AIR 1963 Bom 233) as inapplicable.

The petitioners appealed to the Collector. The Resident Deputy Collector dismissed the appeal, observing he was not convinced there was ground to interfere with the Rent Controller's order and that there appeared to be no need to set aside the ex parte order. The petitioners then challenged these orders by filing the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application to set aside an ex parte order (or to restore an application dismissed for default of appearance) is tenable when the defaulting party satisfies the authority that there was "good cause" for non-appearance.
  2. Whether the Rent Controller and the appellate authority were bound to follow the principle in the Division Bench decision reported at 1962 Nag LJ 180 (AIR 1963 Bom 233) that a tribunal which proceeds ex parte has a duty to restore the matter if good cause is shown.
  3. Whether the Rent Control authorities were required to hold an inquiry and permit evidence to be led (including taking steps to secure representation for minors) before rejecting an application to set aside an ex parte order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners (two adult women) are illiterate, belong to the Gujrathi community, and, by custom, do not appear in public; they had relied on their counsel to act for them.
  • The two other petitioners are minors (below 12 years), and the interest of minors was involved; consequently, proceedings should not have been taken ex parte without securing proper representation or a guardian.
  • They alleged that because of the death of Damjibhai and the family circumstances, they did not consider it necessary to personally attend on 23-2-1966 and expected counsel to attend and act; their absence was not due to culpable negligence.

Respondents' (Landlords') Arguments

  • By way of a preliminary objection, the respondents relied on the Nagpur High Court decision reported at 1953 Nag LJ (Notes) 211, contending that an application to set aside the ex parte order is not tenable under the law.
  • In the Rent Controller's view, the petitioners' failure to appear was negligent and did not justify setting aside the ex parte order; therefore restoration should be refused on merits as well.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1953 Nag LJ (Notes) 211 Advanced by respondents as authority that an application to set aside an ex parte order (or for restoration after default) is not tenable under the law. The Rent Controller relied on this decision, treating it as applicable "on all fours" and as still good law. The Court criticized the Rent Controller's reliance on it, pointing out that it conflicted with a binding decision of this Court (1962 Nag LJ 180) and that Rent Control authorities in the State are bound by the Division Bench decision of this Court.
1962 Nag LJ 180 : (AIR 1963 Bom 233) Establishes the principle that the power to dismiss an application for default or to proceed ex parte implies a corresponding duty to restore or set aside if the defaulting party satisfies the tribunal that there was good cause for non-appearance; an authority to adjudicate has implicitly this jurisdiction and duty. The Court held this decision to be binding on Rent Control authorities in the State. The Court found that the Rent Controller failed to apply this principle, did not hold an inquiry or allow evidence, and thus erred in refusing restoration and in treating the petitioners' absence as mere negligence without examination.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from the legal principle articulated in the Division Bench decision reported at 1962 Nag LJ 180 (AIR 1963 Bom 233). The Court framed the issue as one of procedural duty inherent in a tribunal's jurisdiction: if a tribunal has power to dismiss for default or to proceed ex parte (which is implicit in its jurisdiction to adjudicate claims), that power necessarily carries an accompanying duty to restore a matter or set aside an ex parte order where the defaulting party shows good cause for non-appearance.

The Court characterized Rent Control authorities as quasi-judicial tribunals adjudicating civil rights, and emphasised that the duty to permit restoration when good cause is shown is "a sine qua non of judicial procedure." The Rent Controller and the appellate authority were therefore bound by the Division Bench ruling.

The Court found multiple procedural defects in the approach of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority:

  • They rejected the application to set aside the ex parte order without holding any inquiry or allowing the petitioners to lead evidence to substantiate the reasons given for non-appearance.
  • They relied on the contrary decision from Nagpur (1953 Nag LJ (Notes) 211) instead of applying the binding Division Bench decision.
  • They failed to account for material facts apparent on the record: (a) two petitioners were adult women of the Gujrathi community who averred they did not customarily appear in public and were described as old and illiterate; (b) two petitioners were minors; (c) Damjibhai had died shortly before the hearing date and a nephew had appeared in Court on 27-1-1966 and informed the Court of the death, which the Court treated as evidence that the family was acting with diligence in prosecuting their interests.
  • The Court stressed that judicial procedure does not contemplate proceeding against minors without securing proper representation; if a guardian neglects a minor's interest in civil proceedings, the Court should normally appoint a guardian. The Rent Controller did not take steps to secure such representation before proceeding ex parte.
  • The Court observed that the landlords had not made any statement explaining why the petitioners' application for restoration should be refused, a factor that should have been considered before rejecting restoration without inquiry.

On these grounds, the Court concluded that the orders of both Rent Control authorities were vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. The Court further held that remanding for inquiry would not serve useful purpose and that justice required immediate setting aside of the ex parte order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's core rulings were:

The ex parte order granting permission to terminate the tenancy passed on 28-2-1966 is set aside.

The order in appeal (the appellate authority's order) is also set aside.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controller on 30th March, 1969; that date is fixed only for appearance and the proceedings shall be continued from the stage at which they stood (by giving an opportunity for the petitioners to lead evidence).
  • The writ petition is allowed and the petitioners are awarded their costs from the respondents. The records are to be sent back immediately.
  • The Court also ordered that no remand was required for inquiry; it directly set aside the impugned orders and restored the matter for prosecution with opportunity to the petitioners to adduce evidence.

Broader implication: The opinion reaffirms that Rent Control authorities in this State are bound by the Division Bench decision reported at 1962 Nag LJ 180 (AIR 1963 Bom 233) which recognizes the duty to restore matters dismissed or proceeded ex parte where good cause is shown. The opinion did not state that it was announcing a new legal precedent distinct from that authority; rather, it applied and enforced that binding principle in the circumstances of this case.

SSG/D.V.C

Result: Petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioners in this case under Article 227 of the Constitution are two widows of one Damjibhai and his two minor sons Liladhar and Champalal. They along with Damjibhai were occupying certain premises in Amravati town. The opponents are the landlords of those premises. They filed an application on 2-12-1964 seeking permission to terminate the tenancy of the premises under Cl. 13(3)(i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order. The proceedings seem to have protracted for a considerable time and were fixed for 27th January, 1966. It may be mentioned that both parties were represented by their counsel before the Rent Controller. On 27th January, 1966 the counsel of the opponents-landlords intimated to the Court that Damjibhai was dead. One Sureshchandra it appears, was present in Court on that date and he informed about Damjibhai's death, he being the nephew of Damjibhai. The landlords' counsel therefore wanted time to bring the legal representatives on record and case was adjourned to 2-2-1966. An application to bring on record the present petitioners was granted and they were noticed for appearance and evidence on 14-2-1966. On 14-2-1966, the petitioners were represented by an advocate who filed written statement and the case was adjourned to 23-2-1966 for evidence. On this date, neither the petitioners nor their counsel were present and as the case was fixed for evidence of the petitioners there being no appearance, the Court closed the case for orders on 28-2-1966. In other words, the Rent Controller decided to proceed ex parte against the petitioners on 28-2-1966. When none was present an order granting permission to the prejudice of the interest of the petitioners, was passed. On 28-3-1966, an application was filed on behalf of the petitioners to set aside the ex parte order dated 28-2-1966. In this application the petitioners averred in paragraph 3 that petitioners 1 and 2 were illiterate and simple ladies, that they are not accustomed to appear in public, they being of Gujrathi community and are old and that the petitioners 3 and 4 were minors below 12 years and in these circumstances they did not consider it necessary to go to their counsel on 23-2-1966 as they thought that their counsel will do the needful, but in their absence and for want of their signatures, their counsel could not do anything in the case and the Court proceeded ex parte against them all and the case was posted to 28-2-1966 and the final order was passed, Under these circumstances, the petitioners prayed that they could not present themselves in Court and the interest of minors was involved and therefore, the ex parte order should be set aside.

2. This application was vehemently opposed on behalf of the respondent-landlords as is the case even in this Court. The position seems to be founded on law relating on decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in 1953 Nag LJ (Notes) 211. It was contended that such an application for setting aside the ex parte order is not tenable under the law. This was by way of a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the landlords. I do not find any other objection on merits raised on behalf of the landlords at all.

3. The Rent Controller had fixed the case first on 24-5-1966 and again on 28-5-1966 on which the latter date arguments were heard and the case was fixed for orders. An order was passed rejecting the application on 6-6-1966. It may be noted that the Rent Controller did not consider it necessary to fix the case for making an enquiry and to allow parties to adduce evidence, at any rate, the petitioners to substantiate their application by evidence.

4. The Rent Controller rejected the application observing that the ruling cited on behalf of the landlords viz., 1953 Nag LJ (Notes) 211 was applicable on all fours and was still good law. He also observed that even on merits, the petitioners having failed to make any appearance through advocate on 23-2-1966, the reasons given by the petitioners for their absence have hardly any justification and it is nothing but a case of negligence and law could not come to help such parties who are negligent. As regards the decision of this Court reported in 1962 Nag LJ 180 : (AIR 1963 Bom 233) the Rent Controller observed that this ruling “is altogether on different point and has no bearing to the facts of the instant case.” The application having been thus rejected both on merits as well as on the ground of ten-ability, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Collector. The Resident Deputy Collector who heard and disposed of the appeal has also observed in paragraph 5 that he was not convinced that there was any good ground to interfere with the order of the Rent Controller who has given his reasons in detail. The appellate authority observed also that since final order has been passed, the appellants cannot ask for its setting aside on the ground that they could not appear on the date of hearing. The appellate authority, has observed as follows:—

“There appears to be no need to set aside the ex parte order which has not been passed by the Court behind the back of the parties…………”

5. The petitioners challenged these orders in this writ petition.

6. in my opinion, the Rent Control authorities have entirely missed to appreciate the principle on which this Court held that an application dismissed in default was liable to be inquired into and registered if the Rent Control authority was satisfied that there was good cause for non-appearance. As pointed out by the Division Bench of this Court by which I am bound, the jurisdiction to dismiss an application for default of appearance or to proceed ex parte against a party who fails to enter appearance is implicit in the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the claims made before it by the parties in proceedings under the Rent Control Order. This jurisdiction is not traceable to its inherent powers but is implicit in the power to decide the case itself. If there is a power to dismiss an application for non-appearance of the applicant, it hardly needs any emphasis to point out that there is a co-ordinate power to proceed ex parte against a party who fails to appear, but this power to dismiss in default or to proceed ex parte also implies equally a duty to restore an application dismissed for default or to set aside ex parte order if the defaulting party satisfies the authority that there was good cause for non-appearance. This right and this duty is a sine qua non of judicial procedure. The authorities under the Rent Control Act are quasi judicial tribunals adjudicating upon civil rights of parties and this is a necessary rule of procedure that power should vest during the proceedings of the tribunal either to dismiss in default of appearance of party or to proceed ex parte against a defaulting party. I therefore, do not see how the Rent Controller could have failed to notice that he was bound by the decision of this Court reported in 1962 Nag LJ 180 and apply the principle to the case before him. There is undoubtedly a decision taking a contrary view in Nagpur High Court but the Rent Control authorities in this State are bound by the decision of the High Court in this State.

7. There are two other glaring lacunae in the order of the authorities of which little notice seems to have been taken. It will be seen that the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority purport to reject the application of the petitioners for setting aside the ex parte order on merits without giving any opportunity to the petitioners either to lead evidence or to place facts or material before the Court to show that there was a case for restoration. First two petitioners are ladies and they have stated in their application that they belong to Gujrathi community, and ladies in their community and particularly, petitioners 1 and 2 themselves do not appear in public. There is hardly any reason not to accept this statement. The other two petitioners are minors; probably their minority had been completely lost sight of by both the authorities. Judicial procedure does not contemplate proceedings against a minor litigant without securing his proper representation before the Court. If a guardian of a minor neglects the minor's interest by failure to appear, normally in Civil Court a guardian is required to be appointed for the purpose of the litigation by the Court. In my opinion, the same procedure must be followed in all judicial proceedings. I do not, therefore, see how some of the non-applicants before him being minors, the Rent Control authority could proceed ex parte against them without taking necessary steps to secure representation of the minors in any case. It will also be seen, that the fact that the contesting landlords had not made any statement regarding the grounds on which the petitioners claimed restoration and explained the reason for having allowed the proceedings to proceed ex parte against them, ought to be taken in consideration to find out what circumstances must have prevailed when the order came to be passed against the petitioners. Damaji had died only a few weeks back and his two widows and two minor children were brought on record as the non-applicants. They had engaged a lawyer. It does not appear from the record that they were negligent. On the date of hearing fixed immediately after the death of Damaji i.e on 27-1-1966, his nephew was actually present in Court and informed the Court that Damaji was dead. This conduct of one of the relations of the petitioners could certainly be relied upon to prove that the petitioners were trying to be as diligent as was possible in prosecuting the case. It is seriously suggested that there was nothing to prevent the two adult women to find out what the next date or what was required to be done. This appears to be a counsel of perfection. The two women who recently lost their husband may not find it easy to go out of the house according to the custom. It does not appear, there is any other elderly man in the family, the two minor children being under 12 years of age. Thus, the circumstances on record should have appeared patent enough to persuade the Rent Control authorities to take a reasonable view of the matter before rejecting the application for restoration either on the ground of tenability which view of the law is not supportable or on merits and that too without any inquiry or opportunity being given to the petitioners to substantiate their claim.

8. in my opinion, the orders of both the authorities under the Rent Control Order are vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. In my opinion, no useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter for making an enquiry in the case, and the interest of justice requires that the ex parte order granting permission to terminate the tenancy passed on 28-2-1966 should be set aside and accordingly it is set aside. The order in anneal is also set aside. The parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controller on 30th March, 1969 and the proceedings shall be continued for the stage at which they were viz., by giving an opportunity for leading evidence to the petitioners 30th of March 1969 is a date fixed only for appearance. The result is, the petition is allowed. As the petition was opposed, the petitioners are entitled to their costs from the respondents. The records be sent back immediately.

SSG/D.V.C

9. Petition allowed.