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Farbwerke Hoechst Ak... v. Unichem Laboratories

Bombay High Court
Jul 11, 1968
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Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was filed under s. 29 of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911 by the plaintiffs, who are the legal owners of Indian Patent No. 58716. The patent relates to the manufacture of new sulphonyl-ureas, including Tolbutamide, an anti-diabetic drug marketed under the trademark “Rastinon.” The plaintiffs alleged that defendants Nos. 1 and 3 infringed this patent by manufacturing and selling Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide using the invention claimed in Claims 1 and 11 of the patent.

Defendants No. 1 admitted manufacturing and selling the tablets but claimed to use a different patented process (patent No. 64323 held by defendants No. 2). Defendants No. 2 were later joined in the suit but no relief was claimed against them. Defendants No. 3 succeeded defendants No. 1 in business and were joined as party-defendants. The plaintiffs sought injunctions, damages or an account of profits, and orders for delivery up and destruction of infringing goods against defendants Nos. 1 and 3.

The defendants denied infringement and challenged the validity of the plaintiffs' patent on grounds including insufficiency of description, lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and want of utility. They also pleaded acquiescence, estoppel, and delay as defenses. Issues were framed covering infringement, validity, and these defenses.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the manufacture of Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide by defendants Nos. 1 and 3 was carried out by using the processes mentioned in the plaintiffs' patent No. 58716.
  2. Whether defendants Nos. 1 and 3 have been infringing the plaintiffs' patent No. 58716.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs' patent No. 58716 is invalid and liable to be revoked on grounds of insufficiency of description, lack of novelty, want of inventive step, and lack of utility.
  4. Whether there has been acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs regarding the manufacture of Uni-Tolbid tablets and Tolbutamide by defendants Nos. 1 and 3.
  5. Whether the plaintiffs are precluded or estopped from complaining of infringement.
  6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief for injunction and damages or an account of profits, considering their conduct.
  7. What relief, if any, the plaintiffs are entitled to.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs claimed infringement of claims 1 and 11 of their patent by the defendants' manufacture and sale of Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide.
  • They argued that mere delay in filing suit does not bar relief unless there is prejudice to defendants, relying on authorities such as Van der Lely (C.) N.V v. Bamfords Ltd. and Proctor v. Bennis.
  • The plaintiffs contended that their patent specification sufficiently described the invention and that the compounds claimed had the promised blood sugar lowering properties without the undesirable side effects of sulphonamides.
  • They relied on expert evidence and documentary proof of systematic research establishing the utility of the compounds covered by the patent.
  • The plaintiffs distinguished the Canadian case cited by defendants on the basis of evidence of utility and research in the present case.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendants No. 1 denied infringement, asserting that they used a different patented process (patent No. 64323) licensed from defendants No. 2.
  • They challenged the validity of the plaintiffs' patent on grounds of insufficiency of description, lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and want of utility.
  • They pleaded acquiescence, estoppel, and delay, claiming the plaintiffs failed to take timely action.
  • Defendants relied heavily on the Canadian Supreme Court decision invalidating a similar patent on the basis that the claims covered a limitless class of compounds not all proven to have utility.
  • They argued that the plaintiffs' patent made an unproven promise of safety and utility which was not established by evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Van der Lely (C.) N.V v. Bamfords Ltd. [1964] R.P.C 54 Delay (laches) does not bar a perpetual injunction unless there is more than mere delay causing prejudice. Used to reject defendants’ plea of delay, acquiescence, and estoppel as disentitling plaintiffs to relief.
Proctor v. Bennis 1887 4 R.P.C 333 Acquiescence requires proof that plaintiff knowingly allowed infringement and meant to assert rights. Supported the court's reasoning that mere delay is insufficient to bar relief without prejudice to defendants.
Vidal Byes Syndicate Ld. v. Levinstein Ld. 1912 29 R.P.C 245 Patentee need not immediately stop infringement; longer interval requires careful scrutiny. Reinforced the court’s approach to delay and acquiescence defenses.
Electrolux Ld. v. Electrix Ld. 1953 71 R.P.C 23 Defendants cannot assume consent due to plaintiff’s delay without proper inquiry. Used to emphasize that defendants bore risk of assuming acquiescence.
Lallubhai Chakubhai Jariwalla v. Chimanlal Chunilal & Co. 1935 37 Bom. L.R 665 Infringement is a mixed question of law and fact. Guided the court’s approach to framing and answering issues of infringement and validity.
Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Company Ld. v. New Incandescent (Sunlight Patent) Gas Lighting Company Ld. 1900 17 R.P.C 237 Utility required for patent is minimal; invention need only give the public a useful choice. Applied to hold that the plaintiffs’ patent was not invalid for want of utility.
Canadian Supreme Court (1966) S.C.R 189 and Exchequer Court of Canada (1965) 1 Ex. C.R 710 Patent invalid if it claims a limitless class of compounds without proof of utility for all. Court declined to follow the Exchequer Court’s overly broad invalidation, but accepted the principle of unexpected utility test.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the issues systematically, beginning with the defenses of acquiescence, estoppel, and delay. It held that mere delay by the plaintiffs in filing suit did not disentitle them to relief absent evidence of prejudice to the defendants. The court found no such evidence and answered these issues in favor of the plaintiffs.

On infringement, the court noted that although the plaintiffs bore the onus of proving infringement, the defendants bore the burden of proving the process used to manufacture Tolbutamide, a fact especially within their knowledge under s. 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Since the defendants did not lead evidence on the process, the court drew a presumption against them. The court accepted that the infringement alleged related specifically to claims 1 and 11 of the patent and found these claims infringed.

Regarding validity, the court analyzed each ground raised by the defendants:

  • Insufficiency of description: The court held the patent specification sufficiently described embodiments of the invention enabling skilled persons to carry it into effect without undue difficulty.
  • Lack of novelty and inventive step: The court rejected these grounds, finding the invention involved a new class of compounds with unexpected blood sugar lowering properties.
  • Want of utility: The court applied established principles that only a minimal level of utility is required and that the invention must give the public a useful choice. The court found the plaintiffs’ patent promised blood sugar lowering properties and avoidance of sulphonamide side effects, which was supported by evidence. The defendants failed to disprove utility or show any compound within the patent lacked the promised properties.

The court distinguished and declined to follow the Canadian Exchequer Court decision that invalidated a similar patent on the basis of the large number of untested compounds, emphasizing that extensive research and expert evidence in the present case supported the patent’s validity. The court accepted the principle of unexpected utility as a valid test but found it satisfied here.

The court also noted that the Indian Patent Office’s practice of treating chemical patents differently based on a now-repealed English provision was unwarranted and that chemical patents should be treated like other patents under Indian law.

Finally, the court found no proved failure to produce the promised results and rejected all grounds for revocation, answering issue No. 3 in favor of the plaintiffs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that defendants Nos. 1 and 3 infringed plaintiffs’ patent No. 58716, and that the patent was valid and not liable to be revoked on any pleaded grounds.

The plaintiffs were entitled to relief by way of injunction and an order for delivery up and destruction of infringing articles. The claims for damages and account of profits were not pressed and thus not granted. The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of the suit.

The court certified under s. 32 of the Patents and Designs Act that the validity of the patent was in question and directed a copy of the judgment be sent to the Controller of Patents and Designs under s. 33.

This decision directly affects the parties by granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief and costs but does not establish new legal precedent beyond the application of established principles to the facts of the case.

Show all summary ...

Vimadalal, J.:— This is a suit for infringement of patent under s. 29 of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, filed by the plaintiffs who are the legal owners and proprietors of Indian Patent No. 58716 in respect of the manufacture of new sulphonyl-ureas, salts of those compounds and of anti-diabetic preparations containing such compounds. The application for the said patent was made by the plaintiffs on October 23, 1956 and was accepted on November 7, 1957, but the same took effect from May 8, 1956 by reason of the provisions of s. 78A of the Patents and Designs Act. One of the chemical compounds comprised in the said patent is Tolbutamide, and since 1957 the plaintiffs have been marketing the same as an anti-diabetic drug in India and all over the world under the trade mark “Rastinon”. The suit was originally filed only against the present defendants No. 1 who, according to the plaintiffs, have since May 1961 wrongfully and with full knowledge of the Plaintiffs' said patent No. 58716 infringed the said patent by manufacturing, preparing and selling Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide manufactured in accordance with and by the use of the invention disclosed in the Plaintiffs' said patent “and claimed in Claims 1 and 11” thereof. Defendants No. 1 admit having manufactured or sold the said tablets under the name Uni-Tolbid or Tolbutamide but claim that the said tablets had been manufactured by the application of the processes mentioned in another patent, being patent No. 64323 held by the Haffkine Institute of Bombay which is owned by the present defendants No. 2 State, under a licence granted to them by defendants No. 2 for the manufacture and sale thereof. Defendants No. 2 have, by an order dated February 6, 1967, been made party-defendants to this suit on their own application at their own costs throughout, but it may be mentioned that no relief has been claimed against them in the present suit by way of amendment of the plaint after their joinder. It appears that the business of defendants No. 1 has, since the filing of the present suit, been acquired and taken over as a going concern by defendants No. 3 being a company which was registered under the Companies Act on August 22, 1962, and defendants No. 3 have been manufacturing and selling Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide ever since then as successors to defendants No. 1. Defendants No. 3 were, therefore, joined as party-defendants to this suit by an order dated January 9, 1968, and by the amendments effected pursuant to the said order, the plaintiffs have claimed against defendants No. 3 also the same substantive reliefs which they had claimed against defendants No. 1 in the suit as orignially filed. The reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs in the present suit against defendants Nos. 1 and 3 are, an injunction restraining them from infringing the Plaintiffs' said patent No. 58716, an order for payment of a sum of Rs. 7,000 as and by way of damages, or in the alternative, an order for an account of the profits made by defendants Nos. 1 and 3 from the sale of the infringing goods and for payment of the same to the plaintiffs, and also for an order to deliver up to the plaintiffs for destruction all articles in the possession of defendants Nos. 1 and 3 made in infringement of the Plaintiffs' said patent.

2. On merits, the defence of defendants No. 1 as disclosed by their Written Statement falls into two parts. First, that there is no infringement of the Plaintiffs' said patent as they have not manufactured and prepared Uni-Tolbid tablets in accordance with or by the use of the invention disclosed in the Plaintiffs' said patent, but have manufactured the compound Tolbutamide in accordance with a different process described in defendants No. 2's patent No. 64323 for the preparation of substituted benzenesulphonylureas from the corresponding substituted benzenesulphonylthioureas by desulphurisation with hydrogen peroxide; secondly that the Plaintiffs' said patent No. 58716 is invalid and is liable to be revoked on the grounds of insufficiency of description, lack of novelty, want of inventive step and lack of utility, grounds which the defendants would, under s. 29(2) read with s. 26 of the Patents and Designs Act, be entitled to urge by way of defence to a suit for infringement like the present one. In addition to these two defences on the merits, defendants No. 1 have pleaded the defences of acquiescence, estoppel and delay disentitling the plaintiffs to any relief, by reason of the failure of the plaintiffs to take action till April 4, 1962 when the present suit was filed. Defendants No. 3 who, as I have already stated earlier, are successors to the business of defendants No. 1, have by their Written Statement adopted defendants No. 1's Written Statement. Defendants No. 2 have filed a separate and detailed Written Statement in answer to the Plaintiffs' suit, but they have also, in substance, adopted the same defences as are to be found in the Written Statement of defendants No. 1. On these pleadings, the following issues were framed by me:

1. Whether the manufacture of Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide by defendants Nos. 1 and 3 is carried out by using the processes mentioned in the Plaintiffs' patent No. 58716 as alleged in para 6 of the plaint.

2. Whether defendants Nos. 1 and 3 have been infringing and are infringing the Plaintiffs' said patent No. 58716 as alleged in para 8 of the plaint

3. Whether the Plaintiffs' said patent No. 58716 is invalid and is liable to be revoked on the grounds stated in paras 5 and 6 of the Written Statement of defendant No. 1 and paras 7 and 8 of the Written Statement of the second defendant.

4. Whether there has been acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs in respect of the manufacture of Uni-Tolbid tablets and Tolbutamide by defendants Nos. 1 and 3 as alleged in para 7 of the Written Statement of defendant No. 1, and para 9 of the Written Statement of defendant No. 2.

5. Whether the plaintiffs are precluded and/or estopped from complaining of the infringement, if any, of the said patent No. 58716 as alleged in para 7 of the Written Statement of defendant No. 1, and para 9 of the Written Statement of defendant No. 2.

6. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief for injunction and damages or an account of profits in the facts and circumstances and having regard to the Plaintiffs' conduct set out in para 7 of the Written Statement of defendant No. 1.

7. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled?

3. After evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs had been led and the Plaintiffs' case closed by Mr. Blanco White, while opening the case of the defendants, Mr. Mistree stated that he proposed to examine three or four witnesses. After the examination of his first witness Dr. Krishnamurthi Ganapathi was concluded, Mr. Mistree, however, suddenly decided upon a change of strategy and closed his client's case, probably because he realized that his trump card had not yielded a trick. At the very commencement of his address, Mr. Mistree then stated that he accepted the evidence of Dr. Aumuller and Dr. Bander, and did not quarrel with the evidence of Dr. Lingnau. Mr. Mistree conceded that the evidence of Dr. Krishnamurthi Ganapathi who was examined as an expert by him on behalf of the defendants did not carry his client's case any further. When Mr. Mistree resumed his address on the next day, however, he did try to defend, to some extent, the evidence led by Dr. Krishnamurthi Ganapathi. The evidence of Dr. Krishnamurthi Ganapathi being of no assistance to the defence, as Mr. Mistree has himself conceded, I do not propose to deal with the same in the course of this judgment. I am, however, constrained to say that Dr. Krishnamurthi Ganapathi's evidence did not impress me at all. The record of his evidence on paper, does not perhaps convey the halting and shaky manner in which he gave that evidence. In contrast with the evidence of Dr. Krishnamurthi Ganapathi, it may be stated that. I was considerably impressed by the cogent and confident as well as frank manner in which Dr. Aumuller and Dr. Bander gave evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, and indeed, Mr. Mistree was unable to shake the evidence of either of those witnesses in the course of cross-examination. With these general observations, I will now proceed to deal with the issues framed by me.

4. Before dealing with the questions that arise in the present suit on the merits, it would be convenient to dispose of issues Nos. 4, 5 and 6 relating to acquiescence, estoppel and delay. It may be mentioned that according to the defendants the delay in the present case is a delay of about two years after the Plaintiffs' letter dated March 7, 1960 to defendants No. 1, the present suit having been filed on April 4, 1962. According to the plaintiffs, however, they could not be expeeted to take any action till they came to know in or about May 1961 that defendants No. 1 had placed on the market goods manufactured in infringement of their patent, as recorded in their attorney's letter dated May 31, 1961. Mr. Blanco White for the plaintiffs argued that mere delay is no bar, except to relief by way of interlocutory injunction, and that in order to disentitle the plaintiffs to a perpetual injunction at the hearing of an infringement action, there must be something more than mere delay. Quoting from the judgment of Harman L.J in the case of Van der Lely (C.) N.V v. Bamfords Ltd. . [1964] R.P.C 54, at p. 81. it is stated in Terrell on the Law of Patents, (11th edn.), p. 363, para 940,

“…laches, while a bar to the obtaining of an interlocutory order, would not bar the right to a perpetual injunction as ‘there must be more than mere delay to disentitle a man to his legal rights’.”

5. In support of his argument Mr. Blanco White has relied on the observation in the case of Proctor v. Bennis . 1887 4 R.P.C 333.. Cotton L.J negativing the plea of laches stated in his judgment in the said case (at pp. 355-356) that the Court does not interfere on interlocutory injunction unless the plaintiff has been prompt, but there was no question of interlocutory injunction in the case before him which was at the stage of the hearing of the action. Bowen L.J in the course of his judgment in the same case (at p. 358) observed that in order to make out acquiescence which precluded the plaintiff from raising the question of the validity of the patent and the question of infringement of it by the defendants, it was necessary that the defendants should establish that the plaintiff stood by and knowingly allowed the defendants to proceed and expend money in ignorance of the fact that he had rights, and meant to assert such rights. In the case of Vidal Byes Syndicate Ld. v. Levinstein Ld. . 1912 29 R.P.C 245. which was also cited by Mr. Blanco White, it has been stated by Fletcher Moulton L.J in the judgment (at p. 259) to be settled law that a patentee need not attempt to stop an infringement when he first learns of it, but the greater the interval between the granting of the patent and the trial of the action, the more carefully must the evidence be looked into lest the Court be induced to take an erroneous view, either on the one side or the other, of the knowledge of the world at the critical date. In the later case Electrolux Ld. v. Electrix Ld. . 1953 71 R.P.C 23. Jenkins L.J, dealing with the question of delay, observed (at p. 40) that the defendants were not entitled to assume that the plaintiffs accorded them their consent to the infringement merely because the plaintiffs, knowing of the defendant's use of “Electrix”, did nothing to enforce their right, and that if the defendants adopted the said mark on that assumption and without proper inquiry, they did so at their own risk. The position, therefore, is that mere delay is no bar to the granting of relief by way of perpetual injunction at the hearing of the suit, unless there is something more than mere delay which has caused prejudice to the defendants. There is no averment to that effect in the pleadings in the present suit, and certainly no evidence whatsoever to prove that the defendants were prejudiced in any manner by the alleged inaction of the plaintiffs over a considerable period of time. That is the position in regard to the plea of acquiescence as well as estoppel, and delay as a factor disentitling the plaintiffs to relief. Issues Nos. 4, 5 and 6 must, therefore, be answered in favour of the plaintiffs.

6. As stated by B.J Wadia, J. in the case of Lallubhai Chakubhai Jariwalla…(Plaintiff) v. Chimanlal Chunilal & Co.…(Defendant)* . 1935 37 Bom. L.R 665, at p. 668., the question of infringement is a mixed question of law and fact. Section 3(3) of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, lays down that an application for a patent must contain a declaration to the effect that the applicant is in possession of an “invention”. Section 2(8) of that Act defines “invention” as meaning any manner of manufacture and as including an improvement. Section 2(10) of the said Act defines the term “manufacture” as including any art. process or manner of producing, preparing or making an article, and also any article prepared or produced by manufacture. Section 26 of the Act lays down the grounds on which a patent can be revoked. Section 29(1) provides that a patentee can file a suit in the nature of an infringement action against any person who, during the continuance of the patent, makes, sells or uses the invention without his licence, or counterfeits it, or imitates it. sub-section (2) of that section further provides that every ground on which a patent may be revoked under s. 26 would be available by way of defence to a suit for infringement. Section 30 of the said Act lays down that no damages can be recovered in respect of the infringement of a patent if the defendant proves that at the date of the infringement he was not aware, or had no reasonable means of making himself aware, of the existence of the patent. Section 78A enacts that by virtue of a certain reciprocal arrangement with the United Kingdom, any person who has applied for protection for any invention in the United Kingdom would be entitled to claim that the patent which may be granted to him under the Indian Patents and Designs Act for the said invention should be in priority to other applicants and should have the same date as the date of the application in the United Kingdom.

7. Turning to the first three issues which embody the questions in controversy between the parties on the merits of the present case, it may be stated that issues Nos. 1 and 2 relate to the subject of infringement, whilst issue No. 3 relates to the question of the validity of the plaintiffs patent No. 58716. I will proceed to deal first with the question of infringement which is the subject-matter of issues Nos. 1 and 2. It was contended by Mr. Mistree for the defendants that the plaintiffs have led no evidence on issue No. 1 and they must, therefore, fail on that issue, as well as on issue No. 2 which is consequential thereto. Mr. Mistree's contention was that there is nothing in the evidence on record to show that the manufacture of Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide by defendants Nos. 1 and 3 was carried out by using the processes mentioned in the plaintiff's patent No. 58716 and the plaintiffs have, therefore, not proved the alleged infringement of the said patent by defendants Nos. 1 and 3, the onus in regard to which lay on the plaintiffs. It is true that, as stated by Halsbury, (3rd edn.) Vol. 29, p. 106 para 218, the onus as to infringement lies on the plaintiff. In the Canadian Patent Act there is a specific statutory provision viz., s. 41(2), which lays down that in an action for infringement where the invention relates to the production of a new substance, any substance of the same chemical composition and constitution shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been produced by the patented process of which it is alleged to be an infringement. Though there is no corresponding provision in the Indian Patents and Designs Act, I see no reason why a presumption to the same effect should not be drawn by me against the defendants in the present case under the general provisions contained in s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, since it is admitted by the defendants that it is the very drug Tolbutamide, in respect of which the plaintiffs have obtained their patent No. 58716, that they have prepared and sold. Moreover, though the general burden of establishing the case of infringement undoubtedly rests on the plaintiffs as laid down in the statement from Halsbury mentioned above which is in accordance with s. 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proving a particular fact viz., the process by which Tolbutamide is being prepared by the defendants would be on the defendants, since that is a fact “especially” within their knowledge within the terms of s. 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is impossible for the plaintiffs to know by what precise process Tolbutamide is being prepared by the defendants and it is precisely to that sort of a case that s. 106 is intended to apply. The defendants have not led any evidence whatsoever in regard to the same. That, however, is not all. The first question that arises is, what is the infringement complained of by the plaintiffs in the present suit. In the opening sentence of para 4 of the plaint it is no doubt stated in very wide terms that defendants No. 1 have infringed the Plaintiffs' said patent No. 58716. That averment is not limited to the infringement of any particular claim or claims in the Plaintiffs' said patent. In the following sentence of the said paragraph, however, it is stated that defendants No. 1 have manufactured, prepared and sold Uni-Tolbid tablets or Tolbutamide manufactured in accordance with or by the use of the invention disclosed in the complete specification of the Plaintiffs' said patent “and claimed in claims 1 and 11.” It is not necessary for me to decide on a construction of the said paragraph of the plaint whether the latter everment should be read as restricting the general averment with which the said paragraph opens, as contended by Mr. Mistree for the defendants, in view of the fact that Mr. Blanco White has conceded that, on the suit as framed, the infringement that has been complained of is infringement only of claims Nos. 1 and 11 of the Plaintiffs' said patent No. 58716. Counsel on both sides have argued this case throughout on that footing, and I must, therefore, proceed to deal with the same on the basis that the infringement complained of is infringement only of claims Nos. 1 and 11 of the Plaintiffs' said patent.

8. As stated in Halsbury (3rd edn.) Vol. 29, p. 6, para 8, a complete specification customarily begins, after the title, with a general preamble stating the subject to which the invention relates, followed by a detailed description of one or more embodiments of the inventions. The whole of that is known as the body of the specification. It is further stated in the said paragraph of Halsbury that the specification ends with the claims, delimiting the monopoly granted by the patent, and since they define the monopoly, they must, in the event of legal proceedings, be scrutinised with as much care as any other document defining a legal right, and require to be as carefully drawn. It is stated in another passage in Halsbury (3rd edn.) Vol. 29, p. 10, paras 16 and 17, that the specification is to be read as a whole, and that the body of the specification should be read first. The claims must, however, be read as ordinary English sentences without incorporating into them extracts from the body of the specification, or changing their meaning by reference to the language used in the body of the specification, though the body of the specification should be referred to for the purpose of resolving difficulties of construction occasioned by the claims when read by themselves. It is, therefore, clear that in an infringement action the main function of the Court is to construe the claims which are alleged to have been infringed, without reference to the body of the specification, and to refer to the body of the specification only if there is any ambiguity or difficulty in the construction of the claims in question.

9. [His Lordship, after holding that Claim No. 11 and Claim No. 1 were infringed by the defendants, answered issues Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs.]

10. That leaves for consideration only the question of the validity of the Plaintiffs' patent which has been challenged by the defendants by way of defence to the Plaintiffs' suit under s. 29(2) of the Indian Patents and Designs Act. That is the main question that arises for decision in the present suit and it will, therefore, be necessary for me to deal with it in all its aspects. The grounds on which the validity of the Plaintiffs' patent is sought to be impeached by way of defence in this suit are to be found in paras 5 and 6 of defendants No. 1's Written Statement, read along with the particulars in respect thereof set out in an annexture to the plaint which is marked “No. 2”. It will be convenient to deal with them one by one.

11. [His Lordship, after referring to the relevant paragraphs of the Written Statement, proceeded.]

12. From what is discussed in the preceding paragraph it will, therefore, be clear that the main heads of the alleged invalidity of the Plaintiffs' patent on which the defendants rely by way of defence are four viz., (1) insufficiency of description; (2) want of novelty; (3) no inventive step and (4) want of utility. It may be stated that the onus in regard to all objections to validity lies on the defendant [Halsbury, (3rd edn.) Vol. 29, p. 106, para 218]. I shall now proceed to deal with each of these grounds.

13. Dealing first with the ground of insufficiency of description it is stated in Halsbury, (3rd edn.) Vol. 29, p. 64, para 131 that the claim need only be as clear as the subject admits, and that a patentee need not so simplify his claim as to make it easy for infringers to evade it. It is further stated in that passage in Halsbury that the patentee's duty is not to prevent all possible argument as to whether there is or is not infringement in particular cases, but to enable the Court to formulate the questions of fact to be answered. It is further stated in the same volume of Halsbury (p. 66, para 138) that insufficiency of description has two branches, (1) the complete specification must describe “an embodiment” of the invention claimed in each of the claims, and that the description must be sufficient to enable those in the industry concerned to carry it into effect “without their making further inventions”; and (2) that the description must be fair i.e it must not be unnecessarily difficult to follow. Turning first to claim No. 11 in the present case in the light of these principles, the reference in the body of the specification to “a conventional manner” of eliminating sulphur cannot really create any difficulty, and it is in fact unnecessary to import this from the body of the specification into claim No. 11 in view of the fact that claim No. 11 is unambiguous and clear in terms, being wide enough to include all methods of eliminating sulphur. As stated earlier in this judgment, it is permissible to refer to the body of the specification only when there is some difficulty or ambiguity in the construction of a claim as it stands. In any event, hydrogen peroxide as a desulphurising agent would be an obvious chemical equivalent of heavy metal oxides or a salt thereof in an aqueous or alcoholic solution which are also used for desulphurising in “a conventional manner”. Moreover, the secret or discovery essential to the validity of the Plaintiffs' invention as claimed and forming the very basis of it is not the method, but is the previously undiscovered fact of a new class of chemical compounds having hitherto unsuspected blood sugar lowering properties, twenty-one methods of synthesis of sulphonylureas being already known at the material time as is apparent from p. 27 of Kurzer's article on sulphonylureas and sulphonylthioureas in Vol. 50 of the Chemical Review (exh. 1). There is no evidence led by the defendants to show that the statement in the body of the specification that the synthesis of the desired sulphonylurea may be obtained by eliminating sulphur with a heavy metal oxide or a salt thereof in an aqueous or a alcoholic solution would present any difficulty. The specification and claims are addressed to those with a high degree of knowledge of the field of science to which they relate, particularly when they relate to chemistry and allied subjects. It is not necessary to describe processes in the claims to a specification when they are part of the common knowledge available to those skilled in the science who can, after reading them, refer to the technical literature on the subject for the purpose of carrying them into effect. “An embodiment” of the invention is, therefore, in my opinion, sufficiently described in the Plaintiffs' patent and that description is not unnecessarily difficult to follow, it being sufficient to enable the invention to be carried into effect “without…making further inventions.” As far as claim No. 1 is concerned, there are as many as forty examples of it in the specification (exh. A) and there would, therefore, be no difficulty in carrying the same into effect. The ground of insufficiency of description alleged by the defendants must, therefore, fail.

14. [His Lordship, after dealing with grounds Nos. 2 and 3 and finding in favour of the plaintiffs, proceeded.]

15. That brings me to the most important part of the present case and that is the objection to the validity of the Plaintiffs' patent on the ground of want of utility, which would also cover the other objection, already referred to by me, based on the ground that the methods of manufacture comprised in the Plaintiffs' patent are old, an objection which also rests in the ultimate analysis, on the decision in regard to the question of utility. The first question that arises in regard to the subject of the utility of the Plaintiffs' patent is what is the quantum of utility required to support a patent. Reference may be made in that connection to the statement in Patents for Inventions by T.A Blanco White (the learned counsel appearing’ for the plaintiffs in the present case), 3rd edn., at pp. 152-153 to the effect that in the absence of any promise in the specification that a definite degree of advantage would result from the use of the invention, the amount of utility required to support a patent is very small. It is further stated in the said passage that it is, in particular, not necessary that the invention as described should be commercially useful, unless the specification promises that it would be, and that it is sufficient that invention should, by reason of the features that distinguish it from earlier proposals, be of some use to the public. It is further stated that it is not necessary that a new result should be obtained by using the invention, and that the test is whether the new method “gives the public a useful choice.” In support of that proposition, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied on the decision in the case of Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Company, Ld. v. New Incandescent (Sunlight Patent) Gas Lighting Company, Ld. . 1900 17 R.P.C 237. in which the patent in question was for a gas light mantle, which though stronger than the gas light mantles under the earlier patent, shed less candle power of light than those mantles. It was subsequently discovered that while the patented light had low illuminating power, a small proportion of another chemical substance added to it gave very great improvement in candle power. It was contended on behalf of the defendants to the said action for infringement that since the illuminating methods produced under the patent would give less light, it was not an improvement at all on the mantles prepared under the earlier patent, but was a falling off from it. It was observed in the judgment in the said case (at p. 251) that there were two answers to the objection raised by the defendants. The first was that the patent in question did not claim to be an improvement on the earlier patent but to give a “useful choice”; and the second was that if the matter had to be decided by the value of the mantle as an illuminating appliance alone the contention might be well-founded, but there were advantages other than brilliancy and the new discovery produced illuminating substances which had other qualities, viz. rigidity, flexibility or durability. Judged by these tests, the position is that the Plaintiffs' patent in the present case cannot be attacked on the ground of want of utility, since it certainly gives a “useful choice” in the matter of compounds with a blood sugar lowering property which was not known till then, unless by the specification (exh. A) a higher degree of utility was promised by the plaintiffs. In the course of the evidence led before me, the defendants have not been able to point out a single compound which would fall within the patent, but which did not have blood sugar lowering property, and all that they were able to point out was that some of those compounds were weaker than others, a point which is of no relevance for the purpose of the present case. I must, therefore, proceed to consider, what is the utility promised in the specification (exh. A) for the compounds falling within it? A careful scrutiny of the specification (exh. A) shows that all that is promised therein is, (1) that all the compounds falling within the Plaintiffs' patent would lower the blood sugar and (2) that they are not sulphonamides and avoid the difficulty of the administration of sulphonamides, viz. the causing of allergy as well as their bacterio-static activity. As far as their toxicity is concerned, what is stated in the specification (exh. A) is that their acute toxicity (tested on mice or rats) was as set out in Table No. Ill appended thereto. Mr. Blanco White has submitted that there is no statement contained in the specification (exh. A) by way of promise that any of the compounds falling within the patent is safe for human beings. It is no doubt stated in the said specification that the compounds of the invention are “usually extremely well-tolerated”, and that extensive clinical tests performed on numerous patients had demonstrated good tolerance of the compounds. It is common ground that the expression “well tolerated” means that it had no strong side effects. It was sought to he contended by Mr. Mistree for the defendants that it was, therefore, claimed in the specification (exh. A) that all compounds falling within the patent had no toxic effect, which would be one of the side effects to be guarded against. Mr. Mistree has contended that he has established by the evidence of Dr. Bander that it could not be predicted whether a particular sulphonylurea falling within the patent would be safe to administer to a human being, and that he could not predict tolerability in human beings by experimenting on animals, and the Plaintiffs' patent must, therefore, be held to be invalid on the ground of want of the utility claimed for it in the specification (exh. A). I am afraid, however, the statements in the specification on which Mr. Mistree has relied cannot be torn from their context. It is quite clear from the specification itself that extensive tests for toxicity of the compounds falling within the patent had been performed on mice or rats. The statement that extensive clinical tests performed on numerous patients had demonstrated good tolerance of those compounds, when read in the context of the earlier statement in the said specification that the said compounds are “usually” extremely well-tolerated, shows that it is intended to apply only to such of the compounds as had been subjected to clinical tests. I, therefore, hold that there is no claim in the specification (exh. A) in regard to the utility of the compounds falling within the patent which has been disproved by the evidence led in this case.

16. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Mistree for the defendants on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada reported in (1966) S.C.R 189, confirming the decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada reported in (1965) 1 Ex. C.R 710, in regard to the patent which the plaintiffs had obtained in Canada in respect of the very processes for which the plaintiffs have obtained the patent in question in this country, Tolbutamide being one of the compounds falling within both the Canadian patent as well as the patent in this country. In the action in the Exchequer Court of Canada, the plaintiffs to the present suit who were also party-plaintiffs there, had prayed for an injunction for ten patents, a printed copy of one which viz. patent No. 590201 has been tendered and marked exh. 2 in the present proceedings. The defendants to the said suit had sold throughout Canada Tolbutamide in alleged infringement of the Plaintiffs' said patents. The sale of Tolbutamide by them was admitted by the defendants, but they pleaded that claims Nos. 1 and 10 of nine of the said patents and claims Nos. 1 and 13 of patent No. 590201 were invalid for a number of reasons. If one scrutinizes in the Canadian patent No. 590201 (exh. 2), claim No. 1 therein was, as Mr. Mistree has rightly contended, a combination of claims Nos. 1 and 11 in the present case, the validity of which has been questioned before me. It was not disputed that claim No. 10 in the first nine of the Canadian patents and claim No. 13 in Canadian Patent No. 590201 (exh. 2) related to the compound Tolbutamide itself. It contained the same formula as in Fig. 6 of the specification (exh. A) in the present case, and referred to a compound of that formula whenever obtained according to claim No. 1 or the obvious chemical equivalent thereof. I do not, however, accept the contention of Mr. Blanco White that claim No. 1 in the Canadian patent is different in material respects from claim No, 1 in the present case, merely because there is no limitation in the Canadian patent in regard to carbon atoms as far as alkyl, alkoxy and halogen are concerned. It is admitted by the Plaintiffs' own witnesses in the present case that if R and R. 1 are varied simultaneously, and three different positions viz. ortho, meta and para are used in respect of each monosubstituent, the possible number of sulphonylureas that could be prepared according to claim No. 1 of the Plaintiffs' patent (exh. A) would run into millions. The whole contention of Mr. Mistree is that claim No. 1 of the Plaintiffs' patent No. 58716 is invalid because it covers millions of compounds which have not been tested in respect of their utility, and it is in support of that contention that Mr. Mistree has relied on the Canadian case. Merely because, under the Canadian patent, the permutations and combinations would run perhaps into some thousands or some millions more by reason of the absence of any limitation with regard to carbon atoms as far as alkyl, alkoxy and halogen are concerned, would make no difference in regard to the ratio of the decision in the Canadian case. In my opinion, therefore, the decision in the Canadian case cannot be distinguished on facts from the present case. Even so, I must proceed to consider whether I should follow the same, as decisions of Canadian Courts do not bind me. In the trial Court, Thurlow, J. in his judgment dealt with the question of validity of claim No. 1 of the Plaintiffs' Canadian patent. He observed (at p. 728) that there could not be an invention in a process which consists in applying a known method of reaction to a limitless class of known materials to produce an equally limitless class of expected products, when all that can properly be said of such products is that some of them have utility and others, the identity of which is not known, may have it as well, but that the infinite majority of the substances of the class have never been made or tested by anyone. He held (at p. 734) that it is highly improbable that all, or substantially all, of the members of the infinitely large class defined in claim No. 1 of the ten patents have either the blood sugar lowering activity to a useful extent or the freedom from toxicity or harmful side effects necessary to render them useful. He, therefore, came to the conclusion (at p. 734) that there was no invention as claimed in claim No. 1 of each of the said patents which was, therefore, invalid. He further held that by reason of the provisions of s. 41(1) of the Patent Act of Canada, a substance patent would be valid only if accompanied by a valid process patent, and that in view of the invalidity of claim No. 1 of each of the ten patents which contained the process patent, the substance patent in claim No. 10 in the first nine patents and claim No. 13 in patent No. 590201 must also be held to be invalid. In view of that conclusion, the learned Judge held that it was unnecessary for him to consider the issue of infringement, and he accordingly dismissed the Plaintiffs' action with costs. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from the decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada, it was held (at p. 191) that all the patents related to processes which produced new sulphonylureas by known methods from known materials, with the result that the patentability of the process depended on the possession of unexpected utility by the new substances produced, and that the unexpected utility stated in the patents was the capacity of lowering blood sugar levels which is referred to as hypoglycaemic activity. In the opinion of the Supreme Court (at p. 194), what the appellant had tried to do in claim No. 1 of each of the patents was to obtain a patent for an unproved and untested hypothesis in an uncharted field which could not be held to be valid. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial Court that the appellant had consequently overclaimed, and, in doing so, had invalidated claim No. 1 in each of the patents before them. The Supreme Court also confirmed the decision of Thurlow, J. that if claim No. 1 failed, the remaining claims in the patents in question must also fail. Mr. Blanco White has submitted that he has no quarrel with the decision of the Supreme Court, but that the decision of the Exchequer Court goes a little too far in so far as it relies merely on the possible number of compounds that would be comprised in claim No. 1. Mr. Blanco White contended that the Supreme Court of Canada had, however, not gone merely on numbers, but had proceeded to decide the case on the principle that the validity of the patents in question depended on the possession of unexpected utility by the new substances produced, and had invalidated the Plaintiffs' patents on the ground that the limitless class of compounds comprised in them remained uncharted and unexplored. Mr. Blanco White has submitted that the decision in the Canadian case is not applicable to the present case, because there is evidence in the present case of systematic exploration by way of research leading to the establishment of the Mood sugar lowering properties of all the compounds falling within the Plaintiffs' patent. That evidence consists in the present case of the oral evidence of the Plaintiffs' expert witnesses, and documentary evidence in the form of the chart (exh. B) as filled in by Dr. Anumuller, evidence which I accept as reliable. As a result of that research, the necessary limitations in regard to the carbon atoms in the radicals E and R. 1 were discovered, which in its turn led to the invention that all compounds with those limitations had blood sugar lowering properties and other compounds without those limitations did not have blood sugar lowering properties, as Dr. Bander has deposed in examination-in-chief. It is not clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada whether it has proceeded on a basis different from the ratio of the decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada, as Mr. Blanco White has submitted in the course of his argument. In any event, I do not agree with the decision of the Exchequer Court in so far as it has proceeded purely on a numerical basis and has rested its judgment merely on the fact that there would be a large number of possible compounds that could be produced by the patented process which had not been tested. In my opinion, when a process patent is obtained after prolonged and thorough research work, it may be possible to predict that the substances produced by that process would have a particular property, though it is usually impossible for anybody to test all the possible substances that could be produced by that process. As stated in Terrell on the Law of Patents (11th edn.) p. 128, para 315, it is wrong to suppose that “there is no previson in chemistry”. I accept the evidence of Dr. Bander that when several pharmacological compounds having the same characteristic structure exhibit the same pharmacological behaviour, it can be predicted that other such compounds would have the same behaviour, provided the necessary limitations in regard to radicals are observed, particularly when compounds without those limitations have also been tested and found not to have the property in question. I am afraid I am unable to agree with the decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada in the above case that merely because a process patent may embrace a very large number of compounds, all of which, or even a substantial number of which, cannot be individually tested, the patent must be held to be invalid. To take that view would, in my opinion, invalidate a large number of process patents. I, therefore, decline to follow the decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada in the above case. If the Supreme Court of Canada intended to lay down a different test viz. the test as to whether the new substances produced by that process can, after proper research, be predicted as possessing “unexpected utility” in the form of hypoglycaemic effect, I agree with that view. That test is satisfied in the present case, as held by me above.

17. I am informed that the Patent Office in this country follows the same practice as is prevalent in Canada which is based on s. 41(1) of the Canadian Patent Act mentioned above, which in its turn was based on a section in the old Patent Act in England that, as far as chemical substances intended for food or medicine are concerned, patents cannot be granted for the substance itself, except when prepared by the processes claimed or their obvious chemical equivalents. It has been stated to me that this practice of the Indian Office is based on the English practice. I am afraid, however, the Indian Patent Office has overlooked the fact that the section on which the English practice was based has since been repealed in England (vide Terrell on the Law of Patents (11th edn.) p. 20, para 53) and does not find place in the new English Patents Act of 1949, and there is no such practice now prevalent in England, and that there is no section corresponding to the old English section or to s. 41(1) of the Canadian Patent Act in the Indian Patents and Designs Act. There is, therefore, no warrant for chemical patents being treated in this country in a way different from other patents, in regard to which the patent office in this country does grant patents for substances per se. In the absence of express statutory provisions, as stated in Terrell on the Law of Patents (11th edn.) pp. 127-128, para 315, the belief that the law applicable to chemical cases is peculiar is erroneous, and the principles applicable in the case of patents for chemical processes are “precisely similar” to those applicable in the case of other patents.

18. The validity of a claim corresponding to claim No. 1 in the present case was also challenged in an infringement action brought by the present plaintiffs in Ireland where the validity of that claim was upheld by the Irish Court in a judgment delivered on November 28, 19677. It may be stated that the plaintiffs have registered a substance patent for Tolbutamide in England but their patent in Ireland is a process patent only in view of the statutory provisions in force there. In upholding the Plaintiffs' patent, it was stated by Kenny, J. in his judgment in the said Irish case,

“In my opinion, the writer of the claims in a process patent is entitled to include claims for processes which he is certain will work because of the results of other processes.”

19. I am in full agreement with that view of Kenny, J. The question which arose for decision in the Canadian case and is raised by Mr. Mistree in the present case, however, did not arise before the Court in Ireland and it is, therefore, not necessary for me to deal any further with the same. It may be mentioned that the Canadian case discussed above, though earlier in point of time, has not been considered in the judgment in the Irish case.

20. As stated by Halsbury (3rd edn.) Vol. 29, p. 59, para 123, the expression “not useful” in patent law means that the invention will not work, either in the sense that it will not operate at all or, more broadly, that it will not do what the specification promises that it will do. If the invention will give the result promised at all, the objection on the ground of want of utility must fail. It is further stated in the said passage that the practical usefulness or commercial utility of the invention does not matter, nor does it matter whether the invention is of any real benefit to the public, or particularly suitable for the purposes suggested, and that it is only failure to produce the results promised that will invalidate the patent, not misstatements as to the purposes to which such results might be applied. In Terrell on the Law of Patents, (11th edn.) p. 98, para 248, quoting from an English case, it is stated that if the patentee claims protection for a process for producing a result and that result cannot be produced by the process, the consideration fails. It is further stated there that objections to patents on such grounds are sometimes treated as objections for want of utility, and when so treated, the well-known rule is that the utility of an invention depends upon whether, following the directions of the patentee, the result which the patentee professed to produce can in fact be produced. Quoting from another English case, the same proposition is stated in another way in Terrell at p. 99, viz. that the protection is purchased by the promise of results, and that it does not, and ought not to, survive “the proved failure” of the promise to produce the results. As already stated above, the only result which the specification (exh. A) in the present case professed to produce was a new class of chemical compounds having hitherto unsuspected blood sugar lowering property, but without the undesirable side effects of the previously known sulphonamides. As also stated above, the defendants have not been able to prove that a single compound falling within the patent does not possess blood sugar lowering properties to a greater or lesser degree. The position, therefore, is that not only is there no “proved failure” to produce the results promised by the Plaintiffs' patent specification (exh. A), but there is a “proved failure” on the part of the defendants to show that compounds falling within the patent do not have the blood sugar lowering properties promised by that patent. I, therefore, hold that the objection on the ground of want of utility must fail, and with it also the objection that the methods of manufacture are old and known methods and, therefore, there is no inventive step as far as the Plaintiffs' patent No. 58716 is concerned. In the result, all the grounds on which the validity of the Plaintiffs' patent was challenged stand rejected, and issue No. 3 must be answered in favour of the plaintiffs.

21. In view of the conclusions at which I have arrived, the plaintiffs will be entitled to the normal reliefs available in an infringement action, viz., an injunction, as well as an order for the delivering up for destruction of all articles in the defendants' possession made in infringement of the Plaintiffs' patent No. 58716. The plaintiffs have, however, not led any evidence before me to prove damages, nor has any argument been addressed to me in regard to the claim for damages or the alternative claim for an account of the profits contained in prayer (c) of the plaint which must, therefore, be treated as not pressed by the plaintiffs.

22. I answer the issues as follows:—

1. In the affirmative.

2. In the affirmative.

3. Plaintiffs' patent No. 58716 is not invalid and is not liable to be revoked on any of those grounds.

4. In the negative.

5. In the negative.

6. The plaintiffs are entitled to relief by way of injunction, but the reliefs sought in prayer (c) of the plaint have not been pressed.

7. See Order below.

Order:—

23. I grant an injunction in terms of prayer (a) and pass an order in terms of prayer (d). I also order that the defendants do pay the Plaintiffs' costs of the suit.

24. Under s. 32 of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, I certify that the validity of the patent came in question in this suit. Mr. Laud states that his clients will not enforce the orders passed by me for a period of two weeks from today in order to enable the defendants to consider my judgment.

25. In accordance with s. 33 of the said Act, I direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Controller of Patents and Designs,.