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Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge v. The State Of Maharashtra

Bombay High Court
Jul 27, 1966
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Patel, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as a salesman by respondent No. 4, Nagpur Vishal Grahak Sahakari Sanstha Ltd. An audit revealed that certain amounts were not properly accounted for. Respondent No. 4 conducted an enquiry, charged the petitioner with the shortage and referred the dispute to the Deputy Registrar under s. 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.

The Assistant Registrar, acting with delegated powers under s. 3 of the Act, exercised jurisdiction under s. 91 and held that a dispute existed which required decision under the Act; he referred the matter to a nominee under s. 93. This Court had previously held that before a decision is arrived at by the Registrar under s. 91 the person affected must be given a hearing; the petitioner had not been given such a hearing. The petitioner filed a revision application to the State Government. The State Government, in view of the Court's direction, told the Registrar to hear the petitioner.

When the Assistant Registrar heard the matter again, the petitioner raised multiple points including that the Assistant Registrar lacked jurisdiction. The Assistant Registrar decided against the petitioner and nominated respondent No. 3 to hear the dispute under the Act. The petitioner again filed a revision application before the State Government. The State Government, by order dated May 25, 1966 (annexure 8), informed the petitioner that revisional jurisdiction under s. 154 had been shifted to the Co-operative Tribunal and that the Tribunal had the ultimate power of entertaining an appeal against the order of a Registrar's nominee. The petitioner challenged that State Government order in this petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How is s. 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 to be construed—does it permit the State Government and the Registrar to exercise concurrent revisional jurisdiction over subordinate officers' proceedings?
  2. Whether the Co-operative Tribunal, under s. 149(9) and s. 97, has revisional jurisdiction or the power to call for and examine records in respect of an order of the Registrar under s. 91(2) (i.e., the Registrar's decision as to whether a dispute exists)?
  3. In the facts of this case (an order passed by the Assistant Registrar exercising delegated powers under s. 3), to which forum does the right of revision lie — the State Government or the Registrar — and how does s. 152 determine that question?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's / Mr. Chandurkar's Arguments

  • Mr. Chandurkar contended that the phrase "any proceeding" (in s. 149(9)) should be read to mean that the proceeding commences from the initial step under s. 91 — i.e., the reference to the Registrar by a party — and that therefore the Co-operative Tribunal's power to call for and examine the record of "any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it" includes the initial s. 91 stage.
  • The petitioner argued that s. 154 provides concurrent jurisdiction and thus a litigant in a case like the present should have the choice of approaching either the Registrar or the State Government for revisional relief.

Respondent No. 4 and State Government's Arguments

  • Both respondent No. 4 and the State contended that s. 154 should not be interpreted to give concurrent revisional jurisdiction to the State Government and the Registrar in respect of orders of subordinate officers; instead the statute must be read so that the State Government examines records of the Registrar (its immediate subordinate) and the Registrar examines records of officers subordinate to him.
  • Implicitly, they maintained that the Tribunal's power under s. 149(9) should be interpreted in the context of the appeal provisions (notably s. 97) and the staged nature of proceedings under the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a statutory construction analysis focused on the interaction of several provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960: s. 91, s. 93, s. 95, s. 96, s. 97, s. 149(9), s. 152, s. 154 and the delegation mechanism in s. 3. The reasoning can be broken down into the following steps, stated as the Court set them out:

  1. Characterisation of stages in a dispute: The Court distinguished two separate stages in the statutory process. The first is the initial reference under s. 91, where the Registrar decides whether a dispute exists (s. 91(2)). That decision is final in respect of that stage. The second stage commences after the Registrar's finding that a dispute exists and consists of the adjudication on the merits, whether by the Registrar himself or by nominees under s. 93.
  2. Interpretation of "any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it": The Court examined s. 97 (the provision that actually provides rights of appeal to the Tribunal) and s. 149(9). Section 97 gives rights of appeal against limited orders — those under s. 96 (decisions on merits by the Registrar or his nominees) and under s. 95 (certain interlocutory orders). The Court concluded that the words "any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it" in s. 149(9) must be read in relation to the types of orders enumerated in s. 97, and thus pertain to the adjudicatory stage (s. 96) and specified interlocutory matters (s. 95).
  3. Rejection of the petitioner's submission on the scope of "proceeding": The Court rejected Mr. Chandurkar's argument that the proceeding begins with the reference under s. 91 and that the Tribunal's revisional power under s. 149(9) or the appeal jurisdiction under s. 97 would extend to the s. 91(2) decision. The Court reasoned that s. 91(2) marks a distinct and complete stage at which the Registrar makes a final decision about the existence of a dispute; the subsequent adjudicatory stage is separate. Therefore, the Tribunal's power to call for and examine records of "any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it" cannot be read to include an order under s. 91(2).
  4. Construction of s. 154 (revisional power of State Government and Registrar): The Court addressed arguments that s. 154 cannot be read as permitting concurrent jurisdiction of the State Government and the Registrar over the same subordinate officer's orders. Reading the provision in context, the Court held that s. 154 is a compendious provision: the State Government may call for and examine records of the Registrar (since the Registrar is its immediate subordinate) while the Registrar may call for and examine records of officers subordinate to him. Thus the section should be understood in light of the statutory hierarchy rather than as creating an unrestricted, litigant-choice concurrency between State Government and Registrar.
  5. Effect of delegation (s. 3) and the appellate route (s. 152): The Court examined s. 3 which allows delegation of the Registrar's powers to subordinate officers and makes clear that persons exercising delegated powers remain under the guidance, superintendence and control of the Registrar. The Court emphasized that delegation does not convert an Assistant Registrar's order into the Registrar's order automatically. Section 152 was then invoked to show how the forum of appeal depends on whether an order is "made or sanctioned or approved by the Registrar" (in which case appeal lies to the State Government) or is made by a subordinate officer without the Registrar's sanction (in which case appeal lies to the Registrar).
  6. Application to the facts: The Court found that the Assistant Registrar had passed the order in question on his own, without approval or sanction of the Registrar. Under the principles gleaned from s. 152, the revisional jurisdiction in this instance therefore lay with the Registrar and not with the State Government.

The Court confined itself to statutory construction and application to the facts; it did not purport to broaden the reach of the Tribunal's revisional powers beyond the textual limits it identified.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court refused to direct the State Government to hear the petitioner's revision and held that, because the impugned order was passed by the Assistant Registrar without the sanction or approval of the Registrar, the proper revisional forum is the Registrar (and not the State Government).

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The Court will not order the State Government to entertain the petitioner's revision application.
  • The petitioner retains the option to pursue revision as is appropriate (the Court noted: "The petitioner may adopt such course as he is advised to take").
  • There was no order as to costs.

Broader Implications

The opinion explains and applies the statutory scheme governing stages of dispute resolution under the Act and limits the scope of the Co-operative Tribunal's record-calling power under s. 149(9) to proceedings in which appeals are expressly provided for (as enumerated in s. 97). The Court also clarifies the effect of delegated powers under s. 3 and the operation of s. 152 in determining the appropriate revisional forum. The opinion does not announce or state that it is creating a broader precedent beyond this interpretative application; its effect is to determine the appropriate forum for revision in the circumstances before the Court.

If a section required above could not be populated from the opinion text (for example, named precedents), this summary follows the instruction to use a concise fallback statement or to omit the section as appropriate.

Show all summary ...

Patel, J.:— This petition is filed challenging the decision of the State Government by which it has refused to entertain the revision application filed by the petitioner. The short facts are that the petitioner was in the employment of respondent No. 4, Nagpur Vishal Grahak Sahakari Sanstha Ltd., as a salesman. It seems during the audit, it was found that certain amount was not properly accounted for. Respondent No. 4, therefore, after making certain enquiry, charged the petitioner with the shortage and referred the dispute to the Deputy Registrar under s. 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. In the present case, the Assistant Registrar, with delegated powers under s. 3 of the Act, exercised jurisdiction under s. 91 and held that a dispute existed which required to be decided under the provisions of the Act. He referred the matter to a nominee as provided by s. 93. This Court has held that before a decision is arrived at by the Registrar under s. 91 the person affected must be given a hearing, which the petitioner was not given. He filed a revision application to the State Government. The State Government in view of the decision of this Court directed the Registrar to hear the petitioner before deciding under s. 91 whether a dispute existed which required reference to an arbitrator. When the matter went before the Assistant Registrar again, the petitioner raised several issues, one of them being that the Assistant Registrar had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The Assistant Registrar decided all these points against the petitioner and held that a dispute did exist between respondent No. 4 and the petitioner. He nominated respondent No. 3 to hear the matter under the provisions of the Act and decide it. The petitioner filed a revision application before the State Government and the State Government, by order, dated May 25, 1966, (annexure 8) intimated to the petitioner that the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government under s. 154 was shifted to the Co-operative Tribunal and that the Co-operative Tribunal had the ultimate power of entertaining an appeal against the order of a Registrar's nominee. The petitioner challenges this order of the State Government.

2. The matter involves a question of construction of s. 154 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. It gives jurisdiction to the State Government and the Registrar to call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them for satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and making such orders as they deem proper. An exception is created and that is “except those proceedings or matters referred to in sub-section (9) of section 149”. Section 149 provides for appeals, review and revision and occurs in Chapter XIII.

3. It may be stated that appeals are really provided, not by s. 149 but by s. 97 of the Act. Section 149 deals with the constitution of a Tribunal called “the Co-operative Tribunal” to exercise functions conferred on it by or under the Act. Section 97 is one of such sections which confers powers on the Tribunal of appeal and provides that

“Any party aggrieved by any decision of the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees under the last preceding section, or an order passed under section 95 may, within two months from the date of the decision or order, appeal to the Tribunal”.

4. Section 149(9) provides that

“The Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed…”

5. Section 97, which we have reproduced above, gives rights of an appeal against only limited number of orders. One is a right of appeal against an order made under s. 96 and the other is against an order made under s. 95. An order under s. 96 is made in a proceeding determined by the Registrar or by his nominee or board of nominees on merits, and an order under s. 95 is one relating to attachment before award and other interlocutory orders. If, therefore, the words “any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it” have to be interpreted in relation to s. 97, it would appear to include only such orders as are made on merits after the Registrar has referred the dispute to arbitration and the Registrar, or his nominee or the board of nominees have decided the dispute on merits. It would also include cases where interlocutory orders are made under s. 95.

6. Mr. Chandurkar has raised an ingenious contention and it is that it is wrong to say that the word “any proceeding” means a proceeding which commences with the enquiry by the Registrar or his nominee under s. 96. According to him, the proceeding commences from the initial step taken under s. 91 by which a reference is made by either of the parties covered by that section to the Registrar in connection with a dispute. Section 91 requires that all disputes of the nature mentioned therein must be referred to the Registrar. Section 91(2) requires the Registrar to decide whether a dispute exists or not, and his decision is declared to be final. Thereafter, the Registrar either undertakes to decide the dispute himself or refers the dispute for decision to nominee or board of nominees under s. 93. Having regard to the precise terms in which s. 97 is framed, as also the terms of ss. 91 and 93, it is impossible to regard each of the two stages in the settlement of a dispute between the parties, as one proceeding. Section 91(2) indicates a complete stage by itself at which the Registrar makes a decision as to whether a dispute between the parties exists or not. This decision is final and is not subject to any review. After he decides that there is a dispute between the parties, he undertakes to determine the dispute on merits between them, or appoints nominees under s. 93. It is distinctly a different stage and a different proceeding which commences after his decision on the first proceeding and it is only a decision on merits given either by himself or by his nominee that is the subject-matter of an appeal. This procedure is, unlike the procedure where a tribunal of limited jurisdiction decides the initial questions in a proceeding which commences with the filing of a plaint and ends with the final order, entirely different. Under this Act, first the party makes a reference and the Registrar decides whether a dispute exists. Then commences the second proceeding on merits which is a judicial proceeding. It is impossible to hold that the proceeding commences with the reference of the dispute to the Registrar and ends with the decision on merits, either by the Registrar or by his nominee. In this view of the matter, it is impossible to hold that under s. 149(9), the Co-operative Tribunal has revisional jurisdiction against an order under s. 91(2).

7. Both on behalf of respondent No. 4 and on behalf of the State, a contention is made that s. 154 cannot be read to give concurrent jurisdiction to the Government and the Registrar to revise orders of subordinate officers. The words are “The State Government and the Registrar may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them”. This is a compendious way of providing revisional powers and jurisdiction and it must be read in the light of the other sections to mean that the Government may examine the records of the proceedings or enquiry of the Registrar because he is its immediate subordinate and the Registrar may call for and examine the record of enquiry of any officer subordinate to him. On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that s. 154 provides a concurrent jurisdiction and gives a litigant a choice of approaching, either the Registrar or the State Government in a case like the present.

8. Section 3 provides for delegation of powers of the Registrar to any subordinate officer by the State Government, either by general or special order. It further provides that a person or persons so appointed to assist the Registrar and on whom any powers of the Registrar are conferred, shall work under the general guidance, superintendence and control of the Registrar. This section makes it clear that even if the Assistant Registrar is empowered to exercise the powers of the Registrar, even so the Assistant Registrar works under the guidance, superintendence and control of the Registrar himself. He is clearly, therefore, subordinate to the Registrar. It is not possible to contend that merely because the Assistant Registrar exercises the delegated powers of the Registrar, his order must be taken to be the order of the Registrar. Under the Act, all the duties are cast on the Registrar. There is no statutory duty east on the Additional or Deputy Registrar or Assistant Registrar as such. In all these eases, therefore, where delegated powers are exercised, they are exercised by virtue of s. 3, and in many cases the powers exercised are powers of the Registrar. Even so, all these officers are subordinate to the Registrar as shown by s. 152 which provides the forum of appeal against the orders made by respective officers. Section 152(1) states that—

“An appeal against an order or decision under sections 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 29, 35, 78 and 105 shell lie,—

(a) if made or sanctioned or approved by the Registrar, or the Additional or Joint Registrar on whom powers of the Registrar are conferred, to the State Government,

(b) if made or sanctioned by any person other than the Registrar, or the Additional or Joint Registrar on whom the powers of the Registrar are conferred, to the Registrar.”

9. In the present case, the order is made by the Assistant Registrar. If it is made with the approval of the Registrar, then the revisional jurisdiction must, on the principles of this section, lie to the State Government, because, in that case, it becomes virtually the order of the Registrar. If, however, the order is made by the Assistant Registrar without reference to the Registrar, then the revision application will lie to the Registrar. In every case, whether the revision lies to the State Government or to the Registrar must, in view of s. 152 depend upon whether the order was made with the approval or sanction of the Registrar. All are agreed before us that, in the present case, the order was passed by the Assistant Registrar on his own without the sanction or approval of the Registrar. In accordance with the principles laid down by us, the revisional jurisdiction will, therefore, be of the Registrar.

10. Under the circumstances, it is impossible for us to direct the State Government to hear the revision. The petitioner may adopt such course as he is advised to take. There will be no order as to costs.

11. Order accordingly.