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Chaitram Dagadu Sonavane v. The Malegaon Panchayat Samiti

Bombay High Court
Mar 25, 1965
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chainani, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are members of the Panchayat Samiti of Malegaon. Respondent No. 2 was the Chairman. On May 7, 1964, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and 12 other members served a requisition/notice of a motion of no-confidence in respondent No. 2 under sub-section (1) of section 72 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act; respondent No. 2 received that notice on May 7, 1964. On May 16, 1964, respondent No. 2 issued a notice calling a meeting of the Samiti to consider the motion on June 27, 1964. At that meeting the motion of no-confidence was carried by a majority of 14 to 9. The petitioner filed the present special civil application contending that the June 27, 1964 meeting was illegal because it was not held within ten days of receipt of the notice of the no-confidence motion, and sought a writ of mandamus (or other relief) directing the Samiti not to give effect to the motion passed on June 27, 1964.

The Division Bench that first heard the application referred it to a larger Bench because it considered there to be conflicting Division Bench decisions: Haribhau v. State (1963) and Popat Ragho Patil v. Damu Shankar Patil (1964).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under sub-section (2) of section 72 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act as it stood before the 1964 amendment, it was necessary that the meeting of the Panchayat Samiti to consider a no-confidence motion (of which notice had been given under sub-s. (1)) be held within ten days of receipt of the notice; or
  2. Alternatively, whether sub-s. (2) only required that a notice calling such a meeting be issued within ten days of receipt of the notice of the no-confidence motion (i.e., whether the ten-day obligation applied to issuing the notice rather than to the holding of the meeting).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Argument

  • The meeting held on June 27, 1964, was illegal because it was not held within ten days from the date on which the notice of the no-confidence motion was received by respondent No. 2; accordingly, the petitioner sought a writ preventing the Panchayat Samiti from giving effect to the motion passed at that meeting.

Arguments advanced by Counsel (as recorded)

  • Mr. Adik: Pointed to other provisions of the Act showing that the same or similar words have not always been used to express identical intentions; he relied on textual differences across provisions (e.g., the use of "call", "summon", "convene", "arrange") to argue that the word "convene" in the relevant provisions could bear a meaning different from "call" or "summon" and that context should govern meaning.
  • Mr. Phadke: Urged that because the word "convene" appears in sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 72 it should be given the meaning "call together or assemble together" (i.e., require the body to be actually assembled within ten days). He relied on the decision in Popat Ragho v. Damu Shankar (Popat Ragho Patil v. Damu Shankar Patil).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Haribhau v. State (1963) 65 Bom. L.R. 529 Held that a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti convened by the Commissioner under sub-s. (4) of s. 72 is an ordinary or special meeting and must comply with s. 111(4) notice requirements; the Commissioner had convened a meeting on two days' notice and the Division Bench held that notice bad and meeting illegal. The Court recorded Haribhau's holding and noted that this reasoning led to legislative amendment (Maharashtra Act XXXV of 1963). However, the Court criticized the practical effect of treating "convene" as requiring the meeting to be held within ten days, observing that such an interpretation would render the provision unworkable given the clear-notice periods; this pointed against adopting Haribhau's narrower meaning for the pre-1963 text.
Popat Ragho Patil v. Damu Shankar Patil (1964) 66 Bom. L.R. 729 Held that the expression "convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti" in sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 72 implied that the Chairman should have called the body together and held the meeting before the expiry of ten days from receipt of the notice (i.e., the meeting itself must be held within ten days). The Court reviewed Popat Ragho's reasoning and explicitly disagreed with it. The Court concluded that Popat Ragho's literal approach produced impractical consequences and should not be followed for the pre-1964 version of the statute.
Bhimrao Narayan Deskmukh v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Yeotmal (1963) Special Civil Application No. 4 of 1963 (Unreported) Held that the word "convene" in sub-s. (2) of s. 72 meant "call" — i.e., the Chairman was required to issue a notice calling a meeting within ten days of the requisition but the meeting itself could be held later after giving the requisite notice. The Court agreed with this view and adopted it for construing sub-s. (2) of s. 72 as it stood before the 1964 amendment, treating "convene" as meaning "call" or "summon" rather than requiring the meeting to be held within ten days.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and contextual construction of the word "convene" in sub-section (2) of section 72 as it stood before the 1964 amendment. The principal steps in the Court's analysis (as recorded) were:

  1. Start from dictionary meaning: The Oxford English Dictionary gives "convene" multiple meanings, including "to come together; to assemble" and "to summon." Because the word has more than one meaning, context must determine which meaning applies.
  2. Compare near-identical provisions: Sub-s. (2) of s. 49 (dealing with the President of a Zilla Parishad) used nearly identical language to sub-s. (2) of s. 72. Under s. 111(4), ten clear days' notice of a special meeting had to be given. If "convene" were taken to require that the meeting itself be held within ten days, compliance would have been impossible because a special meeting required ten clear days' notice. This would render s. 49(2) (and similarly s. 72 before amendment) ineffective and unworkable.
  3. Principle of uniform meaning across similar provisions: Because the sections are almost identical in terms and purpose, the same word should bear the same meaning in both. Therefore, if "convene" in s. 49(2) must mean "call" to avoid making the provision unworkable, the same should hold for s. 72.
  4. Consideration of internal usage and legislative amendments: The Court examined other provisions where words like "call", "summon", "convene", or "arrange" appear (e.g., ss. 111(14), 113(1), 111(8), 122 and others) and noted that the Act uses different words in similar senses in different provisions. That showed that "convene" had been used in some places in the sense of "call/summon." After Maharashtra Act XXXV of 1963 the notice periods for Samiti meetings changed (reducing the required notice), and on account of conflicting judicial interpretations the legislature later replaced "convene" with "call" in the 1964 amendment; however, the Court was required to construe the pre-1964 text.
  5. Balance of legislative purpose and practical effect: The Court acknowledged the policy aim behind a short statutory limit (to treat a no-confidence motion as a matter of urgency). It accepted there was force in the argument that a chairman could abuse a requirement limited to issuing notice by issuing a notice to a much later meeting date and thereby retain office despite loss of majority. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that statutory wording should, so far as possible, be construed to render the statute workable rather than to defeat its operation through a literal meaning that makes other mandatory notice requirements impossible to satisfy.
  6. Rejection of Popat Ragho's literalism: The Court considered the Popat Ragho decision, which gave "convene" its plain English (assemble) meaning, but rejected it because that approach ignored practical impossibility and the need to make statutory provisions effective. The Court preferred the construction in the unreported Special Civil Application No. 4 of 1963 (Bhimrao Deskmukh) that "convene" means "call" or "summon" for the pre-1964 text.
  7. Conclusion on the formulated question: The Court concluded that under sub-s. (2) of s. 72 as it stood before the 1964 amendment, it was not necessary that the meeting itself be held within ten days; rather the subsection required that the notice summoning the meeting be issued within ten days of receipt of the requisition/notice of the no-confidence motion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is dismissed; the petition fails and the rule is discharged.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The Court held that sub-s. (2) of s. 72 (as it stood before the 1964 amendment) required only that a notice summoning the meeting be issued within ten days of receipt of the requisition; it did not require that the meeting itself be held within ten days. On that basis the present special civil application challenging the legality of the June 27, 1964 meeting failed.
  • The Court recorded: "Rule discharged. No order as to costs." (and later repeated "Rule discharged").

Broader implications:

The opinion explains the interpretive principle applied to the pre-1964 text (construing "convene" as "call" to avoid making the statutory scheme unworkable) and expressly disagrees with the contrary decision in Popat Ragho. If the reader seeks whether the opinion purports to set a broader precedent beyond the facts and statutory text addressed, the opinion itself does not state additional wider implications beyond the construction adopted and the disposition of the present application.

Show all summary ...

Chainani, C.J:— The petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are the members of the Panchayat Samiti of Malegaon. Respondent No. 2 was the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti. On May 7, 1964, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and 12 other members of the Panchayat Samiti gave a notice of a motion of no-confidence in respondent No. 2 under sub-s. (1) of s. 72 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act. This notice was received by respondent No. 2 on May 7, 1964. On May 16, 1964, he issued a notice calling a meeting of the Samiti for the purpose of considering the motion of no-confidence on June 27, 1964. A meeting was accordingly held on June 27, 1964, in which the motion of no-confidence in respondent No. 2 was carried by a majority of 14 to 9. The petitioner thereafter filed the present special civil application, in which he has contended that the meeting, which was held on June 27, 1964, at which the motion of no-confidence was passed, was illegal, as it was not held within ten days from the date on which the notice of no-confidence motion was received by respondent No. 2. The petitioner has, therefore, prayed for a writ of mandamus or any other suitable writ or direction to be issued to the Panchayat Samiti respondent No. 1 not to give effect to the motion of no-confidence passed in the meeting held on June 27, 1964. The Division Bench before which the application came up for hearing decided to refer it to a larger Bench in view of what it regarded to be conflicting decisions in Haribhau v. State . 1963 65 Bom. L.R 529. and Popat Ragho Patil v. Damu Shankar Patil* . 1964 66 Bom L.R 729..

2. The question, which arises for our consideration, may be formulated as under:

“Whether under sub-section (2) of section 72 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samiti Act, as this section stood before it was amended by the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis (Second Amendment) Act, 1964, it was necessary to hold a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti for the consideration of a motion of no-confidence of which notice had been given under sub-section (1), within ten days of the receipt of the notice or whether this sub-section only required that a notice calling a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti should be issued within ten days of the reciept of the notice of no-confidence motion?”

3. In order to consider this question, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Sub-section (1) of s. 72 stated that a motion of no-confidence in the Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti should be made by a requisition from not less than one-fourth of the total number of the members after giving a notice thereof in such manner as might be prescribed. sub-section (2) of this section provided that the Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti shall convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti to consider such motion within ten days of the receipt of the notice. Sub-section (4) provided that if no such meeting was convened by the Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti within the period specified in sub-s. (2), all or any of the members who have given notice of motion of no-confidence, might forward to the Commissioner a copy of the notice and request him to convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti and that the Commissioner shall notwithstanding anything contained in s. 118 read with sub-s. (3) of s. 111 within ten days of the receipt of such communication by him convene the special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti for the consideration, of the motion. The words “a special meeting” and “the special meeting” were substituted for the words “a meeting” and “the meeting” in sub-ss. (2) and (4) by Maharashtra Act XXXV of 1963. Sub-section (5) lays down that the meeting convened for the purpose of considering a motion under this section shall not, for any reason, be adjourned. Sub-section (4) of s. 111 provides that fifteen clear days' notice of an ordinary meeting, and ten clear days' notice of a special meeting, specifying the time and place at which such meeting is to be held and the business to be transacted thereat, shall be circulated to the Councillors. Under this sub-section, therefore, fifteen clear days' notice for an ordinary meeting and ten clear days' notice for a special meeting must be given. The provisions of s. 111 apply to Zilla Parishads, but they have been made applicable with some modifications to meetings of a Panchayat Samiti by s. 118. Originally sub-s. (4) of s. 111 applied without any modification to the meetings of a Panchayat Samiti and the period of notice required for calling an ordinary or a special meeting was the same. But by Maharashtra Act XXXV of 1963 the period for an ordinary meeting of a Samiti was reduced from fifteen days to ten days and for a special meeting of a Samiti from ten days to seven days. Section 49 prescribes the procedure to be followed when notice of no-confidence motion in the President of a Zilla Parishad is given. Sub-section (2) of s. 49 provided that the President shall convene a special meeting of the Zilla Parishad to consider the motion within ten days of the receipt of notice. In Haribhau v. State, a Division Bench of this Court held that a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti convened by the Commissioner under sub-s. (4) of s. 72 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act is either an ordinary meeting or a special meeting and that notice of such meeting must, therefore, be given in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 111 of the Act. In that case the Commissioner had convened a meeting of the Samiti after two days notice. It was held that the notice was bad and that the meeting held in pursuance of it was illegal. This, decision led to the amendment of sub-s. (2) of s. 49, sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 72 and s. 118 by Maharashtra Act XXXV of 1963, as mentioned above. In the meantime another Division Bench of this Court at Nagpur in Bhimrao Narayan Deskmukh v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Yeotmal . 1963 Special Civil Application No. 4 of 1963, decided by Abhyankar and Wagle JJ., on September 27, 1963. Unrep.. held that the word “convene” in sub-s. (2) of s. 72 only meant “call”, that what was required by sub-s. (2) was that the Chairman shall call a meeting or issue a notice of the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion within ten days of the receipt of the requisition and that it did not require that the meeting shall be held within ten days of the receipt of the motion of no-confidence. A contrary view has, however, been taken in Popat Ragha v. Damu Shankar, in which it has been held that the expression “convene a special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti” in sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 72 of the Act implied that the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti should have called the body together and held the meeting before the expiry of ten days from the receipt of the notice. Evidently on account of these decisions the Legislature has again amended the above sections by maharashtra act xliii of 1964 and the word “convene” has been replaced by the word “call” in ss. 49 and 72.

4. We have, however, to construe sub-s. (2) of s. 72 as it stood before the Act was amended in 1964. The word “convene” according to the Oxford English Dictionary means, to come together; to assemble or meet for a common purpose or for united action; to cause to come together; to summon (a person) before a tribunal. As the word has more than one meaning, the question as to what meaning it bears in a particular provision must be decided by reference to the context in which it has been used.

5. Sub-section (2) of s. 49 was almost in the same terms as sub-s. (2) of s. 72. This required the President to convene a special meeting of the Zilla Paris had to consider the motion, of no-confidence within ten days of its receipt. Under sub-s. (4) of s. 111, ten days' notice of a special meeting has to be given. If, therefore, the word “convene” implied that the meeting must be held within ten days, then it would have not been possible to hold any meeting’ for considering a motion of no-confidence, for if the meeting was to be held within ten days, ten clear days' notice of it could not have been given and if notice of a shorter period was given, the meeting would have been illegal, see Haribhau v. State. The above meaning did not, therefore, fit in the context, for it would have made s. 49(2) ineffective and nugatory. On the other hand, if “convene” in this provision meant call or summon, then it was possible to hold the special meeting after giving the requisite notice. The Legislature could not have used this word in a sense in which it would have made the section unworkable. It follows that in s. 49(2) “convene” meant call or summon; and it must bear the same meaning in sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 72, because the same word cannot have two different meanings in two provisions of the same Act almost identical in terms and enacted for the same purpose. Moreover, before the Act was amended in 1963, ten clear days' notice was also necessary for a special meeting of a Panchayat Samiti. The word “convene” was, therefore, used in s. 72 in the sense indicated above before the Act was amended in 1963. It cannot change its meaning merely because by the amendment the period of notice for a special meeting was subsequently reduced.

6. Mr. Adik has pointed out the other provisions of the Act, which indicate that the same words have not always been employed to express the same intention. The proviso to sub-s. (4) of s. 111 refers to a meeting being “called”. Sub-section (14) of s. 111 states that a Minister who desires to discuss with the Zilla Parishad any matter relating to the work of the Parishad may request the President to call a meeting of the Zilla Parishad and that the President shall summon the meeting accordingly. Sub-section (1) of s. 113 states that a President may convene a meeting of the Zilla Parishad to enable such dignitaries as the State Government may specify to address the Councillors. The word “convene” in this sub-section, therefore, appears to have been used in the same sense in which the words “call” and “summon” have been used in sub-s. (14) of s. 111. Section 122 provides that when a Minister requests the President of a Zilla Parishad to arrange a meeting with the Standing Committee or any Subjects Committee, the President shall take steps to summon such meeting. The words used in this section are “arrange” and “summon”. It will, therefore, be seen that different words have been used in the same sense in different provisions of the Act. Mr. Phadke has urged that as another word “convene” has been employed in sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 72 it should be given a different meaning of “call together or assemble together”. This word “convene” is also used in other provisions of the Act, such as ss. 76(1)(a), 111(8), 113(1) and 115(1). As stated above, in s. 113(1) it appears to have been used in the sense of call or summon. Sub-section (8) of s. 111 states that except with the permission of the presiding authority, no business shall be transacted and no proposition shall be discussed at any ordinary meeting, unless it has been entered in the notice convening such meeting. The meaning of the word “convene” in this sub-section obviously is “call” or “summon”. It is, therefore, clear that this word has not always been used in the Act in the sense of assembling or bringing together.

7. It has been contended that the object of the Legislature in specifying a time limit within which a meeting has to be convened is that a motion of no-confidence should be treated as a matter of urgency and should be disposed of within a short time after notice of it has been given. If it is held that sub-s. (2) of s. 72 only required that a notice calling a meeting should be issued within ten days, the Chairman, who had lost the confidence of the majority of the members of the Samiti, might have complied with the requirements of sub-s. (2) by issuing a notice summoning the meeting within ten days, but might actually have called the meeting at a very much later date, so as to enable him to continue in office for a long period against the desire of the majority of the members. There is some force in this argument. But on the other hand, we-must not so interpret the provisions of the Act as to defeat the intention of the Legislature that a person who had lost the confidence of the members should not continue in office. As I have pointed out, unless the word “convene” is held to mean “call or summon”, no meeting of the Zilla Parishad could lawfully have been held for consideration of the motion of no-confidence in the President or Vice-President. Ten clear days' notice of such a meeting had to be given and the meeting could not, therefore, have been held within ten days of the receipt of the notice of motion of no confidence. It would, therefore, have been impossible to carry out the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 49. Similarly, before the Act was amended in 1963, it would not have been possible to hold any lawful meeting of the Panchayat Samiti for consideration of the no-confidence motion against its Chairman or Deputy Chairman. Since one of the dictionary meanings of the word “convene” is summon, it seems to us that the word “convene” in ss. 49 and 72 must be held to have this meaning, for otherwise sub-s. (2) of s. 49 and sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 72 before the Act was amended in 1963 could not have been given effect to and would have become unworkable.

8. Mr. Phadke has relied on the decision in Popat Ragho v. Damn Shankar. The judgment shows that the learned Judges were aware of the difficulties which have been pointed out above. At p. 733 it has been observed:

“…It may be that when making the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 49 the legislative draftsman overlooked the difficulty that would arise, but for the reason that difficulties would arise in the implementation of the other provisions of the Act, we cannot give to the expression used in s. 72 ‘convene a special meeting’ any meaning other than what the plain English requires and merely to obviate difficulties.”

9. With respect, it seems to us that the Court should, if possible, so construe a provision in an Act as will make it and the other provisions of the Act workable and as will not render any of them ineffective or incapable of being carried out. The intention of the Legislature should not be allowed to be defeated merely because the draftsman has used a word in a sense in which it is not ordinarily used.

10. With respect, we do not, therefore, agree with the view taken, in Popat Ragho v. Damn Shankar. We agree with the view taken in Special Civil Application No. 4 of 1963. In our opinion, all that sub-s. (2) of s. 72 required was that the notice summoning the meeting for consideration of the motion of no confidence, in respect of which a requisition had been received under sub-s. (1), should be issued within ten days from the date of the receipt of the requisition and that it was not necessary to hold the meeting within ton days of the receipt of the notice. The reply to the first part of the question formulated for our consideration is, therefore, in the negative and to the second part in the affirmative.

11. In this view the present application must fail.

12. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.

13. Rule discharged.