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Ishwariprasad Ganpatrao v. Shankar Dayal Shukla
1. This is an application by the original plaintiff against the order of the trial Court staying the suit for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages.
2. The plaintiff is a landlord of certain premises in this city. Opponent is a tenant of those premises. The opponent is described as retired D.I.G of Police, resident of Wright Town. Jabalpur. According to the plaint averment, the plaintiff purchased the premises under a registered sale deed dated 12-12-1962 when they were occupied by the opponent at a monthly rental of Rs. 140/- The plaintiff applied to the Rent Controller under the C.P and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, for permission to issue a notice terminating the tenancy of the opponent.
3. The Rent Controller granted permission on 27-9-1963. Thereafter, the plaintiff issued a notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant on 1-11-1963 calling upon him to evict (sic) the premises at the end of the month. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed his suit on 17-12-63. In this suit he claims Rs. 1260 by way of arrears of rent from 1-3-1963 to the date of the filing of the suit, damages from 1-12-68 for the further period at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day he also claims in the suit possession of the property and determination of damages and arrears of rent as claimed therein.
4. It appears considerable time was taken to bring the defendant before the Court and the defendant filed his written statement, after seven months of the filing of the suit, on 27-7-1964 Issues were framed on 12-8-1964. On this date, the defendant filed an application Exh. 20 praying that the suit should be stayed till the disposal of the appeal filed by him against the order of the Rent Controller. The defendant has not disclosed as to when the appeal was filed, only mention being that appeal was pending before the Collector. This was opposed by the plaintiff. The grounds of opposition were that the premises were required for personal occupation of the plaintiff, that the application for stay was deliberately delayed and was not made in good faith and in any case if a stay were to be granted it should be on terms because the defendant was in arrear of a considerable amount by way of rent which he should be called upon to pay as condition for ‘stay and further provision should be made to ensure payment for subsequent period. The learned Judge of the trial Court has granted stay’ of the suit without terms by the following order:
“The suit is fixed for evidence. In view of the ruling in AIR 1948 Bom 347. I am bound to stay the suit, and the stay order cannot be a condition precedent to payment or non-payment of rental arrears. The plaintiff if so advised may resort to his remedies like the one given in O. XXVIII R. 5 of the CPC Case stayed until further orders.”
5. The plaintiff challenges this order as vitiated by material irregularity and Illegality in exercise of jurisdiction. Neither counsel was able to throw light on the relevancy of the reference to Order 28, Rule 5 in the order under challenge. It is not understood how the provisions of Order 28, Rule 5 could be availed of by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's request was that there was no case for stay but if stay were to be granted it should be on terms securing payment of large amount of arrears already due and requiring payment for occupation till the stay operated. The learned Judge ought to have applied his mind to this contention and mere reference to Order 28, Rule 5 could not have disposed of the objection of the plaintiff.
6. It is also clear that the learned Judge has not exercised his jurisdiction properly and with care. The decision of this Court in Indra Singh v. Shiavax Cawasji, AIR 1948 Bom 347 which was with reference to section 14(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act (7 of 1944) would not in terms apply but assuming that the principles were to be called in aid the Court could not have stayed the suit wholesale. The learned Chief Justice has held that pending an appeal before the Collector from the order of the Controller i.e Rent Controller, the landlord is not entitled on the strength of the certificate which he has obtained from the Controller to evict the tenant. Thus, the only effect of the certificate granted to the landlord being put in challenge was to disable the landlord from evicting the tenant. In other words, actual eviction could not be ordered until the question of permission was finally decided. But barring that stage, it does not appear there is any impediment in the way of the Court in proceeding with the suit with respect to all other matters. The suit concerns the claim for arrears of rent and also for damages which have to be determined. In any case, almost that could be done with propriety in such cases is that in case the Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to eject the tenant the decree for ejectment will not be executed until final decision in the Rent Control proceedings if at all the circumstances justify such a course.
7. Reference is made on behalf of the non-applicant to a decision of the Nagpui High Court reported in Phanibhushan Deb v. Gulabchand, 1951 NLJ 10 : (AIR 1951 Nag 203) and the only observations of which any assistance could be derived is in placitum (a) where it is observed that the tenant can request the Court trying the suit for ejectment to stay proceedings therein and await the decision of the Deputy Commissioner in appeal. This certainly the defendant could do. But, before such a request could be granted, the defendant must show his bona fides. It cannot be laid down as an invariable rule that in every case where the landlord obtains an order from the Rent Controller to evict the tenant or issue a notice determining his lease and a suit is filed that suit must be stayed in all cases where the defendant prefers to challenge the order of the Rent Controller. The question whether a suit should be stayed is a matter of discretion and that discretion has to be exercised judicially in exercising discretion in favour of the tenant, his conduct, his willingness to discharge the obligation, whether the tenant is deliberately keeping arrears of rent and the failure of the tenant to make proper arrangement for payment of compensation during the period he is in occupation are all relevant factors which are to be taken into consideration. It has also to be seen, as is apparent from this case, that the application for stay was inordinately delayed. Stay could have been applied at the very first hearing by bringing to the notice of the Judge that the order of the Rent Controller on which the suit is founded is itself being challenged in appeal. There are sufficient indications in this litigation to show that every attempt has been made by the tenant to prolong and procrastinate proceedings so that the evil day will be postponed as much and as far as possible. Such attitude cannot be countenanced and the trial Court should not have granted stay merely for the asking. It is not the law that merely because an appeal is filed, the proceedings out of which the appeal arises get automatically stayed. Even in a civil Court merely filing an appeal does not operate as staying of execution of the decree appealed against that is made very clear from Order 41, rule 5 of the CPC. It will be much more so when certain ancillary proceedings are pending in a different Tribunal which may have a bearing on the litigation between the parties in the civil Court. It is not unusual to find that the order of the Rent Controller is challenged in appeal and then by a writ petition in the High Court and the tenant could successfully stave off eviction for quite some time. The Civil Court therefore cannot lightly countenance such an attempt to prolong the proceedings.
8. The provisions of clause 13 of the C.P and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order show that the only bar that is raised by clause 13 is giving of notice terminating his lease without written permission of the Rent Controller Once such permission is granted, the bar is removed. If that permission gets set aside by appeal or other order the plaintiff's cause of action may not survive, and that must have its effect ultimately on the litigation commenced in the civil Court. Merely because there is a possibility of such a contingency arising it is not proper for the Civil Court trying the suit to stay its hands indefinitely awaiting result of the Rent Control proceedings first before the appellate Court and then before the superior Courts Such course is not warranted as it results in unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings.
9. Normally, therefore, the order passed could not have been justified and was liable to be set aside. It is however pointed out that the appeal before the appellate authority is fixed for hearing on 4-3-1965, i.e a few days hence. I therefore modify the order challenged in this revision and direct as follows:
The tenant shall deposit within the period of one month from today all the arrears of rent claimed in the suit and the amount claimed for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 140/- p.m from 1st December, 1963 til) 1st March, 1965 within a period of one month on such deposit being made further proceedings in the suit will be staved only till the decision of the appeal filed before the Rent Control Authorities. The defendant shall further pay each month on or before 5th of next month a monthly sum of Rs. 140/- by way of use and occupation of the premises. On these terms being satisfied the stay shall continue. Thus the stay will continue till the decision of the appeal and not till the decision of any further proceeding that may he taken.
10. With this modification, the revision is allowed. The applicant will be entitled to his costs. The slay will operate only so far as delivery of judgment is concerned.
G.J/JHS/D.V.C
11. Order accordingly.
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