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Mrs. Damayanti G. Chandiramani v. S. Vaney

Bombay High Court
Sep 16, 1964
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Factual and Procedural Background

This proceeding for contempt of Court was initiated by the High Court based on a report submitted by Mr. Vimadalal, Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay, regarding an incident on March 4, 1963. The plaintiff, Mrs. Damayanti G. Chandiramani, filed a suit against the defendant, S. Vaney, seeking recovery of possession and arrears of compensation, alleging that the defendant was a licensee and that the licence was revoked. The suit was filed on October 26, 1962. The defendant launched multiple prosecutions against the plaintiff, her family, and advocate Punwani, who represented the plaintiff. On January 10, 1963, the defendant initiated prosecution under section 24 of the Rent Control Act against the plaintiff and others, which led the plaintiff to seek a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with this prosecution. The hearing of this injunction notice on March 4, 1963, before Judge Vimadalal gave rise to the contempt proceeding. The defendant allegedly threatened the plaintiff's advocate during the hearing, which was reported by the Judge to the High Court. The defendant filed an affidavit denying some allegations and providing his version of the events. The case proceeded through various hearings, including before Division Benches, and involved multiple related prosecutions and appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statements and conduct of the defendant during the Court proceedings amounted to contempt of Court by interfering with the administration of justice.
  2. Whether the alleged contempt falls within the jurisdiction of the High Court or is barred under section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act due to punishability under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code.
  3. Whether the defendant's conduct constituted a threat or intimidation sufficient to deter an advocate from performing his professional duties fearlessly.
  4. Whether section 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act is constitutionally valid.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant denied uttering the threatening words attributed to him and contended that he only warned the advocate of legal consequences based on the advocate's alleged wrongful acts.
  • He argued that the statements by advocate Punwani were defamatory and irrelevant to the suit, made to provoke a reaction.
  • The defendant claimed that the Judge did not allow him to read his affidavit during the proceedings.
  • He contended that the alleged threat did not amount to contempt as it was not accompanied by a demand to desist from legal action.
  • The defendant relied on a decision (Kamta Prasad v. Ram Agyam) to argue that threatening to take legal proceedings if a settlement is not accepted does not amount to interference with the course of justice.
  • He challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, asserting that the matter should be dealt with under section 228 IPC.
  • The defendant questioned the correctness of the Judge's report and argued that section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act is ultra vires the Constitution, though he later did not press this point.
  • He indicated willingness to apologize if convinced he had erred.

Advocate Punwani's Position (as supported by the Court)

  • Advocate Punwani justified his references to the defendant’s past convictions and conduct as relevant and privileged statements made in the course of legal proceedings.
  • He supported the version of events as reported by Judge Vimadalal, including the defendant's threats to prosecute him repeatedly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Telhara Cotton Ginning Co. v. Kashinath [1940] A.I.R Nag. 110 Threatening an advocate to withdraw allegations amounts to contempt as it interferes with administration of justice. Used to establish that threats aimed at deterring an advocate from performing duties constitute contempt.
Rajendra Singh v. Uma Prasad 1934 I.L.R 57 All. 573 Interference with administration of justice through threats to compel withdrawal of defense is contempt. Supported the view that threatening legal proceedings to influence litigation is contempt.
Smith v. Lakeman 1856 26 L.J Ch. 305 Threatening a party with legal action to intimidate him in defense is contempt. Illustrated that threats, even if indirect, can amount to contempt.
Thirumalaiappa v. Kumaraswami [1956] A.I.R Mad. 621 Disrespect or insult to counsel that interferes with justice is contempt. Endorsed principle that insults to advocates within court precincts can be contempt.
French v. French 1824 1 Hog. 138 Abuse or insult to advocates as officers of the Court interfering with justice is contempt. Reinforced that advocates are protected from insults that impede justice.
Nand Lal Bhalla v. Kishori Lal 1946 48 Cr. L.J 757 Threats and insults to an advocate during performance of duties constitute contempt. Confirmed that threatening advocates professionally is contempt even if not direct contempt of Court.
Kamta Prasad v. Ram Agyam [1950] All. 530 Offers of settlement coupled with warning of legal proceedings do not amount to contempt if proceedings are lawful. Distinguished from present case as the defendant’s threats were intended to deter litigation.
Emperor v. Jehangir Jassawalla 1946 49 Bom. L.R 393 Described a vexatious litigant and recognized repeated frivolous prosecutions as relevant background. Supported characterization of defendant as vexatious litigant, justifying references to his history.
Pratap Singh v. Gurbaksh Singh [1962] A.I.R S.C 1172 Launching proceedings to coerce a party to withdraw suit is contempt as it interferes with administration of justice. Applied to show that defendant’s prosecutions against advocate Punwani had a deterring effect amounting to contempt.
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State Of Madras [1952] A.I.R S.C 149 Clarified that contempt jurisdiction is not barred merely because offence is punishable under another law. Supported refusal to bar contempt proceedings under section 3(2) Contempt of Courts Act.
State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar [1959] A.I.R S.C 102 Supported principle that contempt jurisdiction is independent of other penal provisions. Reinforced the Court’s jurisdiction to proceed with contempt despite other penal provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the conduct of the defendant in the context of contempt of Court, focusing on whether his statements and threats interfered with the administration of justice. It accepted the version of events as reported by Judge Vimadalal, supported by the defendant's own admissions and the affidavit of advocate Punwani. The Court noted that advocate Punwani was within his rights to refer to the defendant's past convictions and vexatious litigation history, as these were relevant to the defendant’s pattern of conduct and were supported by evidence.

The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the statements did not amount to threat or that they were mere warnings of legal consequences. It held that the defendant's conduct, including multiple prosecutions against the advocate and threats made in the presence of the Court during hearing, was intended to deter the advocate from performing his duties fearlessly. The Court emphasized that contempt includes any conduct calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrespect or to interfere with the duties of advocates.

The Court considered precedents establishing that threats or intimidation against advocates, especially during litigation, amount to contempt. It distinguished the defendant’s conduct from lawful offers of settlement or warnings of legal action, noting the defendant’s actions went beyond lawful litigation into intimidation.

Regarding the defendant's contention that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act because the offence fell under section 228 IPC, the Court held that the advocate is not a public servant under section 228 IPC and that the offence must be punishable as contempt to bar High Court jurisdiction. It found that the offence qualified as contempt and thus the High Court had jurisdiction.

The Court also addressed the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the Contempt of Courts Act but noted the defendant did not press this argument further.

Finally, the Court considered the defendant’s age and health and the fact that he had committed prior contempts, balancing deterrence with leniency in sentencing.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that the defendant's statements and conduct during the Court proceedings amounted to contempt of Court.

The defendant was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 and the costs of the proceedings, with two months granted to pay the fine. The Court noted this was the defendant’s third contempt and hoped the punishment would have a deterrent effect. The decision directly affects the defendant by imposing punishment but does not create any new precedent beyond affirming established principles that threats and intimidation against advocates during litigation constitute contempt of Court.

Show all summary ...

Naik, J.:— This proceeding for contempt of Court has been initiated by the High Court on the report submitted by Mr. Vimadalal, Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay, (as he then was), in respect of an incident which took place in his Court on March 4, 1963. The facts leading up to the incident on March 4, 1963, may be briefly outlined as follows. The plaintiff, Mrs. Damayanti G. Chandiramani, filed a suit against the defendant, S. Vaney, for recovery of possession and arrears of compensation on the basis that the defendant was a licensee and that the licence was revoked. That suit was filed on October 26, 1962. After the service of the summons, the defendant attended the office of advocate Punwani, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit, for inspection of the documents. This was on November 10, 1962. On January 10, 1963, the defendant started prosecution under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act against the plaintiff, her parents and advocate Punwani on the basis: that the plaintiff had withheld essential services in respect of the flat which he had taken from the plaintiff. The Presidency Magistrate, before whom the prosecution was launched, issued process only against the plaintiff and not against the rest. The plaintiff then took out a notice of motion in the suit for possession asking for temporary injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with the prosecution launched by him under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act. The mother of the plaintiff, who held the power-of-attorney for the plaintiff, put in an affidavit in support of the notice of motion. The notice came up for hearing on March 4, 1963, and it is in the course of the arguments on the notice of motion that the incident, from which this proceeding has arisen, took place. Before dealing with the happenings of March 4, 1963, in the Court of Judge Vimadalal, it is necessary to set out a few more facts.

2. On January 10, 1963, the defendant launched a prosecution against advocate Punwani for defamation. This complaint arose in the following circumstances. The defendant had started a criminal case (No. 588.S of 1962) on October 23, 1962, against the members of the managing committee of Bela Housing Society for defamation. It may be mentioned that the flat in respect of which the plaintiff had asked for possession in the suit in the City Civil Court was a part of the building known as Bela Court, which belonged to Bela Co-operative Housing Society. In Criminal Case No. 588.S of 1962 advocate Punwani appeared for the accused, i.e, the members of the managing committee. Mr. Punwani argued that the defendant who complained of a libel against himself, had no reputation to defend. It was the case for the defendant that the statements made by Mr. Punwani in the course of the argument amounted to defamation and that is why he started prosecution against advocate Punwani on January 10, 1963, under s. 500, Indian Penal Code. On February 26, 1963, the defendant started a criminal case against the plaintiff's father, her mother, members of the managing committee and advocate Punwani for intimidation and insult and abetment of the said offence. It may be mentioned at this stage that advocate Punwani happens to be the legal adviser of the Bela Co-operative Housing Society. The defendant had refused to become a member of the said Housing Society. Because of his refusal to become a member of the said society, the managing committee passed a resolution that the use of the lift should be refused to the occupants who were not members of the Housing Society. A notice was put up in that regard. The defendant alleged that the two lift-men and advocate Punwani actually prevented him from using the lift and in that way insulted him. It is on that basis that he lodged the complaint on February 26, 1963, for insult and intimidation. It would thus be seen that the two cases launched by the defendant against advocate Punwani were pending on the day, when the notice of motion came up for hearing before Judge Vimadalal on March 4, 1963. If appears that the criminal case launched by the defendant on February 26, 1963, was dismissed on March 13, 1963, without issuing process against any of the accused. Let us now turn to the happenings of March 4, 1963. Advocate Punwani, in the course of his arguments, referred to the contents of para. (6) of the affidavit put in by the plaintiff's attorney in support of the notice of motion. Paragraph (6) of the affidavit runs thus:

“I say that the defendant seems to be a notorious litigant. He has been convicted four times for offences under the Indian Penal Code, the last of which was for assaulting a lady (Case No. 135.P of 1951) for which he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months, as recorded in the judgment dated 3-10-1952 of the 8th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. He has filed many cases against the owners of the Guest Houses or Hotels, where he used to reside before shifting to the suit premises…”

3. The apparent object of advocate Punwani in referring to the contents of para. (6) of the said affidavit was to show that the defendant was in the habit of launching upon vexatious cases and complaints and the complaint lodged by him under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act against the plaintiff stood in the same category. It may be recalled that by the notice of motion, the plaintiff had asked for a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with the criminal complaint lodged by him under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act. The learned City Civil Court Judge asked the defendant as to whether he had to say anything with regard to the allegations contained in para. (6) of the affidavit. The defendant stated that he would see to it that the plaintiff's advocate, Mr. Punwani, would go to jail; that two criminal cases had already been filed by the defendant himself against the plaintiff's advocate, the said Mr. Punwani and that he would file two more criminal cases against him shortly. It appears that Judge Vimadalal made a note of these statements on the docket sheet and asked the defendant to explain as to why he should not be proceeded with for contempt of Court. The defendant did not offer any explanation and on March 12, 1963, Judge Vimadalal submitted a report to the High Court requesting that action for contempt of Court should be taken against the defendant. On the same day, he disposed of the notice of motion and made the rule, which was already granted restraining the defendant from proceeding with the criminal case under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act, absolute.

4. It is, also necessary to refer to certain events, which took place after March 4, 1963, because one of the contentions raised by Mr. Punwani in the course of these proceedings was that, the threat given by the defendant was not just a piece of bravado, but he actually carried that threat into action. We will consider the question as to whether and how far these happenings are relevant for deciding the present case, at a later stage of this judgment. For the time being, we will proceed to narrate the events as have taken place after March 4, 1963. On March 6, 1963, the defendant started prosecution against the plaintiff's father, members of the managing committee, two lift-men and advocate Punwani for insult and intimidation in respect of an incident which took place on March 5, 1963, in which, according to the defendant, he was refused the use of the lift. On March 7, 1963, the criminal case No. 588.S of 1962, to which a reference has already been made, was taken up for hearing. Advocate Punwani was appearing on behalf of the accused in that case. The defendant made an application requesting that advocate Punwani should be made a co-accused on the ground that he had instigated the managing committee to pass the resolution refusing-the services of the lift to the defendant. Notice was issued to advocate Punwani and on his showing cause, Mr. Punwani was discharged on June 26, 1963. The-defendant went in appeal from the order in the notice of motion passed on March 12, 1963. He obtained an interim stay order on March 30, 1963. On April 3, 1963, he launched a second prosecution under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act against the plaintiff, her parents, members of the managing committee, the two lift-men and advocate Punwani. The plaintiff appeared in the appeal before the High Court and eventually, the stay was vacated. The High Court passed an order restraining the defendant from starting fresh proceedings under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act pending the hearing of the appeal. The High Court, however, refused to pass any stay order in respect of the prosecution already launched by the defendant on April 3, 1963, and suggested that the plaintiff may approach the Magistrate for such relief. On May 9, 1963, the defendant started another prosecution for defamation against the plaintiff's mother and advocate Punwani in regard to the contents of para. (6) of the affidavit put in by the plaintiff's mother in support of the notice of motion.

5. The defendant has appeared in answer to the notice and put in his affidavit: showing cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt of Court. He has given his own version as to what transpired on March 4, 1963, and denied some of the statements attributed to him by Judge Vimadalal in his report. The defendant has complained that Judge Vimadalal did not allow him to read his affidavit. At para. (8) of the affidavit, the defendant has set out a lengthy conversation, which, according to him, took place between him and Judge Vimadalal. He has suggested that it was only after the Judge asked him as to what was his occupation that he told him that he was engaged in writing a book about the administration of justice and when the Judge further asked him as to what he was doing prior to his engagement of writing the book, the defendant told the Judge that he could have become a Judge if he wanted to. When further asked as to what Government posts were offered to him, the defendant told the Judge that he was offered a nomination to the Indian Civil Service and if he had accepted the same, he would have started as an Assistant Judge and in that case, he would have become senior to the present Chief Justice of Bombay in the Civil Service Cadre. At para. (11) he has explained as to how advocate Punwani has gone on making defamatory statements about him wherever he appeared against the defendant. According to him, Mr. Punwani made some defamatory statements on December 10, 1962, at the hearing of the notice of motion before Judge Walavalkar; that again he made the same statements before the Court of the 16th Presidency Magistrate on January 10, 1963, and that he repeated the same statements on March 4, 1963. He has admitted that he filed a criminal case for defamation against advocate Punwani (No. 101.S of 1963) which is pending in the 28th Presidency Magistrate's Court in regard to the defamatory statements made by Mr. Punwani on January 10, 1963, in the Court of the 16th Presidency Magistrate. He has then referred to the incident, which took place in the Court of Judge Vimadalal and according to the defendant, this is what has happened:

“In this Court the learned Judge Vimadalal himself asked me, if I had anything to say regarding the allegations made against me. I replied, ‘Yes, a good deal, Sir’. Then the learned Judge asked, ‘Have you suffered imprisonment for three months?’ I replied, ‘These are false allegations. I have never suffered any sentence of imprisonment at any time. But, apart from that your Honour would appreciate that even if it were true that I had spent a number of years in prison, there is no occasion or justification for the plaintiff's advocate to make that fact known here as it has no bearing on the issues before the Court. I respectfully submit that the purpose of this Advocate in making these statements is to defame me and create an atmosphere of prejudice and provoke me to make a brawl in Court or indulge in violence and, therefore, he is guilty of contempt of Court, and I request that the Court will be pleased to take action against him…’ I thereupon continued, ‘…If the certificate granted to the Society is cancelled, this advocate stands to lose his job. He, therefore, bears me great malice and everywhere he goes, he makes defamatory statements about me. Already I have filed a complaint of defamation against him which is case No. 101.S of 1963 in the 28th Presidency Magistrate's Court. Also he is an accused in another criminal case in his capacity of an employee of the said Housing Society. And in a day or two, I intend to file two more criminal cases in which this Advocate will be one of the accused for his ‘wrong doing’. I have also made an application to the Bar Council for suspending him on account of his professional misconduct on five counts, one being that he has been an employee of the Housing Society for more than two years, and the President of the Bar Council informed me that my application would be kept pending and action will be taken when the Chapter V of the Advocates Act comes into force. I am hoping that there would foe a conviction in each of the four cases in which he will appear as an accused, and that there will be a jail sentence’”.

6. The defendant has denied that he gave any threat or intimidated the advocate. He has also denied that he uttered the words ‘I would see to it that the plaintiff's advocate would go to jail’. He has argued that he has no power of sending anybody to jail and, therefore, it is unlikely that he would utter any such words towards the advocate. In short, his contention is that he warned the advocate of the consequences of his own ‘wrong doing’ and what he contemplated was to take action against the advocate to vindicate his own legal rights.

7. It is also necessary to refer to certain stages through which the contempt proceedings have gone on in this Court. The proceedings came up for hearing before a Division Bench comprising Patel and Kantawala JJ. on August 7, 1963. It appears that the defendant was then represented by Mr. K.L Gauba, a senior advocate of this Court. After some brief discussion, the Division Bench adjourned the case and gave a direction to the City Civil Court Judge to expedite the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant. It appears that thereafter the suit was heard and disposed of in March 1964. On April 15, 1964 this case came up for hearing before another Division Bench comprising the Chief Justice and Gokhale J. It was adjourned and then it was placed before the Division Bench comprising Kotwal and Palekar JJ. This was on June 25, 1964. At that time, the defendant put in a written affidavit stating that Patel J. had expressed the view that the statements attributed to the defendant, even if true, would not amount to contempt. The Division Bench felt that, in view of the various allegations contained in the affidavit put in by the defendant against Judge Vimadalal, it would be more appropriate if a report was called for from Judge Vimadalal. Accordingly, a report was called for from Judge Vimadalal, who submitted the report on August 26, 1964. In May 1964, the defendant launched another prosecution against the plaintiff, her parents, advocate Punwani and certain lift-men.

8. In the affidavit put in by the defendant, in order to show that the case was part-heard and that certain views were expressed by the Division Bench comprising Patel and Kantawala JJ., the defendant has formulated four propositions as follows:

“(a) Whether the report against me which is made by a senior Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court bears a semblance of correctness?

(b) Whether the alleged vague statements amount to contempt?

(c) Whether if the statements amount to contempt, they fall within the mischief of s. 228 I.P.C and the jurisdiction of this Court is excluded by s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act?

(d) Whether s. 3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act offends article 14 of the Constitution and is invalid.”

9. The defendant, who has himself argued his case in detail, has developed his arguments on the basis of the four propositions formulated by him in his affidavit dated June 22, 1964.

10. The defendant has strenuously contended that the version set out by Judge Vimadalal as to what transpired on March 4, 1963, is not correct. He has argued that there is intrinsic evidence in the report to show that some of the statements attributed to him could not possibly be true. In that connection, he pointed out that he is a man of good education; that he knows English very well and that he has also considerable experience about the working of Courts. In these circumstances, it is unimaginable that he would make a statement to the effect that he would see to it that advocate Punwani would go to jail. He has pointed out that he has no powers to send even a thief or a murderer to jail and all that he can do is to make a report in regard to the offence of theft or murder. That being the case, it is unlikely that he would utter the said words as regards advocate Punwani. It is necessary to note that Judge Vimadalal has made the following note on the docket sheet presumably on the day of the argument on March 4, 1963:

“The defendant states that the advocate would go to jail. Two cases already filed and two more proceedings”.

11. The defendant has argued that assuming that the learned Judge made the said note at the time of the argument in his Court, even so, the note does not say that he (defendant) uttered the words ‘He would see to it that advocate Punwani would go to jail’. There is undoubtedly slight difference in the wording of the report on this point and the wording in the note made on the docket sheet. But the distinction is without difference and no importance can be attached to the small hair-splitting distinction, which the defendant has ingeniously pointed out to us. The version that the defendant has set out in great detail at para. (11) of his affidavit is not also materially different from the one which the learned Judge has set out in his report. The defendant has admitted in the affidavit at para. (11) that he has lodged a complaint for defamation against advocate Punwani and has gone a step further and stated that advocate Punwani bears malice towards him. This complaint of defamation relates to the statements made by advocate Punwani in the course of his arguments in criminal case No. 588.S of 1962. The statements made by Mr. Punwani were similar to the statements which he made in the course of the arguments in support of the notice of motion in the City Civil Court. The defendant has also admitted that advocate Punwani is an accused in another criminal case, which was filed against the members of the managing committee of the Housing Society. He has also admitted that he stated that he intended to file two more criminal cases in which advocate Punwani would be an accused. He has then proceeded to say, ‘I am hoping that there would be a conviction in each of the four cases in which he will appear as an accused and that there will be a jail sentence’. This is what he stated before Judge Vimadalal on his own admission in this affidavit. Therefore, whether the version set out by Judge Vimadalal is accepted as true in its entirety,—and we see no reason as to why we should not accept the same—, or not, on his own admissions contained in the affidavit, it is quite clear that the defendant did say in the course of his arguments in respect of the notice of motion that he had already launched a criminal case for defamation against advocate Punwani in respect of the statements made by the advocate to the effect that the defendant is a notorious litigation-monger and that he has been convicted four times. On his own admission, the defendant also gave a threat that he intended to file two more criminal cases for what he calls the advocate's ‘wrong doing’. Of course, in this affidavit, he does not admit that he told the Court that he would launch a prosecution for defamation against advocate Punwani for the defamatory words uttered by him on March 4, 1963. At the same time, taking the context into account, it is clear that what the defendant hinted was that, he would launch such a prosecution and that too in respect of the statements made by the advocate in the course of the arguments. According to the defendant, the statements made by him do not amount to threat and what he stated was that he would take such legal action as he would be entitled to take on the basis of the wrong deeds committed by advocate Punwani. The question as to whether the statements made by the defendant amounted to threat or not would be considered by us at a later stage of this discussion. We will also consider the question as to whether, assuming that the statements do not amount to threat, they amounted to a conduct, which would interfere with or subvert the administration of justice. For the time being, we are only considering the two rival versions that have been placed before us and on a due consideration of the two versions, we have no hesitation in preferring the version put forward by the learned Judge Vimadalal, particularly, when the admissions contained in the affidavit of the defendant support the version of the learned Judge in its broad outline. It may be pointed out that advocate Punwani also has put in his affidavit fully supporting the version set out by Judge Vimadalal.

12. The next point that was urged by the defendant was that he had sufficient justification to make the comments which he made. According to him, the statements made by advocate Punwani were entirely irrelevant and beside the point, which was being considered by the City Civil Court. The defendant suggested that advocate Punwani went out of his way to make these defamatory statements so that he would be provoked into engaging himself into a brawl with the advocate. In the course of his arguments, he went so far as to say that had he been a little younger, he would perhaps have engaged himself in a brawl with the advocate on account of the highly provocative statements made by him. We are unable to accept that advocate Punwani's statements were beside the point or that they were provocative. Advocate Punwani was within his rights in referring to the past history of the defendant, and in particular, his conduct in launching upon unwarranted prosecutions and indulging in frivolous litigation. Mr. Punwani wanted to suggest that the defendant's action in launching the prosecution under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act was a piece of his general conduct. In other words, his argument was that the action of the defendant in going to the criminal Court under s. 24 of the Rent Control Act was utterly vexatious and made with a view to bring pressure upon the plaintiff to withdraw the suit. Nor do we think that the reference made by advocate Punwani in regard to the previous convictions of the defendant was beside the point. In the first place, these statements were based on the contents of the affidavit sworn to by the attorney of the plaintiff. In the second place, Mr. Punwani says that not only he was instructed by his client but that he tried to ascertain the truth of these statements and that he was supplied with a copy of the judgment in criminal case No. 135.P of 1951, which was pronounced on October 3, 1952. That was a prosecution under s. 323, Indian Penal Code, against the defendant initiated by the Colaba Police Station, in which the defendant was sentenced to undergo three months' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 150 or in default to undergo further three months' rigorous imprisonment. The defendant admitted in the above case that he had three previous convictions to his credit. In view of these circumstances, advocate Punwani was fully justified and enjoyed a privilege in making the statements, which he made in the course of his arguments. It is significant to note that in his affidavit the defendant has not denied the fact of any of these four previous convictions. He has only stated that these statements were defamatory. In the course of his arguments before us, the defendant asserted with considerable vehemence that he had preferred an appeal or a revision (he said, he did not remember which) from the conviction and sentence in criminal case No. 135.P of 1951 and that the conviction and sentence were quashed by the higher authorities. He has gone to the length of adding that the higher authorities had passed strictures against the Magistrate, who recorded the conviction. We repeatedly asked the defendant to give us the number of the appeal or revision or at least the year in which these proceedings were instituted. He told us frankly that he did not know either the number or the year when he preferred the appeal or revision. He has, however, advanced a somewhat ingenious argument before us in this respect. He quoted the maxim ‘every saint has a past and every sinner a future’. He pointed out that the convictions to which reference was made is a matter of past history and that many developments had taken place since 1952 and there has been no conviction against him since then. It is not necessary for us to pursue this line of reasoning any further. It is sufficient for us to observe that it is implicit in the argument advanced by the defendant himself that he does not dispute the factum of previous convictions. If that is so, advocate Punwani would be within his rights to make that statement.

13. In the course of his arguments, the defendant also made reference to the fact that he had made applications to the Bar Council for starting proceedings for misconduct against advocate Punwani. It is not disputed that the defendant has made an application on April 20, 1963, to the High Court for starting proceeding for misconduct in respect of certain acts committed by advocate Punwani between April 1963 and April 1964. It is not necessary for us to enter into the details of this question. The defendant however contended that this was not the first application made by him, but that he had made applications earlier, one in December 1962 and another in February 1963. Whatever that may be it is quite clear that he has made these applications; against advocate Punwani after the institution of the suit by the plaintiff against the defendant for eviction. We have referred to the multiplicity of the proceedings, which the defendant had started against advocate Punwani. We have to see in perspective as to whether the object of the defendant in launching these cases was to deter advocate Punwani from appearing on behalf of the plaintiff in the said suit or at least preventing him from discharging his duties fearlessly and impartially towards his client. The answer to this, question will depend upon the answer to another question viz., whether the statements attributed to the defendant by Judge Vimadalal amount to threat or, at any rate, amount to a course of conduct motivated with the object of frightening the advocate from discharging his duties towards his client. One of the arguments advanced by the defendant was that, assuming that all the statements attributed to him are true, still they do not amount to any kind of threat.

14. We will first consider the effect, in law of the words uttered by the defendant. In the present case, the defendant has not been accused of having committed any act of contempt, disregard or defiance or disobedience to the Judge. He has been accused of having made statements in respect of an advocate of the opposite party, and the point for consideration is, whether the statements amount to interference with the administration of justice. Oswald in his book on Contempt of Court, 3rd edn., page 6, says:

“To speak generally, contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during the litigation”.

15. At p. 91 of ‘Contempt, Committal & Attachment’ by Oswald, occurs the following passage:

“An insult to counsel may be punished as contempt. All publications which offend against the dignity of Court or are calculated to prejudice the course of justice will constitute contempt.”

16. It is settled law that disrespect or disregard to an advocate in certain circumstances so as to deter him from discharging his duties would amount to contempt of Court. The decision very much to the point was given by Niyogi J. in Telhara Cotton Ginning Co. v. Kashinath . [1940] A.I.R Nag. 110.. In that case, the defendant had addressed a notice to the advocate of the plaintiff demanding that certain allegations in the written statement of his client should be withdrawn unconditionally and an apology tendered on pain of legal proceedings being taken against him. Another letter was sent by the defendant or somebody interested in him to the plaintiff complaining against the counsel for his refusal to withdraw the allegations described as foolish. It was held:

“In sending the notice containing threats to the counsel, the defendant made a clear invasion of the counsel's right to represent his client's case loyally and properly and further interfered with the due performance of his duty towards his client. The addressing of notice and the letter was calculated to interfere with and to obstruct or divert the course of justice. Hence, he was guilty of contempt of Court”.

17. In the course of his judgment, Niyogi J. observed (p. 112):

“…The law of contempt covers the whole field of litigation itself. The real end of a judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, is to ascertain the true facts and dispense justice. Various persons have their respective contributions to make in the proper fulfilment of that task. They are necessarily the Judges or the Magistrates, the parties to the proceeding, or their agents or pleaders or advocates, the witnesses and the ministerial or menial staff of the Court. All these persons can well be described as the limbs of the judicial proceeding. For proper administration of justice it is essential that all these persons are, in the performance of their respective duties, ensured such fullness of freedom as is fair and legitimate. Anything that tends to curtail or impair the freedom of the limbs of the judicial proceeding must of necessity result in hampering the due administration of law and in interfering with the course of justice. It must therefore be held to constitute contempt of Court”.

18. The view taken by the Nagpur High Court has been endorsed by the Allahabad, Madras and Lahore High Courts. In Rajendra Singh v. Uma Prasad . 1934 I.L.R 57 All. 573. during the pendency of the suit a notice was sent on behalf of the plaintiff through his advocate to the defendant, threatening him that unless he withdrew the plea and paid a certain sum as damages he would be criminally prosecuted for defamation of the plaintiff's deceased father. Proceedings for contempt were taken out on this notice. It was held:

“Interference with the administration of justice is one of the well recognized heads of contempt of Court. In the present case the notice was undoubtedly intended to put extraneous pressure on the defendant in order to compel him, under threat of drastic action being taken against him, to withdraw the plea which had been taken by him specifically in the written statement. It amounted to a direct interference with the administration of justice in preventing or attempting to prevent the defendant from pressing the plea, which might prove to be a very substantial and legitimate defence; and in that way an indirect attempt was made to exclude that plea from the consideration of the court”.

19. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judges relied upon the decision in Smith v. Lakeman . 1856 26 L.J Ch. 305. in which an unsigned letter had been sent by the plaintiff to the defendant with a view to intimidating him in the conduct of his defence. The letter warned the defendant that he had a suit pending in Chancery and should it go up for judgment, he would at once be indicted for swindling, perjury and forgery and thus bring disgrace on his family. It was not mentioned who would start such prosecution, but the threat was that certain legal action in Court would be taken if the matter was pressed to final conclusion. Stuart, V.C, in committing the plaintiff for contempt remarked that the letter amounted to a threat for the purpose of intimidating him as a suitor, and therefore, whether it had that effect or not, was unquestionably a contempt of Court. It would be clear from the above decisions that a piece of conduct intended or calculated to bring pressure upon a party, which must necessarily include his advocate, not to pursue the matter according to his choice, would amount to an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. Secondly, the threat need not be direct, in the sense that the contemner specifically asserted that he would take such action. It is sufficient if the context showed that the action contemplated was the action of the contemner himself. A similar question arose in Thirumalaiappa v. Kumaraswami . [1956] A.I.R Mad. 621.. The Madras High Court referred to the leading case of French v. French . 1824 1 Hog. 138., which formed the basis of the statement on this subject contained in Oswald's Contempt of Court. The passage in Oswald (part of which has already been quoted) runs thus:

“An insult to counsel may be punished as a contempt. All publications which offend against the dignity of the Court, or are calculated to prejudice the course of justice, will constitute contempts. Offences of this nature are of three kinds, namely, those which (1) scandalise the Court, or (2) abuse the parties concerned in causes there, or (3) prejudices mankind against persons before the cause is heard. Under the first head fall libels on the integrity of the Court, its Judges, officers or proceedings; under the second and third heads anything which tends to excite prejudice against the parties or their litigation, while it is pending. For example, attacks on or abuse of a party, not amounting to an interference with the course of justice, does not amount to contempt, the party being left to his remedy by action”.

20. In French v. French an insult was given to a counsel while he was attending in the Master's office, which was situated within the precincts of the Court, It was held (p. 623):

“…Advocates who appear for the parties being officers of Court, any abuse or insult or aspersions cast oil them, which would interfere with the course of administration of justice, must necessarily be held to amount to contempt of Court”.

21. Reference was made by the Madras High Court to the Nagpur case and the observations of Niyogi J. have been cited with approval. At the same time, the Madras High Court did not take any action in regard to the insult levelled against the counsel, because the incident took place two days after the termination of the case.

22. In Nand Lal Bhalla v. Kishori Lal . 1946 48 Cr. L.J 757., the Inspector of Police issued threats and used insulting language towards an advocate. It was held that the advocate was threatened in the performance of his duties, and although there was no contempt of the Court directly, there was contempt inasmuch as an officer of the Court such as an advocate appearing in his professional capacity was threatened and insulted while in the performance of his professional duties in the Court.

23. In this background, let us now examine some of the arguments that were advanced by the defendant-contemner. The defendant referred to the meaning of the word ‘threat’ contained in the concise Oxford Dictionary. Several meanings of that word are mentioned. The defendant wanted to rely on the first and second meaning viz., ‘Declaration of intention to punish or hurt’; ‘such menace of bodily hurt or injury to reputation or property as may restrain person's freedom of action’. The third meaning of that word as given is, indication of coming evil and the fourth meaning is, threat of calamity. Even under the second meaning, it is quite clear that the language in order to amount to a threat need not necessarily be aimed at causing bodily injury or hurt. It is enough if it is calculated to cause injury to the reputation so as to restrain the freedom of action of that person. On examining the words used by the defendant, we feel no hesitation in holding that in effect the words amounted to a threat. As stated above, the question as to whether the words amounted to a threat is not of the essence of the matter. What is of the essence of the matter is the course of conduct adopted by the contemner, and if, on the whole, the conduct has a tendency to interfere with the course of administration of justice or subvert the course of justice, it would amount to contempt of Court. The defendant also argued that unless the threat is accompanied by a demand that the party or the counsel should not proceed with his action, the threat does not amount to contempt of Court. We do not think that the nexus between the threat and the demand for doing something or refraining from doing something need be express or need be expressly stated. It is enough if from the context the link between the two is apparent. In the present case, it is necessary to note that the threat was issued in the presence of the Court and in the course of the arguments before the Judge. It is quite clear that the object of the defendant was to bring undue pressure upon the advocate not to perform his duties in a fearless and proper manner. As we have already mentioned, the defendant had started a prosecution for defamation against advocate Punwani on account of similar statements made by him in the course of his arguments in criminal case No. 588.S of 1962. He also expressly stated that he would start two more prosecutions against the advocate and actually, he did start a prosecution on May 9, 1963, in connection with the arguments advanced by Mr. Punwani on March 4, 1963. The subsequent conduct of the defendant in so far as it relates to the prosecutions having been started against advocate Punwani is concerned, would, in our view, be relevant, and taking an overall view of the matter and having regard to the entire conduct of the defendant and further taking into account the circumstance that the threat was uttered in the course of the arguments and in the presence of the Judge, we feel no hesitation in holding that the threat was intended to operate upon the mind of the counsel so that he should flinch from performing his duties towards his client.

24. The defendant relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kamta Prasad v. Ram Agyam . [1950] All. 530.. In that case, the party to the dispute had made an offer for settlement of the dispute between the parties out of Court and as part of the settlement he suggested that the pending litigation should be withdrawn. He suggested that failing this, he would take legal proceedings open to him under the law. It was held that the party could not be said to be interfering with the course of justice, because all that he suggested was that if the suggested terms were not accepted, he would take such proceedings as were open to him to take in the matter. We are unable to understand how the decision of the Allahabad High Court, which proceeded on the peculiar facts of that case would in any way help the defendant in the arguments, which he is advancing. We notice that the Allahabad High Court referred to its earlier decision in Rajendra Singh's case and expressed its approval of the view taken in that case. It also referred to the decision in Smith v. Lakeman and pointed out that in the circumstances of that case, the threat issued by the party amounted to contempt of Court. The Allahabad High Court explained that in the notice merely an offer for compromise of a pending dispute was made and that offer was coupled with a warning that proceedings which were open in law to the opposite parties would be taken in case the offer was rejected. At pages 541 and 542 the learned Judges have set out five propositions, and it was the contention of the defendant, in the present case, that these propositions assist him in the argument, which he is advancing. Now, the first proposition was based on the decision of Smith v. Lakeman, and, in our view, the present case would fall within the ambit of the first proposition laid down in the said case. The other propositions enunciated in that case have no relation to the facts of the present case. Some of the propositions were not necessary even for the decision of the case and, therefore, will have to be treated as obiter dicta. The facts of the present case are particularly strong, as we have repeatedly pointed out, because unlike in most of the cases referred to above wherein the threats were given outside the Court, in the present case, the threat was given in the presence of the Court and in the course of the hearing of the case, and one prosecution for defamation was launched before the threat was administered and again a second prosecution for defamation against the advocate Punwani, for the arguments advanced by him in the present case, was actually started by the defendant and in that way, the threat was carried out.

25. It may be pointed out that just as the statements made by advocate Punwani viz., that the defendant was an ex-convict, was supported by the judgment, a certified copy of which was with him, in the same way, his statement that the defendant was a notorious litigant was also supported from the observations made by Stone C.J in Emperor v. Jehangir Jassawalla . 1946 49 Bom. L.R 393.. It is not necessary to refer to the facts of that case and it is enough to point out that the defendant had started as many as twenty prosecutions against one Jassawalla, who in his turn had also started some prosecutions against the defendant restraining him from starting subsequent prosecutions against the same party and it was in that connection that the learned Chief Justice observed:

“… in Mr. Vaney's case there is no doubt that he is a vexatious litigant”.

26. Now, to give a threat to an advocate suggesting that prosecution for defamation would be launched against him in respect of the statements made by him against the defendant which were supported by unimpeachable evidence, is certainly to try to bring pressure on the advocate with the object of deterring him from performing his duties towards his client. It is established law that a statement made by an advocate on the basis of instructions taken from the client and after verifying that it is well-founded, is privileged and protected. It is in respect of a privileged statement that the defendant had taken the extraordinary step of launching prosecution for defamation. Again, it is in respect of a similar statement made in support of the notice of motion that the defendant brandished a threat of prosecution. Later on, he has implemented that and started a second prosecution. And in his affidavit in this Court, he has repeatedly stated that the statements of the advocate are per se defamatory. The course of conduct on which the defendant had launched himself will have to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether it was the object of the defendant to pressurise advocate Punwani into withdrawing from the case so as to avoid further harassment or, at any rate, to deter him from discharging his duties to his client, honestly, efficiently and fearlessly, by keeping the sword of prosecution hanging over his head.

27. The law on this question has been clarified in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh v. Gurbaksh Singh . [1962] A.I.R S.C 1172.. In that case, after citing the passage from Oswald's Contempt of Court, which has already been quoted by us above, their Lordships referred to the facts of the case and observed that although departmental proceedings were started against the officer in accordance with the directions contained in the circular still the launching of these proceedings would have a deterring effect upon the officer, who had already filed a suit to ventilate his grievances. At page 1177, their Lordships observed:

“…What would be the effect of these proceedings on the suit which was pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar? From the practical point of view, the institution of the proceedings at a time when the suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, was pending could only be to put pressure on the respondent to withdraw his suit, or face the consequences of disciplinary action. This, in our opinion, undoubtedly amounted to contempt of Court. There are many ways of obstructing the Court and ‘any conduct by which the course of justice is perverted, either by a party or a stranger, is a contempt; thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending; or abusing a party in letters to persons likely to be witnesses in the cause, have been held to be contempts’. …The question is not whether the action in fact interfered, but whether it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The action taken in this case against the respondent by way of a proceeding against him can, in our opinion, have only one tendency, namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. If that be the clear and unmistakable tendency of the proceedings taken against the respondent, then there can be no doubt that in law the appellants have been guilty of contempt of Court, even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter”.

28. It may be noted that in the above case, there were no threats issued by the Government. What the Government did was that it started departmental disciplinary action against the respondent, and it was this action which was taken by the Government in accordance with a circular issued by it which raised the question as to whether it amounted to contempt. Their Lordships held that launching of departmental proceedings itself amounted to contempt of Court, because it would exert pressure upon the respondent either to withdraw from the case or at any rate not to press it. Their Lordships have considered the question from the practical point of view and have considered the possible effect of the institution of the proceedings upon the respondent. In the present case also, advocate Punwani would be placed on the horns of a dilemma either to withdraw from the case or face the consequences of multiplicity of criminal proceedings and all these in respect of the statements made by him in the discharge of his duties as a counsel. We, therefore, feel no hesitation in holding that judged, as a whole, the words used by the defendant and his conduct amounted to contempt of Court.

29. We may consider one more argument that was urged by the defendant. The defendant contended that since the words, which, according to the Judge, amount to contempt, were uttered in his presence, the matter can be dealt with under s. 228, Indian Penal Code, and, therefore, the High Court cannot take cognizance of that matter in view of the provisions of s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Sub-section (2) of s. 3 of the said Act runs thus:

“No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code”.

30. Section 228, Indian Penal Code, runs thus:

“Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both”.

31. The offence under s. 228, Indian Penal Code, can arise only in the case of a public servant, while he is sitting in a judicial proceeding. In the present case, the threat has not been addressed to the Judge, but it has been addressed to the advocate. Although the advocate is a part of the machinery of the administration of justice, he is not a public servant within the meaning of that expression in s. 228, Indian Penal Code. It is on this short ground that the argument advanced by the defendant can be disposed of. But the matter does not rest there. In order that the proceedings are barred under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, it is further necessary to establish that the offence committed by the contemner in the presence of the Court is such as can be punished as contempt. It is not enough that the offence is punishable under any other law. This position is clear from the wording of s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. There is also ample authority in support of the said proposition, vide Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State Of Madras . [1952] A.I.R S.C 149. and State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar . [1959] A.I.R S.C 102.. As against this, the defendant relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Allu . 1922 I.L.R 45 All. 272.. We, however, notice that the learned Judge (it was a decision of a single Judge) has not discussed the question at all and since the conclusion is stated without any discussion or reasoning, we do not think that conclusion is entitled to much weight. Although the defendant had urged as one of the points in the affidavit that s. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act was ultra vires the Constitution, in the course of his arguments however he fairly conceded that would not be the position and did not press the matter further.

32. Before concluding, we may refer to one more circumstance and it is this. We are told at the bar that when this matter came up before the Division. Bench comprising the Chief Justice and Gokhale J., and when it was suggested that the defendant should offer an apology, the defendant told the Court that, he would offer an apology if he was convinced that he had committed a wrong. The defendant accepted the above statement made by advocate Punwani at the bar.

33. When the matter came up before the Division Bench comprising Patel and Kantawala JJ. the defendant told us that he did offer an apology, but he added that the Government Pleader as also the plaintiff's advocate objected to accepting his apology and requested that the matter should be proceeded with. When the defendant started his arguments before us, he began by asking us as to what would happen if he were to tender an apology. We told him that if he thought it proper, he may tender an unconditional apology, because after all, the apology should be born out of repentance or remorse. We also pointed out to him that he could not enter into any kind of stipulation with the Court. The matter rested at that.

34. We have now to consider the quantum of punishment to be imposed on the defendant. We asked the learned Assistant Government Pleader as also the defendant as to what should be the proper punishment for this offence. The learned Assistant Government Pleader pointed out that this is a third contempt committed by the defendant. The first contempt committed by the defendant appears to have taken place before 1947. Reference to the same is to be had at p. 395 in Emperor v. Jehangir Jassawalla where Stone C.J during the course of the narration of the antecedents of the defendant observed:

“…Mr. Vaney was fined for his contempt of Court”.

35. The learned Assistant Government Pleader also drew our attention to a recent case, wherein the defendant was charged with the same offence by this Court. That was in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 188 of 1960. That matter came up before the Chief Justice and one of us viz., Tambe J., on January 9, 1961. The defendant having tendered an unconditional apology the proceedings were dropped. It, therefore, appears that the defendant has been in the habit of making reckless allegations against the Court or the officers of the Court. Ordinarily, we would have awarded a sentence which would have deterred him from taking similar action in future. When we asked the defendant as to what he has to say about the punishment, he stated that the matter is left in our hands. In the course of his arguments, the defendant told us that he was suffering from low blood pressure and he found it difficult to argue the matter beyond the first part of the day on the 14th. He, therefore, requested that the matter should be adjourned to the next day. The defendant also appears to be an old man. In view of his age and the condition of his-health, we feel averse to sending him to jail. In our view, the ends of justice would be met if we direct him to pay a fine of Rs, 1,000. We hope that the imposition of the said punishment, which errs on the side of leniency, would have a sobering effect upon the defendant. We also direct that the defendant should pay the costs of these proceedings. We grant two months' time from, today to the defendant to pay the amount of fine.