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Khandchand Pokardas v. Harumal D. Varma
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Tulzapurkar, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This revisional application concerns whether the Poona Court could entertain a pauper suit for damages for malicious prosecution. Prior to February 4, 1962, the defendant in Bombay entrusted diamonds (valued at Rs. 15,000) to Jairamdas (the plaintiff's brother) for sale on commission. Jairamdas's pocket was picked while travelling from Bombay to Poona. The defendant filed a criminal complaint on February 14, 1962 in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate at Esplanade, Bombay, charging Jairamdas and the plaintiff with criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and abetment under sections 403 and 406 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Summons in the criminal complaint were served on the plaintiff and his brother at Poona.
Evidence was led for the complainant, but on November 27, 1962 a compromise was reached whereby Jairamdas and the plaintiff agreed to pay back Rs. 15,000 in instalments; the criminal complaint was dismissed and both accused were discharged. The criminal Court observed in its judgment that the plaintiff was "wrongly prosecuted" and that there was "no iota of evidence to connect" him with the offence.
The plaintiff then presented a pauper suit (Misc. Application No. 206 of 1963) in the Poona Civil Court on April 15, 1963, claiming Rs. 10,000 as damages for malicious prosecution. The suit was transferred to the 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Poona. After notice, the defendant contested jurisdiction among other contentions. The trial Judge held that, because the criminal summons had been served upon the plaintiff in Poona, the Poona Court had jurisdiction under section 19 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), and directed further hearing. The defendant filed the present revision against the trial Court's order of July 31, 1963.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Poona Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try a pauper suit for malicious prosecution when the criminal summons in the underlying prosecution were served on the plaintiff within Poona's territorial limits (i.e., application of section 19 CPC).
- Whether service of process (summons) in the criminal proceedings at a particular place can be regarded as part of the wrong done to the person for purposes of establishing territorial jurisdiction under section 19 CPC, even if service is not an essential element of the cause of action for malicious prosecution.
- Whether the Poona Court would also have jurisdiction on the alternative basis that part of the cause of action arose in Poona (invoking section 20 CPC) — although the Court treated this as unnecessary to decide.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Poona Court lacked jurisdiction because no cause of action arose within its territorial limits; the wrong (i.e., institution of the criminal prosecution) occurred in Bombay where the criminal complaint was filed.
- Service of summons in Poona is not a part of the cause of action for malicious prosecution and therefore the mere fact of service at Poona cannot confer jurisdiction on the Poona Court (relying on the elements of malicious prosecution: filing a prosecution, malice, and acquittal).
- As a hypothetical, the defendant argued that a criminal complaint might be dismissed without any process being served, yet still give rise to damages for malicious prosecution; thus service cannot be essential to jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Poona Court has jurisdiction under section 19 CPC because the criminal summons in the prosecution were served on the plaintiff at Poona; service of process at Poona makes that place one where a wrong to the person was committed.
- The plaintiff also pleaded particulars of special and general damages (including fees to counsel, travelling and business loss, and mental and bodily pain), and thus alternatively contended that part of the cause of action and part of the damages were suffered in Poona — invoking jurisdiction under section 20 CPC as well.
- Therefore, according to the plaintiff, jurisdiction lay in Poona both because a part of the wrong was effected there (service) and because part of the damages were suffered there.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gokaldas v. Baldevdas, [1961] A.I.R Mysore 188 | Authority indicating a similar view that service of process may be relevant to territorial jurisdiction for wrongs to the person (as applied to malicious prosecution). | The Court noted that the Mysore High Court had taken a similar view; this was cited as supportive authority for the conclusion that service at Poona could render the Poona Court competent under s. 19 CPC. |
| Alexander v. Indrakrishna, [1933] A.I.R Cal. 706 | Referenced by the trial Judge; involved a Letters Patent matter (not considered with reference to s. 19 CPC in that case). | The Court observed that this ruling was under the Letters Patent and the question before it had not been considered under s. 19 CPC, so it was of limited relevance to the section 19 issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began with the statutory language of section 19 CPC: a suit for compensation for a wrong to the person can be brought either in the Court where the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, or in the Court within whose local limits the wrong was done. The central question was whether service of the criminal process at Poona constituted part of the "wrong" to the plaintiff for purposes of s. 19.
The defendant's argument was that the essential elements of the cause of action for malicious prosecution are (a) filing a criminal prosecution, (b) doing so maliciously, and (c) acquittal, and that service of summons was not part of that cause of action; therefore service in Poona could not confer jurisdiction. The Court rejected this contention as founded on a fallacy of conflating "cause of action" with the broader notion of a "wrong" for territorial jurisdiction.
The Court explained the distinction: service of process may not be necessary to establish the cause of action in a suit for malicious prosecution, but that does not mean that, when service is in fact effected, service cannot be part of the wrongful acts constituting the prosecution. Malicious prosecution is characterised as a malicious abuse of the process of the criminal Court. When that process is served upon the person at a particular location, the service is part of the prosecution and hence part of the wrong done to the person at that place.
Consequently, the Court concluded that where a malicious prosecution involved service of process at a particular place, the Court within whose local limits that service (i.e., that part of the wrong) was effected would have jurisdiction under s. 19 CPC. The trial Judge's view that the Poona Court had jurisdiction because the summons were served at Poona was therefore upheld.
The Court also noted that the Mysore High Court had reached a similar conclusion in Gokaldas v. Baldevdas (1961). The Alexander v. Indrakrishna decision cited by the trial Judge was distinguished as being under the Letters Patent where the issue had not been considered with reference to s. 19 CPC.
As the Court found jurisdiction to exist under s. 19 CPC on the basis of service of the summons, it held that it was unnecessary to decide whether section 20 CPC (part of the cause of action arising in Poona) applied in this case.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court discharged the rule in the revisional application and upheld the trial Judge's decision that the Poona Court had jurisdiction to entertain the pauper suit for malicious prosecution because the criminal summons had been served upon the plaintiff at Poona (jurisdiction under section 19 CPC).
The revisional rule was discharged with costs and the Court ordered "Rule discharged."
Implications
- Direct effect: The Poona Civil Court was properly competent to proceed with the plaintiff's pauper suit for malicious prosecution because service of the criminal process at Poona constituted part of the wrong done to the plaintiff within Poona's territorial limits.
- Scope: The Court did not decide whether section 20 CPC independently conferred jurisdiction (finding such a determination unnecessary once jurisdiction under section 19 was established).
- Precedential note: The Court observed the Mysore High Court's similar view in Gokaldas v. Baldevdas; no broader or novel legal principle beyond the statutory interpretation of s. 19 CPC was claimed to be established by this opinion.
Tulzapurkar, J.:— This revisional application raises a neat question of jurisdiction, whether the Poona Court can entertain a pauper suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution. The relevant facts are these. Some time prior to February 4, 1962, the defendant in Bombay entrusted certain diamonds of the value of Rs. 15,000 to one Jairamdas, the brother of the plaintiff for the purpose of sale on commission, but while Jairamdas was travelling from Bombay to Poona his pocket was picked. However, the defendant filed a criminal complaint against Jairamdas and the plaintiff (both of whom carry on business as jewellers at Poona) in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate at Esplanade, Bombay, charging them with the offences of criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust and abetment thereof under ss. 403 and 406 read with s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code. This criminal complaint was filed by the defendant on February 14, 1962 and after obtaining the process from the criminal Court in that behalf, the defendant effected service of the summons upon the plaintiff and his brother at Poona. It appears that evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant (defendant) was led in the criminal Court but on November 27, 1962, a compromise was arrived at where-under Jairam and the plaintiff agreed to pay back Rs. 15,000 to the defendant in certain instalments notwithstanding the fact that the diamonds had been stolen during Jairamdas's journey from Bombay to Poona. As a result of the compromise the criminal complaint was dismissed and both the plaintiff as well as his brother were discharged. But while discharging them the criminal Court in its judgment observed as follows:
“There is no iota of evidence to connect Accused No. 2 (Plaintiff) with this offence. In my opinion Accused No. 2 (Plaintiff) is wrongly prosecuted in this case.”
2. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a pauper suit against the defendant claiming Rs. 10,000 as damages for malicious prosecution by presenting Miscellaneous Application No. 206 of 1963 to the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Poona, on April 15, 1963. The pauper petition was in due course transferred to the 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, of Poona. After notice to show cause was issued and served upon the defendant, the defendant raised several contentions at exh. 10. Inter alia it was contended by the defendant that the Poona Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit as no cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. The plaintiff urged that inasmuch as the process of the criminal Court had been served upon him at Poona on October 26, 1962, a part of the cause of action arose in Poona and therefore, the Poona Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
3. The learned Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Poona, at the instance of both the parties raised a preliminary point about the jurisdiction and after hearing the advocates, held that since the summons in the criminal case had been served upon the plaintiff in Poona, he had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and he, therefore, directed that the hearing of the pauper petition be proceeded further. Against this order passed by the trial Court on July 31, 1963, the defendant has come up in revision to this Court.
4. On behalf of the defendant, Mr. Keshavdas strenuously urged before me that the plaintiff in his pauper petition claimed jurisdiction in the Poona Court solely on the ground that the summons in the criminal case was served upon him in Poona and he, therefore, contended that fact by itself could not give jurisdiction to the Poona Court in view of s. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, which was applicable to the facts of the case. On the other hand Mr. Mhamane, on behalf of the plaintiff, brought to my notice that the plaintiff in the body of his plaint had claimed special damages amounting to Rs. 1,500 comprising of 3 items: (i) Rs. 700 being fees paid to Shri T.C Motwani, advocate, (ii) Rs. 300 for travelling, diet and other expenses and (iii) Rs. 500 for loss of business as a jeweller and further claimed Rs. 8,500 as and by way of general damages comprised of (i) Rs. 1,500 for mental and bodily pain and (ii) Rs. 700 for loss of reputation and after setting out these particulars of damages claimed by him the plaintiff in para. 11 of his plaint averred that the cause of action arose at Poona within the jurisdiction of the Poona Court as the summons of the criminal proceedings was served upon him at Poona on August 26, 1962. In other words, according to Mr. Mhamane, the plaintiff claimed jurisdiction in the Poona Court both on the ground that the summons of the criminal case was served upon him in Poona and that thereby a personal wrong had been done to him in Poona and also on the ground that a part of the eause of action had arisen in Poona inasmuch as some part of the special damages and some part of the general damages were suffered by him in Poona. According to Mr. Mhamane, therefore, the Poona Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit both under ss. 19 and 20 of the Civil Procedure Code. In my view, irrespective of the question as to whether s. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable to the facts of the case or not, Poona Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit under the provisions of s. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code.
5. It is clear that under s. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code a suit for compensation for a wrong done to the person can be filed either in the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain or in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the wrong was done. What has been urged by Mr. Keshavdas is that in the present case the wrong to the person of the plaintiff was already done by the defendant when he instituted the criminal complaint against the plaintiff in the Esplanade Court at Bombay for the alleged offences under ss. 403 and 406 read with s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code and service of summons upon the plaintiff cannot be regarded as any part of the wrong done to the plaintiff. He further urged that in a suit for malicious prosecution, the cause of action consists of three things: (a) filing of a criminal prosecution, (b) doing so maliciously and (c) acquittal of the accused by the criminal Court and the plaintiff, if he establishes these facts, would be entitled to get his damages without proving the fact that he was served with the summons in the criminal case. He further went on to point out that in a conceivable case, the criminal Court may even without issuing any notice or process to the accused (plaintiff) dismiss the criminal complaint filed by a complainant (defendant) and even in such a case, if such criminal complaint was filed maliciously the plaintiff would be entitled to claim damages. He, therefore, contended that the mere fact that the summons in the criminal case was served upon the plaintiff at a particular place would not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of the place where such service was effected. It is difficult to accept Mr. Keshavdas's contention, for in my view, it proceeds upon a fallacy, for Mr. Keshavdas assumes that a fact which may not constitute a part of the cause of action in a suit for malicious prosecution does not also constitute a part of the wrong done to the person of the plaintiff when the criminal complaint is maliciously instituted against the plaintiff. It is true that the fact that process of the criminal Court was served upon the plaintiff would not go to constitute a part of the cause of action for a malicious prosecution but it is quite a different thing to say that service of process of a criminal Court is no part of the wrong done to the person of a plaintiff, when after filing the criminal case the summons is actually served upon the plaintiff. What is required under s. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code is that the wrong to the person must have been done to the plaintiff within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit to recover damages for the said wrong is instituted and in a given case a wrong may consist of a series of acts. It is clear that a malicious prosecution is in essence a malicious abuse of the process of the criminal Court and if such abuse of the process of the criminal Court is made at a particular place by serving that process upon the person, who was maliciously prosecuted, the wrong could be said to have been done at the place where the person was served with the summons. It is one thing to say that it is not necessary for the plaintiff claiming damages for malicious prosecution, to establish that he was actually served with the summons in the criminal case, but it is quite a different thing to say that the service of summons, if one has been done, cannot be regarded as part of the prosecution. If the essence of the malicious prosecution is a malicious abuse of the process of the criminal Court then it is obvious that service of the said process of the criminal Court upon a person will be a part of the prosecution. It is, therefore, clear that the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction that part of the wrong was done will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit for malicious prosecution. In my view, therefore, the learned trial Judge was right in taking the view that the summons in the criminal case having been served upon the plaintiff at Poona, he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit under s. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code. I may indicate that the Mysore High Court has also taken a similar view in Gokaldas v. Baldevdas . [1961] A.I.R Mysore 188.. The other ruling relied upon by the learned trial Judge viz. in Alexander v. Indrakrishna . [1933] A.I.R Cal. 706., it must be pointed out, was in a case under the Letters Patent and the question was not considered with reference to s. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code.
6. In this view of the matter, it is really unnecessary to decide the question as to whether the Poona Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the basis that part of the cause of action arose in Poona inasmuch as the plaintiff alleged that he suffered part of the damages (special as well as general) in Poona.
7. The rule in the revisional application is, therefore, discharged with costs.
8. Rule discharged.
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