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Shri Adinath Tirthankar Jain Mandir v. Shri Shantappa Dada Madnaik
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit property is land that originally belonged to Devappa. After Devappa and his son Annappa died, the property passed to Devappa's widow Ratnabai. Ratnabai executed a gift-deed on July 23, 1945, donating the suit land to "Shri Adinath Tirthankar Jain Mandir" (defendant No. 1). Ratnabai died later in 1945.
The plaintiff alleges that he and defendants Nos. 2 to 4 are reversioners to the estate of Annappa and filed suit for partition and separate possession of a one-fourth share, asserting that Ratnabai, as a widow in a joint Hindu family, had only a limited estate and thus lacked authority to donate the land to the Mandir.
The Charity Commissioner is defendant No. 5. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction under section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 ("the Act"). The plaintiff appealed to the District Court, Kolhapur; the Assistant Judge set aside the trial Court's decree and remanded the suit for disposal on merits, holding that the suit was not barred by s. 80. Trustees of the Mandir and the Charity Commissioner appealed the remand order to the High Court, which is the subject of this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the question raised by the plaintiff—specifically whether Ratnabai had the capacity or authority to create the alleged trust by gifting the property—falls within the matters covered by section 79 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.
- Whether, in consequence, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the plaintiff's suit is barred by section 80 of the Act where the plaintiff was not a party to any prior inquiry under section 19 of the Act.
- Whether statutory remedies under the Act (including sections 22A, 70A and 72) provide an adequate alternative for a person who was not a party to earlier inquiries under sections 18 and 19 and who claims title to property recorded as trust property.
Arguments of the Parties
Trustees' and Charity Commissioner's Arguments
- Relying on sections 79 and 80 of the Act, they contended that the question in the suit—whether the land belongs to the plaintiff and other reversioners or to the Mandir as public trust property—falls within the jurisdiction of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner under section 79.
- They argued that incidental questions (including whether the author of the alleged trust had the authority to create it) must be decided by those officers while determining whether a public trust exists, and that therefore civil court jurisdiction is barred by s. 80.
- They relied on precedents (identified in the opinion) for the proposition that the Act places final determination of such matters with the statutory authorities created by the Act.
Plaintiff's Contentions (as reflected in the plaint and the court's characterisation)
- The plaintiff asserts he and defendants Nos. 2–4 are reversioners to Annappa's estate and claim partition and separate possession of one-fourth share of the suit land.
- The plaintiff contends that Ratnabai, being a widow in a joint Hindu family, had only a limited estate and lacked authority to donate the land to the Mandir; accordingly, no valid trust was created and the donation is void as against his title.
- Implicitly, the plaintiff maintains that this claim to title can be adjudicated by the Civil Court despite prior or possible inquiries under the Act because he was not a party to any such inquiry under section 19.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Taraben Baldevdas v. Charity Commr. (1955 57 Bom. L.R. 1069) | Invoked by respondents to support the contention that the Charity Commissioner (or his officers) must decide whether a public trust exists and incidental questions arising in that determination. | The court noted that the specific question before the present appeals was not decided in Taraben Baldevdas and that the matter was expressly left open in that case; therefore it did not resolve the issue here. |
| Gurusiddappa v. Miraj Education Society (1960 63 Bom. L.R. 312) | Discussed the scope of s. 50 of the Act and whether consent of the Charity Commissioner was necessary; used to argue the Act regulates matters involving public trust administration. | The court observed that in Gurusiddappa the issue before it was different (s. 50 consent) and that the present question (capacity of author to create a trust and jurisdiction under ss.79–80) did not directly arise in that case, limiting its applicability. |
| Shirgonda Kalgonda Patil v. Amritrao Anandrao Bhoperao (1960 Civil Revision Application No. 483 of 1960, Unrep.) | Cited for some observations that seemed to favour the contention that matters could be adjudicated under the Act's machinery. | The court distinguished this decision on facts: in Shirgonda the petitioners sought to be joined in proceedings under s.72, so they had invoked the Act's procedures; that factual posture made the case different from the present appeals where the plaintiff was not a party to prior proceedings. |
| Kuberbhai v. Purshottamdas (1961 2 Guj. L.R. 564) | Discussed the character of inquiries under the Act (s.19) as adjudicatory and the import of ss.79 and 80 in making certain decisions final and conclusive; used to argue civil courts may be barred. | The court noted that in Kuberbhai the plaintiffs had actually pursued remedies before the Charity Commissioner and did not follow up s.72; consequently, the decision rested on that procedural fact and does not support the trustees' contention in the present appeals where the plaintiff was not a party to earlier proceedings. |
| Prataprao Marutrao Pangavane v. Raje Laxmanrao Vyankatrao Deshmukh (1962 First Appeal No. 353 of 1959, Unrep.) | Cited for the observation that it is difficult to assert Charity Commissioners have exclusive jurisdiction where titles of third parties may be involved, and that the Act's summary procedure is ill-suited for complicated title inquiries. | The court expressly agreed with these observations (while noting they were obiter in that case) and relied on them to support the view that Civil Court jurisdiction should not be excluded in the absence of clear legislative intent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the decisive question as whether the plaintiff's claim—namely that Ratnabai lacked the authority to create the gift and hence no trust exists—is covered by section 79 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, thereby attracting the bar in section 80 against Civil Court jurisdiction.
The court analysed the parties' contentions and the statutory scheme:
- It observed that the plaintiff's suit is essentially a challenge to the capacity of the author (Ratnabai) to create the alleged trust; that issue, if decided in the plaintiff's favour, would mean no trust exists.
- The trustees and the Charity Commissioner argued the Act empowers the Deputy/Assistant Charity Commissioner and Charity Commissioner under s.79 to decide whether a public trust exists and that incidental questions must be decided by them; hence s.80 bars civil jurisdiction.
- The court examined prior authorities relied upon by the respondents and found them distinguishable or not directly in point:
- Taraben Baldevdas did not decide the precise question and left it open.
- Gurusiddappa concerned s.50 and administrative/management disputes; it did not directly address the present issue.
- Shirgonda Kalgonda Patil involved petitioners who had sought to be joined in proceedings under s.72 and therefore was distinguishable on facts.
- Kuberbhai involved plaintiffs who had already availed themselves of remedies under the Act and had not pursued s.72; the decision was based on that factual situation and therefore did not support the trustees' contention here.
- The court analysed the statutory remedies available to non-parties:
- Section 22A: The court held s.22A is limited to inquiring into particulars that were not the subject-matter of the original s.19 inquiry. It does not provide a mechanism for a person who was not a party to s.19 proceedings to reopen the matter merely by asserting title to a property already held to be trust property. Section 22A is discretionary and the Deputy/Assistant Charity Commissioner may refuse further inquiry.
- Section 70A: The court observed that s.70A gives the Charity Commissioner discretion to re-open an inquiry but does not constitute an adequate remedy because the Charity Commissioner is not bound to re-open.
- Section 72: The court noted the scope of an inquiry under s.72 is limited; further, there is no provision for public notice in the Act, weakening the proposition that non-parties routinely have full remedial protection via the Act's mechanisms.
- The court adopted the reasoning of Prataprao (Patel, J.) that it would be inappropriate to treat the Charity Commissioners as having exclusive jurisdiction in cases where titles of third parties are involved because (a) summary procedures under s.19 may be unsuited for complex title inquiries, and (b) the statutory scheme does not clearly and expressly oust Civil Court jurisdiction in such cases.
- Putting these points together, the court concluded that the question whether Ratnabai had the authority to create the trust did not fall within the matters covered by s.79 in such a way as to bar the plaintiff's suit under s.80, especially where the plaintiff was not a party to any prior inquiry under s.19.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court confirmed the order of the lower appellate Court and dismissed the appeals. The court held that the present suit is not barred by section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (read with section 79) insofar as the plaintiff, who was not a party to prior proceedings under section 19, seeks to challenge the capacity of Ratnabai to create the alleged trust.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The remand order of the lower appellate Court stands, so the suit is to be disposed of on merits by the trial Court; appeals by the trustees of the Mandir and by the Charity Commissioner were dismissed. Costs were made costs in the cause.
- Legal consequence noted by the court: Where a person was not a party to inquiries under sections 18 and 19 of the Act and seeks to establish title by challenging the capacity of the author of an alleged trust, Civil Court jurisdiction is not automatically ousted by sections 79 and 80 of the Act unless there is clear legislative intent to that effect. The court emphasized the limited scope and discretionary character of statutory remedies (e.g., ss.22A and 70A) for non-parties.
- The court did not treat the decision as an invitation to displace the Act's machinery in appropriate cases; rather, it required a clear statutory exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction before holding suits like the present to be barred.
Chitale, J.:— These are appeals by the trustees of ‘Shri Adinath Tirthankar Jain Mandir’ and the Charity Commissioner against the order of remand passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Kolhapur.
2. These appeals arise in this way. The suit property, which is land, originally belonged to one Devappa. After the death of Devappa and his son Annappa, Devappa's property was inherited by his widow Ratnabai. She donated the suit land to ‘Shri Adinath Tirthankar Jain Mandir,’ which is defendant No. 1 in the present suit. The gift-deed was executed on July 23, 1945. After the execution of that gift-deed Ratnabai died sometime later during the same year. The plaintiff alleges that he and defendants Nos. 2 to 4 are reversioners to the estate of Annappa. The plaintiff filed the present suit for partition and separate possession of his one-fourth share in the suit land. According to the plaintiff, Ratnabai as a widow in the joint Hindu family had a limited estate and she had no right to donate the suit land to the said Mandir. On these allegations, partition and separate possession of one fourth share is claimed by the plaintiff. The Charity Commissioner is defendant No. 5 in the present suit. The suit was contested on various grounds, one of them being that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit in view of s. 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The trial Court upheld that contention and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. Against this decision, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the District Court, Kolhapur. The learned Assistant Judge, who heard the appeal, held that the present suit is not barred under s. 80 of the above-said Act. He, therefore, set aside the decree passed by the trial Court and remanded the suit to the trial Court for disposal on merits. It is against this decision, that Appeal from Order No. 271 of 1962 is preferred by the trustees of the above said Mandir. Appeal from Order No. 302 of 1962 is preferred by the Charity Commissioner against the same decision.
3. Mr. Shrikhande, who appears for the trustees, and Mr. Abhyankar, who appears for the Charity Commissioner, both contend that the view taken by the trial Court is correct and that of the lower appellate Court is wrong. Reliance is placed on ss. 79 and 80 of the Act. It is urged that the question in the present suit is whether the suit land is the property of the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 to 4, or whether it is the property of a public trust in the name of defendant No. 1. This question must be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner under s. 79, hence jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under s. 80 of the Act. I am unable to accept this contention. Considering the allegations in the plaint in the present suit, it is clear that the question raised by the present suit is whether the author of the alleged trust, viz. Ratnabai, had the capacity to create the trust in question. According to the plaintiff, Ratnabai had no authority to create the trust, hence no trust exists in the eyes of law. That is the contention raised by the present suit. Thus the question for determination in these appeals is whether the above-said question, viz. whether Ratnabai had the authority to create the trust in question, is covered by s. 79 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. It is urged by Messers Shrikhande and Abhyankar that under the Act, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner has to decide whether a public trust exists or not and while deciding that they have also jurisdiction to decide the above-said question. It is further urged that not only they have jurisdiction to decide that, but they are bound to decide it while arriving at the finding whether a public trust exists or not. In other words, while deciding whether a public trust exists or not, all other incidental questions could be decided, in fact they have got to be decided, by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on a decision of this Court, viz. Taraben Baldevdas v. Charity Commr. . 1955 57 Bom. L.R 1069.. As pointed out by the learned appellate Judge, the question that arises in these appeals was not decided in that case and it was expressly left open. Reference is also made to Gurusiddappa v. Miraj Education Society . 1960 63 Bom. L.R 312.. In the first place, in that case the question that arose was whether the suit was barred, because the consent of the Charity Commissioner was not obtained, as provided by s. 50 of the Act. The question that arises in these appeals did not directly arise in that case. Mr. Justice Naik took the view that it is only in the cases of disputes arising out of administration and management of public trusts that the Charity Commissioner comes into the picture and s. 50 of the Act provides that the Charity Commissioner or with his consent two or more persons interested in the trust can file a suit for any of the various reliefs set out in sub-cls. (a) to (h) of cl. (iii) of s. 50. With these observations Mr. Justice Naik held that the claim in that suit did not fall within the scope of the said section. Messrs Abhyankar and Shrikhande rely on a decision of Mr. Justice Gokhale in Shirgonda Kalgonda Patil v. Amritrao Anandrao Bhoperao . 1960 Civil Revision Application No. 483 of 1960, decided by Mr. Justice Gokhale, on August 23, 1960 Unrep.. Some of the observations in that decision seem to favour the contention advanced by Messrs Abhyankar and Shrikhande. It is, however, important to note that in that case an application under s. 72 of the Act was filed in the District Court. The petitioners before Mr. Justice Gokhale having come to know of that application under s. 72 of the Act applied to the District Court praying that they should be joined as parties to that application. That prayer was rejected and against that order a revision application was preferred to this Court. Thus, in that case the petitioners themselves wanted to have their claim adjudicated under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and Mr. Justice Gokhale held that if a person feels aggrieved by the decision under the Act, he is entitled to apply to the District Court under s. 72 of the Act and have his claim adjudicated. But the point that arises in these appeals before me is whether a person, who was not a party to the proceedings under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, but finds that his property is registered as trust property pursuant to the said proceedings, is precluded from filing a suit for declaration of his title in a Civil Court in view of ss. 79 and 80 of the Act. In my opinion, the decision by Mr. Justice Gokhale can be distinguished on facts; in that case persons concerned wanted to be joined as parties to the proceedings under the Act.
4. Reliance is also placed on a decision of Mr. Justice Shelat, as he then was, in Kuberbhai v. Purshottamdas . 1961 2 Guj. L.R 564.. Here again it must be pointed out that the plaintiffs in that case did file an application before the Deputy Charity Commissioner. That application was rejected, an appeal to the Charity Commissioner against that decision was also dismissed, but the plaintiffs did not pursue the further remedy by way of an application under s. 72 of the Act. Thus there was a decision in proceedings under the Bombay Public Trusts Act against the plaintiffs in that case. Mr. Justice Shelat at page 567 observes that inquiry under s. 19 of the Act is by no means an administrative or an executive inquiry, the inquiry is not only for the purpose of registration, but it involves adjudication of questions, viz. whether a trust exists, if a trust exists whether it is a public trust and what properties belong to that trust. Mr. Justice Shelat referred to the various provisions of the Act and then came to the conclusion that the Act provided certain remedies to a person affected by a decision in a proceeding under the Act, i.e the Bombay Public Trusts Act. In this respect he referred to s. 22A of the Act. With regard to ss. 79 and 80 of the Act Mr. Justice Shelat observes:—
“…It would also appear that section 79 had to be inserted to make clear what section 80 provides. Section 79 therefore expressly provides that the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner shall have power to decide matters set out therein and having conferred that power on those officers, the Legislature by section 80 debars the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to decide or deal with any question in respect of which the decision or the order of such officer has been made final and conclusive under section 79(2). That was necessary because under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inspite of sections 19, 20 and 79, a civil Court would still have jurisdiction to entertain matters involving such questions. That jurisdiction under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been now taken away by the provisions of section 80 of the Act. It would also appear that whereas section 19 confers power upon the Assistant or the Deputy Charity Commissioner to ascertain the question as to whether a trust exists or not and if so, whether it is a public trust or whether a particular property is the property of such trust in an inquiry for registration, section 79 in express terms and with a view to avoid any possible ambiguity confers power upon these officers to decide the questions set out therein….”
5. Relying on these observations, it is urged that the present suit is barred under ss. 79 and 80 of the Act. With regard to s. 22A Mr. Justice Shelat observes (p. 571):—
“…Therefore, any person, not merely a trustee, can apply under section 22A for a change in the entry on a matter or a particular left out from consideration in a previous inquiry under section 19. If an order is passed under section 22A, and an applicant is aggrieved, he has the right of appeal under section 70. If he is dissatisfied by an order under section 70, a right has been conferred upon him to apply under section 72 to the District Court and thereafter in appeal to the High Court. Such a right is confined to the two questions set out in section 79(1). Therefore, there is a complete code provided in the Act for dealing with matters set out in sections 18 and 19 and recourse must be had to the procedure laid down in the Act….”
6. I may point out here that the scope of s. 22A is limited. Section 22A reads thus:—
“If at any time after the entries are made in the register under section 21 or 22 it appears to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner that any particular relating to any public trust, which was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under section 19, or sub-section (3) of section 22, as the case may be, has remained to be enquired into, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner, as the case may be, may make further enquiry in the prescribed manner, record his findings and make entries in the register in accordance with the decision arrived at or if appeals or applications are made as provided by this Act, in accordance with the decision of the competent authority provided by this Act. The provisions of sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 shall, so far as may be, apply to the inquiry, the recording of findings and the making of entries in the register under this section.”
7. From the wording of this section it is clear that s. 22A deals with a case, where any particular relating to a public trust was not inquired into at the initial inquiry. The wording of s. 22A does not indicate that if a particular property is registered as property belonging to a public trust after inquiry under s. 19, further inquiry under s. 22A can be made merely because someone, who was not a party to the proceedings under s. 19, sets up a title to that property. The words ‘which was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under section 19’ are material. If after inquiry under s. 19 a particular property is held to be public trust property, it is difficult to see how it can be said that the title to that property is a particular, which was not the subject-matter of the inquiry under s. 19. Moreover, under s. 22A the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has discretion, he can refuse to make further inquiry. It is also important to note that the scope of the inquiry under s. 72 of the Act is a limited one, as is clear from the wording of s. 72. It is also pertinent to note that there is no provision for issuing a public notice in any of the proceedings under the Act. In view of all this, it cannot be said that s. 22A provides a remedy for a person who is aggrieved by the findings at an inquiry under ss. 18 and 19 of the Act, but was not a party to the proceedings under the said sections. In this respect reference is also made to s. 70A of the Act. Relying on s. 70A, it is urged that any aggrieved person, though not a party to the proceedings under ss. 18 and 19, may apply to the Charity Commissioner and have his claim adjudicated. It is, however, important to note that the remedy provided by s. 70A is not an adequate remedy, because under s. 70A the Charity Commissioner is not bound to re-open the inquiry. It merely confers discretion on the Charity Commissioner to re-open the inquiry if he finds it expedient to do so. It cannot be said that question of title of persons, who were not parties to proceedings under ss. 18 and 19 of the Act, was left merely to the discretion of the Charity Commissioner and that they would not have an unfettered right to have their title declared. Mr. Justice Shelat observes (p. 571):
“…This is made clear by the provisions of section 80 which bar the jurisdiction of a civil Court in the two categories of matters, viz., (1) those questions left under the Act to be decided by the Assistant or the Deputy Charity Commissioner under sections 18 and 19, and (2) those which the Act has made final and conclusive under section 79(1) and section 21(2). The plaintiffs having had recourse to section 70 and not having followed up their remedy under section 72 are bound by the decision of the Charity Commissioner in their appeal before him.”
8. The last observation of Mr. Justice Shelat will indicate that his decision was based upon the fact that the plaintiffs in that suit did not avail themselves of the remedy provided by s. 72 of the Act. Hence, in my opinion, the decision of Mr. Justice Shelat does not support the contention advanced in these appeals.
9. Here I may refer to the decision of this Court in Prataprao Marutrao Pangavane v. Raje Laxmanrao Vyankatrao Deshmukh . 1962 First Appeal No. 353 of 1959, decided by Patel and K.K Desai, JJ., on November 19, 1962 Unrep... In the judgment Mr. Justice Patel observes:—
“…It is difficult, however, to assert that the Charity Commissioners have got exclusive jurisdiction where titles of third parties may be involved. While requiring them to decide statutory issues, if finality were to be attached to certain matters, we would be permitting them indirectly to decide very complicated and important questions of facts of heredity and legitimacy as well, which, in all probability, in view of the wording of section 19, may not have been intended. Even apart from this, the procedure, prescribed is also a summary procedure, which is highly unsuited to any inquiry about the titles of third persons….”
10. With respect, I agree with these observations. It is pointed out that these observations are obiter. Even so, the view expressed in these observations seems to be a considered view and I am in agreement with that view. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Patel, even though s. 70A provides some sort of remedy to a person aggrieved by an inquiry under ss. 18 and 19 of the Act to which that person was not a party, that remedy seems to be inadequate. Unless the intention of the Legislature to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide title of persons, who are not parties to the proceedings of the inquiry under ss. 18 and 19 of the Act, is clear, either by an express provision or by necessary implication, it cannot be held that suits like the present one are barred under s. 80 read with s. 79 of the Act.
11. It is urged that questions like the one that arises in these appeals may arise during inquiries under the Act. It is possible that such questions may arise, but the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be held to be barred merely because such questions may arise during inquiries under the Act. Considering ss. 79 and 80 and other relevant provisions of the Act, I am of the opinion that the question that arises in the present suit, viz. whether Ratnabai, the author of the trust, was capable of creating the trust in question, cannot be said to be covered by s. 79 of the Act. In any case, the plaintiff in the present suit was not a party to the proceedings under s. 19 of the Act. By the present suit the plaintiff wants to establish his title to one-fourth share in the suit property on the ground that Ratnabai had no authority to gift the property in question and create a trust. For reasons indicated above, I am unable to hold that the present suit is barred under s. 80 read with s. 79 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.
12. The learned appellate Judge has in a careful and considered judgment held that the present suit is not barred by s. 80 of the Act. That view seems to be correct.
13. I, therefore, confirm the order passed by the lower appellate Court and dismiss these appeals. Costs will be costs in the cause.
14. Appeals dismissed.
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