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Messrs Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. M.W Pradhan

Bombay High Court
Dec 14, 1964
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Summary of Opinion: Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. (Order of Kantawala, J., 22 Sept 1964)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Company (Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.) appealed against an order of Mr. Justice Kantawala dated 22 September 1964 in Company Petition No. 4 of 1964, which admitted a winding-up petition and directed advertising of the petition. The petition had been presented by the Court Receiver appointed in Partition Suit No. 224 of 1961.

Relevant factual points recited by the court:

  • The Company was incorporated in January 1933; authorized and issued share capital details are recorded in the opinion. A large block of shares stood in the name of Narayanlal Bansilal, who was Chairman of the Company and Karta/manager of a joint Hindu family.
  • By a registered conveyance dated 8 March 1956 the joint family sold a sugarcane farm (Harinagar) to the Company for Rs. 40,00,000, Rs. 10,00,000 having been paid and the balance agreed to be paid by quarterly installments of Rs. 2,50,000. The Company paid only two installments and defaulted in respect of installments aggregating to Rs. 25,00,000.
  • After appointment as Receiver in the partition suit, the Court Receiver issued a statutory notice dated 28 June 1962 under s. 434 of the Indian Companies Act requiring payment of Rs. 25,00,000 (with interest) and warning of winding-up proceedings if not paid within 21 days. The Company replied on 17 July 1962 disputing aspects of the claim, relying on a prior attachment/notice by the Income-tax authorities under s. 46(5A) of the Income-tax Act and asserting limitation and other defences.
  • The Court Receiver presented a winding-up petition on 10 January 1964; after the Company filed an affidavit in opposition, the learned Judge admitted the petition and directed notices/advertisements. The Company appealed the admission and related directions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Court Receiver appointed under Order XL, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) had the power to present a winding-up petition on behalf of parties whose property he held in custody.
  2. Whether the Court Receiver could be regarded as a "creditor" within the meaning of s. 434 (and related provisions) of the Indian Companies Act and thus entitled to serve a statutory notice and present a winding-up petition.
  3. Whether the statutory notice issued by the Court Receiver on 28 June 1962 complied with the requirements of s. 434 of the Companies Act.
  4. Whether an attachment/prohibitory notice issued by the Income-tax authorities under s. 46(5A) of the Income-tax Act prevented the Company from complying with the statutory notice so as to negate the presumption of inability to pay under s. 434.
  5. On the merits, whether the petition had been presented mala fide (at the instance of the sons of Narayanlal) and whether the Company was solvent so that the petition ought not to have been admitted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Company / Mr. Banaji) Arguments

  • The Court Receiver, appointed under Order XL, r. 1, CPC, did not have power to present a winding-up petition because the appointment order (and the rule) authorized him to file suits but not to present winding-up petitions.
  • The Court Receiver was not a "creditor" within the meaning of s. 434 of the Companies Act and therefore was not entitled to serve the statutory notice or present the petition.
  • The statutory notice of 28 June 1962 was invalid or not in accordance with the provisions of s. 434; specifically, it did not call on the Company to make payment to the Court Receiver himself and, by directing payment to the Additional Collector, deprived the Company of the opportunity to secure or compound the debt to the creditor's reasonable satisfaction.
  • Because of a prohibitory order and an attachment issued by the Additional Income-tax Officer under s. 46(5A) of the Income-tax Act, the Company could not pay the amount demanded and therefore there was no neglect to pay within the meaning of s. 434.
  • On merits: the petition was mala fide, instituted at the instance of Madhusudanlal and other sons with ulterior motives (family disputes and attempts to secure management control), and the Company was solvent, so the petition should not have been admitted.

Respondent / Petitioner (Court Receiver / Mr. Parpia) Arguments

  • The winding-up petition was a proper remedy to enforce payment of a just debt; authorities and standard text (Palmer's Company Precedents) were relied upon to show a winding-up petition is a proper mode of execution against a company unable to pay its debts.
  • The Court Receiver, clothed with all powers under Order XL, r. 1 (including powers for realization, management and protection of property and expressly authorized to "file suit"), was entitled to institute proceedings (including a winding-up petition) to realize property for the benefit of creditors.
  • The statutory notice complied with s. 434 because the section does not require that payment must be demanded to the creditor personally and it is permissible to direct payment to a third party (here the Additional Collector) when the debt has been attached for tax dues.
  • The Companies Act provisions (ss. 434, 433, 439) support the petition: a creditor who has served a valid notice and on whom the company has neglected to act within the statutory period may treat the company as unable to pay its debts and take winding-up steps; the Receiver qualified as such a creditor.
  • On merits: the Court Receiver had referred to other debts of the Company (e.g., a decree debt to Bank of India); material before the court made out a prima facie case for winding-up, and allegations of mala fides were irrelevant once a prima facie case had been established.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indrajitsinghji v. Rajendrasinghji (1955) 57 Bom. L.R. 962 Referenced by appellant to support a technical distinction about proceedings commenced by plaints vs. other proceedings. The court noted the reliance but stated it was unnecessary to decide the argument based on this case because Order XL, r.1(d) conferred broader powers to the Receiver; the court did not adopt the appellant's narrow reading.
Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Fly. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1953] 24 Comp. Cas. 507 Authority for the proposition that winding-up is not the normal mode of realising a debt and is primarily for equitable distribution when substratum is gone. Cited by appellant to argue winding-up is not a normal remedy for debt realization; the court acknowledged the passage but focussed on whether winding-up proceedings are proceedings "for realization of the property" and concluded they are.
Bowes v. The Hope &c. Society (1865) 11 H.L.C. 389; In re General Company for the Promotion of Land Credit; In re National Permanent Benefit Building Society: Ex parte Willamson Authorities underlying the proposition (in standard text) that a winding-up petition may be a proper remedy to enforce payment of a just debt. The court observed that Palmer's statement (cited by respondent) was based on these cases and treated a winding-up petition as a proceeding that results in realization of the debtor's property.
In re Sacker: Ex parte Sacker (English Court of Appeal) Held that a receiver was not a 'creditor' entitled to present a bankruptcy petition where the receiver could not sue in his own name; general proposition about receiver's incapacity to be a petitioning creditor in those circumstances. The court discussed the decision, noting its limited ratio: where the receiver could not sue in his own name he could not be a petitioning creditor. The court contrasted English law positions with Indian law on receivers' powers.
Macoun, In re (English Court of Appeal) Held that a receiver who had an assignment of the judgment debt could present a bankruptcy petition; distinguished from Re Sacker and treated some observations in Re Sacker as obiter. The opinion relied on this later authority to show that where a receiver could sue (or had title), he could be a petitioning creditor; the court used the discussion to support the proposition that a receiver empowered to sue may be a creditor.
K.V. Mallayya v. T. Ramaswami & Co. [1963] II M.L.J. 110 (S.C.) Authority that a receiver authorised to collect debts is empowered to institute suit and can sue in his own name. Adopted by the court to support the view that a Court Receiver appointed under Order XL, r.1, CPC is entitled to maintain actions in his own name and hence can be a petitioning creditor under the Companies Act.
Achut v. Shivajirao (1936) 39 Bom. L.R. 224 Decision indicating a receiver appointed by the court is entitled to file suit in his own name. Relied upon by the court as consistent authority that a receiver could sue in his own name in India.
In re European Banking Co.: Ex parte Baylis Authority where a petition was dismissed because the petitioner's debt was small and had been attached in another court, making the petitioner's interest uncertain. The court distinguished that case: here the claimed amount was substantial, and the Receiver's notice expressly sought payment to the Income-tax authorities (Additional Collector), so attachment did not render the petitioner's interest too uncertain.
Bachharaj Factories Ltd. v. Hirjee Mills Ltd. (1954) 57 Bom. L.R. 378 Principle that motive or mala fides of petitioners is irrelevant once prima facie materials supporting winding-up are placed before the Court. The court applied this principle to reject appellant's mala fides argument, holding that if proper materials were placed before the court, motive is irrelevant in considering admission of a petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by addressing the appellant's contentions sequentially and on the basis of statutory provisions, the Receiver's appointment order, and authorities cited in the opinion.

  1. On the Receiver's power to present a winding-up petition:
    • The appointment order of 20 October 1961 expressly conferred upon the Court Receiver "all necessary powers under Order XL Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure including power to vote and/or exercise all the property rights in respect of the shares ... including power to file suit..."
    • The court read Order XL, r.1(1)(d) as permitting the conferral of all powers "for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property" and held that proceedings commenced by filing a winding-up petition are proceedings "for realization of the property" because realization of property is a necessary prelude to equitable distribution in winding-up.
    • The court therefore concluded the Receiver, being clothed with the full powers under Order XL, r.1(d), had power to present a winding-up petition to realize property for the benefit of creditors. The appellant's narrow argument that the power to "file suit" excludes presentation of a winding-up petition was rejected.
  2. On whether the Court Receiver was a "creditor" under the Companies Act:
    • The court reviewed English authorities (Re Sacker and Macoun) and concluded that under Indian law the position is clear: a Court Receiver appointed under Order XL, r.1 with powers to bring and defend actions is entitled to maintain actions in his own name (citing K.V. Mallayya and Achut v. Shivajirao).
    • Reading ss. 434 and 430 of the Companies Act along with Order XL, r.1 CPC, the court held that the Court Receiver was a creditor of the Company for purposes of presenting a winding-up petition because he was authorised to sue and to realize the property held in custodia legis for the benefit of persons ultimately entitled.
  3. On validity of the statutory notice under s. 434:
    • The court observed the notice dated 28 June 1962 identified the balance shown in the Company's balance sheet and demanded payment of Rs. 25,00,000 and interest, and warned of winding-up proceedings if not paid within 21 days.
    • The appellant argued the notice was defective because it did not demand payment to the Court Receiver personally and therefore excluded the Company's ability to secure or compound the debt to the Receiver's satisfaction. The court rejected that argument, holding s. 434 does not require the demand to be to the creditor personally and it is permissible to direct payment to a third party; moreover, the Company could still have sought to secure or compound the debt to the Receiver's reasonable satisfaction.
    • The court noted the Company, in its reply of 17 July 1962, raised substantive disputes about liability rather than the form of the notice and had not contended in that reply that the form of notice deprived it of the opportunity to secure or compound the debt.
  4. On the effect of the Income-tax attachment under s. 46(5A):
    • The court recorded that the Income-tax authorities had issued a notice (attachment) and had taken the position that any payment to them would discharge the Company's liability to the payee in respect of amounts held for Narayanlal Bansilal.
    • The appellant argued the attachment prevented the Company from complying with the Receiver's notice and therefore there was no neglect to pay within s. 434. The court distinguished In re European Banking Co. (where a small debt had been attached and the attachment "seized" the debt), noting the present claim was substantial and, critically, the Receiver's notice expressly required payment to the Additional Collector so as to liquidate income-tax dues.
    • The court held that because the Receiver called for payment to the Income-tax Collector (the party holding the attachment), a direct compliance would have liquidated the tax dues and removed the attachment; therefore the attachment did not excuse non-payment and did not prevent the presumption of inability to pay arising under s. 434 when statutory conditions were met.
  5. On bona fides / motive and the merits:
    • The appellant alleged the petition was motivated by family disputes and mala fide intentions of Madhusudanlal and other sons. The court referred to authorities (Bachharaj Factories Ltd. v. Hirjee Mills Ltd.) holding that once a petitioner places proper materials making out a prima facie case for winding-up, the motive of petitioners is irrelevant.
    • The court noted the existence of other debts and material before it (e.g., a decree debt to Bank of India) and observed that the Company had not taken the court's practical suggestion to secure Rs. 25,00,000 in cash or by guarantee. The court found the Company's contest on key points (including the genuineness of the debt) was not bona fide and that the petitioner's materials supported admission.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and orders made by the court (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The learned trial Judge's order admitting the winding-up petition and directing advertisements was upheld; the appeal failed and was dismissed with costs.
  • The court directed that the advertisements be published on Wednesday, 16 December (year as in the opinion) and that the petition be heard on 11 January 1965.
  • The Court Receiver was permitted to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500 deposited by the Company towards his costs.

Implications:

The decision resolved the specific disputes between the parties in favor of the Court Receiver and upheld the admission of the winding-up petition. The court applied Order XL, r.1 CPC and ss. 434/433/439 of the Companies Act in the circumstances of this record to conclude the Receiver had power and standing and that the statutory notice was valid; the court also rejected the Company's defences based on attachment and allegations of mala fides. The opinion does not state that it establishes any novel, broader legal precedent beyond its application to the facts of this case; the immediate legal effect is the continuation of the winding-up proceedings as ordered.

Show all summary ...

Tulzapurkar, J.:— This is an appeal preferred by Messrs Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. (hereinafter called “the Company”) against the order passed by Mr. Justice Kantawala on September 22, 1964, in Company Petition No. 4 of 1964 admitting the petition and directing the advertisements to be given on and after October 13, 1964 in the “Indian Express” and “Bombay Samachar” and the Government Gazette.

2. A few facts giving rise to this appeal may be stated. The Company was incorporated in January 1933 and its authorised capital consists of 12,500 equity shares of Rs. 100 each and 25,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each. The issued and subscribed capital of the Company consists of 7500 shares of Rs. 100 each and 25,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each. All these shares are fully paid up. Out of this subscribed capital of the Company, 788 equity shares of Rs. 100 each and 14,265 equity shares of Rs. 10 each stand in the name of Narayanlal Bansilal who is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company. Narayanlal Bansilal is also the Karta and manager of joint Hindu family consisting of himself, his sons and daughters and the shares standing in the name of Narayanlal Bansilal were purchased out of the funds belonging to the joint family. According to the Court Receiver who was appointed Receiver in High Court Suit No. 224 of 1961 and who presented the petition for winding up, a large number of other shares of the Company were also purchased out of the funds belonging to the joint family and were taken in the names of Kishanlal Murlidhar Jayakrishna, Gangadas Gajanan and Sevaram Ranchhoddas as the ‘Benamidars’ for the joint family. It appears that prior to March 8, 1956, the joint family of Narayanlal Bansilal owned a sugar farm at Harinagar in the State of Bihar. On March 8, 1956, by a registered conveyance made between Narayanlal Bansilal and his sons Balkrishna Narayanlal, Madhusudanlal Narayanlal and Madhavlal Narayanlal on the one hand and the Company on the other, the said sugarcane farm with all the crops, buildings, agricultural equipments, bridges, tools, pumping sets, live-stock, carts etc. was sold to the Company for rupees forty lakhs. Out of this price of rupees forty lakhs, it appears the Company had paid to the vendors (Narayanlal and his three sons) a sum of rupees ten lakhs on January 31, 1956, and it was agreed that the balance of rupees thirty lakhs should be paid by quarterly installments of Rs. 2,50,000 each, the first of such quarterly installment being payable on or before April 30, 1956, and subsequent installments at the end of each subsequent quarter. The registered conveyance dated March 8, 1956, further provided that if the Company failed to pay the vendors any of the said installments of Rs. 2,50,000 on the due date, the Company should pay interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum to the vendors on the amount of the unpaid installment. It further appears that after the execution of the conveyance the Company paid to the vendors only two installments of Rs. 2,50,000 each but failed to pay the remaining installments aggregating to rupees twenty-five lakhs, and this is the debt which was claimed by the petitioner (the Court Receiver) under a statutory notice and upon neglect to pay the same a winding up petition was presented by the petitioner under following circumstances.

3. In or about July 1961 Madhusudanlal, one of the sons of Narayanlal, filed a partition suit on the Original Side of this Court being Suit No. 224 of 1961 against Narayanlal and others claiming certain share in the joint family properties and after filing the suit Madhusudanlal took out a Notice of Motion for appointment of Court Receiver as the Receiver of joint family properties. On October 20, 1961, the Court appointed the Court Receiver as the Receiver of all the joint family properties with all powers under O. XL, r. 1, cl. (d), of the Civil Procedure Code. After the Court Receiver thus came on the scene the Court Receiver issued the statutory notice on June 28, 1962, under s. 434 of the Indian Companies Act to the Company requiring the Company to make payment of rupees twenty-five lakhs with interest to the Additional Collector of Bombay and by that notice the Court Receiver further ??? that if the said payment was not made within 21 days of the receipt of the notice, proceedings for winding up of the Company will be adopted without any further intimation. On July 17, 1962, the Company sent a reply to the Court Receiver raising several contentions. It was contended that a sum of rupees twenty-five lakhs and odd was not due to the joint family of Narayanlal Bansilal but as per the Company's balance-sheet the said amount was due and payable to Narayanlal Bansilal and his three sons who were the vendors under the conveyance dated March 8, 1956. It was further contended that the installments due under the registered conveyance could not be paid by the Company on account of a notice of attachment dated July 24, 1956, that had been issued and served upon the Company by the Additional Income-tax Officer, Section V, Central Bombay under s. 46(5A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Company further contended that in any event the claim for rupees twenty-five lakhs had become barred by the law of limitation. In view of these contentions the Company pointed out that there was no question of payment of the said amount of rupees twenty-five lakhs to the Additional Collector of Bombay as required by the Court Receiver and the Company further informed the Court Receiver that in spite of these facts being brought to his notice if any steps for winding up of the Company were taken, the Company would hold the Court Receiver personally responsible for any loss or damage that may be suffered by the Company on account of such steps being taken. Since the statutory notice that was issued by the Court Receiver on June 28, 1962, was not complied with by the Company, the Court Receiver presented a winding up petition, being Company Petition No. 4 of 1964, on January 10, 1964. After the petition was accepted, notice was issued to the Company and the Company put in affidavit in reply showing cause against the petition. After hearing the parties, the learned Judge by his order dated September 22, 1964, admitted the petition and directed that advertisements be given in newspapers mentioned in his order and in the Gazette. It is against this judgment and order that has been passed by the learned Judge that the present appeal has been preferred by the Company before us.

4. In this appeal Mr. Banaji on behalf of the appellant-Company has urged two or three technical contentions. In the first place he contended that the Court Receiver who had presented the petition for winding up had no power to present the same under O. XL, r. 1, of the Civil Procedure Code under which he was appointed by this Court in the partition Suit No. 224 of 1961; secondly, he urged that the Court Receiver was not a creditor of the Company within the meaning of s. 434 of the Indian Companies Act and, therefore, was not entitled to file the petition. He further contended that the statutory notice which had been issued by the Court Receiver on June 28, 1962, was invalid and not in accordance with the provisions of s. 434 of the Companies Act. Lastly, he contended that because of the prohibitory order and the notice of attachment that had been issued by the Additional Income-tax Officer under the provisions of s. 46(5A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, the Company could not pay the amount and could not comply with the requisitions contained in the Court Receiver's notice dated June 28, 1962, and therefore it could not be said that there was any neglect on the part of the Company to make payment. Apart from these technical contentions. Mr. Banaji also urged two points on merits. According to him, on the facts and circumstances of the case the petition had been preferred by the Court Receiver at the instance of the sons of Narayanlal out of ulterior motives and it had been filed mala fide. Mr. Banaji further urged that the Company was perfectly solvent and therefore the petition ought not to have been admitted and the directions with regard to the advertisements etc. ought not to have been given by the learned Judge. We shall deal with all these points one after the other presently.

5. In support of his contention that the Court Receiver had no power to present a winding up petition in this case, Mr. Banaji relied upon the provisions of O. XL, r. 1, cl (d) of the Civil Procedure Code and also on the order that had been made by this Court while appointing Court Receiver as the Receiver of the joint family properties. The relevant provisions of O. XL, r. 1, run as follows:

“1. (1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order—

(a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after decree;

(b) …;

(c) …; and

(d) confer upon the receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit.”

6. In this case the order appointing Court Receiver as ad interim Receiver of the property was passed on August 28, 1961, in the partition suit filed by Madhusudanlal against Narayanlal and others being Suit No. 224 of 1961 and the said appointment was confirmed by an order dated October 20, 1961. The operative part of the order dated October 20, 1961, runs as follows:

“And it is further ordered that the Court Receiver be and he is hereby appointed Receiver of the properties belonging to the joint family in suit and all the books of accounts papers and vouchers with all necessary powers under Order XL Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure including power to vote and/or exercise all the property rights in respect of the shares belonging to the joint family in the several joint stock companies mentioned in the plaint including power to file suit…”

7. Relying upon the aforesaid provisions Mr. Banaji in the first place urged before us that the Court Receiver in this case had been specifically clothed with the power to file a suit but in terms he had not been clothed with the power to present a winding up petition. However, it must be observed that apart from the power to file a suit which has been specifically referred to in the order dated October 20, 1961, the said order in terms confers upon the Court Receiver “all powers under O. XL r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure”. In other words it is clear that all powers under O. XL, r. 1, cl. (d), of the Code of Civil Procedure have been conferred upon the Court Receiver in this case and it is clear that under cl. (d) of sub-r. (1) such powers include not only a power to bring and defend suits but powers “for the realisation, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property”. An attempt was made by Mr. Banaji to suggest that when a specific power to file a suit was conferred upon a Court Receiver, that power merely empowered the Court Receiver to commence all proceedings by filing of a plaint and since a winding up petition was not a proceeding which is commenced by filing of a plaint, the Court Receiver could not present a winding up petition. In this behalf he relied upon some observations of this Court in the case of Indrajitsinghji v. Rajendrasinghji . 1955 57 Bom. L.R 962.. In our view, it is really unnecessary to consider this argument of Mr. Banaji for the simple reason that cl. (d) of sub-r. (7) of O. XL, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure not only deals with powers which could be conferred upon the Court Receiver for the purpose of filing a suit but with all powers for the purposes of realisation, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property. In this case under the order dated October 20, 1961, the Court Receiver was clothed not only with a power to file a suit but with all necessary powers for realisation, management, protection and preservation of the property under cl. (d) mentioned above. The only question that need, therefore, be considered is as to whether a proceeding which is initiated by filing a winding-up petition is a proceeding “for the realisation, management, protection and preservation of the property” or not. Mr. Banaji urged that ordinarily a winding-up petition is not the normal mode of realising a debt due to a creditor and that a suit would be the proper remedy for realisation of such a debt by a creditor. According to Mr. Banaji, a winding-up petition is a process by which the Court achieves the object of equitable distribution of debtor's property. In support of his contention Mr. Banaji referred us to the case of Bukhtiarpnr Bihar Light Fly. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India . [1953] 24 Comp. Cas. 507. and the relevant observations on which reliance was placed by him appear at p. 517 which run as follows:

“A winding up order may be a form of equitable execution, but there is no equity in making such an order when the debt of the creditor is not in peril, although the substratum of the company may be gone, and when matters remain outstanding which can be best attended to in the interests of the shareholders by the company functioning as a company through its directors. A winding up order is not a normal alternative in the case of a company to the ordinary procedure for the realisation of the debts due from it.”

8. Relying upon the above observations Mr. Banaji urged before us that the main object of a winding up proceeding is to ensure the equitable distribution of the debtor's property. On the other hand Mr. Parpia on behalf of the petitioner relied upon the following passage which occurs in Palmer's Company Precedents, Part II, 1960 edn., at p. 25. The passage runs as follows:

“A winding-up petition is a perfectly proper remedy for enforcing payment of a just debt. It is the mode of execution which the court gives to a creditor against a company unable to pay its debts.”

9. It appears clear that this passage is based upon three decided cases in Bowes v. The Hope &c. Society . 1865 11 H.L.C 389., In re General Company for the Promotion of Land Credit4 and In re National Permanent Benefit Building Society: Ex parte Willamson5.

10. In our view, in this case we are not called upon to decide the question as to whether a proceeding which is commenced by filing a winding-up petition is a normal or proper mode of realization of a debt or not. What we are really concerned with is as to whether such a proceeding is a proceeding “for realization of the property”. It is true as has been pointed out by Mr. Banaji that the main or dominant object of a winding-up petition is to ensure the equitable distribution of the property of the debtor; but it cannot be forgotten that before there could be any equitable distribution of the property of the debtor amongst his creditors, his property must be first got in i.e realised and it cannot be disputed that the property of the debtor is realised by filing a winding-up petition. It is no doubt true that the dominant object of a suit is to realise a particular debt, while that of a winding-up petition is the equitable distribution of the debtor's property amongst his creditors but, as we have said above, such equitable distribution must of necessity be preceded by the getting in of all such debtor's property and realisation of all such property. It cannot be disputed that a necessary consequence of filing a winding-up petition is the realisation of all the property of a debtor and thereafter the process of equitable distribution thereof commences. In this view of the matter it is clear that a proceeding which is commenced by filing a winding-up petition is a proceeding for realization of the property and therefore when the Court Receiver was clothed with all the powers under O. XL, r. 1(1)(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it must be held that he was clothed with the power to file a winding-up petition for the purpose of realizing the property the benefit of which would enure to all the creditors of the Company. We are, therefore, unable to accept Mr. Banaji's contention that the Court Receiver in the present case had no power to present a winding-up petition.

11. The next contention of Mr. Banaji is that the Court Receiver cannot be regarded as a creditor of the Company within the meaning of ss. 434 and 439 of the Indian Companies Act, and as such the Court Receiver who was after all an officer appointed by the Court in the partition suit, could not by serving a statutory notice on the Company demanding payment of the debt file the winding-up petition. In this behalf Mr. Banaji relied upon a decision of an English Court in In re Sacker: Ex parte Sacker6 where it was held by the Court of Appeal that a receiver was not a ‘creditor’ entitled to present a bankruptcy petition against the debtor within the meaning of s. 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. In that case, in an action in Chancery Division, a receiver was appointed to collect, get in, and receive the goods comprised in its charge given to the plaintiffs by one of the defendants, including therein any balance of the proceeds of the goods so charged in the hands of the other defendants. An order was subsequently made for the payment by the last mentioned defendant to the receiver of a specific sum being the money received by him in respect of the proceeds of the goods and comprised in the charge. It appears that the receiver was not paid that amount, and the receiver presented a bankruptcy petition against the defendant who was ordered to pay. It was held, that the receiver was not a creditor entitled to present a bankruptcy petition. Lord Esher M.R after pointing out that the position of a receiver was not that of a trustee and that there was no debt due to him from the particular defendant went on to observe as follows (p. 183):

“…The petitioner is a receiver. He is not a trustee. There is no debt due to him from the appellant. He could not sue for this sum of money in his own name either at law or in equity. Even if he could by the authority of the Court sue for it in his own name, is the money due to him personally either at law or in equity? At law it is certainly not. The debt was due to another person for whom he is not a trustee. The money will not be his when he has got it. Would it be his in equity? I apprehend that he would hold it subject to the authority of the Court, who would deal with it according to the circumstances of the case, but certainly not for his benefit.”

12. Fry, L.J at page 185 pointed out the general rule as follows:

“…As a general rule, a receiver cannot maintain an action to compel obedience to an order for the delivery of goods or the payment of money to him by a party to the action. There may, no doubt, be exceptional cases in which a receiver can bring an action in his own name—when, for instance, he is the holder of a bill of exchange. In that case he can maintain an action, not because he is a receiver, but because he is the holder of the bill.”

13. It would thus appear that according to the above decision under English law a receiver cannot maintain an action in his own name except in special cases. We may point out that the decision in Re Sacker came to be considered by the English Court in a later decision and the general observations made by Lord Esher have been dissented from and have been regarded as being obiter and that later decision is Macoun, In re.7 In this later case the Court of Appeal held that the Receiver who had obtained an assignment of the judgment debt over the creditor could present a bankruptcy petition and it was further held that the decision in Re Sacker only decided that the receiver who cannot sue in his own name cannot be a good petitioning creditor. The relevant observations of Vaughan Williams L.J appear at p. 702 and they run as follows:

“I think those words (referring to the observations of Lord Esher in In Re Sacker) go very far to cover the proposition for which Mr. Hansell contended; but it was not really necessary for the case which was before the Court of Appeal that this question should have been determined—that is, the question whether a receiver having a title to sue at law could be a good petitioning creditor. It is plain from the judgments, I think, of each of the Lords Justices that in that case the position of things was such that it was perfectly impossible for the receiver to bring an action to recover the debt either at law or in equity; and therefore I think we must treat these observations of Lord Esher as obiter, and one can only look at the case as having decided that a receiver who could not sue could not be by himself a good petitioning creditor. Looking at the judgment of Fry L.J, I observe that he begins by saying that in that case the receiver could not have maintained an action either at law or in equity, and later on he deals with exceptional cases in which a receiver could maintain such an action. One of the cases which he gives is where the receiver is the holder of a bill of exchange, and the other is where he is in possession of chattels, and the chattels are wrongfully detained from him. In these circumstances it seems to me that we ought not to hold the case of In re Sacker to be an authority for the proposition that a receiver cannot be a good petitioning creditor even though the state of things is such that he could maintain an action at law… In the present case the receiver happens to be the assignee of a judgment, and I think that being the assignee of a judgment he can be a good petitioning creditor even though when the money is recovered it is recovered for the purpose of enabling the Court of Chancery to deal with it.”

14. The position that emerges from a consideration of the above two cases is that under English law if a receiver could maintain an action at law in his own name, he could be a good petitioning creditor and could present a bankruptcy petition.

15. In our view, the position in India is more clear and unambiguous. Order XL of the Civil Procedure Code deals with appointment of receivers and under r. 1 a receiver could be empowered to bring and defend actions and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property. It is well settled that once a receiver is appointed by a Court under O. XL, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure with all the powers mentioned in cl. (d) of sub-r. (1), the property in respect whereof such a receiver is appointed is in the custodia legis and no party to the litigation except the receiver is entitled to deal with the property of which he is appointed a receiver. It is also well-settled that such a receiver appointed by the Court is entitled to file a suit in his own name. If necessary we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in K.V Mallayya v. T. Ramaswami & Co. . [1963] II M.L.J 110, S.C., where their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out that “a receiver authorised to collect the debts” is empowered to institute suit therefor and a suit instituted by the Receiver in his own name is perfectly competent. A decision of our Court reported in Achut v. Shivajirao . 1936 39 Bom. L.R 224. has also taken the same view. Though it is true that the property in respect whereof a receiver is appointed does not vest in the receiver, at the same time it is clear that the receiver so appointed is entitled to maintain action in his own name. In this view of the matter it is clear that though the debt in respect whereof a statutory notice was issued by the Court Receiver was really due to the members of the joint family, the Court Receiver who had been appointed in a partition suit and had assumed management and administration of the entire joint family properties for the benefit of such parties who may ultimately be found entitled thereto, would be a good petitioning creditor for the purpose of filing a winding-up petition since in our view it is clear on authorities that such a receiver is entitled to maintain an action in his own name. Reading the provisions of ss. 434 and 430 of the Companies Act along with the provisions of O. XL, r. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code we are of the opinion that the Court Receiver would be a creditor of the Company and as such was entitled to present the winding-up petition.

16. The next contention of Mr. Banaji is with regard to the statutory notice that was issued by the Court Receiver under s. 434 of the Indian Companies Act. In this behalf a two-fold contention was urged by Mr. Banaji before us. In the first place he contended that the statutory notice, which was a formal document, as well as the provisions of s. 434 should be strictly construed and so construed the notice in question would appear to be not in conformity with the said provisions. It may be stated that, by his said notice dated June 28, 1962, addressed to the Company the Court Receiver pointed out that in the Company's balance sheet for the year ending September 30, 1961, a sum of Rupees twenty-five lakhs and odd was shown as due and payable by the Company to the joint family of Narayanlal Bansilal being the balance of the purchase price of the sugar farm belonging to the joint family purchased by the Company under the registered conveyance dated March 8, 1956, and that since he was appointed a Receiver of the joint family properties in High Court Suit No. 224 of 1961 he was issuing that notice to the Company. By that notice the Court Receiver called upon the Company.

“to make immediate payment of the said sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- and interest payable thereon at 5% per annum in the manner above mentioned and to give you notice as I hereby do, that if you will fail to pay the amount to the Additional Collector of Bombay, by whom the debt is attached within 21 days from the receipt of this letter by you, I will, without any further intimation to you, take proceedings for the winding up of the Company.”

17. Incidentally it may be stated that a large amount by way of income-tax arrears and penalty to the tune of rupees thirty-five lakhs and odd was due and payable by Narayanlal Bansilal to income-tax authorities and in respect of the said dues the Additional Income-tax Officer, Section V, Central Bombay, had served a notice dated July 24, 1956, on the Company under s. 46 (5A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, whereby the Additional Income-tax Officer had called upon the Company to pay to him whatever amount was due from the Company to him or was held by the Company on account of Narayanlal Bansilal in liquidation of the said income-tax dues. The Additional Income-tax Officer had pointed out to the Company that any payment that would be made by the Company to him in pursuance of his notice would in law amount to a good and sufficient discharge of the Company's liability to Narayanlal Bansilal and the officer had further pointed out to the Company that if after service of his notice the Company made any payment to Narayanlal Bansilal, the Company would be held personally liable to the income-tax authorities to the extent to which such payment would be made by the Company to Narayanlal Bansilal. In other words, under the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act the Income-tax authorities had served a prohibitory order and had in effect attached the debt of rupees twenty-five lakhs and odd in the hands of the Company. It was in these circumstances that the Court Receiver in his statutory notice under s. 434 of the Companies Act had called upon the Company to make payment of rupees twenty-five lakhs and odd to the Additional Collector of Bombay, by whom the debt had been attached, within the prescribed period of 21 days.

18. With regard to the above notice which was issued by the Court Receiver under s. 434 of the Indian Companies Act, Mr. Banaji's first contention was that the Court Receiver had not called upon the Company to make payment of the debt to himself and that was not in compliance with the provisions of s. 434 of the Companies Act. Mr. Banaji drew our attention to the provisions of s. 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act whereunder a creditor to whom a Company is indebted in a sum exceeding Rs. 500 can serve on the Company a notice calling upon the Company either to maks payment of the sum so due or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor. What was urged by Mr. Banaji was that by the present notice the Court Receiver left no scope to the Company to secure or compound the debt to the reasonable satisfaction of himself by calling upon the Company to make payment of the amount due directly to the Additional Collector of Bombay. Mr. Banaji, therefore, urged that the notice that was issued by the Court Receiver was invalid and not in accordance with the provisions of s. 434 of the Act. We are unable to accept this contention of Sir. Banaji for the simple reason that the section nowhere requires that by such notice the creditor should make a demand upon the debtor to make payment of the debt to himself. It is perfectly competent for the creditor to direct his debtor to make payment to a third party under such notice. Further, we fail to appreciate as to how by issuing a notice in question the Court Receiver put it beyond the reach of the Company to secure or Compound for the debt to the satisfaction of the Court Receiver. On receipt of such notice from the Court Receiver, it would have been perfectly open to the Company to secure or compound for the debt to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court Receiver if the Company were so minded to do so. On the other hand, what we find is that the Company by its reply dated July 17, 1962, raised various disputes with regard to their liability of the said debt by contending that debt was not due to the joint family of Narayanlal and others but that it was due and payable to the four individuals from whom the Company had purchased a sugarcane farm. Significantly enough, we may point out that this difficulty which is now being put before us by Mr. Banaji has not even been referred to by the Company in its reply dated July 17, 1962. It has nowhere been stated by the Company in its reply that because of the manner in which the notice has been given, the Company had been deprived of its right to secure or compound for the debt to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court Receiver. It is dear on the facts of the case that under the conveyance a sum of rupees twenty-five lakhs and odd was payable by the Company to Narayanlal Bansilal and his sons. There is no dispute that the income-tax dues amounting to more than thirty-live lakhs of rupees were due and payable by Narayanlal Bansilal to the Income-tax authorities and in that behalf the debt in the hand of the Company had been attached by the Additional Income-tax Officer. This fact is even referred to by the Court Receiver in his statutory notice. After referring to these facts the Company has been called upon by the Court Receiver to make payment of the debt due to the Additional Collector of Bombay obviously for the purpose of liquidating the income-tax dues. In these circumstances it is difficult to accept Mr. Banaji's contention that the notice that has been issued by the Court Receiver is defective or is not in accordance with the provisions of s. 434 of the Indian Companies Act.

19. Mr. Banaji then contended that there was a bona fide dispute regarding this liability of rupees twenty-five lakhs and odd, for according to the Company the amount of rupees twenty-five lakhs which was payable by the Company under the registered conveyance dated March 8, 1956, was not a debt due and payable to the joint family of Narayanlal Bansilal and his sons but it was a debt due to the four individuals mentioned in the conveyance and, therefore, the Court Receiver was not entitled to serve a statutory notice upon the Company and make a demand for payment of that debt on behalf of the joint family. In this behalf it would be pertinent to note that in the partition suit it was admitted by Narayanlal Bansilal in para. 14 of his affidavit filed to show cause against a Notice of Motion for the appointment of Receiver that the balance of purchase price was payable under the conveyance dated March 8, 1956, to the joint family in respect of Harinagar Sugarcane farm. In the said paragraph Narayanlal Bansilal inter alia stated as follows:

“Referring to para. 10(c) of the affidavit I deny there is any manipulation in the Balance Sheet of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. as falsely sought to be suggested by the 3rd defendant. No loan of Rs. 25,00,000/- has been given fey me to the said company. The said amount is the balance of the purchase price payable by the said company to the joint family in respect of Harinagar Cane Farm.”

20. It is true, as has been pointed out by Mr. Banaji, that this admission which has been made by Narayanlal Bansilal would not be binding on the Company since a Company is a different entity from Narayanlal Bansilal. But when we are considering the question on merits as to whom the amount was really due it does appear to us that the affidavit filed by Narayanlal Bansilal and the statements made by him in that affidavit would be relevant and could be taken into consideration by us. It cannot be forgotten that Narayanlal Bansilal was a Chairman of the Board of Directors of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd., and was also the Karta and manager of joint Hindu family consisting of himself, his sons and daughters. In view of this dual position which Narayanlal Bansilal occupied at the material time, the admission made by Narayanlal Bansilal in his affidavit which we have quoted above would clearly go to show that the amount of Rs. 25,00,000 being the balance of purchase price was payable by the Company to the joint family of Narayanlal Bansilal and his sons and this admission of Narayanlal would go a long way to indicate that the dispute raised by the Company in its reply in that behalf was not bona fide. On the other hand the contention raised by the Company to say the least was frivolous.

21. Mr. Banaji then urged that because of the prohibitory order and the attachment that had been levied by the Additional Income-tax Officer on the debt claimed by the Court Receiver in his statutory notice, the Company was unable to comply with the Court Receiver's notice and, therefore, it could not be said that mere non-payment on the part of the Company would amount to a neglect to make payment. In this behalf ss. 439, 433 and 434 of the Indian Companies Act would be material. Section 439 categorises persons who can make an application for winding up of a Company and under that section inter alia an application for winding-up of a Company can be presented by any creditor or creditors including any contingent or prospective creditor or creditors. Section 433 provides for circumstances in which a Company, may be wound up and under cl. (e) it could be wound up if it is unable to pay its debts. Section 434 provides that under certain circumstances a Company shall be deemed unable to pay its debts. Court Receiver in this case claiming to be a creditor of the Company presented this petition to the Court for winding-up of the Company and before lie presented the petition the Court Receiver had issued and served a statutory notice upon the Company under s. 434 of the Companies Act whereunder a presumption has been raised as regards the Company's inability to pay its debt under certain circumstances. Under s. 434(1)(a) it has been provided that a Company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if a creditor, by assignment or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in a sum exceeding five hundred rupees then due, has served on the company, by causing it to be delivered at its registered office, by registered post or otherwise, a demand under his hand requiring the company to pay the sum so due and the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum, or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor. In other words if the conditions which have been laid down in cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of s. 434 are complied with, the presumption arises that a Company is unable to pay its debt. In order that such a presumption should arise, it is necessary that there must be a creditor to whom the Company is owing a sum exceeding Rs. 500; secondly such a creditor must serve a notice upon the Company by delivering the same at its registered office making a demand for the sum so due and lastly if the Company has neglected to pay the said sum within three weeks of such service of the notice upon it, then the Company would be deemed to be unable to pay its debt. What was urged by Mr. Banaji was that in the present case because the debt had been attached by the Income-tax authorities and a prohibitory order had been issued on the Company, the Company did not make any payment and therefore the presumption with regard to the inability on the part of the Company to pay its debt would not arise because there was no neglect on the part of the Company to make payment of the sum due.

22. In this behalf Mr. Banaji referred us to a decision of the English Court in In re European Banking Co.: Ex parte Baylis10. In that case several petitions had been presented for winding-up of a Company and when all the other petitions had been dismissed the question was as to whether the petition which had been presented by a creditor who had only to recover £ 65 from the Banking Company should have been accepted and winding-up order be made on the petition. The petitioning creditor was a creditor of a banking company for only £ 65 and the debt had been attached in Lord Mayor's Court and the question arose as to whether the petition on behalf of such a creditor whose debt had been attached in Lord Mayor's Court should be accepted or dismissed and the Court dismissed the same. Mr. Banaji relied upon the observations of Sir R.T Kindersley, V.C, which run as follows (p. 522):

“…The question then is, whether, if there were no other Petition than this of Mr. Baylis, an order for winding-up the company ought to be made thereon. Though Mr. Baylis appears as a creditor in the books of the company for £65 (a very inconsiderable (sum), the fact is, that before the Petition was presented, an action had been brought against him by one of his creditors in the Lord Mayor's Court, under which this debt, which was assumed to be due to him from the European Bank, was attached. It is true that does not absolutely do away with the debt, and he still remains legally a creditor of the bank. But the attachment is more efficacious than a mere stop order, for it seizes the debt into the hands of the Lord Mayor's Court. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that if this had been the only Petition, the Court would not have made an order upon it to wind up the company, on the ground that the interest of the Petitioner as a creditor is so uncertain in its character, that the Court ought not, upon the ground of that interest, to impose upon the shareholders of the company so great a burden as a winding-up order. Dealing with the Petition as if it had been the only one presented, I shall dismiss it with costs.”

23. In our view, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts which obtained in the case decided in In re European Banking Co. In the first place, from the facts which have been recited in the report it appears that the Court considered the amount due by the banking company to the creditor as a very inconsiderable amount; secondly, the fact that the petitioner a debt had been attached in Lord Mayor's Court was undoubtedly taken in consideration as a result of which it was stated that the attachment had the effect of seizing debt into the hands of Lord Mayor's Court. In those circumstances it was held that the interest of the petitioner as a creditor was very uncertain in its character and, therefore, the petition for winding-up should have been dismissed. In the present case the facts are entirely different. The amount claimed by the Court Receiver on behalf of the joint family is not an insignificant amount. Incidentally it may be stated that the petitioner in his petition hail referred to several other debts which the Company owed to other creditors apart from this debt of Rs. 25,00,000 which, was payable to the joint family of Narayanlal Bansilal and his sons. Further the most important distinguishing feature, in our view, is that in this case by the statutory notice issued under s. 434 the Court Receiver had in fact called upon the Company to make payment to the Income-tax authorities for the purpose of liquidating the income-tax dues for non-payment of which the debt had been attached. If by the statutory notice the Court Receiver had called upon the Company to make payment of the dues to himself inspite of the attachment that had been levied by the income-tax authorities on that debt, the Company would in that case have been unable to comply with such a requisition because of the attachment levied on that debt. But here the Court Receiver expressly asked the Company to make payment of the debt due to the Additional Collector of Bombay for the purpose of liquidating the income-tax dues for the non-payment of which the attachment had been levied. In these circumstances it is difficult to accept Mr. Banaji's contention that because of the subsisting attachment on the debt at the instance of the income-tax authorities, the Company was unable to comply with the requisitions contained in the statutory notice issued by the Court Receiver. On the other hand, a direct compliance of the statutory notice would have resulted in the payment of the income-tax dues and the attachment obviously would have fallen to the ground. As we have pointed out earlier, without putting forth any such difficulty the Company in its reply raised all sorts of contentions against the liability to pay the amount. In these circumstances it is not possible for us to accept Mr. Banaji's contention that there was no neglect on the part of the Company to make payment as is contemplated by the provisions of s. 434 of the Indian Companies Act.

24. In our view, the learned trial Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that none of the technical points that had been urged before him on behalf of the Company had any substance.

25. On merits Mr. Banaji contended before us that the petition had not been presented by the Court Receiver bona fide but the proceedings were instituted at the instance of Madhusudanlal and other sons of Narayanlal with ulterior motives of causing harm to the Company and the shareholders. In this behalf Mr. Banaji drew our attention to the several passages in the affidavits that had been filed before the learned trial Judge to show that there were disputes between Narayanlal Bansilal on the one hand and his sons on the other and that the sons were trying to get elected as Directors of the Company and because the sons failed in their attempt to get power, they had instructed the Court Receiver to apply and obtain directions from the Court to wind-up the Company and thereafter the present petition was filed by the Court Receiver. In other words, according to Mr. Banaji the main object with which the petition had been filed was to cause harm to the interest of the Company and its shareholders because the sons had failed to secure a controlling interest or power in the management of the Company. On the facts of the case we do find that there were disputes between the father on the one hand and the sons on the other and the other nominees of the father, but it is also clear that the father apart from preventing the sous from getting any hand in the management of the Company is also trying to fight his personal disputes with his sons and is taking shelter under both his dual capacity, one as a Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company and the other as a karta and manager of the joint Hindu family as and when the occasion arises. In this behalf it is an admitted position that several litigations are pending between the father on the one hand and the sons on the other and several suits have also been filed by the Court Receiver against the so called benamidars of the father in respect of shareholdings in the Company. But quite apart from this position, there could be no dispute that the Company has failed and neglected to pay the debt that was claimed by the Receiver under a statutory notice during the prescribed period of 21 days and, therefore, a right undoubtedly accrued to the Court Receiver as a creditor to file a winding-up petition against the Company. Even apart from this debt, in the winding-up petition the Court Receiver has referred to several other debts which are due and payable by the Company to the third parties. For instance, there is a reference to a debt to the tune of Rs. 8,00,000 owed by the Company to the Bank of India in respect whereof the Bank of India had obtained a decree against the Company and amongst several grounds that have been put forward by the Court Receiver in his winding-up petition there are principally two on which the petition was pressed, first that the Company was unable to pay its debts and, secondly, it was just and equitable that the Company should be wound up. In this regard it would be useful to refer to the observations of Chief Justice Chagla in Bachharaj Factories Ltd. v. Hirjee Mills Ltd. . 1954 57 Bom. L.R 378. where the learned Chief Justice has pointed out that once a party had put proper materials before the Court making out a prima facie case for winding-up, considerations about the motive with which the petition was presented would be irrelevant. The relevant observations appear at p. 392 of the report which run as follows:

“…We have not permitted Mr. Mathalone to go into the merits of these allegations about the mala fides of the petitioners because in our opinion these allegations are entirely irrelevant. If the petitioners have made out a case for the winding up of the company, if they have placed materials before the Court which satisfy the Court that the company is insolvent, if they have placed materials before the Court which satisfy the Court that the substratum of the company is gone, it is difficult to understand what the motive of the petitioners has got to do with the question whether an order of winding up should be made or not.”

26. It is true that in that case the petitioners had placed sufficient materials before the Court to show that the substratum of the company had gone and it was not possible for the company to carry on its business without difficulty.

27. In the present case we may point out that apart from the several debts that are owed by the Company to several creditors which have not yet been satisfied by the Company, a suggestion was made by us to Mr. Banaji that if the Company were able to pay Rs. 25,00,000 in cash or secure the same by way of any guarantee through any Bank or Insurance Company, the winding-up petition may not be proceeded further, and Mr. Banaji had taken time to consider that suggestion and even after adjourning the matter once or twice, nothing has been done by the Company in that behalf to secure the amount of Rs. 25 lakhs and odd to the Income-tax authorities to the satisfaction of those authorities. In these circumstances we do not feel that there is any substance in the contention urged by Mr. Banaji that the petition is actuated by mala fides and, therefore the same ought not have been admitted by the learned trial Judge.

28. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

29. Having regard to the fact that the Inspector to look into the affairs of the Company was appointed somewhere about 1955 and all attempts of investigation had been defeated by one method or the other, we do not think that the advertisements can be stayed any longer. We direct that the advertisements shall be published on Wednesday December 16 and the petition to be heard on January 11, 1965. The Court Receiver to be at liberty to withdraw the amount of Rs. 500 deposited by the Company towards his costs.

30. Appeal dismissed.