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Ramchandra Dhondu Dalvi v. Vithaldas Gokaldas

Bombay High Court
Nov 15, 1963
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Case Summary — Revision against order setting aside ex parte decree in a summary suit

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application in revision against an order which had set aside an ex parte decree entered in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code. The core procedural posture is an appeal in revision challenging the trial Court's decision to set aside a decree made under the summary procedure. The central statutory provisions considered are provisions of Order XXXVII (in particular Rules 1–4 and sub-rules of Rule 2 and Rule 3) governing summary suits, the making of summary decrees and the Court's power under Rule 4 to set aside such decrees. The defendant had earlier been subject to a decree obtained in summary procedure; the trial Court set that decree aside on motion and this revision challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court's power under Order XXXVII, Rule 4 to set aside a decree is limited only to cases where the defendant failed to appear in answer to the summons for judgment, or whether it extends more broadly to all decrees obtained under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII.
  2. On what basis and under what standards the Court should exercise the discretion to set aside an ex parte or summary decree — i.e., what constitutes "special circumstances" and the degree of scrutiny required when a defendant seeks to set aside such a decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Mr. Jadhav, appearing for the plaintiff, relied upon the wording of Order XXXVII, Rule 4, especially the clause “and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit… and on such terms as the Court thinks fit,” to argue that the power in Rule 4 applies only to the situation where the decree was passed because the defendant failed to appear in answer to the summons for judgment. On this narrow construction, Rule 4's power to set aside would be limited in scope.
  • The learned advocate for the plaintiff also contended that the trial Judge had not appreciated the restrictive nature (as he saw it) of Rule 4 when setting aside the decree and that the Court must be very careful and fully satisfied of the grounds relied on by a defendant seeking to set aside a summary decree—mere excuses are not enough.

Defendant's Explanation (as recounted in the opinion)

  • The defendant stated that he did not comply with the Court's order or attend Court because his mother was ill; his lawyer had informed him of the hearing date but he still could not attend for the same reason. These facts formed the basis of the defendant's application to set aside the ex parte decree.
  • The opinion records that the defendant had not produced detailed particulars of the mother's illness or satisfactorily explained the inability to attend, and that the application to set aside was made after a delay (application brought on November 20, 1961, although the decree was passed on October 31, 1961, with earlier time extensions to October 3, 1961).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mrs. Ramaben Bhagubhai Patel v. The Hindustan Electric Company Limited, 1962 64 Bom. L.R. 794 Interpreted Order XXXVII, Rule 4 as restricted to cases where the defendant failed to appear in answer to the summons for judgment; trial Court in that case had set aside a decree under inherent powers (s. 151) where conditional leave had been granted but a condition not complied with. The Court in the present opinion reviewed and declined to follow that restrictive interpretation. It held that Rule 4 applies to all decrees made under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII (including decrees made where conditional leave was granted but conditions not complied with), and that Rule 4's powers are discretionary and wide enough to include setting aside any decree obtained under Rule 2 when the rule's conditions are satisfied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and purposive interpretation of Order XXXVII and its rules governing summary suits. The analysis proceeded in the following steps, as stated in the opinion:

  1. Identification of scope and object: The Court recognized that provisions of Order XXXVII are designed for the public interest and the speedy disposal of simple suits, and that decrees made under this summary procedure should not be lightly set aside. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the language of the rule must be given its natural meaning and should not be restricted unless the language itself requires such restriction.
  2. Examination of the relevant provisions: The Court summarized Rule 2 (which contemplates two ways in which a decree under the summary procedure can be made: (a) defendant fails to obtain leave to defend; or (b) defendant obtains leave but does not appear and defend in pursuance of the leave), Rule 3 (conditions for leave to defend and that leave may be conditional), and Rule 4 (which gives the Court power, “after decree,” under special circumstances to set aside the decree and, if necessary, give leave to the defendant to appear and defend on terms).
  3. Interpretation of "after decree the Court may": The Court reasoned that the phrase must mean after the decree made under Rule 2 (i.e., a decree arrived at under the summary procedure). The word "decree" is applicable to a decree obtained in either of the two eventualities contemplated by Rule 2. Hence, Rule 4 should apply to both kinds of decrees made under Rule 2 and is not limited only to decrees entered because of non-appearance in answer to the summons.
  4. Response to narrow construction: The Court rejected Mr. Jadhav's narrow reading that would confine Rule 4 to the single eventuality of non-appearance in answer to the summons. The Court explained that Rule 4 is general and discretionary, and the additional clause about giving leave to the defendant to appear if necessary does not by itself limit the primary power to set aside the decree. When setting aside a decree the Court may exercise any of the powers it considers appropriate, including granting leave to defend on terms where it is warranted.
  5. On consequences of broad interpretation: The Court addressed the contention (from the earlier precedent) that a broad reading would allow the trial Court, upon setting aside a decree, to retrospectively disturb conditional leave previously granted (something that, it was argued, only a High Court in revisional jurisdiction could do). The Court rejected this fear, explaining that Rule 4's grant of powers is flexible and that, in practice, the Court setting aside a decree would be limited to making orders necessary to proceed fairly (for example, extending time for compliance with a condition under section 148 CPC), rather than rewriting substantive determinations where res judicata or other preclusive rules would apply.
  6. Standard for setting aside: The Court emphasized that Rule 4 must be exercised with circumspection. The language of Rule 4 differs from Order IX, Rule 13, and therefore a Court must be very careful, and fully satisfied as to the grounds made out by the defendant; mere vague excuses do not suffice. The Court must consider the merits of the defence, timing of its first assertion, and whether "special circumstances" exist.
  7. Application to facts before the Court: The defendant's explanation (mother's illness and that his lawyer had told him the hearing date) was found vague, not supported by particulars, and belated (application only on November 20 after the decree on October 31). The trial Court ought to have required more convincing particulars and proof of the substance of the defence. On this basis the Court exercised its revisional discretion.
  8. Discretionary outcome fashioned by this Court: Rather than unconditionally setting aside or restoring the decree, the Court conditioned its interference on the defendant depositing the outstanding balance (Rs. 900) within one month. If deposited, the trial Court's order would stand confirmed with costs in the cause; if not, the rule would become absolute with costs and the ex parte decree restored. The Court thereby exercised its discretionary power to balance the competing considerations of fairness to the defendant and protection of the plaintiff's rights under the summary decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The Court held that Order XXXVII, Rule 4 applies to all decrees made under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII — that is, it is not confined only to decrees obtained because the defendant failed to appear in answer to the summons for judgment. The power conferred by Rule 4 is discretionary and wide enough to permit the Court, under special circumstances, to set aside any decree made under Rule 2 and to exercise such ancillary powers (including granting leave to defend and imposing terms) as it thinks fit.
  • On the facts before it, the Court exercised its discretion conditionally: if the defendant deposited the balance of Rs. 900 (alleged to be due) in the trial Court within one month, the trial Judge's order would stand confirmed; if the deposit was not made within one month, the rule would become absolute with costs and the ex parte decree would be restored.

Implications:

  • The decision clarifies the proper scope of Order XXXVII, Rule 4 — it can be invoked to set aside any decree formed under the summary procedure contemplated by Rule 2, and the Court may attach terms and take other necessary measures when setting aside such a decree.
  • The opinion emphasizes that despite the breadth of Rule 4, Courts must exercise the power cautiously: a defendant seeking to set aside a summary decree must demonstrate special circumstances and provide adequate particulars (including credible evidence) that justify the exercise of discretion. Mere vague excuses and delayed applications are insufficient.
  • Direct practical effects on the parties in this case are specified: an opportunity to avoid restoration of the ex parte decree by making the specified deposit within the given time; otherwise the decree will be restored with costs. The Court imposed a conditional order tailored to the facts rather than issuing a blanket ruling for either party.

Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

Patel, J.:— This is an application in revision against an order setting aside an ex parte decree passed in a summary suit and the important question that arises is: whether the power of the Court to set aside a decree is limited to a case in which, the defendant has failed to appear in answer to the summons for judgment or is wider?

2. Provisions relating to Summary Suits are contained in O. XXXVII, Rule 1, cl. (1) provides that the order shall apply to the High Courts at Madras and Bombay and enables the High Court to apply the same to any other Court. Rule 2, sub-r. (1) enunciates classes of suits which can be filed as Summary Suits and prescribes the maimer of presentation of plaints. Such suits can be filed in respect of bills of exchange, hundis or promissory notes. In this State the scope of the order is widened and is applied to all suits in which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or money payable on demand, with or without interest, arising out of a contract.

3. It is sufficient, to state that the present demand of the plaintiff falls within the category of the claims in respect of which suits can be instituted under this rule. Sub-rule (2) of that rule disables a defendant from defending the suit unless he obtains leave from the Judge as provided in r. 3 and it provides further that if he mates default in obtaining leave or does not, appear and defend in pursuance of the leave, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree as provided in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of the sub-rule. Sub-rule (3) of the rule provides that a decree so obtained may be executed forthwith. Rule 3(1) defines conditions under which the Court must give leave to defend to the defendant and sub-r. (2) of the same rule provides that, the, leave may be given either unconditionally or subject to terms that the Court may fix. Rule 4 relates to the power of the Court to set aside the decree and is worded as follows:

“After decree the Court may, under special circumstances, set aside the decree and if necessary stay or set aside execution and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit, if it seems reasonable to the Court so to do and on such terms as the Court thinks fit.”

4. Mr. Justice Chandracbud in Mrs. Ramaben Bhagubhai Patel v. The Hindustan Electric Company Limited* . 1962 64 Bom. L.R 794. restricted the application of this rule to cases where defendant failed to appear in answer to the summons for judgment and then if it appeared to the Court that there are special circumstances by reason of which the defendant could not appear in answer to the summons. There he was dealing with a case where the defendant having obtained leave to defend which was granted conditionally, failed to fulfil the condition and a decree was passed against him. The trial Court held that the rule applied in the circumstances above stated only but acted under s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code under its inherent powers and set aside the decree on a notice of motion. The learned Judge accepted this construction of the rule.

5. No one can deny the fact that the provisions of O. XXXVII are made in the general interest of the public with a desire to speedy disposal of simple suits. Consistent with this object, it cannot be denied that such decrees, if once made, ought not lightly to be set aside. Yet the words are of wide application and must be given their natural meaning. There can he no reason to restrict their meaning by construction unless the language used in the rule justifies such a construction. As stated above, it is clear that O. XXXVII deals only with the summary procedure. If leave is granted and he condition complied with, if it is conditional leave, the defendant becomes entitled to defend the suit and then, the suit ceases to be a summary suit and must be transferred to the regular list, in which, case there is no question of the application of any of the other rules contained in O. XXXVII, Rule 4 must apply to a suit as has resulted into a decree under the summary procedure and it enables the Court to set aside “the decree” which must mean “the decree” made under r. 2. Rule 2 contemplates two circumstances under which a decree can be made—one, where the defendant fails to obtain leave to defend; and second, where having obtained such leave, he does not appear and defend the suit in pursuance of the leave. On satisfaction of either of these conditions, the consequences provided by sub-r. (2) of r. 2 must follow and result into a decree. The words ‘after decree the Court may’ in r. 4 must mean after such decree as is made under r. 2. The word ‘decree’ is applicable to a decree obtained in either eventuality and in the absence of any thing else either kind of decree can be set aside by the Court if conditions laid down in the rule are satisfied.

6. Mr. Jadhav for the plaintiff relies on the words ‘and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit… and on such terms as the Court thinks fit.’ He says that these words can apply to only one eventuality under which the decree was made i.e where the defendant had not appeared in answer to the summons and therefore, the power must be construed to be limited in scope. This is not so. What the rule means is that the power is general—to set aside the decree and to do any of the other things including the granting of leave if necessary. The power given to the Court is discretionary and the words could not have been intended to limit the power of the Court to set aside such decrees only as are made in the absence of the defendant in answer to the summons. The Court while setting aside the decree may exercise any of the several powers which it thinks fit. If the decree is made in the absence of the defendant in answer to the summons, then only the Court may consider whether he is entitled to leave in terms of r. 3 and cither refuse it or grant it on such conditions as it deems necessary. In a case where conditional leave is granted, but the conditions are not complied with and if the Court-sets aside the decree, the suit must be proceeded with from the stage it was and the Court cannot review the earlier decision, rule of res judicata applying. Of course, while setting aside the decree the Court is entitled to impose such terms as it deems fit. In our view there is nothing in the rule itself which limits the power of the Court to set aside the decree only if it is made against a defendant, who has failed to appear in answer to the summons.

7. In the above case the learned Judge observes that if the construction adopted by us above were accepted it would produce startling consequences. He says that in a case where conditional leave were granted but the defendant failed to comply with the same and a decree followed, if the decree were set aside, it would be open to the Court not only to set aside the decree, but also the conditional leave which cannot be done except by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction and that too in exceptional cases. With respect, it is not possible to accept that such result must necessarily follow. As pointed out above the power to give leave to defend has to be exercised, only if necessary, as the other power of staying the suit or setting aside the execution of the decree and not otherwise. If, therefore, a case arises where conditional leave is granted and the condition is not complied with and the decree follows and if the Court is satisfied that there are special circumstances which require the setting aside of the decree then it has to set aside the decree and the only effect would be to enable the Court to extend the time for complying with the condition, which it otherwise has under s. 148 of the Civil Procedure Code, if an application were made before the expiry of the period. If the ambit of the rule is to be limited we have necessarily to add words qualifying “the decree” which the Court cannot do. Additions to the language of the statute would be permissible only when it is meaningless or absurd. When the language is clear the Court cannot import limitations on the basis of Supposed intention of the legislation. With respect, we must, therefore, differ from the interpretation of the learned Judge and hold that, r. 4 applies to all decrees which are made under r. 2 and the Court eau pass such orders as are required by the circumstances of the case as indicated by us above.

8. The present case, however, cannot be disposed of only on the decision of this point. The learned advocate for the plaintiff contended that the learned trial Judge has not realised the limitation of r. 4 for setting aside such a decree. The language of r. 4 is in marked contrast with that of O. IX, r. 13. This would suggest that the Court has to he very careful in the exercise of its powers and be fully satisfied about the grounds made by the defendant for setting aside the decree. Merely because a defendant comes to the Court and makes some sort of excuse it does not give power to the Court to set aside the decree. In the present case, the defendant came with a bare allegation that his mother was ill and therefore, he was not able to comply with the order of the Court. He also said that though his lawyer had intimated to him the date of the hearing of the suit for the same reason he could not attend Court. It is significant, to note that the order was made for making a deposit within certain time and the time was further extended to October 3, 1961. Thereafter the case was placed on October 31, 1961, on which date the decree was passed and the application was made to the learned Judge as late as November 20, 1961. It was incumbent upon the defendant to have given all particulars of his mother's illness and explain how he could not attend Court. The allegations are vague and on a careful analysis, cannot possibly be accepted. It may be that defendant's mother may have become ill but when an application is made to the Court to set aside an ex parte decree the Court ought to seriously apply its mind to the merits of the defence in particular the stage at which and the time when the defence of the particular nature was taken by him for the first time and if the Court is satisfied that there is some substance, in the defence and the other conditions of the rule are satisfied then only the Court can set aside the ex parte decree.

9. It is, however, within our discretion to interfere in revision, or not. A part of the amount due to the plaintiff is deposited in the trial Court. A balance of Rs. 900 remains and we are inclined not to interfere in this application provided the defendant within one month from to day deposits Rs. 900, being the balance of the amount alleged to be due to the plaintiff in the lower Court. If he makes the deposit of the above amount within one mouth from the date of this order, the order of the learned trial Judge will stand confirmed. If he fails to make the deposit of balance as directed above, the rule will automatically become absolute with costs of this Court and of the trial Court and the ex parte decree restored.

10. In case he makes the deposit, costs will be costs in the cause.

11. Order accordingly.