Patel, J.:— [His Lordship after setting out the facts of the case and dealing with points not material to this report, proceeded.] Though it is not necessary to consider the other points in view of what I have stated above, I will shortly deal with the points which have been considered by the Court below and which have been argued before me. Mr. Mehta argues that the Custodian has no power to review an order made by his predecessor. This argument divides itself into several branches. His first contention is that s. 26 as contained originally in the act of 1950 was repealed by act xci of 1956 and, therefore, power of review was lost. Now, s. 26 was omitted by an Ordinance. It sought to amend the Act of 1950 in several particulars and by s. 9 of the Ordinance it omitted ss. 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 42 and 55(2) of the Act. This Ordinance was later on substituted by Act XCI of 1956. Mr. Mehta relies upon s. 16 of the amending Act wherein sub-s. (2) reads as under:

“Notwithstanding such repeal, (i.e repeal of the Ordinance) anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any powers conferred by or under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act, as if this Act were in force on the date on which such thing was done or action was taken.”

2. It is argued that this section clearly shows that the right of review was not intended to be saved even in pending proceedings. Mr. Mehta re-enforces his argument by reference to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian Of Evacuee Property, Delhi & Others . [1955] 2 S.C.R 1117. in respect of similar words in s. 58(3) of the Act of 1950. It is undoubtedly true that the words used in sub-s. (3) of s. 58 of the Act and the words used in s. 16(2) in the amending Act are similar to the extent of the later part of sub-s. (5) of s. 58. Now, in the case before the Supreme Court, the question was whether the right to go in revision to the Custodian General was available to the party in a case where the application was made before Act XXXI of 1950 was enacted. While considering that question, their Lordships emphasised the provisions of s. 55 of the Ordinance in question which provided that notwithstanding any repeal by the Ordinance of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, or of any corresponding law, anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Ordinance, etc. In view of that provision the Court held that whatever was done under the provisions of the previous law was to be deemed to be done under the Ordinance, and if that was so, this provision being a self-contained provision s. 6 of the General Clauses Act had no application. In the result they upheld the right of revision in the Custodian General. This authority would be applicable only in respect of anything done under Ordinance 6 of 1956 and no more. Neither in Ordinance 6 of 1956 nor in the amending Act XCI of 1956 any special provision is made in respect of pending matters, and that being so, ordinary rule contained in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act must necessarily apply. If that is so, review would be competent. It is, however, argued that a right to review or right to make an application for review is not a vested right, and if it is not a vested right any amendment must necessarily apply in respect of such a proceeding. Mr. Mehta has cited before me cases of Sawaldas Madhavdas v. Arati Cotton Mills . 1954 57 Bom. L.R 394. and K.B Sipahimalani v. Fidahussein Vallibhoy* . 1955 58 Bom. L.R 344. wherein it has been observed that a review is an independent proceeding and that in as much as large amount of discretion is vested in, the Court or in the authority to whom an application of review is made, it cannot be regarded as a vested right. In the present case the question is not whether it is a vested right from the date of the original application on which the order, of which review is sought, is made. If s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies, which I hold applies, it saves by cl. (e) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment. Now, in the present case, even assuming that mere making of an order dated April 30, 1955, would not have given Mohsin Abdulla a right to make an application for review after the amendment of the Act, since the application was already made and it was pending, when Ordinance 6 of 1956 was promulgated and Amending Act XCI of 1956 was enacted, that application is clearly saved. It is clearly a legal proceeding which was then pending and which cannot be affected by the amendment. Apart from it, Mohsin Abdulla was already on the premises as a lodger and if an order was made prejudicial to him a remedy by review was available to him and I do not see why it could not be regarded as a remedy in respect of a right or wrong which is saved. The observations in these cases were made in a different context and can have no application to the wording of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act.

3. It is then contended that in any case, remedy of review could be available to the applicant only on grounds which are defined in O. XLVII, r. 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, i.e if there is a discovery of new fact or matter which was not brought before the Court by excusable mistake or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason which the Court may deem proper. He is supported in his contention by the decision of the Patna High Court in Bibi Nazma v. R.P Sinha . [1954] A.I.R Pat. 43. where the learned Judges took the view that the expression “review” must be construed in the context and background of the Code of Civil Procedure where the same expression has been used. They observed (p. 45):

“…It is a familiar rule of construction that when the legislature has deliberately used a term which has a known legal significance in law, it must be taken that the legislature has attached to that term that known legal significance… In our opinion the expression ‘review’ used in S. 26(2), Administration of Evacuee Property Act must be construed not in a grammatical sense but it must be construed to have the same legal meaning as in O. 47, R. 1, Civil P.C”

4. I may point out, with respect, that it is not possible to hold that the word “review” has been the subject-matter of construction by Courts in India and that it has acquired a restricted meaning. No authority has been cited where this word has been interpreted and given a restricted meaning either narrower than that contained in the Civil Procedure Code or larger. Apparently the framers of the Civil Procedure Code realised that mere use of the word “review” might enable a Court to reconsider its decision without any limitations and it is for that reason that the scope of a review application has been limited in O. XLVII of the Code. Even with the limiting words which were used in 0. XLVII, interpretations placed upon these words were varied and divergent until the Privy Council stepped in the case of Chhajju Ram v. Neki . 1922 L.R 49 I.A 114, S.C 24 Bom. L.R 1238.. It is only on the ground of diversion in the judicial interpretation that the Privy Council interpreted the words “sufficient cause” to mean, cause at least analogous to that which preceded the use of that expression. I think that analogy of the powers of Civil Court to authorities constituted by an Act like the present is not appropriate. (See Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur . [1959] S.C.R 1148..) The history of reviews in Charles Bright & Co., Limited v. Seller . [1904] 1 K.B 6. L.R 1238. shows that originally in Chancery Courts opportunity to correct decision was afforded by a petition to re-hear. The matter was heard by the same Judge or another Judge and re-hearing does not seem to be limited to any particular ground. This could be done only if the order or decision was not enrolled. If the order or decision was sealed then it could be reviewed only on limited grounds of fresh evidence being found or error apparent on the face of the record. The limitation of the grounds on which a matter could be re-heard depends on the fact of the order being sealed. There can be no reason to impose such limitation on the power of review in cases of orders made under this Act.

5. The ordinary meaning of the word “review” as given in Aiyar's Law Lexicon is as follows:—

“A review is a proceeding which exists by virtue of statute. It is in its nature a new trial of the issue previously tried between the parties, the cause of action being brought into court again for trial by a new petition. The proceeding in some respects resembles a writ of error, and also a new trial.”

6. In considering the scope of this word, one must also remember that this was an Act which was passed in an emergency. Moreover, most of the hearing would be only in the presence of one party and sometimes by inexperienced officers. Mistakes were, therefore, likely to be committed in large numbers. Sometimes orders may be passed on ex parte representations and inadequate legal aid. It may, therefore, be that the Legislature thought that larger power of review must be vested in the officers concerned to set the matters right where injustice was caused to any party. One must also bear in mind the ordinary rule of construction that.

“When a word is capable of being construed either in its popular sense or as a word of art, it is for those who assert that it is used in a technical, and not in a popular sense, to establish the fact.” (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Ed., Vol. 31, p. 481).

7. In view of the circumstances which obtained at the time when this Act was enacted, it is very likely that larger powers of review were intended to be given to the officers concerned and unless there were substantial reasons to hold that the review was intended to be limited only to the circumstances mentioned in the Civil Procedure Code, the meaning of the word cannot be cut down. As stated above, there is nothing, in the first place, to show that the word “review” by itself has acquired a technical sense and looking to the provisions of the Act there can be no reason to give it a limited meaning only. In that view of the matter it is not necessary for me to consider as to whether or not in the present case there was an error apparent on the face of the record or it was a latent or patent error. I have shown above while considering the order of April 30, 1955, that the order is clearly invalid.

8. Though I have given comparatively wider meaning to the word “review”, it does not mean that merely because a succeeding officer takes a contrary view that he is entitled to set aside that order. It might for example include cases where an order is obtained behind the back of a party interested in the passing of the order or by suppression of facts or for some other reason which shows that the order is clearly illegal in law. My conclusion on the validity of the order in the beginning of the judgment brings this case within this limit, and if that is so, the Custodian was entitled to set aside the order.

9. The second branch of the argument is that the power to review is available only to the officer who made the order and not to his successor. The words of s. 26(2) are

“The Custodian, Additional Custodian or Authorised Deputy Custodian (but not a Deputy or an Assistant Custodian) may, after giving notice to the parties concerned, review his own order.”

10. Mr. Mehta emphasises the word “own” used in the last part of s. 26(2). He refers me to the provisions of O. XLVII, rr. 2 and 5, of the Civil Procedure Code, which lay down limitations as to the person who can hear a review application. It seems to me difficult to accede to this argument. The provisions contained in rr. 2 and 5 of 0. XLVII emphasize the fact that but for those provisions it would have been possible for succeeding officer to deal with review application. The word “own” has been necessary since the power is given to several officers of varying authority to review the order. In the absence of the word “own”, the Deputy Custodian might be called upon to review the order of a Custodian and an Additional Custodian may be called upon to review the order either of a Deputy Custodian or a Custodian—thing which was likely to introduce chaos in the administration of law. In order to confine each one within his own authority, the word “own” has been used. I am supported in this view by a decision of the Pepsu High Court in Kartar Singh v. Custodian M.E.P, Pepsu . [1952] A.I.R Pepsu 82.. It is then contended that the language of s. 26 taken in its context must necessarily indicate that review could be suo motu and not on an application of a third party. Mr. Mehta refers to s. 26(7) and s. 26(i) and s. 27 of the Act where the Legislature has indicated that the powers could be exercised by any of these officers either on his own motion or on an application made to him in that behalf. Now, s. 26(7) gives power to the Custodian, Additional Custodian or Authorised Deputy Custodian to revise an order made by an officer subordinate to him. Sub-section (3) deals with a special subject and that is in respect of an intending evacuee. It is possible that so far as sub-s. (3) is concerned, the words “on application made to him in this behalf” have been used because special provision had to be made as a proviso in respect of certain matters. Even otherwise, merely because these words are absent in sub-s. (2), it is impossible to hold that the decision could be reviewed only suo motu. It may be that the draftsman did not want to repeat the same language while dealing with different subject matters. (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 9th ed., 326-327 and cases cited therein). I do not see any reason why the words “suo motu” should be added in sub-s. (2) in preference to the words “application of the party”. In this case it is convenient for Mr. Mehta to argue that review could be made suo motu, though in another case he may argue that the words “on the application of a party” must be interpolated. There is no justification made out for adding only one of them. If it is construed to mean that the power could be exercised only if the officer acts suo motu, it may cause a great deal of injustice in many cases where the illegality or impropriety of an order cannot be discovered except when an application is made by a party who is affected by the order. Taking into account the purpose of enacting the section, it is impossible to limit its application either to one case or other; it must include both. I am not, therefore, prepared to hold that the powers must he exercised only suo motu and not on an application of a person aggrieved by the order.

11. Appeal allowed: Suit dismissed.