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Anandrao Kesheorao v. Krishnaji Baliram

Bombay High Court
Nov 19, 1962
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Case Summary — Opinion of Chandrachud, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (decree-holder) filed a darkhast to execute a decree against the petitioner (judgment-debtor) on June 16, 1960. The petitioner filed an application under s. 3(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1956 (the Act) for stay of execution on July 22, 1960.

The petition under s. 3(1) was dismissed for default on December 21, 1961 because the petitioner was absent. Thereafter the petitioner pursued two parallel remedies: (i) an application for restoration of the dismissed application (filed January 12, 1962) and (ii) a fresh application under s. 3 (the opinion records the fresh application as having been filed on January 4, 1962 in one part of the text and later refers to a fresh application having been filed on January 24, 1962). The application for restoration was dismissed on February 14, 1962 partly on the ground that an application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) was not maintainable and partly for want of sufficient cause for absence on December 21, 1961. The fresh application was dismissed on September 27, 1962 on the ground that Order IX governed and, since no appeal had been preferred against the February 14, 1962 order, the fresh application was not maintainable.

The petitioner filed the present revision application challenging the order of September 27, 1962. The principal issue raised was whether proceedings under s. 3(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act are execution proceedings (to which Order IX would not apply) or independent original/substantive proceedings (to which Order IX would apply).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether applications filed by a judgment-debtor under s. 3(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1956 are proceedings in the nature of execution proceedings or are they independent original/substantive proceedings.
  2. If such proceedings are substantive/original, whether the provisions of Order IX (in particular Order IX, Rule 9) of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to them by virtue of s. 141 of the CPC.
  3. As a consequence: whether the petitioner's application for restoration (dismissed on February 14, 1962) was maintainable and whether the fresh application was barred by Order IX, Rule 9.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner (Mr. Ghate)

  • Argued that Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC has no application to proceedings under s. 3(1) because those proceedings are in substance execution proceedings and Order IX does not apply to execution matters.
  • Contended that the stay application is necessarily a component of execution proceedings (because a stay of execution is sought) and thus should be treated as ancillary to execution.
  • Also asserted that if the petitioner were to file an appeal against the February 14, 1962 decision now, it would be time-barred.

Respondent / Decree-Holder (Mr. Chandurkar)

  • Relied on three High Court decisions (Allahabad, Madras, Nagpur) to support the proposition that proceedings of the kind under s. 3 are not execution proceedings and that Order IX may apply.
  • Contended that an application under s. 3 should be deemed to fall under Section 47 of the CPC (so that an appeal would lie against an order passed on such an application).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Har Narain v. Mathura Prasad, [1940] A.I.R. All. 326 (Full Bench) Construction of provisions similar to s. 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Act (U.P. Temporary Postponement Act). Held that an order on an application under s. 3 was an order under s. 47 CPC; importantly, the application could not be treated as an execution proceeding. The Court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that applications under s. 3 are not execution proceedings and may attract the procedural treatment applicable to original proceedings rather than execution procedure.
T. Viswanadham v. Sokalachand Chunnilal, [1947] A.I.R. Mad. 377 Whether Order IX applies to petitions under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (s. 23). Held that the order dismissing the application was procedurally an order under Order IX, r. 8 (and thus Order IX, r. 9 applies). The Court treated this as supporting authority for the proposition that such applications are governed by the provisions of Order IX (i.e., they are not to be treated as execution proceedings); the Madras decision turns on procedural construction rather than merely a statutory fiction.
Thandaram Manwa v. Kashiprasad, [1948] A.I.R. Nagpur 350 Proceedings under s. 11 of the C.P. Moneylenders Act are not execution proceedings; Order IX applies. The Court relied on this decision as further support for the view that applications of this kind are independent original proceedings and not ancillary execution proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the central issue as whether proceedings under s. 3(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act are execution proceedings or independent original/substantive proceedings. The analysis proceeded in distinct steps:

  1. Character of s. 3 proceedings: The Court rejected the contention that s. 3 proceedings are execution proceedings. Although the application is described as one for "stay of execution", the Court emphasized that the form of the application conceals its substantive character: by resorting to s. 3 the judgment-debtor asserts independent legislative rights which temporarily divest the executing court of jurisdiction. Thus, the application raises substantive questions about the judgment-debtor's status (e.g., whether he is an agriculturist), the nature of the decree, and the timing of the liability — matters that require the court to frame fresh issues and conduct a substantive inquiry akin to a suit rather than an ancillary execution petition.
  2. Role of procedural provisions: The Court noted that the application under s. 3 does not seek reliefs available under Order XXI (which governs execution of decrees and orders). This distinguishes s. 3 applications from ordinary execution proceedings and points to their substantive/original character.
  3. Statutory support in s. 3(3): The Court relied on sub-section (3) of s. 3 (which allows an agriculturist to apply for a stay even where no execution proceedings are pending) as a clear indicator that applications under s. 3 cannot be treated as mere parts of execution proceedings.
  4. Precedent and comparative statutory schemes: The Court examined High Court decisions (Allahabad, Madras, Nagpur) addressing similar statutory schemes and incorporated their reasoning to reinforce the conclusion that such applications are not execution proceedings. The Court explained distinctions where necessary (for example, some Acts contained explicit deeming provisions to treat orders as falling under s. 47 CPC) but observed that the Madras decision turned on the procedural construction of the order as one under Order IX rather than by virtue of any fiction.
  5. Application of s. 141 CPC: The Court invoked s. 141 of the CPC, which mandates that the procedure in the Code with regard to suits should, as far as applicable, be followed in all proceedings in any civil court. Because s. 3 proceedings are original/substantive in nature, the procedures for suits (including the provisions of Order IX) apply to them. Consequently, an application for restoration of a suit (or like application) dismissed for default must be treated under Order IX.
  6. Consequence for the two parallel proceedings: Applying the above principles, the Court held that the petitioner's application for restoration (filed January 12, 1962) was competent and should have been entertained under the procedural regime applicable to original proceedings (Order IX). However, because the restoration application was dismissed on the merits (for want of maintainability and lack of sufficient cause), the correct remedy was an appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) CPC. Filing a fresh application on the same cause of action is barred by Order IX, Rule 9; by reason of s. 141, Order IX applies to these applications as well, and therefore the fresh application is barred.
  7. Points not finally decided: The Court declined to decide whether an order on an application under s. 3 must be deemed to fall under s. 47 CPC (a point relevant only if the petitioner had preferred an appeal against the February 14, 1962 order). The Court also did not decide whether delay in filing a belated appeal could, in the circumstances, be excused — noting that it would not express a view on whether delay could be condoned if an appeal were now filed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisional rule is discharged.

More specific operative conclusions and implications drawn by the Court (limited to the opinion's statements):

  • The proceedings initiated by a judgment-debtor under s. 3(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1956 are not execution proceedings in nature; they are independent original/substantive proceedings.
  • Procedural provisions applicable to suits (in particular Order IX of the CPC) apply to such s. 3 proceedings by virtue of s. 141 CPC; therefore an application for restoration (filed on January 12, 1962) was competent.
  • Because the restoration application was dismissed, the correct remedy would have been an appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) CPC. A fresh application on the same cause of action is barred by Order IX, Rule 9 (and that bar applies to such applications by reason of s. 141 CPC); consequently the petitioner's fresh application is not maintainable.
  • The Court did not determine whether orders on s. 3 applications fall under s. 47 CPC (and thus whether an appeal under s. 47 would lie) and did not decide whether any delay in filing a belated appeal could be excused.
  • There is no order as to costs.

Note: The summary above records dates and facts as they appear in the opinion. The opinion itself records two different dates for the "fresh application" (January 4, 1962 at one place and January 24, 1962 at another); this summary reproduces the factual record as set out in the judgment without reconciling that inconsistency.

Final disposition in this revision: Rule discharged; no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

Chandrachud, J.:— This revisional application arises out of proceedings which were initiated by the petitioner (judgment-debtor) under s. 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1956 (M.P Act No. V of 1956), which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act. On June 16, 1960, the respondent filed a darkhast to execute the decree, which he had obtained against the petitioner for the refund of earnest money. On July 22, 1960, the petitioner filed an application for stay of execution of the decree under s. 3(1) of the Act, which reads thus:

“All proceedings in execution of any decree for money, or proceedings for making final any preliminary decree for foreclosure or sale, or proceedings in execution of any final decree for sale, passed by a Civil Court on the basis of amiability incurred before this Act comes into force, in which a judgment-debtor or defendant, as the case may be, is, on the date this Act comes into force, an agriculturist, shall be stayed against such judgment-debtor or defendant, on an application made by him in this behalf during the period this Act remains in force.”

2. On December 21, 1961, the application was dismissed for default, as the petitioner was absent. After the application was so dismissed, the petitioner adopted two different but parallel proceedings, one of them being an application for the restoration of the application which was dismissed for default and the other being the institution of a similar but fresh application. The fresh application was filed on January 4, 1962, whereas the application for restoration was filed on January 12, 1962. On February 14, 1962, the application for restoration was dismissed partly on the ground that an application, under O. IX, r. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable and partly for the reason that there was no sufficient cause for the absence of the petitioner on December 21, 1961. On September 27, 1962, the fresh application was also dismissed for the obviously inconsistent reason that O. IX, r. 9 would govern applications filed under s. 3 of the Act and as the petitioner had not preferred an appeal against the order dated February 14, 1962, the fresh application under s. 3 was not maintainable. It is against this order that the present revision application has been filed. The main question, which arises in this revision application is whether the provisions contained in O. IX of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to applications which are filed under s. 3(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1956. If the proceedings initiated by an application filed under s. 3 of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings, then it is indisputable that the provisions of O. IX will not be attracted. On the other hand, if the proceedings, which a judgment-debtor takes under s. 3 of the Act, are not in the nature of execution proceedings, but are in the nature of substantive original proceedings, then it would be equally clear that the provisions of O. IX would apply to the proceedings.

3. Mr. Ghate, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, contends that O. IX, r. 9, of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to the proceedings initiated by the judgment-debtor under s. 3(1) of the Act, because, the proceedings which s. 3 contemplates are in form and substance execution proceedings and it is settled law that the provisions contained in O. IX do not apply to execution proceedings. Now, what is provided by s. 3(1) of the Act is that proceedings in execution of certain decrees shall be stayed if the decree is passed by a Civil Court on the basis of a liability which is incurred before the date on which the Act came into force and if the judgment-debtor is an agriculturist. It seems to me difficult to take the view that the proceedings contemplated by s. 3 of the Act are in substance execution proceedings. By the application, which a judgment-debtor files under s. 3, he raises a contention that by reason of independent and substantive rights, which are conferred by the Act, the executing Court loses its jurisdiction for a temporary period to execute a lawful decree or order. The application, in the first place, though called an application for stay of execution, does not concern itself with any one of the reliefs which a judgment-debtor may legitimately obtain under O. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure which deals with “execution of decrees and orders”. The Court is required to deal with the application as if it is a substantive proceeding because to be able to deal with the contentions raised by the judgment-debtor in his application, it is necessary for the Court to raise fresh issues with regard to the status of the judgment-debtor, the nature of the decree and with regard to the time when the liability which has merged in the decree, was incurred. In other words, the proceeding initiated by the judgment-debtor by an application under s. 3 of the Act, is more in the nature of a suit than in the nature of an ancillary application such as an execution proceeding is. What the Legislature has done by enacting s. 3 is to confer special rights on a special class of persons with regard to decrees of a special description. In the enforcement of such rights, considerations which primarily weigh with an executing Court are out of place and such substantive applications are required to be dealt with as a trial Court would deal with a suit. It is not disputed and indeed it is clear, that an application contemplated by s. 3 of the Act, will not attract the, provisions of any of the procedural rules which are contained in O. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion, therefore, the proceedings which were initiated by the petitioner under s. 3(1) of the Act on July 22, 1960, are not in the nature of execution proceedings, their true nature being that by resorting to them a substantive right is sought to be exercised and a substantive relief is attempted to be obtained by the judgment-debtor.

4. Mr. Ghate contends that a clue to the nature of the proceedings undertaken by the judgment-debtor under s. 3(1) of the Act is afforded by the very nature of the relief which the judgment-debtor is enabled to seek, namely, stay of execution of the decree or order. The argument is that the judgment-debtor can apply for stay of execution only if the decree-holder files an application for execution and that, therefore, the former application should be deemed to be a part of the latter application. A clear answer to Mr. Ghate's contention is provided by sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the Act which says that any judgment-debtor or defendant who is an agriculturist, may, notwithstanding that no proceedings of the nature referred to in sub-s. (1) are pending against him, make an application for stay under that sub-section. The provisions of sub-s. (3), in a sense, also throw a useful light on the true nature of the proceedings contemplated by sub-s. (1). If by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-s. (3) of s. 3, an application for stay of execution can be filed even if no execution proceedings are pending, then it would be difficult to take the view that every application filed under sub-s. (1) must be deemed to have been filed during the pendency of execution proceedings.

5. Mr. Chandurkar, who appears on behalf of the respondent-decree-holder has drawn my attention to three decisions of the High Courts of Allahabad, Madras and Nagpur, which would lend support to the view, which I have indicated above. The first of these decisions is reported in Har Narain v. Mathura Prasad . [1940] A.I.R All. 326, F.B in which a question of construction of provisions similar to those contained in the present Act arose before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. An Act called the U.P Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, was passed in the United Provinces and s. 3(1) of that Act is, for the present purposes, worded in the same terms as s. 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Act. It was held in that case that an order passed on an application under s. 3 of the U.P Act was an order which fell under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, an appeal would lie against the order. The importance of the decision consists not so much in the finding that the order fell under s. 47 of the Code, but the importance rather is that the application could not be treated as an application in the nature of execution proceedings. In T. Viswanadham v. Sokalachand Chunnilal . [1947] A.I.R Mad. 377. the question was whether the provisions of O. IX would apply to petitions filed under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act. The judgment-debtor filed an application under s. 23 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, for setting aside a sale on certain grounds mentioned in that section. That application was dismissed for default and a question arose whether the provisions of O. IX would apply to the application or whether those provisions were inapplicable by reason of the application being in the nature of execution proceedings. It was held that the order by which the application under s. 23 was dismissed was truly an order under O. IX, r. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and that, therefore, the provisions contained in O. IX, r. 9 must apply to such an application. The third decision on which Mr. Chandurkar relies is reported in Thandaram Manwa v. Kashiprasad . [1948] A.I.R Nagpur 350.. The view which was taken in that case was that proceedings under s. 11 of the C.P Moneylenders Act are not execution proceedings and that the provisions of O. IX of the Code of Civil Procedure must apply to them. Mr. Ghate contends that the decisions of the High Courts of Madras and Nagpur are distinguishable, because the Madras and Nagpur Acts contained a specific provision that orders passed under the relevant sections shall be deemed to be orders passed under s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is true that in the Madras and Nagpur Acts, there are express provisions by which orders passed under the respective sections were required to be treated as orders passed under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it is important to bear in mind that the decision of the Madras High Court does not turn on the question as to whether the order was by fiction of law deemed to be an order under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the learned Judge of the Madras High Court has observed in his judgment, on a true construction of the order, it was an order passed procedurally under O. IX, r. 8 and not under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In so far as the Nagpur decision is concerned, there are observations in the judgment which clearly show that the learned Judge took the view that the application was not in the nature of execution proceedings, quite apart from the provisions contained in s. 11 of the C.P Moneylenders' Act by which orders passed under that section were required to be treated as orders passed under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

6. In my opinion, the proceedings initiated by a judgment-debtor under s. 3(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, are not in the nature of execution proceedings but are in substance, independent original proceedings undertaken by the judgment-debtor for assertion of substantive rights. To such proceedings, the provisions of O. IX, r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply by reason of the provisions contained in s. 141 of the Code which provides that the procedure provided in the Code with regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction, it is well-settled that what s. 141 contemplates is original proceedings and to all such original proceedings which fall under the section, the provisions of O. IX must apply. In the result, therefore, the application which was filed by the petitioner on January 12, 1962, for the restoration of the application filed under s. 3 of the Act which was dismissed for default on December 21, 1961, must be held to be competent.

7. If the application for restoration was maintainable and if the application was dismissed both on the ground that it did not lie and that the petitioner had no sufficient cause to remain absent on December 21, 1961, then the proper remedy for the petitioner to adopt was to file an appeal under O. XLIII, r. 1(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and not to file a fresh application for restoration as the petitioner did on January 24, 1962. The present application, which is a fresh application under s. 3 of the Act cannot be held to be maintainable for the reason that if a suit is dismissed for default and an application for setting aside the dismissal is itself dismissed, a fresh suit on the same cause of action would be barred under the provisions of O. IX, r. 9, of the Code of Civil Procedure. As these provisions apply to applications also by reason of s. 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, a fresh application must be held to be barred if the earlier application for setting aside the dismissal for default is itself dismissed.

8. Mr. Chandurkar has also urged that an application filed under s. 3 of the Act must be deemed to fall under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that, therefore, an appeal will lie against an order passed on that application. It is unnecessary to decide the point as the question would have arisen only if the petitioner had preferred an appeal against the order by which his application under s. 3 of the Act was initially dismissed.

9. Mr. Ghate says that if the petitioner was now to file an appeal against the decision dated February 14, 1962 it would be time barred.

10. It is not for me to say whether, if such an appeal is filed, the delay caused in filing the same could not be excused by reason of the fact that the petitioner was pursuing parallel proceedings under a mistaken Relief and as the petitioner may have been misled by the decision given on February 14, 1962, by the trial Court that the application under O. IX, r. 9 was not maintainable.

11. For these reasons, the rule in this revision application will be discharged, but there will be no order as to costs.

12. Rule discharged.