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Mohiuddin Shaikh Chand v. Gulam Ghouse Gulam Jilani
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner on 9 February 1954 agreed to purchase land (Survey No. 168, village Bhokerdhan, Aurangabad district) from opponent No. 1 for Rs. 5,000. On the same day the petitioner paid Rs. 1,000 under an earnest receipt (Visar-Pavati) and was placed in possession. On 11 August 1956 the petitioner paid the balance of Rs. 4,000 and obtained a receipt. On 12 July 1958 the petitioner and opponent No. 1 jointly filed an application before the Tahsildar praying that the transaction be declared valid under s. 98A of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.
During the Tahsildar proceedings opponent No. 1 retracted his earlier position, alleging he did not enter into the agreement and did not execute the earnest receipt. The Tahsildar found that the agreement and earnest receipt were executed and granted a certificate under s. 98A. Opponent No. 1 appealed to the Deputy Collector, who set aside the Tahsildar's order on the ground that opponent No. 1 was unwilling to sell and also observed that there was no adequate proof of execution of the earnest receipt.
The petitioner moved in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. A Full Bench of the Tribunal found that the agreement of sale was entered into, the earnest receipt was executed, and the petitioner was in possession in part performance. However, the Full Bench held that transfer of possession under an agreement of sale was not a "permanent alienation or transfer" and therefore could not be validated under s. 98A; on that ground it confirmed the Deputy Collector's order. The petitioner challenged that decision under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether transfer of possession of agricultural land in pursuance of an agreement of sale amounts to "a permanent alienation or transfer" within the meaning of that expression in s. 98A of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
- Whether the word "transfer" as used in ss. 47 to 49 and s. 98A was intended to be given a meaning wider than the meaning of "transfer" under the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., whether transfer of possession under an agreement of sale falls within that statutory term).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner argued that the word "transfer" in ss. 47 to 49 and s. 98A was intended to be used in a wider sense than the meaning under the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore transfer of possession under an agreement of sale should be treated as a "transfer" for the purposes of those sections.
- Two supports for this contention were identified in the opinion:
- The wording of s. 50(c) (which exempts certain agreements to sell where possession had been transferred before commencement of the Act) suggested the Legislature intended to include agreements of sale with transferred possession within the wider meaning of "transfer."
- The purpose of ss. 47–49 would be frustrated if "transfer" did not include transfer of possession under an agreement of sale. Where a purchaser has taken possession in part performance (relying on s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act) and paid the purchase price, that purchaser would for practical purposes be the owner; excluding such transactions from the scope of ss. 47–49 would enable parties to evade the statutory restrictions (including requirements of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act) by effecting possession transfers without formal sanctioned transfers.
Opponents' / Revenue Tribunal's Position
- Opponent No. 1 retracted the joint application, alleging there was no agreement of sale and that the earnest receipt had not been executed.
- The Revenue Tribunal relied on s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act to observe that a contract for sale does not by itself create any interest or charge in the immovable property, and accordingly concluded that an agreement of sale and transfer of possession thereunder do not constitute either a permanent alienation or a transfer of the land for the purposes of the Act.
- The Deputy Collector, in his earlier order, also found that opponent No. 1 was unwilling to sell and noted an absence of adequate proof of execution of the earnest receipt.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Janardan v. Romchandra, 1926 29 Bom. L.R. 312 | That the words "transfer of property" (in that context, s. 60(a) of the Indian Basements Act) were not necessarily confined to the limited sense of transfer as defined in the Transfer of Property Act; i.e., "transfer" can be used in a wider sense in some statutory contexts. | The court cited this decision as an example showing that "transfer" is sometimes used in a sense wider than under the Transfer of Property Act, to illustrate the argument that "transfer" in the tenancy statute might likewise bear a wider meaning; but the court ultimately treated that possibility as one factor in its analysis of ambiguity rather than as conclusive authority to expand the meaning here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by setting out the statutory context: ss. 98A–98D (introduced by the 1957 amending Act) were intended partly to provide a mechanism to validate otherwise invalid transactions (occurring before December 1957) upon payment of penalties, and partly to prescribe consequences for transactions after that date. The court summarized s. 98A(1)–(3): s. 98A(1) permits validation of "permanent alienation or transfer" contrary to s. 38D or Chapter V upon payment of a specified penalty; s. 98A(2) requires the Tahsildar to issue a certificate on payment; and s. 98A(3) provides that failure to pay the penalty within the prescribed period will lead to declaration of invalidity and application of s. 98C(3)–(5) (resulting effectively in vesting/forfeiture to the State and disposal under priority with recovery of the reasonable price).
The court analyzed Chapter V (ss. 47–50) and s. 38D to determine what transactions are made invalid by those provisions. It noted that s. 47 renders "no permanent alienation and no other transfer" of agricultural land valid without the previous sanction of the Taluqdar/Collector. Sections 48 and 49 describe the policy reasons and constraints (family holding minima, ceiling limits, non-agriculturist transferees), and s. 50 contains exceptions including s. 50(c) which exempts agreements to sell entered into before the Act where possession had already been transferred to vendees before commencement.
The court accepted the Revenue Tribunal's conclusion that transfer of possession under an agreement of sale is not a "permanent alienation." It treated as a closer question whether such a transfer of possession also amounts to a "transfer" for ss. 47–49 and s. 98A. The court recognized that, ordinarily, "transfer" would carry the meaning given in the Transfer of Property Act (under which a mere agreement for sale does not itself create an interest — see s. 54). The court further acknowledged arguments for a wider meaning of "transfer":
- The wording of s. 50(c) suggests the Legislature contemplated agreements of sale with transfer of possession, because it specifically exempts agreements and transferred possession predating the Act.
- The policy behind ss. 47–49 could be frustrated if transfer of possession under an agreement of sale were excluded, since equitable part performance (s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act) might effectively convert such vendees into de facto purchasers, allowing circumvention of statutory safeguards and registration formalities.
The court found ambiguity in the word "transfer" as used in the statute. It then applied a principle of statutory construction grounded in the consequences of its interpretation: because s. 98A(3) (read with r. 44 of the Rules) would lead to severe consequences — including forfeiture of land to the State where the penalty is not paid by the prescribed date (December 31, 1960) — it would be improper to construe "transfer" in a wider sense (thereby invalidating a large number of transactions and risking widespread forfeiture) unless the Legislature had expressed that intention clearly and unambiguously. The court concluded that in the absence of such clear expression, the word "transfer" should be read in its narrower sense as understood under the Transfer of Property Act.
Although the court accepted that the restricted meaning might partially defeat the object of ss. 47–49, it declined to expand the statutory term by judicial construction because of the grave statutory consequences that would follow. Instead, the court directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the appropriate Department of the State Government so the Legislature might consider amending the statute or rules if it thought fit.
On that basis the court confirmed the decision of the Revenue Tribunal and discharged the rule. The court also ordered that there be no costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The rule is discharged; the decision of the Revenue Tribunal is confirmed.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The court confirmed the Revenue Tribunal's view that an agreement of sale with transfer of possession does not amount to a "transfer" in the statutory sense under ss. 47 and 98A (the court construed "transfer" as restricted to the meaning under the Transfer of Property Act). Consequently, such transactions are not rendered invalid by s. 47 and do not require validation under s. 98A by virtue of being treated as statutory "transfers."
- The court noted that this restricted construction may partially defeat the policy behind ss. 47–49, but declined to expand the statutory meaning because of the severe consequences (including potential forfeiture under s. 98A(3) and r. 44) that would result from a broader construction.
- The court directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the appropriate State Government Department so that legislative or rule amendments may be considered if the State deems them necessary; thus the court left corrective action to the Legislature rather than judicially enlarging the statutory term.
- Costs: The court ordered that there be no order as to costs.
Tarkunde, J.:— The petitioner on February 9, 1954, agreed to purchase from opponent No. 1 a land Survey No. 168 at the village Bhokerdhan in the Aurangabad district, for an amount of Rs. 5,000. On the same day he paid Rs. 1,000 to opponent No. 1 under an earnest receipt or Visar-Pavati, wherein the terms of the agreement were set out. In pursuance of the agreement the petitioner was placed in possession of the land. On August 11, 1956, the petitioner paid to opponent No. 1 Rs. 4,000 being the balance of the purchase price and obtained a receipt for the amount. Then on July 12, 1958 the petitioner and opponent No. 1 jointly filed an application before the tahsildar from which the present proceeding has arisen, praying that the transaction between them be declared valid under s. 98A of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act During the pendency of the matter before the Tahsildar, opponent No. 1 resiled from 1 lie position taken by him in the joint application and alleged that he did not enter into an agreement of sale with the petitioner, and did not execute the earnest receipt. The Tahsildar found that the agreement was entered into and the earnest receipt executed by opponent No. 1. Accordingly he granted a certificate under s. 98A that the transfer was not invalid. In an appeal filed by opponent No. 1, the Deputy Collector set aside the Tahsildar's order on the ground that opponent No. 1 was unwilling to sell the land. The Deputy Collector also observed incidentally that there was no adequate proof of the execution of the earnest receipt. The petitioner went in revision to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The case was heard by a Full Bench of the Tribunal. On the facts, the Full Bench were of the view that the agreement of sale was entered into between the parties as alleged by the petitioner, that the earnest receipt was duly executed, and that the petitioner was in possession of the land in part performance of the agreement. The Full Bench, however, held, disagreeing with the contrary view curlier held by a Division Bench of the Tribunal, that transfer of possession under an agreement of sale was not “a permanent alienation or transfer” of the land, and could not be validated under s. 98A. On this ground the Revenue Tribunal confirmed the order of the Deputy Collector. This decision of the Revenue Tribunal is challenged before us by the petitioner under art. 227 of the Constitution.
2. The question which falls for determination is whether transfer of possession of agricultural land in pursuance of an agreement of sale amounts to “a permanent alienation or transfer” within the meaning of that expression in s. 98A of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1950. It appears from the impugned judgment of the Revenue Tribunal, and from what we were told at the Bar, that this question is involved directly or indirectly in a number of other matters pending before Tenancy Courts. We have, therefore, considered the question with a good deal of care. Sections 98A to 98D were introduced in the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1950, by the amending Act of 1957 (Bombay Act No. XXXII of 1958). One purpose of these provisions was to provide the mode of validating transactions which were otherwise invalid under the Act, on payment of penalties at certain rates, provided the transactions had taken place before December 1957. Section 98A provides for the validation of such transactions. The other object was to lay down the consequences of transactions which take place after December 1, 1957, and which are incapable of being validated under s. 98A. We are not directly concerned with the provisions of ss. 98B to 98D, which deal with transactions to which s. 98A does not apply. Sub-section (1) of s. 98A provides that a permanent alienation or transfer of any land in contravention of any of the provisions of s. 38D or of Chapter V as it stood at the commencement of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lauds (Amendment) Act 1957, shall not be declared to be invalid merely on the ground of such contravention, if the alienee or transferee pays to the State Government a certain amount, of penalty, Sub-section (2) lays down that, on payment of such penalty, the Tahsildar shall issue a certificate to the alienee or transferee that such transfer is not invalid. Sub-section (3) say that, where the alienee or transferee fails to pay the penalty referred to in sub-s. (1) within such period as may be, prescribed, “the transfer shall be declared invalid by the Tahsildar and thereupon the provisions of sub-sections (3) to (5) of s. 98C shall apply”.
3. The provisions of sub-ss. (3) to (5) of s. 98C law down in substance that the land shall be deemed to vest in the State Government, that the Tahsildar shall determine the reasonable price of the land, that, the Tahsildar shall dispose of the land on payment of the reasonable price according to a certain order of priority, and that the reasonable price so recovered shall, subject to payment of the encumbrances it any subsisting on the land, be credited to the State Government. It is thus clear that, even in respect, of transactions which are capable of being validated under s. 98A, the penalty has to be paid before the date prescribed by the Rules, and in the absence of payment of the penalty in time, the land is to be forfeited to the State Government, for distribution according to the order of priorities fixed under the relevant provisions of the Act.
4. Section 98A applies in terms to permanent alienations or transfers which have taken place in contravention of the provisions of s. 38D or of Chapter V of the Act The scope of s. 98A, which is a validating section, necessarily depends on the scope of these provisions, under which alienations and transfers are rendered invalid. Section 38D provides that, if a landholder at any time intends to sell the land held by a protected tenant or an ordinary tenant, lie shall give notice in writing of his intention to such protected tenant or ordinary tenant and offer to sell the land to him. Chapter V of the Act is comprised of ss. 47 to 50C. Of these, ss. 47 to 50 are material for the present purpose. Section 47, in so far as it is relevant, provides:—
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any decree or order of a Court, no permanent alienation and no other transfer, of agricultural land shall be valid unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Taluqdar”
5. It will he noticed that the words “permanent alienation” and “transfer” occur in s. 47 just as they occur in s. 98a. sections 48 and 49 provide for restrictions on the grant of sanction by the Collector to a permanent alienation or transfer. These sections indicate the purpose of the Legislature in providing that permanent alienation and transfers shall not be valid unless they have received the previous sanction of the Collector. Under s. 48, the Collector is not to sanction a permanent alienation or transfer if thereby the area of the land held by the alienor or transferor falls short of a family holding or, on the other hand, the area of land held by the alienee or transferee, after the alienation or transfer, would exceed ⅔rds of the ceiling area determined under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961. Section 49 lays down that the Collector shall not sanction an alienation or transfer in favour of a non-agriculturist unless the latter intends to adopt the profession of an agriculturist. Sections 47 to 49 are thus designed to secure that permanent alienations and transfers will not result in reducing the area of land held by alienors or transfers below a certain minimum, or in increasing the holding of the alienors or transferees above a certain maximum, or in the land going to persons who are not agriculturists and do not intend to adopt the profession of agriculture. Then s. 50 provides for cases in which the restrictions imposed by ss. 47 to 49 are not to apply. The provisions of s. 50, in so far as they are material, are as follows:—
“The restrictions imposed by sections 47, 48 and 49 shall not apply to—
(b) registered sales of agricultural lands before the commencement of this Act;
(c) agreement to sell agricultural lands entered into before the commencement of this Act, if possession of the lands had been transferred to the vendees before such commencement in pursuance of such agreements.”
6. The wording of cl. (c) of s. 50 suggests that the restriction imposed by ss. 47 to 49 would apply to agreements of sale of agricultural lands where possession of the lands is transferred to the vendees after the commencement of the Act, i.e on or after June 10, 1950. If agreements of sale accompanied by transfer of possession were not intended to be covered by the expressions “permanent alienation” and “transfer” of agricultural land, it was not necessary to specify, as cl. (c) of s. 50 does, that the restriction imposed by ss. 47 to 49 shall not apply to those agreements of sale where the lands were transferred to the vendees before the commencement of the Act.
7. In their judgment, the Revenue Tribunal have held that an agreement of sale and the transfer of possession thereunder do not amount either to a permanent alienation or a transfer of the land in question. In s. 2(1)(o) of the Act, the expression “permanent alienation” has been defined as including.
“… any sale, exchange, gift or disposition by will and any transfer of a right of occupancy or of the patta of a holding but does not include any disposition by will.”
8. After referring to the meaning of the word “occupancy” as given in the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, the Revenue Tribunal have observed—and in our opinion rightly—that
“occupancy is a special kind of land tenure and signifies that the holder has a lawful title to the land which he is entitled to hold subject to the provisions of the Land Revenue Act.”
9. On the meaning of the term “transfer”, the Revenue Tribunal have referred to s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides in terms that a contract, for the sale of immovable property “does not by itself create any interest in or charge on such property”. Accordingly, the Revenue Tribunal came to the conclusion that an agreement of sale and transfer of possession thereunder do not constitute cither a permanent alienation or a transfer of land.
10. It is clear from the judgment of the Revenue Tribunal that, while reaching the above conclusion, the Tribunal failed to take notice of ss. 47 to 50 of the Act. It must he emphasized that the judgment, of the Revenue Tribunal does not mean that the transaction between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 is invalid, and is incapable of being validated under s. 98A it means, on the contrary, that the transaction is valid being unaffected by s. 47 and does not, therefore, require validation under s. 98A. The primary question obviously is whether a transaction of this nature, where possession is transferred under an agreement of sale, requires the previous sanction of the Collector under s. 47, and it is this question that the Revenue Tribunal have failed to consider.
11. We agree, with respect, with the Revenue Tribunal that transfer of possession under an agreement of sale does not amount to a permanent alienation; but it is a moot point whether it does not also amount to a transfer within the meaning of that, term as used in ss. 47 to 49 and in s. 98A of the Act. It is true that normally the word “transfer” would bear the meaning which it has under the Transfer of Property Act; and it is also true that transfer of possession under an agreement of sale would not normally be regarded as a transfer of the land itself or of any interest therein. The word “transfer” is however, sometimes used in a sense wider than the sense in which it is used in the Transfer of Property Act. It was, for instance, held in Janardan v. Romchandra . 1926 29 Bom. L.R 312. that in s. 60(a) of the Indian Basements Act the words “transfer of property” are not used in a limited sense of a transfer as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the word “transfer” in ss. 47 to 49 and s. 98A of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is also used in a wider sense than that of a transfer under the Transfer of Property Act Two arguments were advanced in support of this contention.
12. In the first place, it was urged that the language employed in s. 50(c), to which a reference has already been made above, shows that the Legislature intended to include in the meaning of the word “transfer” a transfer of possession of agricultural lands in pursuance of an agreement of sale. There is some plausibility in this contention. Secondly, it was argued that the purpose of the restriction imposed by s. 47, as expressed in the provisions of ss. 48 and 49, is liable to be frustrated if the word “transfer” did not, include transfer of possession under an agreement of sale. It was contended that where a contract for sale is by writing signed by the transferor, and the transferee has taken possession of the land in part performance of the contract and has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, he is entitled to defend his possession by relying on the equity of part, performance as defined by s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act against the transferor or any person claiming through him. In such a case the transferee, particularly when he has paid the entire purchase price, is for all practical purposes the purchaser of the land. If such a transaction did not require the previous sanction of the Collocutor, if in other words no invalidity attaches to such a transaction by virtue of s. 47, the purpose of the Legislature in making the provisions contained in ss. 47 to 49 can always be frustrated by parties entering into such transactions, without executing a formal deed of transfer as required by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act. It was, accordingly, urged for the petitioner that the Legislature intended to include in the word “transfer”, as used in ss. 47 to 49 and 98A, a transaction in which possession was transferred under an agreement of sale.
13. It does appear to us that there is some ambiguity in the meaning of the word “transfer” as used in the aforesaid sections. But in deciding whether the Legislature intended to use the word in the narrower meaning which it has under the Transfer of Property Act or in a wider meaning, it is necessary to take notice of another provision of the Act Reference has already been made above to sub-s. (3) of s. 98A. That provision applies to permanent alienations or transfers which took place after the commencement of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, and before December 1, 1957, which were invalid under the Act but were intended to be validated under s. 98A. Even in respect of such transactions, sub-s. (3) of s. 98A provides that, if the alienee or transferee fails to pay the penalty referred to in sub-s. (2) of that section “within such period as may be prescribed”, the transfer shall be declared invalid by the Tahsildar, and thereupon the provisions of sub-ss. (3) to (3) of s. 98C shall apply. Under r. 44 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 1958, it has been provided that the penalty referred to in sub-s. (1) of s. 98A shall be paid on or before December 31, 1960. The effect, of sub-s. (3) of s. 98A read with r. 44 is that, in the case of all permanent alienations and transfers which were contrary to s. 47, and in respect of which penalty has not been paid before December 31, 1960, the land involved is to be forfeited to the State Government, and the occupancy price thereof, subject to the payment of encumbrances if any thereon, is to be credited to the State Government. In view of the grave consequences which are to follow under s. 98A(3) on the non-payment of penalty within the prescribed time, it would not be proper to attribute to the word “transfer” as it occurs in s. 47 a wider meaning than it would normally have. The result of attributing a wider meaning to that expression is to invalidate a large number of transactions, with the result that in many of such cases the lauds involved are likely to be forfeited to Government. If the Legislature intended that transfers of possession under agreements of sale should be invalid in the absence of the Collector's sanction, and that the failure of the transferee to pay the penalty under s. 98A within the prescribed time should have the consequence of forfeiting the lauds to the State Government, it was essential that the intention of the Legislature should have been expressed clearly and unambiguously. Inferences which can be drawn from the negative provision of s. 50(c) or from the legislative intention behind ss. 48 and 49 are not, in our view, sufficient to remove the ambiguity attaching to the word “transfer” so as to include therein a mere transfer of possession under an agreement of sale. Considering the matter as a whole, we have come to the conclusion, not without a good deal of hesitation, that the meaning of the word “transfer” occurring in ss. 47 and 98A and other allied provisions is restricted to its meaning under the Transfer of Property Act Since, however, it appears to us that this restricted meaning of the word “transfer” might result in partially defeating the object of the Legislature in imposing the restriction mentioned in ss. 47 to 49, we direct that a copy of this judgment may be sent to the appropriate Department of the State Government, so that the State Government might, if it deems fit, initiate such amendments in the Act or in the Rules as may be found necessary. For the reasons mentioned above, the decision of the Revenue Tribunal is confirmed. The rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
14. Rule discharged.
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