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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Asian Assurance Co. Ltd.

Bombay High Court
Sep 12, 1961
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Tambe, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a reference under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act. The relevant assessment years are 1952–53, 1953–54 and 1954–55 (accounting years 1951–53). The assessee is a life insurance company. The assessments were made by the Income-tax Officer under rule 2(b) of the Schedule framed under section 10(7) of the Act, on the basis of the actuarial valuation for the biennial period 1950–51.

The assessee constructed a building at Borivli between 1 April 1946 and 31 December 1949; by 31 December 1949 the building was complete and was let out. The assessee claimed that rental income from the Borivli property was exempt from taxation under section 4(3)(xii) of the Act. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim (taking the view that insurance companies are to be assessed under the Schedule and that income is a notional income determined under the Schedule), and the Commissioner of Income-tax dismissed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, holding that the rental income was exempt under section 4(3)(xii) and should be excluded from the notional surplus determined under the Schedule. The Commissioner of Income-tax then referred a question to this Court under section 66(1).

The question as originally framed presumed the rental income was exempt; the court reframed it to state the real controversy: whether the rental income from the Borivli property is assessable in the assessee's hands in any of the assessment years 1952–53, 1953–54 or 1954–55.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income arising to the assessee from the Borivli property is assessable in its hands in any of the assessment years 1952–53, 1953–54 or 1954–55.
  2. Implicitly: Whether rental income of an insurance company, received in the course of its business, can qualify for exemption under clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4 when the company's total income is computed under section 10(7) read with the Schedule (rule 2(b)).

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue (Mr. Joshi)

  • The profits and gains of an insurance company are not charged under the different heads enumerated in the Act but are computed by the special mode provided in section 10(7) read with the Schedule to the Act (rule 2(b)).
  • Accordingly, an insurance company has no income chargeable under the head “income from property” for the purposes of section 4(3)(xii); that clause therefore does not apply to rental income received by an insurance company in the course of its business.
  • Relied on decisions including Commissioner of Income-tax v. Western India Life Insurance Co. Ltd., Commissioner of Income-tax v. B.B. & C.I. Railway Co-operative Mutual Death Benefit Society for Indian Staff Ltd., and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Crown Life Insurance Co.

Assessee (Mr. Kolah)

  • Tax is charged on the total income of the assessee under the Act; whether a particular receipt is income at all must be determined according to section 4. If a receipt is excluded by section 4(3), it is taken out of total income at the inception and is not subject to subsequent computation under section 10(7).
  • Section 10(7) deals with computation; it does not determine whether a receipt is income falling within section 4(1). Therefore, if rental income qualifies for exclusion under clause (xii) of section 4(3), it should be taken out of total income before applying section 10(7) and the Schedule.
  • Relied on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sir Kameshwar Singh and B.M. Kamdar, In re.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Western India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. [1949] 17 I.T.R. 125 That assessment of an insurance company under rule 2(b) of the Schedule produces a notional income and is computed differently from an ordinary business; therefore certain provisions (like the third proviso to section 4(1) in that case) may not apply to an assessment under rule 2(b). The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that income computed under the Schedule for insurance companies is a notional unitary income and is not assessed in the separate heads (such as “income from property”) for purposes of section 4(3)(xii).
Commissioner of Income-tax v. B.B. & C.I. Railway Co-operative Mutual Death Benefit Society for Indian Staff Ltd. [1949] 17 I.T.R. 509 Explains section 10(7) as providing a special method of computing profits and gains of insurance business, substituting rules in the Schedule for provisions in sections 8, 9, 10, 12 or 18; resulting in a single notional income for an insurance company. The court quoted this decision to underline that under section 10(7) an insurance company's income is returned as one unit (a notional or artificial income) determined by the Schedule, supporting the view that such income is not “income from property” within the normal heads.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Crown Life Insurance Co. [1956] 30 I.T.R. 365 Cited by revenue in support of the proposition that an insurance company's income should be computed under the Schedule and not divided under separate heads. The opinion references this decision as part of the authorities supporting the revenue's position; the court treated it as supportive of the Schedule-based computation approach for insurance companies.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sir Kameshwar Singh [1935] 3 I.T.R. 305 Held that agricultural income (clause (viii) of section 4(3)) could be excluded from total income even if derived in the course of another business; used by the assessee by analogy. The court distinguished this authority on the basis that clause (viii) (agricultural income) is absolute and unqualified, whereas clause (xii) (exemption for certain house property income) additionally requires that the income be chargeable as “income from property” under the Act. Thus Sir Kameshwar Singh did not support the assessee's claim.
B.M. Kamdar, In re Discusses the scheme of section 4: first determine whether an amount is income under section 4(1), then whether it is excluded under section 4(3); if excluded it ceases to be income for the Act. The court acknowledged and accepted the quoted observations about the sequence of analysis under section 4, but held that even if that sequence is followed the assessee had not established that the Borivli rental income was chargeable as “income from property” in the assessee's hands because of the special scheme under section 10(7) and the Schedule.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a statutory and textual analysis to resolve whether the Borivli rental income was exempt under clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4 or was assessable in the hands of the insurance company for the years in question.

  1. The court began with the charging provisions and definitions: section 3 charges tax on the total income; “total income” is defined in sub-section (15) of section 2 as the total amount of income referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4, computed in the manner laid down in the Act. Section 4(1) makes all income, profits and gains from whatever source derived chargeable to tax unless excluded by the Act.
  2. The court set out the material text of clause (xii) of section 4(3), and identified the conditions that must be satisfied for the clause to exclude income: (1) it must be income of a building; (2) the building must have been constructed between 1 April 1946 and 31 March 1956; (3) the exclusion covers two years immediately following completion; and (4) critically, the income must be chargeable under the head “income from property.”
  3. The court observed that the first three factual requirements were not in dispute (at least for assessment year 1952–53), and focused on the fourth requirement: whether in the assessee's hands the rental income was “income from property” (i.e., chargeable under that head in accordance with the Act).
  4. The court examined the heads of income (section 6) and the computation of income from property (section 9), concluding that if section 9 governed the Borivli income in the assessee's hands, then that income would be chargeable under the head “income from property.”
  5. However, the court identified a decisive statutory obstacle for the assessee: subsection (7) of section 10 provides a special computation method for profits and gains of any business of insurance, expressly stating that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 8, 9, 10, 12 or 18, the profits and gains of insurance business and the tax payable on them shall be computed in accordance with the rules in the Schedule.
  6. Applying the plain language of section 10(7), the court concluded that income from property received by an insurance company in the course of its business is not to be computed under section 9 but must be computed under the Schedule. Consequently, such income in the hands of an insurance company is not regarded as income chargeable under the head “income from property” (for purposes of attracting clause (xii) of section 4(3)).
  7. The court reinforced this construction by reference to prior decisions (including B.B. & C.I. and Western India Life) that explained how section 10(7) substitutes the Schedule's rules for the general chapter III computation provisions and produces a single notional income for an insurance company determined by rule 2 (rule 2(b) in particular).
  8. The court considered and rejected the assessee's reliance on authorities (such as Sir Kameshwar Singh and B.M. Kamdar) by distinguishing their factual or textual bases: clause (viii) (agricultural income) is absolute, whereas clause (xii) requires the additional condition that the income be chargeable as “income from property” under the Act — a condition not met where the Schedule's special computation applies.
  9. On this statutory and precedential analysis, the court concluded that the assessee had failed to establish that the Borivli rental income was chargeable as “income from property” in its hands, and therefore clause (xii) of section 4(3) did not apply to exempt that income.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the reframed question in the affirmative — the rental income from the Borivli property is assessable in the assessee's hands for the relevant assessment year(s); the assessee is not entitled to claim exemption under clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4 in respect of that rental income.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Borivli rental income must be included in the assessee's taxable income as computed under the Schedule applicable to insurance business (rule 2(b) under section 10(7)), and the assessee is not entitled to the section 4(3)(xii) exclusion for that income.
  • The court ordered that the assessee shall pay the costs of the department.
  • The opinion does not propose or declare a new general precedent beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and earlier authorities to the facts; it rests on the textual operation of section 10(7) and the Schedule and on prior decisions interpreting those provisions.

Question answered in the affirmative.

Show all summary ...

Tambe, J.:— This is a reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The relevant assessment years are 1952–53, 1953–54 and 1954–55, the accounting years being the calendar years 1951, 1952 and 1953. The assessee is a life insurance company, and the assessment has been made by the Income-tax Officer under rule 2(b) of the Schedule under section 10(7) of the Act on the basis of the actuarial valuation for the biennial period 1950 and 1951. The assessee company constructed a house property at Borivli between 1st April, 1946, and 31st December, 1949. By 31st December, 1949, the building had been completed and had been rented out. The question involved in this case relates to the rental income of this property. The assessee company claimed that the rental income from Borivli property was exempt from taxation under section 4(3)(xii) of the Act. This contention was not accepted by the Income-tax Officer. In his view the insurance company had to be assessed according to the rules contained in the Schedule of the Act. In that Schedule, the income of an insurance company is only the income from its business and is not divided under the various heads. The income assessed is a notional income as determined under the Schedule of the Act. In this view of the matter, the deduction claimed by the assessee was not granted. An appeal taken by the assessee to the Commissioner failed. A second appeal was taken to the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of the exemption in respect of the Borivli property under section 4(3)(xii) of the Act, and that income being exempt from tax, the manner of computation of the assessee's income did not arise. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal held that from the figure of surplus arrived at in accordance with the Schedule of the Act the rental income derived by the assessee from the Borivli property should be excluded, and the assessee taxed on the balance. On an application made by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 66(1) of the Act, the following question has been referred to this court:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income arising to the assessee from the Borivli property and exempt from taxation under section 4(3)(xii) of the Income-tax Act is assessable in its hands in any of the assessment years 1952–53 or 1953–54 or 1954–55?”

2. In our opinion, the question has not been happily framed. As already stated, the dispute between the parties is whether income of the Borivli property is exempt from taxation under section 4(3)(xii) of the Act. The question, on the other hand, assumes that that income is exempt from taxation. The question, as framed, does not bring out the real controversy between the parties. We therefore reframe the question in the following terms:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the income arising to the assessee from Borivli property is assessable in its hands in any of the assessment years 1952–53 or 1953–54 or 1954–55?”

3. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the revenue, contends that the income, profits and gains of an insurance company are charged to tax not under different heads of income mentioned in the Act, but by the special mode provided in sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act, read together with the rules contained in the Schedule to the Act. The insurance company, therefore, had no income chargeable under the head “income from property”. The provisions of clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4, therefore, are not attracted to the “income from property” received by an insurance company in the course of its business. The assessee, therefore, is not entitled to claim exemption in respect of the rental income of the Borivli property. He referred us to the decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Western India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. [1949] 17 I.T.R 125., Commissioner of Income-tax v. B.B & C.I Railway Co-operative Mutual Death Benefit Society for Indian Staff Ltd. [1949] 17 I.T.R 509. and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Crown Life Insurance Co. [1956] 30 I.T.R 365 On the other hand, Mr. Kolah, for the assessee, contends that under the Income-tax Act, what is taxable is the total income of the assessee. Whether a particular receipt is income or not has to be first determined in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of the Act. If any receipt is taken away or taken out of the total income of an assessee, then that amount cannot be taken into consideration at all. It goes out at the inception and no question arises of any computation of that income as such. Subsection (7) of section 10 of the Act deals only with computation. Unless and until it is shown that a particular receipt is income which can be included in the total income of the assessee, section 10(7) has no application thereto. It is his argument that the rental income received by the assessee from its Borivli property is exempt under clause (xii) of subsection (3) of section 4 of the Act. That income, therefore, goes out of the total income of the assessee. Section 10(7) therefore has no application to that income and that income will have to be deducted from the sum ascertained under section 10(7) read with the rules in the Schedule. He referred us to the decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sir Kameshwar Singh [1935] 3 I.T.R 305. and B.M Kamdar, In re5. In our opinion, the contentions raised on behalf of the revenue are well founded. Section 3 of the Act provides that where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act, in respect of the total income of the previous year of an assessee. “Total income” has been defined in sub-section (15) of section 2 as: “‘total income’ means total amount of income, profits and gains referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4 computed in the manner laid down in this Act…” The liability of an assessee to pay tax is on the total income referred to in sub-section (1) of section 4. Sub-section(1) of section 4 provides that “subject to the provisions of the Act, the total income of any previous year of any person includes all income, profits and gains from whatever source derived…” It will thus be seen that under sub-section (1) of section 4, all income, profits and gains received by the assessee in the previous year from whatever source he might have received it is liable to tax, unless, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, exemption in respect of any particular item of income is permissible. It has to be seen whether the assessee is entitled to the exemption under clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4. The material part reads: “(3) any income, profits or gains falling within the following classes shall not be included in the total income of the person receiving them…..(xii) any income chargeable under the head ‘income from property’ in respect of a building the erection of which is begun and completed between the 1st day of April, 1946, and the 31st day of March, 1956, both dates inclusive, for a period of two years from the date of such completion.” Now, to attract the provisions of this clause, the following facts will have to be established: (1) It is income of a building; (2) the building was constructed between 1st of April, 1946, and 31st of March, 1956; (3) the income is of two years immediately following the date of completion of the building, and lastly (4)—and that is an important factor—that that income is chargeable under the head “income from property”. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the first three tests are satisfied so far as the assessment year 1952–53 is concerned. It has to be seen whether the last test, namely, that it is income chargeable under the head “income from property” is satisfied. Now, the heads of income are enumerated in section 6 of the Act. It provides that “Save as otherwise provided by this Act, the following heads of income, profits and gains shall be chargeable to income-tax in the manner hereinafter appearing…”, and then it enumerates those heads, head (iii) being “income from property”. Reading these material provisions of section 6 together with clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4, it is apparent that unless and until the assessee establishes that the income relating to which it has claimed exemption is income from property within the meaning of section 6 and chargeable to income-tax in the manner provided in the Income-tax Act, he cannot claim that the provisions of clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4 are attracted thereto. Section 9 is the relevant section of the Act, which deals with computation of income from property, which is chargeable to tax. The answer then is, if the provisions of section 9 of the Act govern the income derived by the assessee from the Borivli property, the assessee establishes that the income from the Borivli property in its hands is an income chargeable under the head “income from property”. There is, however, a difficulty in the way of the assessee and that is the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act. Section 10 relates to computation of income from business. Sub-section (7) provides that “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 8, 9, 10, 12 or 18, the profits and gains of any business of insurance and the tax payable thereon shall be computed in accordance with the rules contained in the Schedule to this Act.” On the terms of sub-section (7) of section 10, in our opinion, it is clear that the income from property received by an insurance company during the course of its business is not to be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 9 of the Act, but, on the other hand, that income has to be computed in accordance with the rules contained in the Schedule to the Act. That being the position, on the language of subsection (7) of section 10, it cannot be said that the income from property received in the course of its business by an insurance company is in its hands an income chargeable under the head “income from property”. The assessee, therefore, is not entitled to claim exemption of the said income from its total income. The provisions of the rules contained in the Schedule framed under sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act will show that the profits and gains of an insurance business are computed in a manner different than the profits and gains of an ordinary business are computed. The learned Chief Justice in Commissioner of Income-tax v. B.B & C.I Railway Co-operative Mutual Death Benefit Society for Indian Staff Ltd. has pointed it out at page 512:

“….and section 10(7) provides a special method of computing the profits and gains of any business of insurance and the manner in which tax is to be paid on those profits and gains. Section 10(7) further provides that in place of the provisions contained in section 8, 9, 10, 12 or 18 the rules contained in the Schedule to the Act shall be substituted. Therefore, the result of this provision is that instead of computing the income of an insurance company as laid down in various sections under Chapter III, you compute them in the manner laid down in the Schedule to the Act, and the relevant provision of the Schedule to the Act is rule 2 which provides that the profits and gains of life insurance business shall be taken to be either what is stated in sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) and whichever is greater,………. Therefore, it will be noticed that instead of an insurance company making its return of income under the various heads as laid down in section 6, it has got to submit one unit of income, a sort of notional or artificial income, as provided in the Schedule to the Act.”

4. The aforesaid observations of the learned Chief Justice lend support to our conclusion that the income received by the insurance company from a property is in its hands not an income chargeable as income from property, but, on the other hand, the entire income of the insurance company received by it during the course of business bears one character only and that is profits and gains from the business of insurance. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Western India Life Insurance Co. Ltd., an Indian assurance company doing business in India held, for the purpose of its business, certain foreign investments from which it received income. The income received by the company outside British India was not brought by the company into British India. The company claimed that under the third proviso to section 4(1) of the Act, it was entitled, for assessment purposes, to the allowance therein mentioned of Rs. 4,500 in respect of the said investment income accruing to it outside British India. This contention of the assessee was not accepted by their Lordships of the Privy Council. Their Lordships held that the computation made of the income of the insurance company under rule 2(b) was naturally done in a manner different than the computation of the income of an ordinary business. The income computed was a notional income, and that being the position, the third proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 was not attracted. At page 129 of the report it was observed:

“But apart from authority, their Lordships are of opinion that the appellant's (Revenue's) contention is correct and they find it impossible to apply the words of the third proviso to section 4(1) to an assessment under rule 2(b) of the Schedule and they will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed….”

5. The decisions on which reliance is placed by Mr. Kolah, in our opinion, are not of any assistance to the assessee. Mr. Kolah drew our attention to the observations made by Mr. Justice Kania relating to the scheme of the Income-tax Act in B.M Kamdar, In re and in particular to the following observations:

“According to section 4 therefore two questions arise: (1) whether the amount in question is income, profits and gains, from whatever sources derived; and (2) whether such income falls within the words found in sub-section (a), (b) or (c). If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, the next process is to ascertain if such income is excluded under section 4(3) from tax. This is material because the heading of this section is ‘Applicability of the Act’. Section 4 itself excludes certain income, like agricultural income, or income of charitable trusts from taxation. If it was so excluded, the same ceased to be income for the Act, and no computation is necessary to be made. If the amount passes these tests, it becomes income referred to in section 4(1).”

6. We have no quarrel with these observations of the learned judge. We have, as discussed above, pointed out that the income received from property is an income within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act. That sub-section makes an income from whatever source received by an assessee chargeable to tax, save and except such income as is excluded therefrom in accordance with the provisions of the Act. We have also discussed above that the assessee is not entitled to claim any exemption in respect of this income under clause (xii) of sub-section (3) of section 4.

7. The other decision on which reliance is placed is Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sir Kameshwar Singh. The assessee in that case was a money-lender. In the course of his money-lending, the assessee had advanced considerable amount, and as a part of that money-lending transaction, he obtained as a mortgagee in possession certain agricultural property. A question arose whether income of that agricultural property was liable to tax. The department contended that it was income from business and, therefore, taxable; while it was the contention of the assessee that the source of the income being agricultural, it was exempted from being included in the total income of the assessee. Reliance was placed by the assessee on clause (viii) of sub section (3) of section 4 of the Act. This contention of the assessee was upheld by their Lordships of the Privy Council. On the basis of this decision, it was argued by Mr. Kolah that as agricultural income is excluded from being included in the total income of the assessee, similarly income received from property built between the years 1946 and 1956 is also excluded. The observations of their Lordships would apply with equal force to such income from property. We find it difficult to accept this argument, because clauses (viii) and (xii) are couched in materially different languages. Clause (viii) is unqualified and absolute in terms. The establishment of the fact that a particular income is agricultural income is sufficient to take it out from the total income of the assessee. Such, however, is not the case under clause (xii). Merely establishing that a particular income is income from house property built between the years 1946 and 1956 is not sufficient. The assessee has also further to establish that that income is in his hands chargeable as income from property under the Act. This, as already stated above, the assessee has failed to establish.

8. In the result, in our opinion, the assessee is not entitled to claim exemption in respect of the rental income of the Borivli property. In view of our aforesaid finding, it is not necessary to consider the other alternative question which was argued before us. Mr. Joshi, in the alternative, had argued that even if the assessee is entitled to claim exemption in respect of the rental income of the Borivli property for the year 1952–53, he would not be entitled to such exemption for the years 1953–54 and 1954–55. The question does not survive in view of our aforesaid finding. The answer to the reframed question is in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department.

9. Question answered in the affirmative.