- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State v. Nathumal Damumal
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Patel, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This Reference arises from criminal proceedings concerning alleged sale/distribution of sub-standard drug. The petitioners in the Sessions Court included three of the accused and one Nathumal Damumal (accused No. 1). Accused No. 2 was India Drugs Laboratory Private Ltd., a Calcutta drug manufacturer; accused Nos. 4–6 were directors of accused No. 2.
On 16 March 1956 accused No. 1 purchased 15,000 lbs. of tincture laricis BP 1961 from accused No. 2. The goods were transported to Indore, thereafter 5,000 lbs. were sent to Nasik by rail and 10,000 lbs. by truck to Malegaon. The Drugs Department intercepted the consignments at Nasik and Malegaon. At Nasik the Drug Inspector took samples from the goods lying in the railway yard and these samples were chemically analysed. The Analyser certified that the samples were not according to the standard specified in the Drugs Act, 1940.
As a result, prosecution was launched under s. 18(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Drugs Act, 1940. Because accused No. 2 had given a warranty to accused No. 1, an offence under s. 28 was also alleged against accused Nos. 2 to 6. A preliminary inquiry was held by the Magistrate. Accused Nos. 2 to 6 contended that, so far as they were concerned, the offence was complete at Calcutta and therefore could not be tried at Nasik.
The learned Magistrate held that evidence disclosed an offence under s. 109 IPC (abetment), and therefore Nasik would have jurisdiction even if the sale/manufacture was completed at Calcutta. Accused Nos. 4–6 challenged this in revision to the Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge took the view that the sale was completed in Calcutta, the accused had nothing to do with transport to Nasik/Malegaon, and the original complaint did not mention s. 109; he consequently made a reference for quashing proceedings against accused Nos. 2–6. The present opinion addresses that reference.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether accused Nos. 2–6 could be regarded as having committed an offence "within the jurisdiction of the Court" at Nasik for the purposes of s. 18(a) of the Drugs Act, 1940, where manufacture and sale were completed at Calcutta but the goods ultimately came to repose at Nasik.
- Whether the word "distribute" in s. 18(a) of the Drugs Act, 1940 should be construed broadly to include goods reaching their intended destination (Nasik) even though sale occurred earlier at Calcutta.
- Whether, alternatively, accused Nos. 2–6 could be charged with abetment (s. 109 IPC) for enabling accused No. 1 to commit the offence at Nasik, thereby rendering s. 180 CrPC (jurisdiction) applicable.
- Whether a charge under s. 109 IPC can be framed despite the original complaint not expressly alleging abetment.
Arguments of the Parties
Accused (Nos. 2–6) / Counsel (Mr. Paranjape)
- Contended that the offence (manufacture and sale) was completed at Calcutta; therefore, Nasik had no jurisdiction to try them for those offences.
- Argued the meaning of "distribute" should be the narrower sense (relied on specific meanings in Webster's Dictionary) and that the case Uttam Chand v. Emperor (1911) supported a narrow interpretation of phrases such as "on behalf of."
- Contended that because the complaint did not allege abetment, accused could not be charged under s. 109 IPC.
Magistrate / Prosecution Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The learned Magistrate held that evidence disclosed an offence under s. 109 IPC (abetment), and therefore Nasik Court would have jurisdiction to try accused Nos. 2–6 even if the manufacture/sale occurred at Calcutta.
- Implicitly, the prosecution's stance (as accepted by the Magistrate) was that the accused knew the goods were intended for Nasik and that the process of distribution extended from Calcutta to Nasik.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Uttam Chand v. Emperor, 1911 I.L.R. 39 Cal. 344 | Interpreted the phrase "on behalf of" (in the Excise Act context) to connote some benefit to the person on whose behalf another acts. | The Court held this precedent had no application to the present case because the issue before it was the meaning of "distribute" (not the phrase "by any other person on his behalf"). Thus the precedent was noted but not applied to alter the Court's interpretation of "distribute." |
| In re Jivandas Savchand | Support for applying s. 179 (CrPC) where one ingredient of the offence of distribution is the actual reaching of goods at the place for which they were intended. | The Court relied on the principle, as stated in In re Jivandas Savchand, to conclude that because the goods had reached Nasik (their intended destination), s. 179 applies for jurisdictional purposes. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, applying textual and purposive construction to s. 18(a) of the Drugs Act, 1940 and relevant procedural provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code:
- The court accepted as a premise that the offences of manufacture and sale were completed at Calcutta; therefore, those specific offences could not be tried at Nasik because they were not committed within Nasik's territorial jurisdiction.
- The court then examined the remaining verbs in s. 18(a) — "stock", "exhibit for sale" and "distribute" — and concluded that "stock" or "exhibit for sale" were also not made out at Nasik since the manufacturer/ seller was not stocking or exhibiting at Nasik.
- The central interpretive issue became the meaning of "distribute." The court reviewed dictionary meanings (Webster's, Oxford Concise, Murry's Standard) showing several senses, including spreading or dispersing over a space. The court held that the ordinary and general meaning — which embraces spreading/dispersion so that goods reach parts of a space — was apt in the statutory context.
- Applying purposive interpretation, the court emphasized the object of the Drugs Act: protection of the public against misbranded or sub-standard drugs. To give "distribute" a narrow meaning would frustrate the Act's purpose and allow manufacturers to evade responsibility by selling in one place and shifting distribution elsewhere. Consequently, "distribute" must be given a meaning which includes the goods' repose at the destination where they are intended to be sold.
- The court relied on the bill of sale on record showing accused Nos. 2–6 sold to Shahenshaha Medical Stores, Nasik Road, Nasik — establishing that the sellers knew the goods were destined for Nasik. From this the court concluded the process of distribution began in Calcutta and ended in Nasik where the goods came to repose for the purposes of sale.
- Given that the goods reached Nasik (their intended destination), the court held that s. 179 CrPC applied in respect of jurisdiction for the offence of distribution (as supported by In re Jivandas Savchand).
- Separately, the court considered abetment: if accused Nos. 2–6 sold the goods to accused No. 1 in Calcutta in a way that enabled accused No. 1 to commit the s. 18 offence at Nasik, then accused Nos. 2–6 abetted that commission. In that case, s. 180 CrPC would permit trial at Nasik.
- On the procedural point that the complaint did not expressly plead abetment or s. 109 IPC, the court observed that the Criminal Procedure Code permits framing or altering charges to reflect offences disclosed by the allegations and the evidence, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. Because the matter was still at the charge stage, the court found there would be no prejudice in framing an additional charge under s. 109 IPC.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Reference made by the learned Sessions Judge was rejected.
The court ordered that the learned Magistrate, if not already done, should frame an additional charge under s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code and proceed with the trial.
Consequences and implications:
- The proceedings against accused Nos. 2–6 were not quashed by this court; instead the Magistrate was directed to add a charge for abetment (s. 109 IPC) and continue the trial at Nasik.
- The court construed "distribute" in s. 18(a) of the Drugs Act broadly enough to include goods reaching their intended destination (here, Nasik), thereby supporting territorial jurisdiction where distribution culminates at that destination.
- The opinion does not announce or claim to establish a broader novel precedent beyond its application to the facts: it applied established principles of statutory construction and procedural power to frame or amend charges; no separate, sweeping doctrine was proclaimed beyond the reasoning stated.
Reference rejected. Direction to frame charge under s. 109 IPC and proceed with trial.
Patel, J.:— This is a Reference, which it is not possible for me to accept on the grounds made out in the judgment of reference. A few facts may shortly be stated for the purposes of the judgment. I will employ the nomenclature used for the parties in the trial Court.
2. The petitioners in the Sessions Court were three of the accused along with one Nathumal Damumal trading in Deolali Camp in Nasik District. Nathumal Damumal was accused No. 1. Accused No. 2 Messrs India Drugs Laboratory Private Ltd. is a drug manufacturing company in Calcutta. Accused Nos. 4 to 6 are directors of accused No. 2. Accused No. 1 purchased 15000 lbs. of tincture laricis BP 1961 manufactured by accused No. 2 on March 16, 1956. Accused No. 1 transported this tincture to Indore and thereafter sent 5000 lbs. to Nasik by rail and 10000 lbs. by truck to Malegaon. The Drugs Department got information about these drugs having been consigned by accused No. 1, as a result of which, at both the places, i.e at Nasik and at Malegaon, the officers intercepted the goods. Samples were taken by the Drug Inspector at Nasik when the goods were lying in the railway yard and sent for chemical analysis to the Analyser. The Analyser certified that the samples were not according to the standard specified in the Act. As a result of this certificate nil the accused were prosecuted under s. 18(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Drugs Act, 1940. Accused No. 2 had given a warranty to accused No. 1 and, therefore, in offence under s. 28 was also alleged against accused Nos. 2 to 6. Prcliminary inquiry was held by the learned Magistrate and it was contended on behalf of accused Nos. 2 to 6 that so far as they were concerned the offence was complete at Calcutta and, therefore, they could not be tried at Nasik for the offences charged against them. It appeared to the learned Magistrate that an offence under s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code was made out from the evidence on record. He, therefore, held that if an offence of abetment is made out, then clearly the Nasik Court would have jurisdiction to try these offences even if the facts stated in the complaint made out a clear offence only at Calcutta regarding the sale and the manufacture of these goods. Against this judgment accused Nos. 4, 5 and 6 went in revision to the Sessions Court challenging the order of the learned trial Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge took the view that in view of the fact that, the sale in favour of accused No. 1 was completed by accused No. 2 and the others in Calcutta and they had nothing to do with transport of the goods from Calcutta to Nasik or Malegaon, they could not the said to have committed any offence within the jurisdiction of the Nasik Court. He also was of the view that in the original complaint s. 109 was not mentioned at all. Therefore, he thought that a charge under s. 109 could not be framed against the accused. Under these circumstances, he made the reference for quashing the proceedings against accused Nos. 2 to 6. The question is, whether the accused can be regarded as having committed any offence within the jurisdiction of the Court within the meaning of s. 18(a) of the Drugs Act, 1940. Section 18, so far as is relevant, for the purpose of this Act and the charge, is to this effect:
“…no person shall himself or by any other person on his behalf—
(a)(1) manufacture for sale, (2) sell, (3) stock, (4) exhibit for sale, or (5) distribute—
(i) any drug which is not of standard quality;
(ii) any misbranded drug;
(iii) any patent or proprietary medicine, unless there is displayed in the prescribed manner on the label or container thereof, the true formula or list of ingredients contained in it in a manner readily intelligible to the members of the medical profession;…”
3. It is undoubtedly true that the offence of manufacture is completed at Calcutta as soon as the accused manufactured the goods at Calcutta for the purposes of sale. They cannot clearly, therefore, be charged in Nasik for manufacture for sale. Similarly, it is also clear that they having sold the goods to accused No. 1 at Calcutta, they cannot, be charged at Nasik for this offence either. “Stocking or exhibiting” for sale would also not be triable at Nasik since they are not stocking or exhibiting for sale either by themselves or by anyone else on their behalf at Nasik. The question is whether they can be regarded as having distributed the goods at Nasik for the purpose of sale. If they themselves had consigned the goods from Calcutta to Indore or from Indore to Nasik, then there could have been no question of any argument regarding distribution. But in this case the goods were sold to accused No. 1 at Calcutta and the transaction was complete there. It, however, appears to me that the word “distribute” is wide enough to include the repose of the goods at Nasik, even after a completed sale at Calcutta. The bill given to accused No. 1 and which is on record clearly shows that accused Nos. 2 to 6 were selling these goods to Shahenshaha Medical Stores, Nasik Road Nasik. They knew, therefore, clearly enough that the goods were bound for Nasik. It may be that accused No. 1 thought it inconvenient to take the goods by the direct road and had to adopt the circuitous road to avoid the Prohibition Act. But it was clearly known to these accused that the goods were hound to travel to Nasik for the purposes of the Medical Stores at Nasik. Webster's Dictionary gives several meanings of the word “distribute” as follows: (1) to divide among several or many; to deal out; apportion; allot; (2) to spread out so as to cover a surface or a space; (3) to divide or separate, as into classes, orders, kinds, or species; to classify; assort, as specimens, letters, etc. The same meaning is found in the Oxford Concise Dictionary. Murry's Standard Dictionary gives a somewhat better definition. The second meaning attached to the word is “to spread or disperse abroad, through a whole space or over a whole surface; properly, so that each part of the space or surface receives a portion; less definitely, to spread generally, scatter”. It is clear that the ordinary and general meaning of the word “distribute” is sufficient to convey spreading of the goods anywhere by whatever means that may be employed. Even though the sale was complete at Calcutta, there can be no doubt that they were intended for Nasik. The process of distribution commenced at Calcutta and ended at Nasik where the goods came to repose for the purposes of sale.
4. It is contended that the first or the third meaning assigned in Webster's Dictionary as stated above, is the proper meaning to be given. A word is bound to have several meanings, but the meaning to be assigned to it must depend upon the context in which the word is found. The Act is enacted to-control the rampant evil of misnamed drugs or sub-standard drugs from being sold. Such drugs may in some cases prove seriously injurious to the purchaser. It was for the protection of the public that the stringent provisions have been made. While construing a statute a reasonable meaning has to be assigned to words used, having due regard to the context in which they are used and the object of the Act. The Legislature was used the words “sell, stock, exhibit for sale or distribute”. Each word must be given a distinct meaning, and if a legitimate meaning is to be given to each one of the words, there can be no doubt that the word “distribute” must have the meaning, which I have indicated above. To give it any other meaning would be to frustrate the purpose of the Act and enable manufacturers to manufacture drugs irresponsibly and spread them throughout the length and breadth of the country and escape the consequences for such manufacture.
5. Mr. Paranjape has relied on the case of Uttam Chand v. Emperor . 1911 I.L.R 39 Cal. 344., where the question of interpretation of the Excise Act was involved. One Lakhi Ram was found with certain quantity of opium at a place different from the place of business of his master. Both Lakhi Ram and his master were prosecuted and it was held by the Court that the expression “on behalf of” connoted some benefit to the person on whose behalf another person might act. This case has no application to the present case, because I am not considering the phrase “by any other person on his behalf” in the earlier part of s. 18. I am concerned with the word “distribute” alone. If once this conclusion is reached, then there is no doubt that s. 179 will apply, since one of the ingredients of the offence of distribution is the actual reaching of the goods at the place for which they were intended. They have reached Nasik, and if that is so, as held in In re Jivandas Savchand2, s. 179 must apply.
6. There is another aspect from which this matter may be viewed. The learned Magistrate held a preliminary inquiry and then this question of jurisdiction came up. If these accused sold the goods to accused No. 1 at Calcutta, which enabled accused No. 1 to commit the offence under s. 18 at Nasik, then clearly they have abetted the offence committed by accused No. 1. In that case s. 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code becomes applicable and the offence can be tried at Nasik.
7. It is argued, however, by Mr. Paranjape that in the complaint, there is no allegation that these accused abetted accused No. 1 in the commission of any offence and, therefore, the accused could not be charged under s. 109 for abetment. There is a clear answer to this contention in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, which enable the Court to frame proper charges for offences disclosed in the allegations and in proper cases even alter it at any stage of the trial in accordance with the evidence, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. In this case there can be no question of prejudice, because we are still at the stage of charge. The learned trial Magistrate has clearly indicated s. 109 as being applicable to the case. Since the offence is clearly made out on the allegations, charge for this offence must be framed.
8. The result is that the Reference made by the learned Sessions Judge must be rejected.
9. In view of what I have stated above, I direct the learned Magistrate, if he has not already done so, to frame an additional charge under s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code and proceed with the trial.
10. Reference rejected.
Alert