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Vasant Jaiwantrao Mahajan v. Tukaram Mahadaji Patil
Factual and Procedural Background
A decree in favour of Tukaram and against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was set aside by the Civil Judge, Yeotmal, under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, but the order set aside the decree only as against defendant No. 3; no order was made in respect of the decree as against defendant No. 2 (or the firm, defendant No. 1). Defendant No. 2 applied under Section 151 C.P.C. and also sought review under Order 47, Rule 1, to the successor Judge (Mr. Kolhekar), asking that the decree be treated as having been set aside as against all defendants (defendants 2, 1 and 3). The successor Judge held that (a) the decree proceeded on grounds common to defendants 2 and 3 and should therefore have been set aside against both defendants under the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13, but (b) he lacked jurisdiction on review to correct that illegality because mere illegality was not a sufficient ground for review under Order 47, Rule 1. He rejected defendant No. 2's application. Defendant No. 2 brought the present revision.
The underlying suit was filed by Tukaram against a firm (defendant No. 1) consisting of partners defendants 2 and 3, alleging a contract to plough 200 acres and claiming damages for breach. No written statement was filed by defendant No. 1; defendants 2 and 3 filed a written statement repudiating the claim, but defendant No. 3 did not appear at trial. A decree for Rs. 2640/- was entered against defendants 2 and 3. Defendant No. 2 led evidence; defendant No. 3 did not appear for recording of evidence; the decree was passed for Rs. 2640/- against both defendants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the successor Judge had jurisdiction to review the predecessor Judge's order under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. when the predecessor had allegedly failed to advert to or apply his mind to the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13.
- Whether, on the merits, the decree for money (Rs. 2640/-) against two partners should have been set aside as against both defendants under the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13, or whether the proviso applies only to decrees of such a nature that they cannot be set aside as against one defendant only (i.e., whether the decree was "one and indivisible").
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant (Defendant No. 2)
- Contended that the successor Court's view denying review was erroneous and relied on Hari Sankar v. Anath Nath (AIR 1949 FC 106) to show that review is available where a provision of law conferring jurisdiction was not considered.
- Argued that the predecessor Judge should have set aside the decree against both defendants (2 and 3) rather than only against defendant No. 3, relying on multiple precedents and on the proposition that the decree proceeded on grounds common to both defendants.
- Also urged that in the interests of justice the whole decree should be reopened and set aside as against both defendants.
Lower Court / Respondent Position (as recorded in the opinion)
- The successor Judge accepted that the decree proceeded on grounds common to defendants 2 and 3 and that the predecessor's order was contrary to the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13, but held he had no jurisdiction on review to correct that illegality because illegality alone was not a sufficient ground for review under Order 47, Rule 1.
- The lower Court thought the predecessor's order was contrary to law for three reasons: (i) the decree was one and indivisible; (ii) setting aside the decree only as against defendant No. 3 was likely to result in two inconsistent decrees; (iii) the decree proceeded on grounds common to defendants 2 and 3.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hari Sankar v. Anath Nath, AIR 1949 FC 106 | Where a Court disposes of a case without advertence to or application of its mind to a provision of law that confers jurisdiction, that omission may be an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record and may justify review under Order 47, Rule 1. | The Court relied on this Federal Court ruling to hold that the successor Judge did have power to review the predecessor's order because the predecessor had not considered the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13. |
| Khagesh Chandra v. Chandra Kanta, AIR 1954 Assam 183 (Full Bench) | Discussed the scope of Order 9, Rule 13 and its proviso when a decree was ex parte against one defendant and the suit dismissed as against another. | The Court held this Assam Full Bench decision was inapplicable on the facts (there the decree was ex parte against one defendant and dismissed as to another); the instant case involved an ex parte decree against both defendants. |
| Gopala Chetti v. Subbier, ILR 26 Mad. 604 | Authority cited in argument regarding setting aside decrees (specific principle as cited by applicant). | Listed among authorities relied upon by the applicant; the Court considered such authorities in the general discussion but did not adopt them as controlling on the facts of this money decree. |
| Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das, ILR 24 All. 383 (Full Bench) | Authority cited in argument (as part of case law on setting aside decrees). | Included in the list of authorities relied upon; the Court reviewed analogous authorities when delineating the scope of the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13. |
| Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tohurennissa Bibi, ILR 25 Cal. 155 | Calcutta decision under older Code provisions referenced on the issue of whether whole decree should be set aside. | The Court noted this Calcutta case (under the old Code) and observed that under the old Section 108 the Calcutta Chief Justice took the view that if a decree was to be set aside, it should be set aside against all defendants; the Court treated that decision as of limited relevance under the present Code. |
| Munshi Ram v. Malava Ram, AIR 1917 Lah. 194 | Authority where a decree was passed ex parte against principal debtor and surety and it was held wrong to set aside the decree against the principal without also setting aside as against the surety. | Used to illustrate that where the decree's nature makes separate setting aside impracticable (e.g., principal and surety), the whole decree may need to be set aside. |
| Meenakshi Sundaram v. Chandrakasa Naicker, AIR 1927 Mad. 550 | Authority holding that where decree is for possession of an indivisible house, setting aside as against one defendant only would make execution impossible; whole decree should be set aside. | The Court treated this Madras decision as an authority for the proposition that the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13 applies when the decree is joint and indivisible such that execution would be impossible if set aside against one defendant only. |
| Hiralal v. Sitaram, AIR 1952 Bom. 446 | Money decree against partners in respect of loan: held that a money decree is not indivisible and the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13 does not apply merely because inconsistent decrees may be possible. | The Court applied this principle to the instant case: the money decree for Rs. 2640/- was not of an indivisible character and the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13 was not attracted. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeded in two distinct strands: jurisdiction to review, and the substantive applicability of the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13.
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Jurisdiction to Review:
The Court held that the successor Judge erred in concluding he had no power to review the predecessor's decision. Relying on the Federal Court decision in Hari Sankar v. Anath Nath (AIR 1949 FC 106), the Court explained that where a Court disposes of a case without advertence to or application of its mind to a provision of law that gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that omission may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record and is capable of being corrected under Order 47, Rule 1. Because the predecessor had not considered whether the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13 applied, the successor Judge did have power to review the predecessor's order.
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Merits — Whether the Proviso to Order 9, Rule 13 Applied:
The Court examined the nature of the decree and the proper scope of the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13. It emphasized that the proviso applies where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against one defendant only — i.e., where the decree is "one and indivisible" or where setting aside as against one defendant would make execution impossible or lead to an untenable situation (examples given include possession of a house held jointly, partition decrees, or similar indivisible decrees).
The Court distinguished such cases from ordinary money decrees. It explained that even where the defence of two defendants is common or the decree proceeds on common grounds, the determining factor is the inherent nature of the decree, not the reasons underlying it. A money decree may be decreed against one defendant and dismissed against another; it is not normally of an indivisible character, and the possibility of inconsistent decrees alone does not invoke the proviso.
Applying these principles to the instant facts, the Court found the decree for Rs. 2640/- (money for breach of contract to plough 200 acres) to be a money decree that is not one and indivisible. Consequently, the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13 did not apply, and there was no ground to set aside the decree as against both defendants merely because the decree proceeded on grounds common to them.
-
Conclusion of Analysis:
Although the successor Judge should have had review jurisdiction (because the predecessor had not considered the proviso), on the substantive question the Court disagreed with the view that the decree ought to be set aside against both defendants. The Court therefore rejected the revision application on substantive grounds.
Holding and Implications
Revision application dismissed with costs.
Direct effect on the parties:
- The revision brought by defendant No. 2 was rejected; the order of the predecessor setting aside the decree only as against defendant No. 3 remains unimpaired by this revision.
- The decree for Rs. 2640/- against defendants 2 and 3 stands except to the extent already set aside as against defendant No. 3 by the predecessor's order.
Broader legal implications articulated by the Court:
- The Court clarified that a successor Judge can review a predecessor's order under Order 47, Rule 1 where the predecessor failed to advert to a relevant provision of law conferring jurisdiction (per AIR 1949 FC 106).
- The Court also clarified the proper scope of the proviso to Order 9, Rule 13: it applies only where the decree is inherently such that it cannot be set aside as against one defendant only (i.e., where the decree is indivisible or execution would be impossible if set aside as to one defendant). Ordinary money decrees are generally not of that character and the proviso is ordinarily not attracted merely because the decree proceeded on common grounds or because inconsistent decrees might theoretically arise.
HD/V.B.B
Application dismissed.
A decree passed in favour of one Tukaram and against defendants 2 and 3 was set aside as against defendant No. 3 only under O. 9, R. 13, Civil Procedure Code, by the Civil Judge, Yeotmal. But while setting aside the decree as against defendant No. 3 only, no order was passed as regards the decree as against the other defendants. Defendant No. 2 then made an application under Sec. 151, C.P.C and also for review under Order 47, rule 1, to the successor of the Judge who had passed the order under O. 9, R. 13, praying that the decree be also treated as having been set aside as against defendants 2, 1 and 3. The successor Judge, Mr. Kolhekar, held that the decree proceeded on the grounds common to defendants 2 and 3 and that it should have been set aside against all the defendants i.e defendants 2 and 3, under the proviso to Order 9, rule 13, but he held that although the order passed by his predecessor was contrary to the proviso, he had no jurisdiction to correct that illegality on a review, because illegality of the order of his predecessor was not a sufficient cause for review under O. 47, R. 1, C.P.C He therefore rejected the application of defendant No. 2 who has now come in revision.
2. It is contended for the applicant that the view taken by the lower Court that this was not a good ground for review is wrong. He relies on Hari Sankar v. Anath Nath, AIR 1949 FC 106. He also supports the reasoning of the lower Court that in this case the original Judge who had set aside the decree should have set aside the decree against all the defendants 2 and 3 and not merely as against defendant No. 3 who had applied under O. 9 R. 13. The suit in which the decree came to be passed was filed by Tukaram against a firm (defendant No. 1) consisting of its two partners defendants 2 and 3, alleging that the two partners, defendants 2 and 3, as partners of the firm defendant No. 1, had entered into a contract to plough 200 acres of plaintiff's land, and claimed damages for breach of the contract. No written statement was filed by defendant No. 1, but defendants 2 and 3 filed a written statement repudiating the claim of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 3 did not appear. A decree was passed for Rs. 2640/- against defendants 2 and 3. Defendant No. 2 led evidence but defendant No. 3 did not appear on the date when the evidence was recorded. The Court passed a decree for Rs. 2640/- against defendants 2 and 3.
3. In my opinion, the trial Court erred in its view that it had no powers to review the order passed by its predecessor in a case like this, but I differ from the view taken by it that this was a case in which the order passed by its predecessor should have been modified by setting aside the decree as against both the defendants and not merely as against defendant No. 3, who had applied under O. 9, R. 13. Their Lordships of the Federal Court held in AIR 1949 FC 106:
“That a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the Court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When, however, the Court disposes of a case without adverting to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record sufficient to bring the case within the purview of O. 47, R. 1, C.P.C”.
4. It is therefore clear from the ruling of their Lordships of the Federal Court that the view taken by the trial Judge that he has no power to review the question decided by his predecessor, is not correct because his predecessor had not considered the question whether the proviso to O. 9, R. 13 was to be applied or not. If the relevant provision of law has not been considered at the time of passing the order, such an order can and should be reviewed if necessary by the Judge who passes that order or by his successor. I therefore hold that the trial Judge erred in his view that he had no power to review the order passed by his predecessor.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that although the lower Court held that the Order passed by its predecessor was illegal it did not set aside the order because it thought that it had no power to review the order, and that if this Court holds that the order could have been reviewed the original order passed should be set aside. But this Court cannot set aside the order passed unless it agrees with the view taken by the lower Court that the original order was contrary to the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, C.P.C
6. The lower Court thought that the order passed by its predecessor was contrary to law because (i) the decree in question is one and indivisible, (ii) the decree is likely to result in two inconsistent decrees if the decree is not set aside against defendants 2 and 3, and (iii) the decree proceeds on the grounds common to defendants 2 and 3. In addition to these grounds it is also urged by the learned counsel for the applicants that in the interests of justice the whole decree should be reopened and the decree should be set aside against both defendants 2 and 3 and not merely against one of them, namely, defendant No. 3 who had applied under O. 9, R. 13, to have the ex parte decree set aside. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied on Khagesh Chandra v. Chandra Kanta, AIR 1954 Assam 183 (FB), Gopala Chetti v. Subbier, ILR 26 Mad. 604, Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das, ILR 24 All. 383 (FB), Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tohurennissa Bibi, ILR 25 Cal. 155, Munshi Ram v. Malava Ram, AIR 1917 Lah. 194 and Meenakshi Sundaram v. Chandrakasa Naicker, AIR 1927 Mad. 550.
7. It is unnecessary to consider the Calcutta case at any great length because that was a decision under the old C.P.C and the view taken by the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court was that under Sec. 108 of the old Code if a decree was to be set aside the whole decree should be set aside against all the defendants and not against some only of the defendants.
8. The Assam case deals with a different set of circumstances, because in that case the suit had been decreed ex parte against one defendant and dismissed, after contest, against another defendant. It was held by the majority of the Full Bench of the Assam High Court that O. 9, R. 13 and the proviso to it do not confer any jurisdiction upon the Court to reverse a decree dismissing the suit of the plaintiff as against some of the defendants. In the instant case the ex parte decree had been passed against both the defendants 2 and 3 and not in favour of one of them. The case of the Assam High Court has therefore no application to the instant case. But the view has been expressed that if the decree is joint and indivisible or if there is a possibility of conflicting decrees, then the whole decree should be set aside under the proviso to O. 9, R. 13. In AIR 1927 Mad. 550 in a suit filed for delivery of a house and mesne profits against defendants 2 and 3 and defendant No. 1 who had purchased the house in execution of a decree against the undivided brother of defendants 2 and 3, these two defendants were ex parte and the plaintiff compromised with the first defendant, with the result that the decree was passed against all the defendants for possession and for mesne profits. The second defendant who had been ex parte, got the decree set aside under O. 9, R. 13. Plaintiff filed a petition saying that if the ex parte decree is set aside against the second defendant, it should also be set aside against all the defendants. It was held that the decree was of an indivisible character because it was for the possession of the house which itself was indivisible, and if the share of one of the defendants is excluded, delivery in effect was impossible. The Madras High Court therefore set aside the ex parte decree against all the defendants, although the petition to do so had been filed by the plaintiff. This case is an authority for the proposition that if the decree was joint and indivisible and if the setting aside of the decree against one of the defendants only would result in an impossibility of execution, then the whole decree should be set aside. In AIR 1917 Lah. 194 a decree had been passed ex parte against the principal debtor and his surety and after the ex parte decree against the principal debtor was set aside under O. 9, R. 13, it was held that the Judge was in error in setting aside the decree against the principal debtor without setting it aside against the surety.
9. If we look at the wording of the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, it provides that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only, the decree may be set aside against all or any of the other defendants also. The proviso contemplates cases where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside against one defendant only. Such cases are, for instance, a decree for possession of a house in the joint possession of persons, a partition decree, and a decree for joint possession of property in the joint possession of two or more persons. It is the nature of the decree that is the determining factor and not the reasons behind the decree. Even if the defence of two defendants is common and even if the decree proceeds on a ground common to all the defendants, the ultimate decree should not be set aside against all the defendants unless it is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against one defendant only. Two decrees may be inconsistent in the sense that the grounds given are inconsistent. A decree against two or more defendants may be a decree for a certain amount of money as damages for breach of a contract, and if the decree against one of the defendants is set aside under O. 9, R. 13, and ultimately the suit is dismissed against such a defendant on the ground that he did not commit a breach of contract, then though the grounds may be inconsistent the original decree is not of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against one defendant only. Generally in the case of a money decree the application of the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, C.P.C is not attracted. In Hiralal v. Sitaram, AIR 1952 Bom. 446, which was a case of money lent to two defendants carrying on business under a partnership name and in which an ex parte decree passed against defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and in favour of the plaintiff, was set aside against defendant No. 1 under O. 9, R. 13, it was held that the application of defendant No. 2 for setting aside the ex parte decree against him also under the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, should be rejected because the money decree was not an indivisible decree and the argument of inconsistent decrees being possible was rejected. For the application of the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, it is not sufficient that there was possibility of inconsistent decrees but what is necessary is that the original decree, which is being set aside at the instance of only one defendant, is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against that defendant only; if there is such an infirmity in the original decree, then only action would be taken under the proviso.
10. In the instant case, the original decree was a decree for Rs. 2640/- passed against defendants 2 and 3, who were previously members of a partnership of defendant No. 1, for breach of a contract with the plaintiff to plough 200 acres of land. Such a decree for money is not of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against one defendant only. A suit for money can be decreed against one defendant and dismissed against another, or it may be decreed against both the defendants or dismissed against both. To such a decree the provisions of the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, are not attracted. Such a decree is not one and indivisible. Nor would there be inconsistent decrees if the decree is set aside only against one of the defendants. The interests of justice also do not require that the decree should be set aside against all the defendants even though the decree proceeds on grounds common to the defendants. I therefore reject the revision application with costs.
HD/V.B.B
Application dismissed.
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