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Cooverji Jethabhai Shah v. Amir Abdulali Kachwala
Judgment Summary — Mudholkar, A.C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The defendant No. 1 executed an equitable mortgage on a house at Mahabaleshwar on May 4, 1950, by depositing the title deed. The stated consideration was Rs. 40,000 with interest at 6% per annum and the redemption date was May 4, 1951. Safiabai (a co-mortgagor) died on April 7, 1951 and her son Shiraz died on April 8, 1951. The plaintiff, Amir Abdulali, and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the heirs of Safiabai and Shiraz; the plaintiff alone obtained a succession certificate on March 18, 1952 (extended on October 29, 1952, to cover the mortgage).
No payment was made and the plaintiff instituted a suit on October 21, 1959 (the plaint also appears to have been presented or treated as instituted on November 15, 1957 for limitation purposes in the Court's reasoning) seeking (1) sale of the mortgaged property to enforce the mortgage and (2) a personal decree against defendant No. 1 for any deficiency after sale.
Defendant No. 1 raised multiple defences in his written statement. Relevant contentions pressed on appeal were: that the suit was not properly constituted; that the plaintiff's claim for a personal decree was barred by limitation; and that the reliefs claimed could not properly be granted. The plaintiff applied to amend the plaint to join his two sisters as defendants Nos. 2 and 3 (initially as pro forma defendants) and to add a plea that a particular signed document constituted an acknowledgement under s. 19 of the Limitation Act. The single Judge allowed the amendment on April 15, 1958, without prejudice to the defendant's plea of limitation. The amendment to include the sisters for purposes of obtaining the mortgage relief was later allowed. The Court below negatived the defendant's pleas of limitation and that the suit was badly constituted, and decreed enforcement of the mortgage in favour of the plaintiff and his two sisters, but granted personal relief only to the plaintiff.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit was properly constituted under Mohammedan law when initially instituted by the plaintiff alone, and whether joinder of the co-heirs as defendants (or pro forma defendants) cured any defect.
- Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a personal decree against defendant No. 1 in respect of the personal covenant in the mortgage or whether that claim was barred by limitation.
- Whether the draft document (bearing the defendant's endorsements/signature) relied upon by the plaintiff amounted to an acknowledgement of liability under s. 19 of the Limitation Act sufficient to render the personal claim within time.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant / Appellant (Mr. Chitre)
- The suit was improperly constituted because under Mohammedan law all heirs with unity of title and interest must be represented; a suit by only one or some heirs is defective.
- Even after joinder, the two sisters should have been joined as plaintiffs (co-plaintiffs) rather than as (pro forma) defendants; if they were not plaintiffs the plaintiff could not obtain relief on their behalf.
- The plaintiff was not entitled to a personal decree because the suit was instituted more than six years after the accrual of the cause of action (limitation), and the alleged document does not amount to an acknowledgement within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act.
Plaintiff / Respondent (Mr. Vahanvati)
- The plaintiff obtained a succession certificate entitling him to recover debts and assets due to the estate, and this empowered him to sue in respect of the debt despite limitations of his personal law.
- The plaintiff sought joinder of his two sisters (initially as pro forma defendants) and later extended the amendment to obtain a decree for the mortgage in their favour as well.
- The plaintiff relied upon a draft release and draft mortgage prepared by solicitors, bearing the defendant's endorsements and signature, as amounting to an acknowledgement under s. 19 which would bring the personal claim within time.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Monghibai v. Cooverji, 1939 41 Bom. L.R. 1127 (P.C.) | One or more of several persons jointly interested can bring an action; if right to sue is challenged they can amend by joining co-contractors as plaintiffs if they consent or as co-defendants if they will not; once all parties are before the Court judgment can be given for all interested persons whether joined as plaintiffs or defendants. | Relied upon to hold that after the plaintiff's two sisters were made parties (albeit as defendants) all heirs were before the Court and the Court could properly pass a decree in their favour; supported the view that joinder as defendants did not preclude relief to the heirs. |
| Pyari Mohun Bose v. Kedarnath Roy, 1899 I.L.R. 26 Cal. 409 | Authority for the proposition that it would not be proper to dismiss a plaintiff's suit merely because the plaintiff did not aver or prove that persons who should have been co-plaintiffs refused to be joined, in circumstances like the present. | Used to support the Court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the sole ground that the plaintiff had not alleged that co-heirs refused to be joined as plaintiffs. |
| Biri Singh v. Nawal Singh, 1898 I.L.R. 24 All. 226 | Similar authority to Pyari Mohun Bose on joinder and not dismissing suits for lack of an averment that co-plaintiffs refused to join. | Also relied upon to buttress the conclusion that non-pleading of a refusal to be co-plaintiff was not a ground for dismissal. |
| Virbhadrappa Shilvant v. Shekabai, 1938 41 Bom. L.R. 249 | Decision of a Division Bench concerning suits by some heirs and the consequences for reliefs claimed (cited by defendant to argue incompetence of a suit by one heir for personal relief when others were not joined within limitation). | The Court interpreted this authority and rejected the defendant's narrow reading: it treated the present suit as comprising two distinct reliefs (enforcement of mortgage security and enforcement of the personal covenant) and, given the succession certificate, held that late joinder of co-heirs did not render the claimant's action for personal covenant enforcement invalid in the manner contended; the precedent informed the Court's analysis of distinct remedies. |
| Narsingdas v. Chhaikodilal, [1956] A.I.R. Nag. 267 | Illustration concerning what amounts to an acknowledgement under s. 19 of the Limitation Act (used to show that certain statements are not acknowledgements of subsisting liability). | Relied upon to show that the draft/release before the Court did not amount to an acknowledgement by defendant No. 1 of a subsisting liability. |
| N.A.M. Apvasami v. Morangam, [1935] A.I.R. Mad. 371 | Authority on acknowledgement under s. 19 of the Limitation Act and its requirements. | Referred to support the conclusion that the document relied upon by the plaintiff did not constitute an acknowledgement bringing the claim within time. |
| Harlock v. Ashberry, 1882 19 Ch. D. 539 | English authority on the nature of writings constituting acknowledgements for limitation purposes. | Cited by the learned Judge below and relied upon by the Court to demonstrate that the draft release did not operate as an acknowledgement of a subsisting debt. |
| Chhaterdhari Mahto v. Nasib Singh, [1924] A.I.R. Pat. 806 | Authority holding that certain writings (e.g., an acknowledgement of existence of a mortgage without express statement of liability, or statements showing sale and possession) do not constitute an acknowledgement of liability under s. 19. | Used to support the Court's finding that the writings before it did not amount to an acknowledgement under s. 19. |
| Sheikh Mahomed v. Jamaluddin, 1908 10 Bom. L.R. 385 | Case cited for the proposition that a mere reference to liability in a document by a debtor can suffice as an acknowledgement under s. 19. | The Court distinguished that authority on the facts, finding the recital before it materially different and concluding that defendant No. 1 had not intended any acknowledgement; therefore the case did not assist the plaintiff. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main lines of analysis: (A) whether the suit was properly constituted after amendment and (B) whether the claim for personal relief was barred by limitation because any alleged acknowledgement was insufficient.
A. Constitution of the Suit and Joinder of Heirs
- The Court accepted the general proposition under Mohammedan law that where heirs possess unity of title and interest, a suit by only some heirs to enforce rights of the deceased would ordinarily be defective for lack of title or interest. Thus, if the plaintiff had proceeded alone and remained sole party, the suit would have been improperly constituted.
- However, the plaintiff applied to join his two sisters (the only other heirs). The Court observed that after these two were brought on record, the suit could not be described as badly constituted.
- The defendant argued the sisters should have been joined as plaintiffs and that joining them as defendants (pro forma) precluded relief to them. The Court relied on Monghibai v. Cooverji and the two High Court decisions (Pyari Mohun Bose and Biri Singh) to hold that where all interested parties are before the Court it is open to the Court to make appropriate orders and give judgment for all persons interested whether they are joined as plaintiffs or defendants; and that it is not a ground for dismissal that the plaintiff did not aver that those persons refused to be co-plaintiffs.
B. Limitation and Alleged Acknowledgement under s. 19
- The due date for redemption was May 4, 1951. The relevant limitation period for enforcement of the personal covenant was six years. The plaintiff's suit was instituted long after that period had expired.
- The plaintiff sought to rely on a document (draft release and draft mortgage prepared by solicitors, bearing defendant's endorsements and signature) as an acknowledgement under s. 19 to bring the personal claim within time. The Court examined (i) the plaintiff's explanation for delay in pleading the acknowledgement (which was vague and unsupported by affidavits), (ii) the contents of the document, and (iii) the legal significance of the defendant's endorsement.
- The Court found the plaintiff's explanation for the late amendment unsatisfactory and noted that the defendant categorically denied the plaintiff's statement; the plaintiff failed to support the amendment by affidavit from the solicitors who allegedly held the relevant papers.
- On the merits, the Court held the endorsement by defendant No. 1 on draft documents did not amount to an acknowledgement of liability. The drafts were to be executed by the plaintiff and his sisters, and the defendant's endorsement at most signified approval of a form of document, not affirmation of a subsisting liability in favour of the plaintiff. Crucially, the draft release contained a recital that the entire debt had been fully satisfied, and a statement that the debt was discharged cannot be recharacterised as an acknowledgement of an existing liability for the purposes of extending limitation under s. 19.
- The Court drew upon authorities (including Narsingdas v. Chhaikodilal, N.A.M. Apvasami v. Morangam, Harlock v. Ashberry and Chhaterdhari Mahto v. Nasib Singh) to support the principle that writings which either declare a debt discharged or otherwise do not acknowledge a subsisting liability will not suffice under s. 19. It distinguished Sheikh Mahomed v. Jamaluddin on the facts, finding the present recital materially different and the defendant's conduct here not amounting to an acknowledgement.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is partly allowed. The Court held that:
- The suit, after amendment bringing the two sisters on record, was not improperly constituted; the enforcement of the mortgage by sale in favour of the plaintiff and his two sisters remained permissible and was sustained.
- The plaintiff's claim for a personal decree against defendant No. 1 was barred by limitation at the date of the suit; the document relied upon did not constitute an acknowledgement under s. 19 of the Limitation Act and therefore did not bring the personal claim within time. Consequently the Court modified the decree of the Court below by deleting the direction that the plaintiff could, in the event of deficiency on sale, apply for a personal decree against the first defendant.
- Costs were adjusted: the plaintiff-respondent was awarded two-thirds of his costs in this Court and two-thirds of his costs in the lower Court after January 28, 1959; earlier costs in the lower Court were confirmed as ordered below. The respondents were permitted to withdraw the deposit towards the two-thirds of the costs of the appeal.
Implications: The direct effect is that the mortgage enforcement (sale) decree in favour of the heirs was upheld but the separate remedy of a personal decree against defendant No. 1 was held time-barred and removed from the decree. The Court distinguished authorities relied upon by the parties and applied established principles on joinder and on what constitutes an acknowledgement under s. 19. The opinion does not announce any novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts, and does not purport to set a new precedent.
Miscellaneous
Solicitors for the appellants: Vasant & Co.
Solicitors for the respondents: Zaidy & Co.
Mudholkar, A.C.J:— This is an appeal by defendant No. 1 to a suit for the enforcement of a mortgage and of the personal covenant contained in it.
2. Briefly stated the facts are these: Defendant No. 1 mortgaged a house belonging to him and situate at Mahabaleshwar with one Safiabai and her son Shiraz on May 4, 1950, by depositing the title deed of the said house. The consideration for the mortgage was Rs. 40,000 and interest was agreed to be paid thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum. The due date for the redemption of the mortgage was May 4, 1951. Safiabai died on April 7, 1951 and Shiraz died the very next day. The present plaintiff, Amir Abdulali, is another son of Safiabai and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the daughters of Safiabai. It is admitted that these three persons constitute the only heirs of Safiabai and Shiraz. The plaintiff alone obtained a succession certificate on March 18, 1952, entitling him to recover all the debts and assets due to the estate of Shiraz and this succession certificate was extended on October 29, 1952, to the mortgage in question. As nothing was paid on the mortgage, the plaintiff instituted a suit on October 21, 1959, against defendant No. 1. In that suit he asked for a decree for sale and in addition also asked for a personal decree against the defendant in case the amount realised by the sale of the mortgaged-property was insufficient to discharge the claim under the mortgage.
3. The defendant took various contentions in his written statement but we would confine ourselves to only three of them because those were the ones which were pressed before us. The first contention was that the suit, as instituted, was not properly constituted and, therefore, the Court ought not to have passed any decree whatsoever in favour of the plaintiff. The second defence was that the plaintiff was not entitled to a personal decree against defendant No. 1 because the suit was instituted more than six years after the accrual of the cause of action. The third point urged was that the relief sought by the plaintiff in the plaint could not properly be granted.
4. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that though the plaintiff held a succession certificate in his favour, he was not entitled to sue upon the mortgage by himself since the other heirs of Safiabai and Shiraz were not joined as parties. Thereupon the plaintiff made an application for amendment of the plaint. In that application he not only asked for joinder of two sisters as defendants Nos. 2 and 3 but also for being permitted to raise an additional plea to the effect that a certain document which bears the signature of the defendant operates as an acknowledgment of liability and brings the claim with respect to the personal liability within time. The application was allowed by the learned single Judge on April 15, 1958, without prejudice to the rights of defendant No. 1 to raise the question of limitation, that the claim of the plaintiff was barred by limitation. It may be mentioned that in his application for amendment the plaintiff pleaded that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were being joined merely as pro forma defendants and thereafter the defendant filed a supplemental written statement and in that written statement, amongst other things, he raised a contention that the claim in so far as defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned was barred by limitation despite the allegations made in the application for amendment and further that the document upon which reliance was placed by the plaintiff does not amount to an acknowledgment within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act. The defendant also pointed out that even after the addition of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as pro forma defendants to the suit, the plaintiff's suit was not properly constituted. Thereupon, at the hearing the plaintiff made a further application for amendment of the plaint seeking thereby to obtain a decree in respect of the mortgage also in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The Court allowed the amendment and thereafter tried the suit and eventually decided it on the basis of all the materials placed before it.
5. The Court below negatived the defendant's plea of limitation. It also negatived the defendant's contention that the suit was badly constituted.
6. As regards the reliefs it came to the conclusion that the plaintiff and his two sisters were entitled to the relief of enforcement of the mortgage by the sale of the mortgaged property but so far as the relief under the personal covenant is concerned the plaintiff alone is entitled and passed a decree accordingly.
7. Mr. Chitre confined himself mainly to two points. The first was that the suit, as constituted, was bad and the second was that no decree whatsoever could be passed against the defendant on the personal covenant.
8. It seems to us that the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's suit was bad in its entirety as it has not been properly constituted is untenable. It is no doubt true as contended by Mr. Chitre, that under the Mahomedan law there being a unity of title and interest to the property of the deceased in the entire body of the heirs of a deceased Mahomedan, it is not permissible for only one or some of such heirs to represent the entire body of heirs and that, therefore, a suit by some only of the heirs to recover a debt due to the deceased would be defective on the ground of lack of title or interest in the heirs to the suit. It would, therefore, follow that the suit instituted by the plaintiff alone for the enforcement of the mortgage was not properly constituted. But the plaintiff applied for the joinder of his two sisters, who are the only other heirs of the deceased, Safiabai and Shiraj and his application was allowed. It would, therefore, follow that after these two persons were brought on record the suit could not be said to be badly constituted.
9. Mr. Chitre, however, says that these two persons should have been joined as plaintiffs and not merely as pro forma defendants. The same argument appears to have been advanced before the Court below and while dealing with that argument, the learned Judge has referred to a decision of the Privy Council in Monghibai v. Cooverji . 1939 41 Bom. L.R 1127, P.C., In that case their Lordships have observed (p. 1134):—
“It has long been recognised that one or more of several persons jointly interested can bring an action in respect of joint property and, if their right to sue is challenged, can amend by joining their co-contractors as plaintiffs it they will consent or as co-defendants if they will not… Once all the parties are before the Court, the Court can make the appropriate order and should give judgment in favour of all the persons interested whether they be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.”
10. Now, here, as in the case before the Privy Council, all the heirs are before the Court and, therefore, it was open to the Court to pass a decree in their favour.
11. Mr. Chitre then said that a person who should have been joined as a co-plaintiff would not be entitled to he given relief after being made a defendant to a suit unless it is shown that person was unwilling to be joined as co-plaintiff. In other words, according to him, where a person, who ought to have been joined as a plaintiff to the suit, was not joined as a co-plaintiff because he has refused to be so joined then only he would be entitled to be granted a relief after being made defendant to the suit but not otherwise. Mr. Chitre points out that in this case there is no evidence to show that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 bad originally refused to be joined as plaintiff to the suit and therefore, they would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever. The result of this, according to him, would be that these persons can be regarded as pro forma defendants only, who would not be entitled to any relief. Since the plaintiff alone would not, according to Mr. Chitre, be entitled to claim relief in respect of the mortgage, his suit must be regarded as bad. We think that a suit should not he dismissed upon the sole ground that the plaintiff has not averred or proved that some persons who ought to have been made co-plaintiffs and were subsequently made, defendants to the suit had refused to be joined as co-plaintiffs. In this connection we may refer to the decision in Pyari Mohun Bose v. Kedarnath Roy . 1899 I.L.R 26 Cal. 409. and Biri Singh v. Nawal Singh . 1898 I.L.R 24 All. 226.. In both these cases the learned Judges of the two High Courts took the view that it would not be proper in the circumstances like those present before us to dismiss the plaintiff's suit.
12. Mr. Chitre then contended that in so far as the personal relief is concerned the plaintiff alone would not be entitled to institute a suit without having joined defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as parties to the suit. He joined them as parties to the suit beyond the period of limitation and, therefore, in so far as that relief is concerned, the suit will have to be regarded as having been instituted by one only of the several heirs of a deceased Mahomedan. Such a suit, he contends, would be incompetent and in support of this he relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Virbhadrappa Shilvant v. Shekabai . 1938 41 Bom. L.R 249.. This argument proceeded upon the basis that even in so far as the enforcement of the mortgage is concerned, the suit cannot be regarded as one for the recovery of a debt. We cannot accept this argument in view of what has been held by this Court in Virbhadrappa Shilvant v. Shekabai. If we analyse the present suit, it will be clear that what the plaintiff has sought are two distinct reliefs: One is the enforcement of the mortgage security and the other is the enforcement of the personal covenant. So far as the former relief is concerned, it can no doubt be said that the plaintiff is only enforcing one of the terms of the mortgage deed and not proceeding to realise a debt; but so far as the second relief is concerned the plaintiff can be said to be doing nothing but seeking to realise the decretal amount or deficiency under the personal covenant. Now, here, as already stated, the plaintiff obtained a succession certificate entitling him to recover among others the debt due from defendant No. 1 to Safiabai and Shiraz. The succession certificate thus entitles him to do that which his personal law could not enable him to do. Therefore, the mere fact that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were not joined as parties to the suit within six years of the accrual of the cause of action for the enforcement of the personal covenant would not render the plaintiff's suit for its enforcement bad.
13. The question then is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree against defendant No. 1 upon the personal covenant. As already stated the plaintiff had not pleaded in the plaint that the suit was within limitation because of any acknowledgement made by the defendant before the expiry of the period of limitation. The due date for the redemption of the mortgage, as already stated, was May 4, 1951. The suit was, however, instituted on November 15, 1957, that is, more than six years after the creation of the equitable mortgage. No doubt the memorandum of the mortgage was duly registered. Even so, the mortgagee had to bring a suit within six years of the accrual of the cause of action for the enforcement of the personal covenant. The plaintiff has not given any satisfactory reasons in his application for amendment for not referring to the acknowledgement in the plaint. All that he has said is that the documents upon which the plea is based were in the possession of some solicitors and he came upon the documents only recently and nothing more. The statement is much too vague. Even so, the statement having been categorically denied by defendant No. 1, it was necessary for the plaintiff at least to put in an affidavit of the solicitors. He failed to do so and, therefore, in our opinion, the amendment of the plaint permitting the plaintiff to refer to the alleged acknowledgement ought not to have been granted. Apart from that, having read the document, which is supposed to operate as an acknowledgment, we have no doubt whatsoever that it does not amount to an acknowledgment of liability by defendent No. 1.
14. According to the plaintiff, after the death of Safiabai and Shiraz, he repeatedly demanded the repayment from the defendant but the latter put him off on one pretext or another. In March, 1952 in order to deal with the matters relating to the estate of the deceased he obtained a succession certificate. The plaintiff says that he gave further time to the defendant for redemption of the mortgage deed and that it was arranged between him and the defendant that the latter should execute a fresh equitable mortgage in his favour while the plaintiff himself in his turn should execute a release of the previous equitable mortgage in favour of the defendant. Pursuant to the said arrangement instructions were, according to the plaintiff, given to Mr. Bhedwar, a solicitor of Mulla & Mulla. Mr. Bhedwar prepared a draft of the release deed and a draft mortgage-deed. It is common ground that the defendant endorsed his approval on these drafts and also signed beneath the endorsements made by him on them. The draft deed of release contained, amongst other terms, the following:
“…AND WHEREAS the said principal sum of Rs. 30,000/- (Thirty thousand) and the sum of Rs. 1384/- for interest making together the sum of Rs. 31,384/- are due and owing to the Mortgagee under the said Equitable Mortgage and WHEREAS the Mortgagor is desirous of paying to the Mortgagee the said sum of Rs. 31,384/- and having a Release from the Mortgagee as is hereinafter expressed…”
15. According to the plaintiff the aforesaid recital in the draft deed of release, which contains an endorsement of approval under the signature of the defendant constitutes an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention. For one thing, the document was to be executed not by defendant No. 1 but by the plaintiff and his two sisters. Therefore, whatever was said or was intended to be said in those documents was intended to be so said not by defendant No. 1 but by the plaintiff and his two sisters. The mere endorsement by the defendant on the draft of the document showed that he perhaps did agree that such a deed may be executed but it cannot by any stretch of imagination amount to making an acknowledgement of existing liability to the plaintiff. Apart from that, the document, as a deed of release, has to be read as a whole. When it is read as a whole we find that it contains a statement to the effect that the entire debt due on the mortgage dated May 4, 1950, has been fully satisfied. Therefore, if at all there is an acknowledgement, it is not an acknowledgement of a subsisting liability. In that document the liability is said to have been completely discharged. Where a person makes a statement to the effect that his liability upon a debt has been discharged, that statement cannot be regarded as an acknowledgement of debt which could be availed of for extending time under s. 19 of the Limitation Act. In this connection we may refer to the judgment, of Mr. Justice Kotval in Narsingdas v. Chhaikodilal . [1956] A.I.R Nag. 267. and to the decisions in N.A.M Apvasami v. Morangam . [1935] A.I.R Mad. 371. and Harlock v. Ashberry . 1882 19 Ch. D. 539.—on which reliance was placed by the learned Judge. We may also refer to the decision in Chhaterdhari Mahto v. Nasib Singh . [1924] A.I.R Pat. 806.. In that case it was held that where there was an acknowledgement that there was a mortgage but there was no express statement, that it was discharged, but there was a statement that in order to pay it off a sale was effected and since the date of the sale the vendees had been in possession of the property that writing would not constitute an acknowledgement of liability under s. 19.
16. Mr. Vahanvati, who appears for the plaintiff, has referred us to the decision of this Court in Sheikh Mahomed v. Jamaluddin . 1908 10 Bom. L.R 385., in support of his contention that a mere reference to liability in a document by a debtor is sufficient to constitute an acknowledgement. In that case the plaintiff had instituted a suit for redemption. On the face of it the claim was barred by time but in order to bring it in time they relied upon a certain document as amounting to acknowledgement within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act. The nature and the purport of the document is described thus by Chandavarkar J. in his judgment at page 386:—
“It is necessary to state shortly the nature and purport of that Exhibit, so far as they are material for the purposes of that question. In 1882 the Settlement Officer had to determine under the Khoti Act the tenure on which the lands in dispute were held by their occupants, who were also mortgagors under the mortgages now concerned. Those occupants asserted their title to the lands as dharekaris and alleged that the evidence of that title was contained in certain books relating to the payment of assessment which they further stated, were in the possession of two of the Khots, who were expressly named by them and described also as ‘mortgagees’. These statements of the occupants, which included the description of the two Khots as ‘mortgagees’ were recorded by the Settlement Officer in a big book, of which Exhibit 88 is an extract. At the end of that book, several Khots admitted in writing signed by them the correctness of the statements made by the occupants to the above mentioned effect and recorded by the Settlement Officer.” The learned Judge held that (p. 387):
“…Where a mortgagor describes his mortgagee as such and the latter admits in writing over his signature the correctness of that description, the meaning of the admission is as plain as language can make it. Thereby the mortgagee unmistakably affirms that he is what he is described to be— a mortgagee.”
17. Further, according to the learned Judge, it is a necessary implication from the admission that he acknowledges all the legal consequences of his position as a mortgagee, one of which is his liability to be redeemed.
18. In our opinion, the recital in the document, which was before the learned Judge in that case was quite different from that in the case before us. Apart from that, as we have already pointed out, defendant No. 1 at no point of time intended to make any acknowledgement whatsoever and had in fact not made an acknowledgement.
19. Upon this view we hold that the plaintiff's claim, for personal relief against defendant No. 1 was barred by time at the date of the suit and the so-called acknowledgement does not bring it within limitation.
20. In the result the appeal is partly allowed and the decree of the Court below is modified by deleting the direction.
“In the event of the net sale proceeds proving insufficient to satisfy in full the amount payable hereunder the plaintiff will be at liberty to apply for a personal decree against the first defendant for the balance.”
21. As regards the costs we direct that the plaintiff-respondent will get only two-thirds of his costs in this Court.
22. He will also get two-thirds of his costs in the lower Court after January 28, 1959. As regards the costs prior to that date we confirm the order of the Court below.
23. The respondents are at liberty to withdraw the deposit towards the two-thirds of the costs of the appeal.
24. Order accordingly.
Solicitors for the appellants: Vasant & Co.
Solicitors for the respondents: Zaidy & Co.
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