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Jankibai Tukaram v. Nagpur Improvement Trust, Nagpur
Opinion Summary — Civil Revision Application of Jankibai
Factual and Procedural Background
This civil revision application was filed by one Jankibai challenging an order of the Land Acquisition Officer (L.A.O.), Nagpur, which rejected her application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that it was time-barred. The Collector's award had been passed on 25 June 1958. Jankibai made her application under Section 18 on 19 August 1958. The L.A.O./Collector rejected the Section 18 application on the basis that the notice required by Section 12(2) of the Act was served by affixture on her house on 3 July 1958; accordingly, the Collector computed the six-week period from 3 July 1958 and held the 19 August application to be barred by limitation.
The opponent raised a preliminary objection that the revision application to the High Court did not lie, that any challenge should have been made to the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, and that the Collector had not been made a party to the revision, which allegedly affected maintainability. The High Court first disposed of these preliminary objections and then considered the substantive contention as to the computation of limitation and the validity of service by affixture.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a revision under Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act lies to the High Court against an order of the Collector (i.e., whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction as provided in S.18(3)).
- Whether the application should have been made to the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act rather than to the High Court.
- Whether the Collector needed to be made a party to the revision application for it to be maintainable.
- Whether the six-week period under the proviso to Section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act runs from the date of service of the notice (as by affixture under Section 45(3)) or from the date of actual receipt of the notice by the person concerned.
- Whether service by affixture under Section 45(3) was properly effected in this case (i.e., whether the preconditions of S.45(3) were satisfied).
- Whether time taken by the applicant to obtain a copy of the award should be excluded in computing the six-week period under the Limitation Act (invoking Section 29 and relevant subsections of Section 12 of the Limitation Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Opponent's (Respondent's) Preliminary Contentions
- The revision application to the High Court does not lie (i.e., the High Court lacks revisional jurisdiction over the Collector's order).
- The application, if maintainable at all, should have been made to the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act (which deals with references under S.18 for lands acquired for the Trust).
- The Collector and/or the State Government should have been made parties to the present application; because they were not, the revision is said to be not maintainable.
Applicant's (Jankibai's) Substantive Arguments
- The notice required by Section 12(2) was not personally received by the applicant; it was affixed to her door and she saw it only upon returning to Nagpur on 13 July 1958. For the proviso to Section 18 the relevant date is the date of receipt, not the date of service by affixture.
- The Collector was wrong to rely on Section 45(3) to justify affixing the notice and to compute limitation from the date of affixture (3 July 1958).
- There was no evidence that the applicant "could not be found" on 3 July 1958 or that no adult male member of her family was available — the statutory conditions for affixture under S.45(3) were not shown to be met; temporary absence alone does not establish that the person "cannot be found." The applicant relied on authority expressing that a person cannot be treated as "cannot be found" when no attempt to find him has been made and he was merely temporarily absent.
- The time taken by the applicant in applying for and obtaining a copy of the award should be excluded from the period of limitation (invoking Section 29 and relevant provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hardyal v. Pir Sant Das, 10 Ind Cas 242 (Lah) | It was observed that a person cannot be said to "could not be found" when no attempt whatsoever has been made to find him and he was merely temporarily absent from his house. | The court relied on this principle to support the proposition that temporary absence (or mere not being at home at a particular time) does not satisfy the statutory requirement that a person "cannot be found" for the purposes of Section 45(3); this undermines the validity of service by affixture in the present case. |
| Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm, 55 Ind App 161 : AIR 1928 PC 103 | Interprets Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act (exclusion of time "requisite" for obtaining copy) as applying even where a copy is not strictly required by procedural rule for the initiating document. | The case was cited in the discussion of whether the provision for excluding time to obtain copies applies; the court considered it but concluded Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act relates to appeals and similar proceedings and is therefore not applicable to an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. |
| Burjorjee v. Special Collector, Rangoon, AIR 1926 Rang. 135 | Held that Section 12(4) of the Limitation Act (excluding time requisite for obtaining copy of an award in applications to set aside an award) applies to an application to the Collector to refer a matter to the Court (i.e., that time to obtain a copy of the Collector's award can be excluded). | The court expressly dissented from this view: it held that a Section 18 reference application is not an application to "set aside" an award and therefore Section 12(4) does not apply to Section 18 applications. |
| Secretary of State v. Karim Bux, AIR 1939 All 130 | Holds that time taken to obtain copies of an order under the Land Acquisition Act cannot be excluded for the purposes of computing the six-week period prescribed by the proviso to Section 18. | The court cited and agreed with the view expressed in this Allahabad case in concluding that the time taken to obtain copies of the Collector's award should not be excluded when computing the six-week period for a Section 18 application. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two stages: first it disposed of the preliminary objections, and then it considered the merits of the limitation and service contentions.
Preliminary Objections
- Jurisdictional Objection: The court observed that Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act expressly provides that any order made by the Collector on an application under Section 18 shall be subject to revision by the High Court "as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." On that express provision the court held that the revision application does lie to the High Court.
- Tribunal Objection: The court explained that the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act (Section 60) constitutes a Tribunal "for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894." That Tribunal hears references made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act; however, it is not competent to hear revision applications under Section 18(3), which are reserved to the High Court. On that basis, the objection that the application should have been made to the Tribunal was rejected.
- Non-joinder of Collector/State: The court observed that when the High Court is entertaining a revision against an order of a subordinate court (or in the present statutory analogue), the subordinate court is not customarily made a party to the revision. Given the statutory analogy in Section 18(3), the contention that the Collector or State Government must be made a party was held to be without substance. The preliminary objection was rejected and the court proceeded to the merits.
Substantive Analysis (Limitation and Service)
- Statutory distinction between "receipt" and "service": The court emphasized the textual difference — the proviso to Section 18 refers to the six-week period running "within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2)", whereas Section 45 deals with the modes of "service" of notices. The court held that this distinction is significant: a service effected in the mode prescribed by Section 45 (for example, by affixture) does not necessarily amount to actual receipt by the person concerned. Thus the Collector erred in computing limitation from the date of service by affixture.
- Application of Section 45(3): The court analyzed S.45(3) which permits affixation only when two conditions are met: (i) the person to be served "cannot be found"; and (ii) no adult male member of his family residing with him can be found. The serving officer's report did not refer to the second requirement and the learned counsel for the opponent conceded this omission. For that reason alone, service by affixture did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites of S.45(3) and was not a proper mode of service.
- Meaning of "cannot be found" vs. "not found": The court stressed the linguistic and legal difference between "cannot be found" and "not found (at home at a particular time)". The Collector's report indicated only that Jankibai "was not found at home" on 3 July 1958, which does not carry the same meaning as "could not be found" after reasonable attempts. The court relied on the principle in Hardyal v. Pir Sant Das that a person cannot be said to "could not be found" when no attempt has been made and the person was merely temporarily absent.
- Consequent error in computing limitation: Given the above, the court held that limitation could not be taken to have started on 3 July 1958 (the date of affixture). The Collector therefore erred in rejecting the Section 18 application as barred by limitation when he computed the six-week period from that date.
- Exclusion of time to obtain copy of award (Limitation Act analysis): The court examined whether time taken to obtain a copy of the award should be excluded under provisions of the Limitation Act. It noted that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes certain provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to special laws such as the Land Acquisition Act, and that Section 12 of the Limitation Act contains several subsections:
- Section 12(2) excludes time "requisite" for obtaining a copy in the context of appeals, applications for leave to appeal, and applications for review. The court concluded that S.12(2) relates to appeals and review-type proceedings and does not apply to an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
- Section 12(4) excludes time for obtaining a copy of an award in computing limitation for an application to set aside an award. The court disagreed with the authority that applied Section 12(4) to Section 18 applications (i.e., the view in Burjorjee v. Special Collector) because an application under Section 18 is not, in the court's view, an application to "set aside" an award — even if a reference is allowed the award might only be modified rather than set aside.
- On the facts, the Collector did not positively find that the notice was actually received before the applicant returned to Nagpur. The court noted that if the notice was received on the date the applicant returned to Nagpur (13 July 1958), her Section 18 application dated 19 August 1958 would have been well within the six-week limit. Because the Collector's reasoning was founded on an incorrect start date for limitation (3 July), the Collector's order rejecting the application on limitation grounds was erroneous.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court allowed the revision application. The court held that the Collector erred in treating 3 July 1958 (date of affixture) as the commencement of the six-week period in the proviso to Section 18 and directed the Collector to make a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Court.
Direct Implications for the Parties:
- The Collector's order rejecting the Section 18 application as time-barred is set aside, and the Collector is directed to make the statutory reference under Section 18 to the Court.
- The revision application is allowed and there will be no order as to costs (the court noted the applicant's counsel did not press for costs).
Broader Implications: The opinion emphasizes the textual distinction between "receipt" and "service" in the proviso to Section 18 and the service modes in Section 45; it clarifies that an affixture under S.45(3) will not automatically be treated as "receipt" and that the statutory preconditions to affixture must be fulfilled. The court also took the view that exclusions of time in the Limitation Act applicable to appeals or to applications to set aside awards do not extend to an application for reference under Section 18. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel general rule beyond these applications to the present statutory provisions.
Disposition: Revision allowed.
In this Civil Revision Application by one Jankibai the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, Nagpur, rejecting her application to make a reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act on the ground that it was time-barred is being challenged. The award was passed on 25-6-1958 and the application under Sec. 18 of the Act to the Collector praying that the matter be referred under that section for the determination of the Court was made on 19-8-1958. The application was rejected on the ground that the notice required by sub-section (2) of Sec. 12 of the Act was served on 3-7-1958 by affixture on the house of Jankibai, and that therefore under the proviso to Sec. 18 the application which was made on 19-8-58 was made more than six weeks from the date of service of notice, namely, 3-7-1958, and that the application could not therefore be entertained.
2. A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned counsel for the opponent on the ground that this revision application does not lie, that even if it lies it should have been made to the Tribunal under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, and that the Collector not having been made a party to the present application, the application is not maintainable.
3. Before referring to the merits of the applications, this preliminary objection will be first disposed of. There is no merit in the contention that the revision application does not lie because sub-section (3) of Sec. 18 of the Act in terms provides:
“Any order made by the Collector on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as it the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”
4. There is no substance in the argument that the application should be made to the Tribunal appointed under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. When a reference is made under Sec. 18 of the Act to the Court, the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 provides in Sec. 60:
“A Tribunal shall be constituted, as provided in Sec. 62, for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.” The Tribunal so constituted hears references made under Sec. 18 of the Act and is not competent to hear revision applications made under Sec. 18(3) of the Act which he to the High Court. The third contention in support of the preliminary objection is also bereft of any substance and that contention is that either the Collector or the State Government should have been made a party; and that as neither the Collector nor the State Government has been made a party to the revision application, it is not maintainable. It is clear from sub-section (3) of S. 18 of the Act that an order made by the Collector on an application made under S. 18 of the Act is subject to revision by the High Court as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court. When the High Court is hearing a revision application against an order passed by a subordinate Court, the latter is never made a party to the revision application. I therefore reject the preliminary objection and hold that this revision application does lie to the High Court.
5. Now to turn to the merits of the application. It is contended that the notice required to be given under S. 12(2) of the Act was not given to the applicant but was affixed on the door of her house and was seen by her only on 13-7-1958. It is contended that for the purposes of proviso to S. 18 of the Act the notice must be received by the person concerned and it is not sufficient that it is served by affixing it to the door of his house. It is also contended that the Collector was wrong in applying S. 45(3) of the Act to justify the affixing of the copy of the notice on the outer door of the applicant's house and in calculating the time from the date it was so affixed. It is contended that the limitation starts from the date when the notice is actually received and not from the date when it might have been served under S. 45(3) of the Act. It is also urged that there is nothing to show that the applicant could not be found on 3-7-1958 when the notice was affixed on the outer door of her house and that there is also nothing to show that there was no adult male member of the family in the house at the time. It is urged that temporary absence for a few days would not justify the finding that the applicant could not be found. Lastly, it is contended that the time taken by the applicant in applying and getting a copy of the award should be excluded from the period of limitation under S. 29 and S. 12 of the Limitation Act.
6. To appreciate these contentions it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Sub-section (1) of S. 18 of the Act provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court. Sub-section (2) provides that the application should state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. The proviso to this section provides:
“Provided that every such application shall be made,—
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under S. 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire”.
7. It is conceded in this case that clause (a) of the proviso has no application in the instant case because the applicant was not present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award. It is only clause (b) of the proviso that requires consideration. This clause refers to the notice from the Collector under S. 12, sub-section (2) which provides that after filing the award the Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.
8. Section 45 of the Act deals with service of notices. Sub-section (1) provides that services of notice under the Act shall be made by delivering or tendering a copy thereof. sub-section (2) of this section provides that whenever it may be practicable, the service of the notice shall be made on the person therein named. Sub-section (3) provides:
“When such person cannot be found, the service may be made on any adult male member of his family residing with him; and if no such adult male member can be found, the notice may be served by fixing the copy on the outer door of the house in which the person therein named ordinarily dwells or carries on business, or by fixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place in the office of the officer aforesaid or of the Collector or in the court-house, and also in some conspicuous part of the land to be acquired”.
9. In his order the Collector observed that the award under S. 11 of the Act was passed by the Land Acquisition officer on 25-6-58 and that
“On the same day, i.e 25-6-58, the L.A.O ordered that the party be informed under section 12(2) L.A Act and that the acknowledgments be put up. The notice issued to Jankibai under section 12(2) L.A Act informing her of the award was affixed to her house, as she was not found at home; and the second copy was returned with an endorsement to this effect. It is dated 3-7-1958, which shows that the notice was affixed to her residence on that date”.
10. The Collector therefore held that the notice was served as per the mode laid down in sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act. He then considered the question whether the period of limitation should be computed from 3-7-58 or from 13-7-58 which is the date on which the applicant returned to Nagpur. The Collector observed that there was no reason to disbelieve the report of the serving agency that the notice was affixed to Jankibai's residence on 3-7-58 and therefore, computing the period of limitation from that date the Collector held that the application under S. 18 of the Act was clearly time-barred. He therefore rejected the application.
11. It is clear from clause (b) of the proviso to S. 18 of the Act that in cases to which that clause applies the limitation is six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice or six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period first expires. This clause refers to the receipt of the notice whereas S. 20 of the Act refers to service of the notice. Section 45 also refers to the mode of service of notices. It is clear from the proviso to S. 18 that the person interested in the award should get six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice of the award and that even if he does not get such a receipt of the notice, in any case the limitation would expire after six months from the date of the award. The intention of the Legislature was to give six weeks' time to the person interested from the date of the award if he was present at the time of the award, and otherwise from the date of the receipt of the notice. But in order to avoid long delay it was also provided that no application should be made after six months from the date of the Collector's award. The Act uses two different expressions, namely, “receipt of the notice” and “service of the notice” and this distinction cannot be without significance and cannot be ignored. A service of the notice as contemplated in Sec. 45 would not therefore necessarily amount to a receipt of the notice. The Collector, in my opinion was therefore wrong in holding that limitation started from the date of the service of the notice by affixture on the door of the house of the applicant. It is an admitted fact that the notice was not served personally on Jankibai on 3-7-58. According to the Collector, she was not found at home on that date and therefore the serving officer affixed the notice on the outer door of the house and made an endorsement to that effect. It is clear therefore that limitation cannot run from 3-7-1958 and that the Collector erred in rejecting the application on the ground that limitation started from 3-7-1958.
12. Even if we turn to Sec. 45(3) of the Act, it provides that when the person cannot be found service may be made on any adult male member of his family residing with him. A copy can be affixed on the outer door of his house only when two conditions are fulfilled: (i) the person on whom the notice is to be served cannot be found; and (ii) no adult male member of the family residing with the person also can be found. According to the report of the serving officer there is no reference to the second requirement. This is conceded by the learned counsel for the opponent. Service of the notice on the outer door of the house of Jankibai does not therefore fulfil the requirements of Sec. 45, sub-section (3) of the Act and is therefore not a proper mode of service under that section. Moreover, the serving officer did not report that Jankibai could not be found. The Collector in his order has observed that the notice was affixed to the house of Jankibai as she was not found at home. The expression “cannot be found” is not equivalent to “not found”. A person may not be found at his house at a particular time, but that does not mean that such a person could not be found at his house. Learned counsel for the applicant relies on Hardyal v. Pir Sant Das, 10 Ind Cas 242 (Lah) where it was observed that it cannot be said that a person could not be found when no attempt whatsoever has been made to find him and there was nothing to show that he was deliberately keeping out of the way to avoid service but he was merely temporarily absent from his house.
13. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the time required by the applicant to obtain a copy of the award should be excluded from the period of limitation. He relies on Sec. 29 and Sec. 12 of the Limitation Act. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act provides:
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law:
(a) the provisions contained in Sec. 4, Ss. 9 to 18, and Sec. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”
14. The Land Acquisition Act, which is a special law, prescribes for an application under Sec. 18 a special period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, and therefore in determining such period of limitation the provisions contained in Sec. 4, Secs. 9 to 18 and Sec. 22 shall apply. One of these sections is Sec. 12 of the Limitation Act, sub-section (2) of which reads as follows:
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.”
15. Reliance is also placed on Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S Chettyar Firm, 55 Ind App 161 : (AIR 1928 PC 103) where it was held
“Section 12, sub-section (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which excludes from the period of limitation for appealing from a decree the time “requisite” for obtaining a copy of it, applies even when by a rule of the High Court a memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the decree.
16. But in my opinion, sub-section (2) of Sec. 12 refers to an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of judgment. An application for reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act does not therefore attract the application of sub-section (2) of Sec. 12 of the Limitation Act.
17. Reliance is also placed on sub-section (4) of Sec. 12 of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows:
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.”
and on Burjorjee v. Special Collector, Rangoon, AIR 1926 Rang. 135, where it was held that Sec. 12(4) of the Limitation Act applies to an application to the Collector to refer a matter to the Court and the applicant is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the Collector's award. With great respect, I dissent from this view because sub-section (4) of Sec. 12 refers to applications to set aside an award such as an award in arbitration proceedings and an application for reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can never be treated as an application to set aside an award. Even if the reference is accepted the award may be only modified. An application for reference under Sec. 18 of the Act cannot therefore be treated as an application to set aside an award. Learned counsel for the non-applicant has cited Secretary of State v. Karim Bux, AIR 1939 All 130 in support of his contention that time taken to obtain copies of an order under the Land Acquisition Act cannot be excluded for the purposes of computing the period of six weeks prescribed by the proviso to Sec. 18 of the Act. For the reasons already given and, with respect, I agree with the view taken in this Allahabad case.
18. However, for the reasons already given, the Collector was wrong in the view that the period of six weeks started from 3-7-58. The Collector observed:
“The question, which, therefore, arises is whether the period for purposes of the present application should be computed from 3-7-1958, which was the date of its actual affixing on the house, or from some subsequent date on which the N.A returned to Nagpur.”
19. The Collector did not observe that it was not proved that Jankibai had returned to Nagpur on 13-7-58. It the notice was received on 13-7-58, her application under Sec. 18 would be clearly in time. I therefore hold that the Collector erred in holding that the application was barred by limitation and direct that he should make a reference under Sec. 18 of the Act to the Court.
20. The application for revision is allowed. There will be no order for costs as the learned counsel for the applicant does not press for costs.
HD/K.S.B
Revision allowed.
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