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State v. Kamalakar Prabhakar Juvekar, Accused, .

Bombay High Court
Sep 21, 1959
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Factual and Procedural Background

The accused, Kamlakar Prabhakar Juvekar, was charged before the Presidency Magistrate, 12th Court, Bandra, Bombay, in Case No. 1953.P of 1958 for offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C). The prosecution alleged that on 10-10-1958, the accused drove a bus in a rash and negligent manner causing injuries to Balkrishna Ramchandra Payale. During the trial, the accused and Payale purported to compound the offence under Section 337 I.P.C and sought the Court's permission. The trial Magistrate permitted the compounding and acquitted the accused of the Section 337 charge. The Magistrate further acquitted the accused of the Section 279 charge relying on an unreported decision of this Court in Homi Jehangir Lali v. The State. The State appealed against the acquittal under Section 279 I.P.C to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compounding and acquittal of the accused under Section 337 I.P.C precludes prosecution under Section 279 I.P.C for rash or negligent driving in the same incident.
  2. Whether the offences under Sections 279 and 337 I.P.C are of the same nature or character, such that compounding one affects the prosecution of the other.
  3. Whether the precedent in Criminal Application No. 672 of 1951, which held that an offence under Section 338 I.P.C is an aggravated form of Section 279 I.P.C, is correctly applied in the context of Sections 279 and 337 I.P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's Arguments

  • The accused contended that if rash or negligent driving causes simple hurt, a charge under Section 337 I.P.C may be made, and if grievous hurt is caused, a charge under Section 338 I.P.C may be made, but in neither case can a prosecution under Section 279 I.P.C be sustained.
  • Reliance was placed on a prior judgment (Criminal Appln. No. 672 of 1951) where the Court held that an offence under Section 338 I.P.C was an aggravated form of Section 279 I.P.C, implying that acquittal on the aggravated offence precludes prosecution under the lesser offence.

Prosecution's Position (Implied from Court's Analysis)

  • The offences under Sections 279 and 337 I.P.C are distinct in nature and character, though overlapping.
  • Compounding the offence under Section 337 I.P.C, which deals with causing hurt, does not extinguish the offence under Section 279 I.P.C, which is an offence against public safety.
  • The precedent relied upon does not correctly apply to the relationship between Sections 279 and 337 I.P.C, as Section 337 is not an aggravated form of Section 279.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Homi Jehangir Lali v. The State, Criminal Appl. No. 672 of 1951, Dated 1-10-1951 Used by the trial Magistrate to support acquittal under Section 279 I.P.C following compounding under Section 337 I.P.C. The Court disagreed with the trial Magistrate’s reliance on this precedent, holding that the offences under Sections 279 and 337 I.P.C are not of the same character and compounding under Section 337 does not preclude prosecution under Section 279.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature and scope of Sections 279 and 337 I.P.C. Section 279 penalizes rash or negligent driving endangering public safety and is a non-compoundable offence under Chapter XIV of the IPC. Section 337 penalizes causing hurt by an act endangering life or personal safety and is compoundable under Chapter XVI. Although the offences overlap because rash or negligent driving may cause hurt, they are distinct in character and penalize different legal wrongs — one against public safety and the other against individual bodily harm.

The Court rejected the accused's argument that acquittal or compounding under Section 337 precludes prosecution under Section 279. It clarified that compounding under Section 337 allows the victim to accept private satisfaction for the injury but does not absolve the accused of the public wrong of rash driving. The Court further distinguished the precedent relied upon, noting that Section 337 is not an aggravated form of Section 279, and that the lighter maximum punishment under Section 337 contradicts such a characterization.

Consequently, the Court held that acquittal under Section 337 does not bar prosecution under Section 279, and the trial Magistrate’s order acquitting the accused under Section 279 was set aside to allow trial on that charge to proceed.

Holding and Implications

The Court set aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Magistrate for the offence under Section 279 I.P.C and directed that the accused be tried for that offence.

The acquittal under Section 337 I.P.C remains unaffected. The decision clarifies that compounding an offence involving causing hurt does not preclude prosecution for rash or negligent driving under Section 279 I.P.C, emphasizing the distinct legal objectives of the two offences. No new precedent beyond this case’s direct effect on the parties was established.

Show all summary ...

Shah, J.:— One Kamlakar Prabhakar Juvekar, who will hereafter be referred to as the accused was charged before the Presidency Magistrate, 12th Court, Bandra, Bombay in Case No. 1953.P of 1958, for offences punishable under Ss. 279 and 337 I.P.C It was the case for the prosecution that on 10-10-1958, the accused drove S.K.M.M Co's. Bus No. BYL. 4441 in a rash and negligent manner and caused injuries to one Balkrishna Ramchandra Payale. At the trial Payale and the accused purported to compound the offence under S. 337 I.P.C and asked for the permission of the Court in that behalf. The trial Magistrate granted leave to compound and acquitted the accused of that charge. He then observed that the charge under S. 279 I.P.C also failed in view of the order of acquittal under S. 337 I.P.C and in support of that view he relied upon an unreported decision of this Court in Homi Jehangir Lali v. The State, Criminal Appl. No. 672 of 1951 D/- 1-10-1951. Against the order of acquittal for the offence under S. 279 I.P.C the State has appealed to this Court.

2. Section 279 I.P.C penalises rash driving or riding on a public way. A person who drives any vehicle or rides on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person is liable to be punished under S. 279 I.P.C This offence falls within Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code which is a chapter dealing with offences affecting public health, safety, convenience etc. An offence under S. 279 is essentially an offence against public safety. By S. 337 I.P.C causing hurt by an act endangering life or personal safety of others is penalised. By that Section, whoever causes hurt to any person by doing an act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others is liable to be punished in the manner provided thereby. This section occurs in Chapter XVI, which deals with offences affecting the human body. Under S. 279 I.P.C the maximum sentence which may be imposed is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Under S. 337 I.P.C the maximum sentence which may be imposed is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. The offence punishable under S. 337 is the offence of hurt committed in certain defined circumstances. Undoubtedly S. 279 penalises rash or negligent driving which endangers human life or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, but on that account the offence under S. 337 I.P.C and the offence under S. 279 are not of the same nature or character. By S. 336 I.P.C an act, endangering life or personal safety of others, which is done rashly or negligently is penalised, and evidently the offence punishable under S. 337 I.P.C is an aggravated form of the offence defined by S. 336 I.P.C The offences under Ss. 279 and 337 I.P.C are, however, offences of different nature and the conduct referred to therein is penalised with different objects. An act, which is rash or negligent or is likely to endanger human life, may be the result of driving any vehicle or riding on a public way. There is no doubt that the two Sections overlap but that does not, in our judgment, make those offences of the same character. The offence under S. 279 I.P.C is non-compoundable; and the compounding of the offence under S. 337 I.P.C will not prevent the prosecution from being continued under S. 279 I.P.C When compounding of an offence under S. 337 I.P.C is permitted, the Court permits the aggrieved party to accept private satisfaction for the injury caused to him, but thereby the Court is not seeking to permit composition of an act, which is dangerous to the public. The composition of the offence under S. 337 I.P.C, sanctioned by the learned Magistrate therefore did not result in the acquittal of the accused for the offence under S. 279 I.P.C

3. Mr. Nadkarni, for the accused, contended that whenever on account of rash or negligent driving simple hurt is caused to any other person, a charge under S. 337 I.P.C may be made, and if grievous hurt is caused, a charge under S. 338 I.P.C may be made against the accused and in neither case a prosecution for a charge under S. 279 I.P.C may be sustained. We are unable to accept this argument. If a person drives a vehicle or rides on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, he commits an offence, against public safety. If, by so driving a vehicle or riding on any public way, he causes an injury to any other person, he also commits an offence punishable under S. 337 I.P.C and if he causes grievous hurt, he commits an offence punishable under S. 338 I.P.C If, by such rash or negligent driving the accused has caused injury to some person, offences punishable under Ss. 279 and 337 I.P.C will be committed, and acquittal of the offence under S. 337 or S. 338 I.P.C as a result of the compounding will still leave the charge under S. 279 I.P.C outstanding.

4. Strong reliance was sought to be placed by Mr. Nadkarni upon a judgment of this Court in Criminal Appln. No. 672 of 1951, D/- 1-10-1951. The accused in that case who was charged with offences under Ss. 279 and 338 I.P.C was permitted by the trial Magistrate to compound the offence under S. 338 I.P.C with the complainant and was acquitted of that offence. An express order acquitting the accused of the offence under S. 279 I.P.C was not passed, but that charge was abandoned, and no proceeding in the case against the accused remained outstanding. A fresh summons was thereafter issued by the trial Magistrate to the accused for offences under Ss. 279 and 338 I.P.C read with Secs. 74, 124 and 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The accused then applied to this Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that as he was acquitted of the offence under S. 338 I.P.C no fresh proceedings could lie against him for an offence alleged to be committed in the same incident for which a charge under Ss. 279 and 338 I.P.C was made against him. This Court upheld the contention raised by the accused and quashed the charge observing — though it was not necessary for the purpose of the decision of the case to do so that the offence under S. 338 I.P.C was an aggravated form of the offence under S. 279 I.P.C With respect, we are unable to agree with that view. An offence under S. 279 I.P.C is an offence against public safety and the fact that one of the component ingredients of the offence under S. 337, where this offence is the result of rash and negligent driving, may constitute independently an offence punishable under S. 279 I.P.C will not, in our judgment, justify the view that the offence under S. 337 I.P.C is an aggravated form of the offence penalized by S. 279 I.P.C It may appear somewhat incongruous if the argument of the petitioner be accepted that an offence punishable under S. 337 for which the maximum sentence of fine prescribed is lighter than the sentence prescribed by S. 279 I.P.C is an aggravated form of the later offence. Where a person accused of one offence under S. 337 I.P.C is acquitted, the acquittal may mean that the accused was not guilty of causing hurt to the person or that he was not acting rashly or negligently. Where an offence under S. 337 I.P.C is compounded, the composition can, in very nature of the offence, be of causing hurt to the person so injured and not of doing a rash or negligent act, especially when the rash or negligent act is driving a vehicle or riding on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to that person. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view of the trial Magistrate that the order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused for the offence under S. 337, I.P.C precludes the prosecution of the case under S. 279 I.P.C

5. On that view of the case, we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Magistrate for the offence under S. 279 I.P.C and direct that the accused be tried for that offence. The order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused for the offence under S. 337 I.P.C will, however, stand.

CD/V.R.B
Order set aside.