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The State Of Bombay Referor v. L.D Narayanpure And Others Opponents.

Bombay High Court
Jul 27, 1959
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Tarkunde, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Taxing Officer, under S. 5 of the Court-Fees Act, made a reference to the court and the learned Chief Justice directed the matter to be decided. The reference concerned the proper court-fees chargeable on four appeals that arose from orders passed under section 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act, 1946.

Of the four cases: in three, judgment-debtors had applied under S. 24 for payment of decretal amounts by instalments and those applications were rejected by the Courts below; in the fourth, the judgment-debtor's application was partially granted and he appealed on the ground that the relief was inadequate. The Taxing Officer had taken the view that no appeal lay from an order under S. 24 and suggested conversion of the appeals into civil revision applications with court-fees assessed accordingly, but referred the question for decision because it was of general importance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order under section 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act, 1946, granting or refusing instalments for payment of a decretal amount, is appealable as a "decree" under the Code of Civil Procedure (having regard to S. 2(2) and S. 47 of the Code).
  2. If such an order is appealable, what is the proper court-fee to be charged on a memorandum of appeal from that order (specifically, the Court-fees Act Schedule II item 17(vii) as amended in Bombay State was in issue).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Counsel for the appellants (Mr. Paranjape and Mr. Adik) argued that an order under S. 24 is a determination of a question within S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., relates to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree).
  • Alternatively, they contended that an order under S. 24 amounts to a "decree" under the first part of the definition of "decree" in S. 2(2) of the Code because it adjudicates on a matter in controversy between the parties (the time and manner of payment).

Taxing Officer's View

  • The Taxing Officer's position was that no appeal could be filed from a decision under S. 24. He suggested that appellants could convert their appeals into civil revision applications and have court-fees levied on that basis, but referred the question because it raised a point of general importance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Zaverchand Panaji v. Mayadevi, 58 Bom LR 619 Authority that an order under S. 24 can be made only by the Court which passed the decree and not by the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution. The court observed this decision does not necessarily support the conclusion that an order under S. 24 is not a determination under S. 47; the decision bears on which court may make the order but does not decide the question now before the court on appealability under S. 47 or S. 2(2).
Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India Ltd., ILR (1944) Nag 1 : AIR 1943 Nag 340 (Full Bench) Decision under S. 11 of the Central Provinces Money-lenders Act (in pari materia with S. 24) that the "Court" refers to the court which passed the decree; S. 11 specifically provided the order shall be deemed passed under S. 47. The court noted this full bench decision but observed that S. 11 explicitly deemed the order to be under S. 47; that feature distinguishes it from S. 24 and thus it does not directly decide the present question.
Pramode Nath v. Raseshwari Dassi, ILR (1941-2 Cal 402) : AIR 1941 Cal 530 Held that an order under S. 36(6) of the Bengal Moneylenders Act (reopening decree) does not come under S. 47 and is not appealable as such; the Bengal provision was materially different and involved formal reopening. The court recorded that S. 36 of the Bengal Act appears materially different from S. 24; the Calcutta decision did not consider whether such orders might be decrees under the first part of S. 2(2), so it does not control the present decision.
Dhanukdbari Singh v. Ramratan Singh, ILR 19 Pat 862 : AIR 1941 Pat 1 Under S. 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act, held that an order granting instalments in execution proceedings is not a decree within S. 47 read with S. 2(2) and is not appealable; the court characterized the power as a discretion and not a final determination of rights. The present court disagreed with the Patna reasoning that the exercise of a discretion cannot be a final determination of rights; the court said the exercise of discretion can still finally determine rights and thus may constitute a decree under S. 2(2).
Saya Hattie v. Ma Pwa Sa, ILR 4 Rang 247 : AIR 1926 Rang 192 Under an amended Order 20, rule 11(2) (allowing instalments without decree-holder's consent), held that such an order was one relating to execution/discharge/satisfaction and was appealable as a decree. The court agreed that an order under the amended provision is a decree and appealable, but distinguished it on the ground that such an order does not necessarily determine a question within S. 47 in the present sense; the court relied on the second ground (decree under S. 2(2)) for its conclusion.
Shree Jagruteshwar Deosthan v. Atmaram, ILR (1943) Nag 456 : AIR 1943 Nag 155 Held that an order under the amended Order 20, rule 11(2) granting or refusing instalments is appealable; observed the order is appealable either as one under S. 47 or as a decree in itself because it affects the decree. The court cited and agreed with the reasoning that such post-decree orders are appealable as decrees, aligning with the court's conclusion that S. 24 orders are decrees under S. 2(2).
Sitabai v. R.S.R.R. Abhyankar, ILR 1938 Nag 423 : AIR 1938 Nag 409 (Full Bench) Authority on the appropriate court-fee payable where subject-matter is not capable of money valuation; supports Schedule II, item 17(vii) fee treatment. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the subject-matter of an appeal from a S. 24 order (mode of payment) is not capable of money valuation and that the court-fee in Schedule II, item 17(vii) is applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered two alternative legal routes by which an order under S. 24 might be appealable:

  1. Whether the S. 24 order is a determination of a question within S. 47 (execution/discharge/satisfaction) of the Code:

    The Taxing Officer and a possible argument viewed S. 24 as a partial modification of an existing decree and therefore as falling within execution proceedings (S. 47). The court rejected that characterization. The court reasoned that S. 24 does more than apply prevailing execution law: it empowers the Court to give positive directions altering the time and conditions of payment, and those directions may themselves be executable. Thus, when the court acts under S. 24 it does not merely operate as an executing court applying existing law but may give directions that partially supersede the original decree. For that reason an order under S. 24 is not merely a determination under S. 47.

  2. Whether the S. 24 order is a "decree" under the first part of S. 2(2) of the Code (i.e., adjudication determining rights in relation to matters in controversy):

    The court concluded that the time and manner of payment in a loan suit is one of the matters in controversy between the parties. An order under S. 24 adjudicates that question. Even though the application under S. 24 is made after the original decree, the legislature has qualified the finality of the original decree in respect of the time of payment by providing for subsequent orders under S. 24. Therefore an S. 24 order is properly regarded as an adjudication on one of the matters in controversy and so falls within the first part of the definition of "decree" in S. 2(2).

    The court compared S. 24 orders with post-decree orders under Order XX, Rule 12 (ascertainment of mesne profits) which are treated as decrees and appealable; it found the comparison legitimate and persuasive. The court further held that an order rejecting a S. 24 application is equally a decree because it represents a fresh decision on a matter in controversy (not merely an amendment of the original decree).

In reviewing relevant case law the court distinguished prior decisions insofar as they addressed different statutory wording or different procedural contexts, and it rejected reasoning that the exercise of judicial discretion necessarily prevents a decision from being a final adjudication of rights. The court accepted precedents holding that similar post-decree directions (under amended Order 20, rule 11(2)) are appealable and took the view that S. 24 orders are likewise appealable — not necessarily because they are orders within S. 47, but because they are decrees within S. 2(2).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that an order under section 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act, granting or refusing to grant instalments for the payment of the decretal amount, is appealable as a decree.

Court-fee ruling (direct effect): The proper court-fee to be charged on a memorandum of appeal from such an order is the court-fee specified in Schedule II, item 17(vii), of the Court-fees Act (as amended in the Bombay State). In the four appeals before the court, the Court-fee to be charged on each memorandum of appeal was assessed at Rs. 18-12-0.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the four memoranda of appeal must bear the fee of Rs. 18-12-0 each under Schedule II, item 17(vii). The opinion concentrates on the appealability of S. 24 orders and the correct fee assessment; it does not expressly discuss broader policy consequences beyond the resolution of the reference and fee determination for the present appeals.

Disposition: Reference answered accordingly; Court-fee fixed as above.

Show all summary ...

Tarkunde, J.:— This reference has been made by the Taxing Officer under S. 5 of the Court-Fees Act, and the learned Chief Justice has directed us to decide the question so raised. The question relates to the Court-fees chargeable on four appeals, each arising from an order passed under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act, 1946. In three of the four cases, applications filed by judgment-debtors under S. 24 of the Act for making the decretal amounts payable by instalments were rejected by the Courts below. In the fourth case, the application of the judgment-debtor was partially granted and the judgment-debtor has come in appeal on the ground that the relief granted to him was inadequate. The Taxing Officer was of the view that no appeal could be filed from a decision under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act and that the appellants in the four appeals may, if they so desired, convert the appeals into civil revision applications and that Court-fees may then be levied on that basis. The Taxing Officer, however, felt that the question involved was of general importance and hence he made this reference.

2. The question raised by the Taxing Officer is not free from difficulty. section 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act, 1946, is in the following terms:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court may, at any time, on application of a judgment-debtor, alter notice to the decree-holder, direct that the amount of any decree passed against him, whether before or after the date on which this Act comes into force, in respect of a loan, shall be paid in such number of instalments and subject to such conditions, and payable on such dates, as, having regard to the circumstances of the judgment-debtor and the amount of the decree, it considers fit”.

3. The Bombay Money-lenders Act does not provide any appeal from an order granting or rejecting an application under S. 24. If the order is one not amounting to a decree, it is obviously not appealable, as it is not covered by S. 104 and Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal from the order can be maintained only if the order is a “decree” as defined by S. 2(2) of the Code. That definition is in two parts. The first part defines “decree” as “the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final”. The second part of the definition includes in the term “decree” orders which may otherwise not be decrees. This part, so far as it is material, says that the term “decree” “shall be deemed to include …… the determination of any question within S. 47 …….” An order under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act can be held to be a decree either if it determines a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree under S. 47 of the Code, or if it comes within the first part of the definition of the word “decree”. On behalf of the appellants in the four appeals, Mr. Paranjape and Mr. Adik urged that an order under S. 24 of the Bombay Moneylenders Act is a determination of a question within S. 47 of the Code and, alternatively, that it amounts to a decree according to the first part of the definition of that term.

4. We will deal first with the first of these alternative arguments. The Taxing Officer was of the view that a judgment-debtor seeking a direction under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act seeks in effect a partial modification of the decree passed against him, and that therefore an order passed by the Court either allowing or rejecting his application cannot be regarded as an order relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of that decree. This view of the Taxing Officer assumes what undoubtedly is the general rule, namely, that an executing Court will execute a decree as it is, without any modification or qualification. Nothing, however, prevents the Legislature from modifying or qualifying the rights of decree-holders in executing the decrees passed in their favour. If the Legislature passes an enactment which limits the decretal rights of a decree-holder, the executing Court is bound to execute the decree subject to the limitations so placed by the Legislature. The Legislature may prevent decrees from being executed against certain classes of property (e.g section 10, Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874); it may provide that no process shall be issued against certain classes of judgment-debtors for a specified period (e.g The Bombay Small Holders Relief Act, 1938). Instances of legislation of this type are not few. An executing Court is required to execute the decree in accordance with the prevailing law, and an order passed by the executing Court on whether the decree under execution is limited or otherwise qualified by a legislative enactment does not cease on that account to be an order under S. 47 of the Code. It was argued before us by Mr. Paranjape that an order which is passed by the Court under S. 24 is an order of this nature. The Legislature, according to him, provided a qualification to the rights of the decree-holder in the case of decrees passed on loans, and it is well within the function of the executing Court to decide whether the qualification imposed by the Legislature was available in favour of a particular judgment-debtor. We might have accepted this argument it S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act were merely declaratory of the rights of judgment-debtors in the execution of decrees to which that section applies. In that case it would have been the duty of an executing Court to consider the rights of the judgment-debtor so declared by the Legislature and to execute the decree accordingly. The wording of Sec. 24, however, shows that it is not merely declaratory. It empowers the Court to “direct that the amount of any decree………shall be paid in such number of instalments and subject to such conditions and payable on such dates, as….it considers fit”. Section 24 enables the Court to give a direction, and the direction so given may itself be executable. It must, therefore, follow that the Court, while exercising the powers under S. 24, does not merely act as an executing Court, does not merely consider the prevailing law as it applies to the execution of decrees already passed, but decides whether positive directions should be given in partial supersession of the terms of decrees previously passed. Such an order cannot, therefore, be regarded as a determination of a question within S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. Turning next to the second alternative argument, an order under S. 24 of the Bombay Moneylenders Act would be a decree according to the definition of the term “decree” in the first part of S. 2(2) of the Code, if it amounts to an adjudication of “the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit”. The definition makes it clear that the adjudication need not be of all the matters in controversy in the suit in order that it may be a decree. Now, in a suit based on a “loan” as defined by the Bombay Moneylenders Act, one of the matters in controversy between the parties is the time before which and the manner in which the amount which may be found due to the plaintiff shall be paid by the defendant. An order under S. 24 is an adjudication which determines this matter in controversy between the parties to the suit. It is true that an application under S. 24 is necessarily filed after a decree in such a suit has already been passed by the Court, and as a rule the decree provides, expressly or by implication, the time within which the judgment-debtor must satisfy it. There is, however, no difficulty in treating an application subsequently filed by the judgment-debtor under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act as an application filed in the suit itself. This is because the finality of the original decree, in so far as the decree relates to the time of payment of the decretal amount is qualified by the Legislature and made dependent on an order which may subsequently be passed by the Court under S. 24. In this connection, it would be legitimate to compare an order under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act with an order on an application of the decree-holder for ascertainment of mesne profits filed after the passing of a decree under Order XX, Rule 12, of the Code. The application of the decree-holder in the latter case is regarded as an application in the suit, and the order of the Court awarding a specific amount of mesne profits to the decree-holder, is deemed to be a decree and is appealable as such. The only substantial difference between such an order and an order under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act is that, whereas a direction for the ascertainment of mesne profits is contained in the very decree passed under Order XX, Rule 12, a direction for determining the time of payment is given by the Legislature in S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act. We do not think that this difference can justify the view that an order under S. 24 is any-the-less a decree than an order awarding a specific amount of mesne profits made after a decree passed under Order XX, Rule 12.

6. It may be added that, in our view, an order under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act is a decree even if it is an order rejecting the application, so that the order leaves the original decree unaffected. This is because, in our view, an application under S. 24 is not an application for the amendment of the original decree. The application seeks a fresh decision of the Court on the question whether the decretal amount should or should not be made payable by instalments and whether its payment should be subject to any conditions. Being a fresh decision on one of the matters in controversy in the suit, the order is appealable whether the application is rejected or allowed.

7. None of the cases cited before us deals directly with the question which we have to decide. In Zaverchand Panaji v. Mayadevi, 58 Bom LR 619, Bavdekar J. held that an order under S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act can be made only by the Court which passed the decree and not by the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution. This decision does not necessarily support the conclusion, to which we have reached on other grounds, that such an order is not a determination of a question under S. 47 of the Code. This is because, even in matters which clearly relate to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of a decree, some orders can be made only by the Court which passed the decree and not by a Court to which the decree is transferred for execution. A similar decision was given by a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India Ltd., Bombay, ILR (1944) Nag 1 : (AIR 1943 Nag 340 F.B). That case arose under S. 11 of the Central Provinces Money-lenders Act, which is in pari materia with S. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act. The Full Bench held that the word “Court” used in S. 11 of the Central Provinces Act refers to the Court which passed the decree, and not to the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution. It may be noted that S. 11 of the said Act specifically provides that an order passed thereunder “shall be deemed to have been passed under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure”.

8. In Pramode Nath v. Raseshwari Dassi, ILR (1941-2 Cal 402 : (AIR 1941 Cal 530) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that an order under S. 36 sub-section (6) of the Bengal Moneylenders Act, 1940, either granting or refusing a prayer for reopening a decree, does not come under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is not appealable as such. It was unfortunately not possible for us to see the provisions of the Bengal Act, and particularly the wording of S. 36 thereof. It appears, from the judgment in the above case, however, that S. 36 of the Bengal Act is materially different from S. 24 of the Bombay Act. Section 36 of the Bengal Act apparently provides for the formal reopening of a former decree and the passing of a new decree. The Division Bench held that, it an application under S. 36 of the Bengal Act results in the passing of a new decree, an appeal lies from the new decree, but that no appeal lies directly from the order passed on the application under S. 36. The judgment shows that the only argument which was advanced before the Court in favour of the appealability of an order under S. 36 was that the order determines a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree within S. 47 of the Code. The Court did not consider the question whether such an order determines the rights of the parties with regard to a matter in controversy in the suit itself and is a decree within the first part of the definition of that term in S. 2(2) of the Code.

9. The decision in Dhanukdbari Singh v. Ramratan Singh, ILR 19 Pat 862 : (AIR 1941 Pat 1) proceeds on a different basis. The case arose under S. 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939, which it appears empowers an executing Court to grant instalments for the payment of amounts previously decreed. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court held in that case that an order under S. 11 of the Bihar Act is not a decree within S. 47 read with S. 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and is not, therefore, appealable. The learned Judges observed that every order passed in the course of execution proceedings is not necessarily a decree so as to be appealable, and that, in order to be a decree, it must in some way finally determine the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. The main judgment delivered in the case then went on to say:

“………The right of the decree-holder to be paid the decretal amount and the liability of the judgment-debtor are determined by the decree in the suit. The power conferred on the executing Court by section 11 of the Money-lenders Act is a discretion which the Court may exercise in derogation of the rights of the decree-holder to execute the whole of his decree immediately against the judgment-debtor. In deciding whether it shall or shall not exercise the discretion conferred upon it by this section the Court is not determining any question of the parties' rights, but merely whether an indulgence shall be shown to the judgment-debtor for the purpose of enabling him to meet the just demands of the decree-holder and at the same time avoid the forced sale of his own properties.” On this view, an order granting or refusing to grant instalments would not be appealable as a decree, because it would not be covered by either of the two parts of the definition of “decree” in section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. With great respect, we do not agree with the view which appears to be implicit in the passage quoted above, that a decision given by the Court in the exercise of its discretion does not amount to a final determination of the rights of the parties with regard to a matter in controversy in the suit. If the time within which the plaintiff's dues shall be paid by the defendant is one of the matters in controversy between the parties to the suit, the fact that the Court exercises a discretion in deciding that question will not prevent the decision from being a decree. In a suit for specific performance, for instance, the decision of the Court is given in the exercise of its discretion, but the decision is a decree nonetheless.

10. A reference may next be made to certain decisions relating to the appealability of orders passed under Order 20, rule 11(2), of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 20, rule 11(2), provides that, after the passing of a money decree, the Court may, on the application of the judgment-debtor and with the consent of the decree-holder, order that payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by instalments on such terms as to the payment of interest, the attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor, or the taking of security from him, or otherwise, as it thinks fit. Since an order under Order 20, rule 11(2), requires the consent of the decree-holder, it would normally be not appealable. The rule, however, was amended by the Rangoon and Nagpur High Courts so that an order thereunder could be passed after hearing the parties, but without the consent of the decree-holder. It will be noticed that Order 20, rule 11(2), so amended, is very similar to, though more restricted than, section 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act. In Saya Hattie v. Ma Pwa Sa, ILR 4 Rang 247 : (AIR 1926 Rang 192) a Judge of the Rangoon Hiph Court, sitting singly, held that an order under the above amended provision was one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree and was, therefore, appealable as a decree. While we agree, with great respect, that such an order is a decree and is appealable, we do not think that it determines a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the original decree. The above decision was followed in several subsequent decisions of the Rangoon High Court. In Shree Jagruteshwar Deosthan v. Atmaram, ILR (1943) Nag 456 : (AIR 1943 Nag 155), Bose J., sitting singly, held that an order under the above amended provision, granting or refusing to grant instalments for the payment of the decretal amount, is appealable. The learned Judge observed: “It seems to me that whether the order be regarded as one under section 47 or as a decree in itself because it affects the decree, it must be appealable.” With great respect, we agree with the second alternative mentioned in this observation.

11. We, therefore, hold that an order under section 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act, granting or refusing to grant instalments for the payment of the amount decreed, is appealable as a decree. The proper Court-fee to be levied on a memorandum of appeal from such an order would be the Court-fee mentioned in Schedule II, item 17(vii), of the Court-fees Act, as amended in the Bombay State. The subject-matter in dispute in such an appeal is not the amount of the decree, but the mode in which the amount is to be paid. As such, it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute. A similar view on the Court-fee payable in such cases was taken in Sitabai v. R.S.R.R Abhyankar, ILR 1938 Nag 423 : (AIR 1938 Nag 409) (FB).

12. Our decision on the reference, therefore, is that the Court-fee to be charged on the memoranda of appeal in the four appeals will be Rs. 18-12-0 each, as provided in Schedule II, item 17(vii), of the Court-fees Act.

DD/R.G.D
Reference answered accordingly.