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Shankar Madhavrao Solav v. M.K Sarode And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the order of the State Industrial Court, Nagpur, which upheld the Assistant Labour Commissioner's order directing the reinstatement of respondent No. 1 and payment of Rs. 1000 as compensation for failure to reinstate. The Assistant Labour Commissioner's order was made under Section 16 of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act prior to its amendment by Act XXI of 1955.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Assistant Labour Commissioner had jurisdiction to pass the order directing reinstatement and compensation under Section 16 of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.
- Whether the activity carried on by the petitioner, namely exhibiting cinema films, can be regarded as a "factory" for the purposes of jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Settlement Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent No. 1's Arguments
- Relied on a decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court (In re, A.M Chinniah, 1957-1 Lab. LT 280; AIR 1957 Mad 755) holding that a laundry business falls within the definition of "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948.
Petitioner's Arguments
- Contended that the definition of "factory" under the Factories Act, 1948, cannot be imported for interpreting the term as used in Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.
- Argued that exhibiting cinema films does not constitute a manufacturing process or a factory.
- Relied on the general meaning of "factory" as given in Wharton's Law Lexicon and 55 Corpus Juris Secundum, emphasizing that a factory is primarily a place where goods are manufactured.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re, A.M Chinniah, 1957-1 Lab. LT 280; AIR 1957 Mad 755 | Definition of "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948, including laundry business as a factory. | The Court acknowledged the correctness of this decision in relation to laundry businesses but held it was not applicable to exhibiting cinema films. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court focused on whether the Assistant Labour Commissioner had jurisdiction under Section 16 of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, which was limited to industrial disputes arising in a "factory" and not merely in an "industry." The Court examined the meaning of "factory" and rejected the importation of the Factories Act definition for this purpose.
Relying on Wharton's Law Lexicon, the Court emphasized that "factory" generally refers to a building where goods are manufactured, distinguishing this from a place of trade. The Court noted that the State Industrial Court's reliance on the first part of the definition, which involved traders in a foreign country, was misplaced because the crucial words "in a foreign country" were ignored.
The Court further analyzed the definition of "manufacturing process" under the Factories Act and found that exhibiting films does not fit within any described manufacturing activities. While laundry business involves washing or cleaning, which qualifies as manufacturing, exhibiting films does not.
Thus, the Court concluded that the activity of exhibiting cinema films cannot be regarded as a factory, and therefore the Assistant Labour Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 16.
Holding and Implications
The petition is allowed and the impugned orders of the State Industrial Court and the Assistant Labour Commissioner are set aside.
The direct effect of this decision is that the respondent No. 1 is not entitled to reinstatement or compensation under the impugned orders as the Assistant Labour Commissioner lacked jurisdiction. Costs of the petition are to be borne by respondent No. 1, and the petitioner is to be refunded the outstanding security amount. The opinion does not establish any new precedent beyond clarifying the scope of "factory" under Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Settlement Act in this context.
Mudholkar, J.:— This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order of the State Industrial Court, Nagpur, which upheld the order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, directing reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 and payment of Rs. 1000/- as compensation to him for failure to reinstate.
2. The only point which we need consider in this case is whether the Assistant Labour Commissioner had jurisdiction to make the aforesaid order. It may be mentioned that when that order came to lie passed Section 16 of the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, prior to its amendment by Act XXI of 1955, was in force. Under the old provision the Labour Commissioner had jurisdiction to act under S. 16 only with respect to an industrial dispute which arose in a factory and not merely in an industry. That being the position, what has to be considered here is whether the activity carried on by the petitioner can be regarded as a factory. The activity of the petitioner consists of exhibiting cinema films. It is difficult to see how this activity can be regarded as a factory. Shri Paranjpe, who appears for the respondent No. 1, refers to a decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court reported in In re, A.M Chinniah, 1957-1 Lab. LT 280: (AIR 1957 Mad 755) to the effect that laundry business comes within the definition of ‘factory’ in Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948. In the first place, we cannot read the definition of factory contained in the Factories Act for the purpose of ascertaining what that expression as used in Section 16 and other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, means. In Wharton's Law Lexicon the word factory has been defined thus:
“Factory, a place where a number of traders reside in a foreign country for the convenience of trade; also a building in which goods are manufactured.”
3. Shri Mujumdar, Chairman of the State Industrial Court, has apparently relied upon the first part of thus definition and come to the conclusion that a place where any sort of trade is carried on is a factory. In doing so, what he has apparently omitted to notice is the significance of the words “in a foreign country”. Those words are of paramount importance and therefore where it cannot be shown that the traders are carrying on an activity in a foreign country, the place where they carry on such activity cannot be regarded as a factory. What he ought to have borne in mind was the second part of the definition which is “a building in which goods are manufactured.” Indeed, the word factory, unless specially defined by statute, is always used in connection with the place where some kind of manufacturing process is carried on. In 55 Corpus Juris Secundum at p. 678 it is stated—
“Manufactory and factory are different forms of the same word, and primarily mean a physical plant, or a place or building, where manufacturing is carried on.”
4. That is the general meaning of the word factory and therefore where statute does not give any definition of the word factory it is this general meaning which must be regarded.
5. Apart from that, we are clear that the activity of exhibiting films does not fall within the definition of factory contained in the Factories Act. A factory is defined thus in S. 2(m) of the Act:
“factory means any premises including the precincts, thereof-
(i) where ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Indian Mines Act, 1923 (IV of 1923) or a railway running shed.”
6. Now, “manufacturing process” has been defined thus in S. 2(k) of the Act:
“manufacturing process means any process for
(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal; or
(ii) pumping oil, water or sewage; or
(iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power, or
(iv) printing by letterpress, lithography, photogravure or other similar work or bookbinding, which is, carried on by way of trade or for purposes of gain, eff incidentally to another business so carried on; or
(v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels.”
7. It is difficult to see how exhibiting films can, by any stretch of imagination or by stretch of language, be; included in any of the various activities classified fonder the expression “manufacturing process.” No doubt, the definition in the Factories Act would include a laundry business inasmuch as the process of washing or cleaning is also regarded as a manufacturing process. Therefore while we have no doubt as to the correctness of the decision of the Madras case, we do not understand how it can help the respondent No. 1 in this case.
8. If Shri Mujumdar had paid sufficient regard to the meaning of the word factory as given in the Wharton's Law Lexicon, instead of referring only to portion of what is stated therein, and if he had not ignored the crucial words occurring in that portion then there would have perhaps been no occasion for this Court to be moved and its time taken up in dealing with a case which appears to us to be a simple one.
9. Accordingly, we allow the petition and set aside the impugned orders of the State Industrial Court and of the Assistant Labour Commissioner.
10. Costs of this petition will be borne by the respondent No. 1. The outstanding amount of security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to him.
K.S.B
11. Petition allowed.
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