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The Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd. v. Vijay Bharat Thread Mills (India)

Bombay High Court
Jul 8, 1957
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner manufactures and sells yarn and thread and is the proprietor of a registered trade mark known as the "Sadhu" mark, used inter alia on wrappers and labels for two cord machine thread No. 40. The petitioner produced a certificate of registration (exh. B). In 1955 the respondents began manufacturing and selling two cord machine thread No. 40 under the "Sanyasi" mark and used corresponding labels. On May 5, 1955 the respondents registered that mark as a design under the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (certificate exhibited as exh. G). On May 10, 1955 the respondents applied to register "Sanyasi" as a trade mark (application exh. D), stating use since January 1955.

The petitioner filed a petition under section 51A of the Patents and Designs Act, 1911 seeking cancellation of the respondents' design registration No. D 82466 on the grounds that (a) it is not a design or not new/original, and (b) it had been previously published in India prior to registration (the petition was amended to rely on previous publication once evidence showed prior publication). The principal issues argued before the Court were whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and whether the registered matter was a "design" within the meaning of the Patents and Designs Act or, in any event, a new or original design.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the design registered by the respondents (No. D 82466) falls within the statutory definition of "design" under the Patents and Designs Act, 1911, and whether it is new or original.
  2. Whether the registration of the respondents' design should be cancelled on the ground that the design had been published in India prior to its registration (s. 51A(1)(a)(ii)).
  3. Whether the High Court in which the petition was filed (Bombay High Court) had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for cancellation under s. 51A of the Patents and Designs Act — specifically, the meaning and ambit of the phrase "the High Court" used in s. 51A and whether that phrase limits the choice of High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (summarised)

  • Contended that the respondents' design is a colorable imitation of the petitioner's registered trade mark "Sadhu".
  • Filed the petition under s. 51A seeking cancellation of the respondents' design registration on grounds including prior publication in India and lack of novelty/originality.
  • Relied (by amendment) on evidence that the respondents' design had been published in India prior to the respondents' application for registration, bringing the case within s. 51A(1)(a)(ii).
  • Through counsel (Mr. Shavaksha) argued that an application under s. 51A lies to any High Court specified in s. 2(7) of the Act and that the phrase "the High Court" in s. 51A should not be read as confining the petition to any single particular High Court; s. 51A confers a special jurisdiction not to be circumscribed by Letters Patent or the Civil Procedure Code.
  • At one stage sought to rely on sales of the respondents' goods in Bombay to support jurisdiction; an amendment to raise that plea was granted, and later a witness deposed to sales in January 1957 (after the petition date), but the Court found that fact irrelevant to jurisdiction once the Court concluded it had jurisdiction.

Respondents (summarised)

  • Contended (generally in reply) against the petitioner's claims and challenged points raised in the petition.
  • Argued (through Mr. Shah) that the phrase "the High Court" in s. 51A should be read as meaning the High Court which otherwise would have jurisdiction over the person against whom the petition is filed or over the subject-matter — i.e., that venue is limited by traditional jurisdictional principles.
  • Relied on authority (National Telephone Co. v. Postmaster General [1913] A.C. 546) to support the contention that when matters are referred to an established Court "without more" the ordinary incidents of that Court's procedure (including appeals and procedural incidents) attach and, by implication, jurisdictional limits attach.
  • Used the respondents' own registration documents and trade-mark style presentation (exh. G) to show that what they called a "design" was being used as a trade mark and was registered as a design under class 5.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Telephone Company, Limited v. Postmaster General, [1913] A.C. 546 Quoted for the proposition that when a statute refers matters to an established court "without more", the ordinary incidents of that court's procedure (including rights of appeal and procedural incidents) attach. The Court considered the passage relied upon but held it did not support the respondents' broader contention that jurisdiction under s. 51A is constrained by the ordinary procedural incidents; the Court concluded that the extent of the High Court's jurisdiction under the special enactment must be found in the enactment itself, and the National Telephone dicta did not require limiting s. 51A jurisdiction to the High Court otherwise having ordinary territorial jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two broad strands: (A) whether the registered matter is a "design" within the Patents and Designs Act, and (B) whether the Court had jurisdiction under s. 51A to entertain the petition.

A. Whether the registered matter is a "design"

  • The Court examined the statutory definition of "design" in s. 2(5): features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament applied to any article by an industrial process and judged solely by the eye, excluding trade marks (as defined in s. 478 IPC) and modes/principles of construction or mere mechanical devices.
  • The Act's s. 2(2) defines "article" for design purposes as an article of manufacture or a substance (artificial or natural). Rule 34 and the Fourth Schedule classify goods for registration; the respondents' design was registered under Class 5 (articles composed wholly of paper, card-board, mill-board or straw-board, or in which such materials predominate).
  • The Court held that the respondents' representation was shown on paper and intended to be affixed to goods; the paper serving as mere carrier cannot be regarded as the "article" to which the design is applied for purposes of registration under Class 5 — i.e., an ordinary sheet of paper or wrapper whose sole purpose is to carry an ornament does not render the ornament a registrable "design". The Court relied on the textual analysis and on an authority (A.D. Russell-Clarke) describing that drawings/paintings on paper which have no purpose other than carrying ornament are not registerable designs.
  • Furthermore, the respondents were using the representation as a trade mark: the registered device (exh. G) included the words "Trade Mark" and the name "Sanyasi", manufacturer name and product statements. Because the definition in s. 2(5) explicitly excludes trade marks, the Court found that the respondents' "design" was, in substance, a trade mark and thus not a design within the Act.
  • The Court therefore held that what the respondents termed a "design" was not a design within s. 2(5). Because of that conclusion, the Court did not decide the separate question whether the design was new or original.

B. Jurisdiction under s. 51A

  • Section 51A allows "any person interested" to present a petition for cancellation of a design "to the High Court" on specified grounds (previous registration in India, prior publication in India, or lack of novelty/originality). The phrase in question is the use of the definite article "the" before "High Court".
  • The Court examined s. 2(7), which defines "High Court" by reference to the High Courts for various Part A/Part B States and other territorial allocations (a list of High Courts). The Court noted there is a single Patent and Design Registry at Calcutta but observed the Act's definition enumerates High Courts.
  • Counsel for the respondents (Mr. Shah) argued that "the High Court" should mean the High Court which otherwise has territorial jurisdiction over the person or subject-matter. Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Shavaksha) argued that the petition may be filed in any High Court listed in s. 2(7) and that the Legislature's use of "the High Court" did not intend to confine the application to any particular High Court; the jurisdiction conferred by s. 51A is a special jurisdiction and should be determined by the Act itself rather than by Letters Patent or the Civil Procedure Code.
  • The Court compared the language used in other provisions: for patent revocation the Act uses "a High Court" (e.g., s. 26(1), s. 28(1), s. 34, original s.64 which used "A High Court"). The amending Act (Act VII of 1930) added s. 51A and used "the High Court". The Court found no indication that the Legislature intended a different or narrower regime by that change of article and concluded that one cannot infer a meaningful distinction between "a High Court" and "the High Court" in this context to limit jurisdiction.
  • The Court reasoned that in patent matters the Act contemplated that issues might be sent for trial to another High Court and stay/dismissal where another Court could more conveniently decide the matter — demonstrating the Act did not intend to confine jurisdiction of High Courts strictly by territorial considerations. Applying the same construction to s. 51A, the Court held that an application under s. 51A can be made to any High Court specified in s. 2(7) and that it is for that Court to try the matter or, if appropriate, to stay proceedings or send issues to another High Court for trial.
  • The Court rejected the respondents' invitation to rely on the Letters Patent (clause 12) or Civil Procedure Code provisions to circumscribe s. 51A jurisdiction, observing that s. 51A confers a special jurisdiction and its limits must be found in the statute itself.
  • The Court considered the National Telephone decision cited by the respondents but concluded that the passages relied upon did not require the restrictive construction the respondents sought: the fact that ordinary incidents of procedure attach to a court's exercise of jurisdiction does not determine the extent of the court's jurisdiction when that jurisdiction is enlarged or conferred by statute; the extent must be derived from the statute.
  • Accordingly, the Court held the Bombay High Court (one of the High Courts listed in s. 2(7)) had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under s. 51A.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court ordered that the registration of the respondents' design No. D82466 as a design under the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, be cancelled.

Implications and consequences stated by the Court:

  • The petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed (cancellation) on the ground that the design had been published in India prior to registration and because the representation did not constitute a "design" within the meaning of the Act but was being used as a trade mark (the Court expressly did not decide the separate question of novelty/originality).
  • The Bombay High Court (as one of the High Courts specified in s. 2(7) of the Act) had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under s. 51A; the decision establishes that s. 51A petitions may be brought in any High Court specified in s. 2(7) and are not limited by territorial jurisdictional rules derived from Letters Patent or the Civil Procedure Code.
  • The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner.
  • The Court directed the Prothonotary to send a certified copy of the decree to the Controller of Patents and Designs at Calcutta at the petitioner's costs, and by consent ordered that papers from the Controller's office be returned on true copies being put in.
  • The Court noted it did not decide whether the respondents' device was new or original; its cancellation order rested on the device not being a "design" within the statute and on prior publication under s. 51A(1)(a)(ii).

Disposition: Petition allowed. Costs awarded to petitioner. Certified copy to Controller of Patents and Designs to be sent.

Show all summary ...

K.T Desai, J.:— The petitioner carries on business of manufacturing and selling, amongst other things, yarn and thread. The petitioner is the proprietor of a registered trade mark known as the “Sadhu” mark. The petitioner has been using wrappers and labels bearing a representation of that trade mark. The said trade mark has been registered in respect of yarn and thread, and has been used inter alia in respect of two cord machine thread No. 40. The certificate of registration has been tendered and is marked as exh. B. The respondents, in the year 1955, started manufacturing and selling their two cord thread bearing No. 40 under a mark known as the “Sanyasi” mark and are using labels bearing a representation of that mark. On May 5, 1955, the respondents got that mark registered as a design under the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, in class 5. The certificate of registration of that design is exhibited in the case as exh. G. On May 10, 1955, the respondents applied for the registration of their “Sanyasi” mark as a trade mark affixing a representation of that mark. That application is exh. D. In that application it has been stated that the respondents have been using that mark since January 1955.

2. The petitioner contends that the design used by the respondents is a colorable imitation of its trade mark. The petitioner has filed this petition under the provisions of s. 51A of the Patents and Designs Act, 1911, for an order that the registration of the respondents' “Sanyasi” design bearing No. D 82466 as a design under the Patents and Designs Act be cancelled on the ground that it is not a design or a new or original design and also on the ground, which was subsequently taken, that it is a design which was previously published in India before its registration.

3. Various points have been raised in the petition which have been controverted by the respondents in reply. The two points on which the matter was canvassed before me were (1) that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and (2) that the design in question was not a design within the meaning of the Patents and Designs Act, 1911, or in any event, was not a new or original design. In the evidence that was led before me it came out that the respondents' design had been published in India prior to the application for registration of that design under the Patents and Designs Act, 1911, with the result that there is no dispute now between the parties that the design was published in India prior to the application for its registration. I have allowed the petition to be amended so as to enable the petitioner to claim the cancellation of the respondents' design on the ground of the previous publication in India of that design before its registration. The case clearly falls within the ambit of s. 51A(1)(a)(ii) of the Patents and Designs Act, and the petitioner would be entitled to the cancellation of the registration of the respondents' design on the ground that it had been published in India prior to the date of its registration if it is established that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain this petition.

4. As the question whether the design is a design within the meaning of the Patents and Designs Act has been argued before me at some length, I will briefly deal with the same.

5. Turning to the provisions of the Patents and Designs Act, the first section that may be noticed is s. 43 of the Act. Section 43 lays down that the Controller may, on the application of any person claiming to be the proprietor of any new or original design not previously published in India, register the design under Part II of the Act. Section 2(5) of the Act defines the word ‘design’. The definition is as under:

“‘Design’ means only the features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament applied to any article by any industrial process or means, whether manual, mechanical or chemical, separate or combined, which in the finished article appeal to and are judged solely by the eye; but does not include any mode or principle of construction or anything which is in substance a mere mechanical device, and does not include any trade mark as defined in section 478, or property mark as defined in section 479 of the Indian Penal Code.”

6. There are two things apparent from the definition of the expression “design” as given in the Act, viz., (1) that it must be applied to any article by any industrial process or means and (2) that it would not include any trade mark as defined in s. 478 of the Indian Penal Code. The term ‘article’ is defined by s. 2(2) to mean as respects designs any article of manufacture and any substance, artificial or natural, or partly artificial and partly natural. Rule 34 of the Rules framed under the Patents and Designs Act refers to the classification of goods for the purposes of the registration of designs. That Rule runs as under:—

“34(1) For the purposes of the registration of designs and of these rules, goods shall be classified in the manner specified in the Fourth Schedule hereto.

(2) If any doubt arises as to the class to which any particular description of goods belongs, it shall be determined by the Controller.”

7. When one turns to the Fourth Schedule, one finds various articles referred to under various classes. In this ease, the design is registered under class 5. Class 5 provides as under:—

“Class 5: Articles composed wholly of paper, card-board, mill-board or straw-board (except articles included in Class 2, and paper hangings), or in which such materials predominate.”

8. It will thus be seen that a design which is liable to be registered must be a design which is intended to be applied to any article composed wholly of paper or in which paper predominates. The design in question is shown on paper and is intended to be affixed to other goods. It cannot be said that this is a design which is intended to be applied to an article composed wholly of paper or in which paper predominates. The paper on which the design is printed cannot be said to be the article to which the design is intended to be applied.

9. What constitutes an article for the purpose of the application of a design has been considered by A.D Russell-Clarke in his book on Copyright and Industrial Designs. At pages 144-145 it has been stated as under:—

“…Even under the old Act, however, not every drawing or painting placed upon a piece of paper or canvas was a design. The reason for this was that paper and canvas as such were not “articles of manufacture” or “substances” within the meaning of the definition. The same must be even more true under the 1949 Act, where it is only the application of the design to an “article of manufacture” which has to be considered. An article of manufacture, or a substance under the old Act to be within the definition had to have some purpose other than that of merely carrying the ornament. Where the article has no purpose beyond merely carrying the ornament, as, for instance, in the case of a drawing, painting, or photograph upon an ordinary piece of paper, the article is so subordinate to the ornament that it may be said practically to disappear. Thus in the case of a drawing of, say, a landscape or hunting scene on a piece of paper, although there is a pattern, that pattern is not applied, nor is it shown as applied to any article of the manufacture within the meaning of the Act, and there is no “design” which can be registered.”

10. The learned author was dealing with the provisions of the laws in England on the subject. I would give a similar meaning to similar words used in the Patents and Designs Act, which is copied from the English statute. In my view, that which is registered as a design is not in reality a design within the meaning of the definition as given in s. 2(5) of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911.

11. The respondents are using what they call their design as a trade mark. In fact, they applied under the Trade Marks Act for the registration of what they call their design as a trade mark. Their design itself indicates that trade mark rights are claimed in respect of the design. When one turns to exh. G, one finds that the words ‘Trade Mark’ appear in bold letters on the so called design, and the word ‘Sanyasi’ in similar letters appears at the foot thereof. On one side the name of the manufacturer is given as Vijay Bharat Thread Mills (India) and on another side we have the words ‘superior quality machine thread’. It seems to he the clear intention to use, what is called a design, as a trade mark within the meaning of s. 478 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in connection with the machine thread manufactured by Vijay Bharat Thread Mills. In my view, what is termed as a ‘design’ by the respondents is not really a design within the meaning of the Patents and Designs Act, 1911. In view of what I have held, it is not necessary to consider whether what the respondents call a design is either a new or original one, and I should not be deemed to have decided whether the same is either new or original. In view of what I have stated above, the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed, provided the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

12. It is this question of jurisdiction which has been the principal matter of controversy between the parties. The petition is made under s. 51A of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911. Section 51A provides that any person interested may present a petition for the cancellation of the registration of a design at any time after the registration of the design, to “the High Court”, on any of the following grounds, namely,

(i) that the design has been previously registered in India, or

(ii) that it has been published in India prior to the date of registration; or

(iii) that the design is not a new or original design.

13. Though the definite article “the” has been used before the words “High Court”, one does not find any reference to the particular High Court to which an application has to be made in that section or in what precedes it. The expression “High Court” has been defined by s. 2(7) of the Act. The definition is as under:—

“2(7) High Court means

(a) in relation to a Part A State or a Part B State, the High Court for that State;

(b) in relation to Ajmer and Vindhya Pradesh, the High Court at Allahabad;

(c) in relation to Bhopal, the High Court at Nagpur;

(d) in relation to Bilaspur, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, the High Court of Punjab;

(e) in relation to Coorg, the High Court of Mysore;

(f) in relation to Kutch, the High Court at Bombay;

(g) in relation to Manipur and Tripura, the High Court of Assam;

(h) in relation to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the High Court at Calcutta.”

14. It may here be noted that so far as the registration of Patents and Designs is concerned, there is only one Registry at Calcutta. That office is situate at 214, Lower Circular Road, Calcutta. There are no branches of that office anywhere in India.

15. Mr. Shah, who appears for the respondents, contends that the expression “the High Court” which appears in s. 51A of the Act means the High Court which would otherwise have jurisdiction over the person against whom a petition is filed under the Act, or over the subject matter of such petition. Mr. Shavaksha, on the other hand, contends that the application would lie to any High Court and that the definite article “the” before the words “High Court” has not been used in the section with any design so as to confine the application to any particular High Court having regard either to the person against whom the petition is to be filed or the subject-matter of the petition. Mr. Shavaksha contends that the jurisdiction conferred by s. 51A of the Act is a special jurisdiction, and that for the exercise of that jurisdiction one cannot turn to the Letters Patent or the Civil Procedure Code for ascertaining the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter. He points out that where the Legislature intended that an application had to be made to a particular High Court, the Legislature has expressly so provided. He drew my attention to s. 23F of the Act where it has been expressly provided that an appeal shall lie to the High Court at Calcutta from any order of the Controller made under s. 23 or s. 23A or under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 23B or under s. 23CC of the Act. He says that the expression “the High Court” in s. 51A should be considered in the light of the use of the same words and the words “a High Court” appearing in various sections of the Act, and that it would clearly appear that the Legislature did not in any way intend to specify any particular High Court before which an application had to be filed under the provisions of s. 51A, but that it was left to the petitioner to choose any High Court specified in s. 2(7) of the Act. There is considerable force in what Mr. Shavaksha says.

16. He drew my attention first to the provisions relating to patents and secondly to the history of the legislation in relation to designs. Section 26(1) of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, refers to the question of the revocation of a patent. That section provides as under:

“Revocation of a patent in whole or in part may be obtained on petition to or on a counter claim in a suit for infringement before a High Court on all or any of the following grounds, namely…”

17. There the words used are “a High Court” and not “the High Court”. Section 28(1) of the Act provides that “a High Court” may, if it thinks fit, direct an issue for the trial, before itself or any other High Court, or any District Court, of any question arising upon a petition to itself under s. 26, and the issue shall be tried accordingly. Section 34 of the Act provides that “a High Court” to which a petition has been presented under s. 26 may stay proceedings on or dismiss the petition if in its opinion the petition would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by another High Court. When one turns to the provisions of the Patents and Designs Act, 1911, as originally enacted, one finds that s. 64 of the Act contains the words “a High Court” and not “the High Court”. Section 64(1) ran as follows:—

“64(1) A High Court may, on the application in the prescribed manner of any person aggrieved by the non-insertion in or omission from the register of patents or designs of any entry, or by any entry made in either such register without sufficient cause, or by any entry wrongly remaining on either such register, or by an error or defect in any entry in either such register, make such order for making, expunging or varying such entry as it may think fit…”

18. Section 64(5) provided as under:—

“64(5) A High Court to which an application has been made under this section may stay proceedings on or dismiss the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by another High Court.”

19. Section 64 was amended by Act VII of 1930. By s. 24 of the amending Act s. 51A was added where the expression “the High Court” appears. By s. 27 of the amending Act the original s. 64 was amended and in sub-s. (1), for the words “A High Court” the words “The Controller” were substituted, and the present sub-s. (3) was substituted for the old sub-s. (3) of the Act. It does not appear that the Legislature intended to make any change by the use of the expression “the High Court” instead of “a High Court” in s. 51A. The Legislature could not have intended to provide differently by the use of the words “a High Court” in connection with the revocation of patents and the expression “the High Court” in connection with the cancellation of registration of designs. In my view, no distinction could be made merely on account of the use of the expression “a High Court” and the expression “the High Court” when used in connection with patents and designs, and the Legislature could not be said to have laid down different provisions in connection with the revocation of patents and in connection with the cancellation of the registration of designs in reference to Courts.

20. What I have to consider is whether the Legislature intended to restrict the jurisdiction of the High Courts in respect of an application for the revocation of a patent or the cancellation of the registration of a design having regard to the subject-matter of the application or having regard to the place of residence of the respondents to the application or the place where he carried on business. The provisions relating to patents indicate that the Legislature contemplated the sending down for the trial of any issue in such an application to another High Court. It also contemplated the stay of proceedings when the application could be more justly or conveniently determined by another High Court in India. These provisions indicate that the Legislature did not intend to con fine the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 26 in respect of an application for revocation of a patent, to cases where the subject-matter had arisen within its jurisdiction and to cases where the respondent resided or carried on business within its jurisdiction. In my view, what the Legislature intended was an application to any High Court provided it was a High Court set out in s. 2(7) of the Act, and it was left to the Court either to try the matter or to stay the matter if the Court thought that the application could be more justly or conveniently disposed of by another High Court. In my view, the same construction should be placed on the expression “the High Court” when used in connection with designs, and an application for the revocation of a design can be made to any High Court provided it was one of the High Courts specified in s. 2(7) of the Act. When one has to consider the question of jurisdiction, which has been conferred by a special enactment upon a High Court, one has to look to the provisions of that Act for the purpose of determining when the Court is to exercise that jurisdiction. One cannot turn to the provisions of the Letters Patent or the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of determining when that jurisdiction has to be exercised. If the Legislature intended to circumscribe the ambit of the special jurisdiction of the Court, it was for the Legislature to have expressly stated so.

21. It has been urged that cl. 12 of the Letters Patent applies for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Court under s. 51A of the Indian Patents and Designs Act. There would be considerable difficulty in applying the provisions of cl. 12 of the Letters Patent to a proceeding under s. 51A of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911. The jurisdiction which the Court exercises under s. 51A is the jurisdiction to set aside the act of the Controller. An application made under s. 51A cannot aptly be termed a suit within the meaning of cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. An application under s. 51A has to be made by any person interested; it has to be made against a person who has got a design registered; the person who has got the design registered may be a foreigner or may be a person who neither resides nor carries on business within the local limits of the jurisdiction of any High Court. So far as the subject-matter is concerned, a design can only be registered provided there was no previous publication of that design. Immediately on registration a person who is interested acquires a right to have the same set aside provided the conditions laid down in s. 51A of the Act are satisfied. In those circumstances, difficulty may arise as regards the location of the subject-matter of the application. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent refers to the original jurisdiction of the High Court. There is no reason to confine the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 51A of the Act to the jurisdiction it exercises on the Original Side. In my view, one cannot turn to the provisions of the Letters Patent for the purpose of considering the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court when the same is conferred under a special enactment.

22. Mr. Shah has strongly relied upon a case reported in National Telephone Company, Limited v. Postmaster General . [1913] A.C 546.. He drew my attention to a passage from the speech of Lord Chancellor Viscount Haldane. At page 552 it has been observed as under:—

“…When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches.”

23. This passage clearly indicates that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to apply. Now, the question of jurisdiction of a High Court is not a question relating to procedure and you cannot say that merely because the ordinary incidents of procedure of that Court are to apply, the jurisdiction of that Court is circumscribed. He also drew my attention to the speech of Lord Parker in the same report, appearing at page 562. The learned Lord observed as under:—

“Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same.”

24. This passage also does not help Mr. Shah in the construction he seeks to put upon the provisions of s. 51A of the Indian Patents and Designs Act. Lord Parker observes that the jurisdiction of the Court is enlarged, but to what extent it is enlarged cannot be found in the rules which lay down the procedure of the Court. It can only be found in the enactment which enlarges that jurisdiction. In my view, there is nothing in any of the provisions of the Letters Patent or the Civil Procedure Code to limit the jurisdiction of the Court under s. 51A of the Act. In my view, it is open to the petitioner to file a petition in any High Court provided it is one of the Courts specified in s. 2(7) of the Act. The Bombay High Court is one of such Courts, and in my view the petition is maintainable in the Bombay High Court.

25. Mr. Shavaksha at one stage attempted to rely upon the fact that the goods of the respondents were being sold in Bombay and that the Court had, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the petition. An amendment was applied for in the month of February 1957 and was granted to raise that plea. At the hearing a witness was called by Mr. Shavaksha who deposed to the fact that he had effected the sales of the goods of the respondents bearing the design in question in the month of January 1957, which was long after the date of the petition. That fact cannot in any way help Mr. Shavaksha. I have already stated that the Court has jurisdiction in the matter and the petitioner is entitled to the relief by way of cancellation of the registration of the respondents' design.

26. I accordingly order that the registration of the respondents' design No. D82466 as a design under the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, be cancelled.

27. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of the petition and I order that the respondents do pay to the petitioner the costs of the petition. I do further direct that the Prothonotary do send a certified copy of the decree to the Controller of Patents and Designs at Calcutta at the costs of the petitioner. By consent of the parties I direct that the papers from the Controller's office be returned on true copies being put in.

Solicitors for the petitioner: Payne & Co.

Solicitors for the respondents: Manilal Kher Ambalal & Co.

28. Petition allowed.