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Chhangamal Harpaldas And Another v. Dominion Of India And Another,

Bombay High Court
Apr 18, 1957
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Annotated Summary of the Opinion (Shah, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, commission agents residing in Delhi, appealed the dismissal by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalgaon, of Special Suit No. 12 of 1950 against the Dominion of India (representing the Central Railway). The dispute arose from damage to three wagon-load consignments of raw plantains consigned from Kajgaon to Delhi in late 1948. Forwarding Notes and Parcel Way Bills were issued for consignments dated 29 September, 21 October and 22 October 1948; the consignments were booked at reduced (risk) rates. Although the Forwarding Notes requested despatch by passenger train, the wagons were attached to Parcel Train No. 39 from Kajgaon to Itarsi and thereafter to mixed passenger trains; all three consignments reached Delhi later than the normal passenger-train transit times and were found damaged on arrival. The plaintiffs claimed Rs. 10,061/12/- as compensation (and interest) after claims to the railway administration were rejected. The Dominion of India contested maintainability, alleged the plaintiffs were only commission agents and not owners, relied on the Risk Note to deny liability, pleaded limitation and contended the claimed amounts were excessive. The trial court dismissed the suit holding (inter alia) no breach of contract, no negligence, that the Risk Notes exonerated the railway, that the plaintiffs had no cause of action as mere consignees/commission agents, and that the claim relating to the third consignment was time-barred. The plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal as regards the third consignment and confined the appeal to damages for the first and second consignments totalling Rs. 7,596-4-0.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the railway administration committed a breach of contract by not sending the consignments by passenger train as requested in the Forwarding Notes and as reflected in the Parcel Way Bills.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs — who were consignees acting as commission agents and not in possession of endorsed railway receipts — had a right to maintain an action for compensation for loss or damage to the consignments.
  3. Relatedly, whether the Risk Note signed at booking absolved the railway administration from liability for the losses claimed.
  4. Whether any part of the claim was barred by limitation (noting the trial court held the third consignment claim time-barred and that issue was not pressed on appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The trial court erred in holding there was no breach of contract: the Forwarding Notes expressly requested despatch by passenger train and the Parcel Way Bills were issued accordingly.
  • The plaintiffs' counsel (Mr. Kotwal) advanced that consignor, consignee and endorsees of a railway receipt are entitled to sue for non-delivery or damage; in particular, a consignee (or endorsees) can maintain an action for compensation.
  • The plaintiffs limited their appeal to two consignments (first and second) and sought Rs. 7,596-4-0 as compensation for those consignments.

Respondent (Dominion of India / Railway) Arguments

  • The plaintiffs could not maintain the suit because they were merely consignees acting as commission agents of the consignors and were not owners of the goods; they were agents entitled merely to take delivery.
  • The Risk Note (signed when goods were booked at reduced rates) absolved the railway administration from liability for the claimed loss.
  • The claims were time-barred by limitation (explicitly, the trial court held the claim in respect of the third consignment barred) and, in any event, the claimed compensation was excessive and unreasonable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
B.B. & C.I. Rly. v. Mahamadbhai Rahimbhai, 31 Bom. LR 616 : AIR 1929 Bom 355 Where perishable goods are sent by goods train when agreed to be sent by passenger train, that is a breach of contract and the railway is liable for loss to the consignor. The court relied on this authority to support its view that sending wagons attached to a parcel train when passenger despatch was requested amounted to a breach of contract by the railway administration.
First Appeal No. 303 of 1952 (Bombay) (referred to by the court) The court's earlier view that despatching a wagon attached to a parcel train when a Parcel Way Bill issued in response to a Forwarding Note requested passenger train constituted breach. The present court cited that earlier decision as confirming that despatch by parcel train under such circumstances amounted to breach of contract.
The Union of India v. Taherali Isaji, 58 Bom LR 650 An endorsee of a railway receipt, if he has title (not merely an agent for collection), can sue the railway administration for loss or damage even though not a party to the original contract. Cited by the court to distinguish a consignee who is an owner/endorsee (who may sue) from a bare consignee/agent (who may not). Used to explain that title/endorsement confers a right to sue.
Macnamara, "Law of Carriers by Land" (2nd Ed.), Art. 135; cases: Davis v. James (1770) 5 Burr. 2680; Moore v. Wilson (1787) 1 TR 659; Dunlop v. Lambert (1838-1839) 6 Cl. & Fin. 600; Mead v. South Eastern Rly. Co. (1870) 18 WR 735 Principle: The proper person to sue a carrier is the person with whom the carrier contracted; where property in goods vests in another, that person (owner) is the proper plaintiff. The court invoked these authorities (via Macnamara) to support the general rule that ordinarily the consignor (party to contract) or the owner (if property passed) is the proper claimant, not a bare consignee/agent.
Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 4, Arts. 481–482 Delivery to a carrier does not necessarily vest property in consignee; if property has not passed, consignor should sue; consignee may sue only if he has a special contract with carrier or property passed to him. Used to reinforce the principle that a consignee who is not owner and who did not make a separate contract with the carrier cannot sue for loss; the court relied on this exposition in its analysis of who has the right to sue.
Sri Ram Krishna Mills Ltd. v. Governor-General-in-Council, AIR 1945 Pat 387 Observation (as reported): suggested that the right to sue vests either in the consignee or in the person to whom the railway receipt was endorsed. The court noted this observation but considered it dictum in that case (unnecessary for decision) and therefore of limited authority for the plaintiffs' contention that a bare consignee may sue.
Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd., 65 Ind App 75 : AIR 1938 PC 52 Referenced passage indicating the right to sue may vest in consignee or endorse of railway receipt. Cited only as the passage relied upon in Sri Ram Krishna Mills; the present court treated the related observation as not determinative for the present facts.
Chunna Lal v. Governor-General-in-Council, AIR 1950 All 89 Held that a consignor suing for compensation alleging consignee was commission agent should be given opportunity to prove property had not passed and not be non-suited in limine. The court observed that the actual decision did not support the plaintiffs' broader contention and noted the case relied on Madras precedent (S.M. Rly. Co. v. Rangaswamy Chetty) for certain propositions.
S.M. Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Rangaswamy Chetty, AIR 1924 Mad 517 Head-note (as reported): "Consignee alone can sue for loss caused by the non-delivery of the goods after the goods have been delivered to railway company for consignment." The court observed that this statement was unnecessary to the decision in that case and regarded the head-note/observation as not decisive authority for the plaintiffs' position; it noted inconsistency with other authorities.
Shamji Bhanji & Co. v. North Western Rly. Co., 48 Bom LR 698 : AIR 1947 Bom 169 Held that consignors who became endorsees of the railway receipt could sue for loss; endorsement and re-endorsement conferred right to receive goods and to sue. The court relied on the principle that endorsees/owners (not mere consignees) may sue; it observed this case does not support the proposition that a bare consignee may sue and is inconsistent with the Madras decision.
Erachshaw Desabhai v. Dominion of India, AIR 1955 Madh B. 70 Observed that a consignee has sufficient interest to sue for loss arising from railway misconduct; cited Jalan & Sons (endorsed receipt) in support. The court noted that in Erachshaw the plaintiffs were held on facts to be owners/endorsees and that the observation does not support a bare consignee's right to sue where he is not owner.
Jalan and Sons Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council, AIR 1949 EP 190 Authority in which plaintiffs were held entitled to sue as endorsees of the railway receipt (i.e., on title). Used by the court to illustrate that endorsees/owners (by endorsement) can sue, but that such decisions do not assist a bare consignee who lacks title/endorsement.
National Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Popatlal Mulji, 38 Bom LR 610 : AIR 1936 Bom 344 Illustrates exceptions to the rule of privity of contract (e.g., claim through a party, cestui que trust, principal suing through agent, family settlement). The court cited this case to list recognised exceptions to the rule that a non-party cannot sue on a contract and then observed the plaintiffs did not fall within those exceptions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal stages: first assessing whether a breach of contract occurred, and second determining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to sue for compensation.

1. Breach of contract: The court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that the Forwarding Notes expressly requested despatch by passenger train and that Parcel Way Bills were made out in pursuance of those Forwarding Notes. Although the railway's correspondence asserted the consignments had been carried by passenger train, the court observed it was undisputed that from Kajgaon to Itarsi the wagons were attached to the 39 Dn. Parcel train (a parcel train) rather than a passenger train. The court considered its prior decision in First Appeal No. 303 of 1952 and the established authority in B.B. & C.I. Rly. v. Mahamadbhai Rahimbhai to conclude that despatch of a wagon attached to a parcel train when passenger despatch was requested constituted a breach of contract. The court also noted there was "great delay" between despatch dates and dates of arrival at Delhi and that there was no clear evidence of precise timings for arrival of Parcel Train No. 39 at Itarsi or the period of detention at Itarsi; nevertheless, the factual pattern supported a finding of breach.

2. Right to sue / standing: The court then turned to the threshold question of who has a cause of action for loss of goods in transit. It examined statutory and doctrinal materials: S.2(4) of the Sale of Goods Act (defining "railway receipt" as a "document of title to goods"); authorities and textbook statements (Macnamara and Halsbury) demonstrating the established rule that ordinarily the proper person to sue the carrier is the party to the contract (consignor) or the person in whom property is vested (owner). The court differentiated between:

  • the consignor, who is party to the contract and may sue for breach of the contract of consignment;
  • the owner/endorsee of a railway receipt, who may sue by virtue of title conferred by endorsement; and
  • a bare consignee, who, if not the owner and not a party to the contract, is ordinarily only an agent to take delivery and lacks a cause of action ex contractu or ex delicto.

The court reviewed decisions cited by the parties and explained their limited application: some authorities support rights of endorsees or owners to sue; others contain dicta or are fact-driven and do not establish a general right for a bare consignee. The court emphasised that exceptions to privity exist (citing National Petroleum Co. v. Popatlal Mulji) but found the plaintiffs did not fall within any recognised exception.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court noted that the plaintiffs were commission agents of Peer Mahomed & Sons, had not been sent or endorsed with the railway receipts, expressly admitted that they had not suffered any loss personally and were entitled only to their commission in the sale proceeds, and had no possession or title to the railway receipts. Consequently, although a breach by the railway was found on the facts, the plaintiffs lacked the right to maintain a suit for compensation because they were not owners, endorsees with title, nor parties to the contract of carriage.

The trial judge's conclusions on the Risk Note and limitation were noted: the trial court had held the Risk Notes exonerated the railway and that the third consignment claim was time-barred; the present appeal did not press the third-consignment claim. The appellate court did not adopt the trial judge's exoneration-by-Risk-Note reasoning as determinative in view of its conclusion on plaintiffs' lack of standing.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

  • On the facts the court found a breach of contract in despatching the wagons by parcel train from Kajgaon to Itarsi when despatch by passenger train had been requested; however, that finding did not avail the plaintiffs because they lacked standing.
  • The plaintiffs were commission agents and bare consignees who had not been endorsed with the railway receipts and admitted they had not suffered direct loss; accordingly they had no right of action either in contract or in tort against the railway administration for the losses to the consignments.
  • The direct legal effect is dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal and denial of the compensation claimed for the first and second consignments; the court did not purport to lay down a new, sweeping rule beyond applying established authorities distinguishing owners/endorsees and parties to the contract from bare consignees/agents.

Formal disposition in the opinion: "The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs."

Show all summary ...

Shah, J.:— The plaintiffs, who are commission agents residing at Delhi, have by this appeal challenged the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Jalgaon in Special Suit No. 12 of 1950 dismissing their suit against) the Dominion of India.

2. The facts which give rise to the claim made by the plaintiffs are briefly these: One Malhari Bhika loaded a wagon at Kajgaon station on the Central Railway with raw plantains and obtained Parcel Way Bill No. 7934/79 on 21st October 1948 for carriage of the consignment to Delhi. The goods loaded by Malhari Bhika were then sold to Peer Mahomed and Sons. The Parcel Way Bill was obtained in the name of Malhari Bhika as consignor and consignees were the plaintiffs. The Forwarding Note is Exhibit 93, dated 21st October 1948, and by that Forwarding Note Malhari Bhika requested the Station Master at Kajgaon to receive and forward by passenger train the parcel described therein to Delhi Junction Station at reduced rates as per Risk Note on the reverse signed by him. The consignment was booked at reduced rates. This consignment reached Delhi on 26th October 1948. It appears that between Kajgaon and Itarsi the wagon was attached to 39 Dn. Parcel Train and beyond Itarsi it was attached to a mixed passenger train. In the normal course by passenger train from Kajgaon this wagon should have reached Dehli on 23rd October 1948. On arrival at the Delhi Station the contents of the wagon were found to be damaged and the loss was estimated as of the value of Rs. 2,700/-.

3. On 22nd October 1948, peer Mahomed and Sons signed a Forwarding Note for a wagonload of plantains from Kajgaon to Delhi by the Forwarding Note the Station Master at Kajgaon was requested to forward the wagon by passenger train. Parcel Way Bill No. 7934/83, dated 22nd October 1948, was obtained in the name of Peer Mahomed and Sons as consignors and the consignees were the plaintiffs. This consignment was also booked at reduced rates. The wagon was loaded on 22nd October 1948 and between Kajgaon and Itarsi the wagon was attached to 39 Dn. Parcel train and at Itarsi it was attached to a mixed passenger train. In the normal course, if it had been carried by passenger train, the consignment should have reached Delhi on 24th October 1948, but it reached Delhi on 26th October 1948, and on opening the wagon the contents were found to be damaged. The loss was assessed at Rs. 4,125/-.

4. On 29th September 1948. Peer Mahomed and Sons had signed a Forwarding Note for a wagon-Ioad of plantains from Kajgaon to Delhi. The Parcel Way Bill was No. 7933/63, dated 29th September 1948. The consignors were Peer Mahomed and Sons and the consignees were the plaintiffs. The wagon was attached to 39 Dn. Parcel Train up to Itarsi and from Itarsi it was attached to a mixed passenger train. In the normal course, the wagon should have reached Delhi on 1st October 1948 if sent by passenger train; but it reached Delhi on 5th October 1948. On arrival at Delhi the contents of the wagon were found to be damaged and the loss was assessed at Rs. 2,200/-. By the Forwarding Note in this case also Peer Mahomed and Sons had requested the railway administration to send the consignment by passenger train but it was sent by parcel train from Kajgaon to Itarsi. The goods were booked at reduced rates under a Risk Note.

5. The plaintiffs served notice upon the railway administration and the Dominion of India claiming Rs. 10,061/12/- as compensation for damage to the three consignments. In reply to the claim made by the plaintiffs it was asserted by the Superintendent of Claims by letters exhibits 141, 143 and 111 that the consignments were carried throughout by passenger train as per contract without any avoidable delay and that there was no misconduct on the part of the ‘railway administration’. The railway administration having rejected the claim, the plaintiffs filed Special Regular Suit No. 12 of 1950 in the court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Jalgaon against the Dominion of India as representing the Central Railway, for a decree for Rs. 10,061/12/- being the amount of compensation for loss suffered by the plaintiffs, and interest thereon. The plaintiffs also claimed interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of the suit on Rs. 9,025/-, the aggregate amount of compensation claimed by them.

6. The suit was resisted by the Dominion of India contending inter alia that the plaintiffs could not maintain a suit as they were merely consignees acting as commission agents of the consignors and that they were not owners of the goods and as consignees they were entitled only to take delivery of the consignments as agents of the consignors and the plaintiffs had no cause of action for filing a suit for loss of the consignments. It was also contended that under the Risk Note the Railway administration was absolved from liability, that the claim was barred by the law of limitation and that in any event the compensation claimed was excessive and unreasonable.

7. The learned trial Judge held that the railway administration did not bind itself by agreement to carry the goods by passenger train and that in failing to deliver the goods within a reasonable time the railway administration was not guilty of misconduct or negligence. He also held that no cause of action had accrued to the plaintiffs and that in any event under the Risk Notes the railway administration was exonerated from liability to compensate the plaintiffs for loss that they may have suffered. He observed that the plaintiffs as mere commission agents and consignees under the Railway Receipt could not file a suit for compensation for damage to the consignment; and that the claim for compensation in respect of the third wagon was barred by the law of limitation. The learned Judge accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. In this appeal the plaintiffs have not challenged the decree passed by the trial court dismissing their claim for compensation for damage to the third consignment and have restricted their claim to Rs. 7,596-4-0 — Rs. 3,000/- being compensation for damage to the first consignment and Rs. 4,596-4-0 being compensation for damage to the second consignment.

8. Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the plaintiffs urged that the trial court was in error in holding that no breach of contract was committed by the railway administration in not sending the goods by passenger train. In our view, that contention must be accepted. The Forwarding Notes expressly requested the Station Master at Kajgaon to despatch the goods by passenger train and in pursuance of these Forwarding Notes the Parcel Way Bills were made out. Even it was the case of the railway administration, as is evident from the letters Exhibits 141, 143 and 111, that the consignments of plantains had been sent by passenger train, it is undisputed that from Kajgaon to Itarsi the consignments had not been sent by passenger train but they were sent by parcel trains 39 Dn. from Victoria Terminus, to which the wagons were attached, is only a parcel train. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the view of the learned trial Judge that there was no breach of contract committed by the railway administration in sending the wagons from Kajgaon to Itarsi by a parcel train. In a recent judgment delivered by us in First Appeal No. 303 of 1952 (Bom) (A) we have taken the view that despatching a wagon attached to a parcel train, when the Parcel Way Bill was issued in response to a Forwarding Note requesting the Station Master to send the consignment by passenger train, amounted to a breach of contract. Evidently, there has been great delay between the dates of despatch of the wagons and the dates when they reached Delhi. There is no clear evidence as to when the 39 Dn. Parcel train reached Itarsi with the wagons, and there is also no evidence as to how long the wagons were detained at Itarsi. In B.B and C.I Rly. v. Mahamadbhai Rahimbhai, 31 Bom. LR 616 : (AIR 1929 Bom 355) (B), it was held by this court that if a consignment of perishable goods is sent by goods train, when it was agreed between the consignor and the railway administration that the consignment was to be sent by passenger train, a breach of contract is committed by the railway administration and that the railway administration is liable for loss suffered by the consignor.

9. The next question which falls to be determined is whether the plaintiffs as consignees of the goods can maintain an action for compensation for damage to the goods. Mr. Kotwal urged that a consignor, a consignee and the endorsee of a railway receipt are entitled to, file an action for compensation against the railway administration for loss of consignment. It is not disputed that the consignor being a party to the contract with the railway administration is entitled to file a suit for compensation for loss suffered by him by reason of the breach of contract committed by the railway administration or by reason of misconduct on the part of the railway employees in dealing with the consignment. Again it has been held by this Court in The Union Of India v. Taherali Isaji*, 58 Bom LR 650 (C), that an endorsee of a railway receipt, when he is not merely an agent for collection of the goods but has title to the goods, can file a suit against the railway administration for compensation for loss or damage to the consignment, even though he is not a party to the contract of consignment. A railway receipt is by the definition contained in S. 2(4) of the Sale of Goods Act, a ‘document of title to goods’, and title to the goods covered by a railway receipt may be transferred by delivering the same with the intention of transferring the goods. But a consignee of the goods is not a party to the contract of consignment. At best, he is an agent of the consignor to take delivery of the goods covered by the railway receipt. In form, a railway receipt authorises the consignee to take delivery of the goods at the destination, and a consignee not being a party to the contract of consignment cannot file a suit for breach of the contract contained in the railway receipt.

10. In Macnamara's “law of Carriers by land”, second Edition, at page 107, in Art. 135, it is observed as follows:

“Where goods delivered to a carrier to deliver to a consignee are lost or damaged through the default of the carrier; the proper person to sue is the person with whom the carrier has contracted.”

and reference is made to Davis v. James, (1770) 5 Burr. 2680 (D), Moore v. Wilson, (1787) 1 TR 659 (E). Dunlop v. Lambert, (1838-1839) 6 Cl. and Finn. 600 (F) and Mead v. South Eastern Rly. Co. (1870) 18 WR 735 (G). Then it is observed:

“In the case of goods the subject-matter of a contract of sale being so lost or damaged, and in the absence of any special contract between the carrier and the seller or buyer as the case may be, the proper person to sue the carrier is the person in whom the property in such goods is vested during transit.”

11. In Halsburv's “Laws of England”, Third Edition. Volume 4, page 196, Article 481, it is observed:

“Delivery to a carrier does not necessarily vest the property in the goods in the consignee; and so, if the property in the goods has never passed to the consignee, the consignor should sue for loss or damage. A carrier is usually the agent of a buyer to receive goods, but not to accept them………”

“Delivery of such goods to a carrier does not vest the property in the buyer without his acceptance: the risk remains with the consignor, and the consignor should sue, and not the consignee”. It is also stated in Article 482 that:

“although the property in the goods has not passed to the consignee, if he has made a special contract with the carrier for their carriage, or if the consignor has delivered the goods to the carrier as agent for the consignee, the latter is the person to sue; and this may be the case even though the consignor has paid the carrier, for, in the absence of any arrangement to the contrary, the consignor is always liable to pay the carrier.”

12. Two propositions appear to be well-settled. The right of action to recover compensation for loss or damage to the goods ordinarily vests in the consignor. Where the goods lost or damaged in transit are the subject-matter of a contract of sale, the owner of the goods may in the absence of a contract to the contrary sue the railway administration. Therefore, a consignee who is in possession of a railway receipt duly endorsed by the consignor may maintain an action for compensation for loss of the goods covered thereby, but he can do so not because he is the consignee but because he is the owner of the goods. A consignor may sue for compensation for loss relying upon the breach of contract of consignment. An owner of goods covered by a railway receipt may sue for compensation relying upon his title, and the loss of goods by misconduct of the railway administration. But a bare consignee, who is not a party to the contract of consignment and who is not the owner of the goods, cannot maintain a suit for compensation for loss or damage to the goods. He has no cause of action ex contractu nor ex delicto.

13. Mr. Kotwal fairly conceded that the question raised before us has not been expressly decided by the Courts in India, but he submitted that there are observations in certain decisions which support his contention. In Sri Ram Krishna Mills. Ltd. v. Govemor-General-in-Council, AIR 1945 Pat 387 (H), it was held by Mr. Justice Beevor that the consignee or the person to whom the railway receipt has been endorsed is the only person who can sue for non-delivery of the goods when goods have been delivered to the railway company for consignment. In that case Messrs Baijnath Ramkisun had despatched to Dhanbad five tins of ghee from Begusarai Station to self. The consignor did not endorse the railway receipt in favour of Sri Ram Krishna Mills Ltd., but Sri Ram Krishna Mills, Ltd., filed a suit for damages for failure to deliver the goods. It was held that the plaintiffs could not maintain a suit for damages. Mr. Justice Beevor after referring to a passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mercantile Bank of India. Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, Ltd., 65 Ind App 75 : (AIR 1938 PC 52) (I), observed:

“This suggests that the right to sue vests either in the consignee or in the person to whom the railway receipt has been endorsed….”

14. But the learned Judge having held that the plaintiffs in that case, who were neither the consignees nor endorsees of the railway receipt and who claimed to be owners of the goods, could not maintain the action, the observation relied upon was, in our judgment, a dictum not necessary for the decision of the case.

15. In Chunna Lal v. Govemor-General-in-Council. AIR 1950 All 89 (J), it was held by Mr. Justice Seth that a consignor, who sued for compensation for loss caused to him by non-delivery of goods alleging that the consignee was his commission agent, could not be non-suited in limine without affording him an opportunity to substantiate his allegation that the property in the goods had not passed to the consignee. The actual decision in that case does not support the view contended for by Mr. Kotwal in this case. But the Court in that case relied upon a judgment of the Madras High Court, Madras and S.M Rly. Co., Ltd. v. Rangaswamy Chetty, AIR 1924 Mad 517 (K), wherein it was observed that a consignee alone could sue for loss caused by non-delivery of goods after the goods had been delivered to the railway company for consignment. After referring to that judgment, the learned Judge observed that

“When goods are delivered to a Railway Company for transmission to a buyer, the property in the goods passes to the buyer and any loss that is occasioned thereafter is the loss to the buyer and no loss to the seller, and that the seller having suffered no loss, is not entitled to claim any damages from the Railway Company”.

16. That, however, is not a decision in support of the proposition that a bare consignee under a railway receipt may sue the railway administration for loss of the goods.

17. In AIR 1924 Mad 517 (K) the head-note is:

“Consignee alone can sue for loss caused by the non-delivery of the goods after the goods have been delivered to railway company for consignment.”

18. In that case, the consignors filed a suit for damages for loss of a consignment. On evidence it was found that in consigning the goods the plaintiffs had acted merely as agents of another person and had in consequence of non-delivery of the goods to the consignee not suffered any loss. On those facts it was held that the consignors were not entitled to maintain the action. The observation that a consignee alone can file a suit was plainly unnecessary for the decision of that case.

19. In Shamji Bhanji & Co. v. North Western Rly. Co., 48 Bom LR 698 : (AIR 1947 Bom 169) (L). it was held by Mr. Justice Bhagwati that the plaintiffs, who were consignors and who ultimately became endorsees of the railway receipt, could file a suit for loss of the goods. It was observed in that case that the endorsements made on the railway receipt by the plaintiffs had not the effect of passing the property and that in any event the re-endorsement made by the endorsee in favour of the plaintiffs invested them with the right to receive the goods represented by the railway receipt from the railway company, and that as the contract of carriage had been entered into by the plaintiffs with the railway company the plaintiffs were the only persons entitled to maintain the suit against the railway company for compensation for loss of the goods. The case does not lay down that the consignee can file a suit for compensation for loss, and the principle of the case is plainly inconsistent with the dictum in the case in AIR 1924 Mad 517 (K).

20. In Erachshaw Desabhai v. Dominion of India. (S) AIR 1955 Madh B. 70 (M), it was observed that a consignee of goods has sufficient interest in the goods to entitle him to sue for compensation for loss arising out of misconduct of the railway administration, and in suport of that observation, Jalan and Sons, Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council, AIR 1949 EP 190 (N), was cited. But it is evident from Jalan and Sons' case (N) that the plaintiffs were held entitled to sue as endorsees of the railway receipt, and not as consignees. Again in Erachshaw's case (M) the plaintiffs were held on facts to be owners of the goods and entitled to sue.

21. It is admitted that the railway receipts were never sent to the plaintiffs by the consignors and the plaintiffs were merely commission agents of Peer Mahomed and Sons. Suganmal Harpaldas, who is a partner of the plaintiffs' firm, admitted in his evidence that he had not suffered any loss and that he was entitled merely to his commission in the sale proceeds. He also admitted in his evidence that the railway receipt was never sent to him. Evidently the plaintiffs were not even in possession of the railway receipt and could not be deemed to have become owners of the goods by negotiation of the railway receipt. They had otherwise no interest in the goods as owners and they were not parties to the contract with the railway administration.

22. Mr. Kotwal submitted that when a railway receipt is issued by the railway administration on consignment of goods there is a tripartite contract between the consignee, the consignee and the railway administration and that the breach of contract by the railway administration or misconduct of the employees of the railway confers a cause of action upon the consignee. In our view, this contention cannot be accepted. The contract incorporated in the railway receipt results from acceptance of the Forwarding Note the consignor to the railway administration and which is expressly in the form of a request by it is on acceptance of the Forwarding Note that the railway receipt is issued. It is true that the consignor may direct the railway administration to deliver the goods covered by the railway receipt to the consignee, but the consignee does not thereby become a party to the contract. Unless he is the owner of the goods covered by the railway receipt, the consignee is an agent of the consignor for receiving the goods; and an agent of the consignor cannot sue the railway administration for loss of the goods.

23. It is well-settled that normally a person who is not a party to a contract is not entitled to maintain an action for breach of that contract. That rule, it is true, is subject to certain well-recognised exceptions, e.g, a person who is not a party to a contract can sue on it if he is claiming through a party to the contract or if he is in the position of a cestui que trust or a trust or of a principal suing through an agent, or if he claims under a family settlement (See National Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Popatlal Mulji, 38 Bom LR 610 : (AIR 1936 Bom 344) (O)). In this case, the plaintiffs do not fall within any of the excepted classes. Not being parties, to the contract and not being owners of the goods covered by the railway receipt, in our Judgment, the plaintiffs had no right to maintain an action for compensation for loss of the goods.

24. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.

V.R.B
Appeal dismissed.