- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Bari Rajeshwar Kumbhar v. Tukaram Lahanu Teli
Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Mudholkar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns a second appeal brought by the plaintiffs (appellants) arising from a suit for: (1) a declaration that they have a right to take earth from field No. 111 of mauza Shegaon Buzruk (land of the respondent) for preparing earthen pots, and (2) a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from obstructing them. The field was formerly banjar land of the lamberdar and was purchased by the respondent on 13 December 1948. The appellants claim that the kumbhars (potters) of the village have a customary right to remove earth from the western side of the field; a pit on that side is admitted by the respondent and its dimensions are given in the record. The principal legal question identified is whether the appellants have acquired a customary right to take earth from that pit — a question characterized in the opinion as a mixed question of fact and law.
Procedurally, this matter is before the Court on second appeal. The trial Court had earlier reached a result favorable to the plaintiffs; the lower appellate Court reversed that result. The present Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restored the decree of the trial Court. Costs were awarded against the respondent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellants (kumbhars of the village) have acquired, by custom, a right to remove earth from the pit on the western side of field No. 111.
- What is the proper test or standard for recognition of a local custom in India — specifically, whether a custom must be immemorial in the English sense or whether long usage is sufficient.
- Whether alleged acts done with the tacit approval or consent of the owner (e.g., gifts of pots) necessarily defeat recognition of a custom.
- Whether uncertainty as to the precise limits or location of a customary right defeats recognition of the custom, and whether a court may limit a custom to the portion actually used.
- Whether a customary right that amounts to a profit-à-prendre or right in gross can be acquired by a fluctuating body of persons (i.e., whether such rights are incapable of acquisition by custom when claimed by an uncertain or fluctuating class).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The kumbhars of the village have a customary right to take earth from the western side of field No. 111 for preparing earthen pots.
- There exists a pit on that western side which has been used for this purpose for about 30 years, evidencing long and continuous usage.
Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Shri Mangalmurti)
- A custom of this kind should be shown to have existed from "time immemorial"; reliance was placed on decisions such as Bholanath Nundi v. Midnapore Zemindary Company Limited and Lakashmidhar Misra v. Rangalal to support that contention.
- The earth was removed with the tacit approval and consent of the owner; the plaintiffs themselves admitted in an application to the Tahsildar that they used to give some earthen pots to the malguzar, which, it was argued, indicated consent and therefore negated a prescriptive or customary right.
- The claimed custom lacks certainty because the appellants are not clear about the exact portion of the field from which they are entitled to remove earth.
- The custom is unreasonable because it would prevent the respondent from cultivating the field.
- The claim is in the nature of a right in gross or a profit-à-prendre; under authorities relied upon (beginning with Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo and others), a fluctuating and uncertain body of persons cannot acquire a profit-à-prendre by custom — such rights must arise by dedication or grant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bholanath Nundi v. Midnapore Zemindary Company Limited, 1904 L.R 31 I.A. 75 | Illustration of a claimed right (pasturage) stated to have been enjoyed "from time immemorial" and the practical treatment of such rights. | The Court noted Bholanath's use of the term "time immemorial" and relied on its direction form (allowing rights while protecting owner's cultivation) to support limiting the appellants' right so as not to prevent cultivation. |
| Lakashmidhar Misra v. Rangalal, 1949 52 Bom. L.R. 458, P.C. | Quoted test (from English courts) that a custom must be immemorial in origin, certain, reasonable and continuous in use. | The Court observed that English formulations need not be applied in strict form in India and that "immemorial" need not be taken in the English (1189) sense; used the cited tests as a point of consideration but declined to adopt a rigid immemorial requirement. |
| Musammat Subhani v. Nawab, 1940 L.R 68 I.A. 1 (also reported 43 Bom. L.R. 432) | Principle that antiquity required to prove a custom depends on circumstances and that long, invariable practice showing common consent is the relevant inquiry. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that in India what must be proved is long usage with invariability sufficient to show acceptance as the governing rule of the district — i.e., a strict English "time immemorial" requirement is not necessary. |
| Baba Narayan Lakras v. Saboosa, [1943] Nag. 705, P.C. | Statement that in India a custom need not be immemorial and that evidence of long usage is sufficient; approval of Kuar Sen v. Mamman on this point. | The Court cited this to support rejection of the argument that custom must be immemorial in the English sense and to confirm that long usage suffices in India. |
| Kuar Sen v. Mamman, 1895 I.L.R 17 All. 87 | Held that statute law of India does not prescribe any period of enjoyment for establishing a local custom. | Quoted (via Baba Narayan Lakras) to confirm that no fixed period is statutorily required to establish a custom in India. |
| Mohidin v. Shivlingappa, 1899 I.L.R 23 Bom. 666 | Dealt with objection of uncertainty as to limits of claimed customary right; court limited the right to the portion actually evidenced by usage. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that uncertainty as to precise limits does not defeat recognition of a custom where evidence indicates the portion actually used; the custom can be limited to that portion (the pit). |
| Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo, 1882 I.L.R 9 Cal. 698 | One of the authorities cited for the proposition that rights in gross or profits-à-prendre in favour of a fluctuating body may not be recognized by custom (Calcutta High Court authority refusing fishery rights for fluctuating body). | Listed among cases relied upon by respondent to show the rule against recognition of profits-à-prendre for fluctuating classes; the Court considered the line of authority but concluded it did not preclude recognizing the village/community right in the present facts. |
| Syed Ali v. Sarjan Ali, 1913 18 C.W.N. 735 | Cited among cases addressing acquisition of rights by fluctuating bodies and profit-à-prendre issues. | Included in the respondent's list of authorities; the Court noted the line of cases but distinguished them on the ground that the village/community here was not to be regarded as a fluctuating body incapable of acquiring a custom. |
| Abdul Hosain v. Sadai Gobinda, 1938 42 C.W.N. 1102 | Cited in the context of rights/profits-à-prendre and fluctuating bodies. | Referenced by counsel and noted by the Court as part of the authorities canvassed on the point; the Court did not accept the respondent's contention that those authorities compelled refusal in the present case. |
| Kunja Paria v. Nitya Nanda, 1948 53 C.W.N. 346 | Another authority cited among cases concerning rights of fluctuating bodies or profits-à-prendre. | Referred to by counsel; the Court considered the general principle but held the facts before it (continuous village practice) supported recognition of the custom. |
| Brajendra Kishore Roy Chowdhury v. Bama Charan Kaivarta, 1932 37 C.W.N. 18 | Listed among authorities relevant to the rule on fluctuating bodies/profits-à-prendre. | Noted by the Court as part of the corpus of cases relied on by counsel; the Court nonetheless upheld the customary right given the local circumstances. |
| Arjun Kaibarta v. Manoranjan De Bhoumik, 1933 I.L.R 61 Cal. 45 | Another Calcutta decision referenced on similar points (profit-à-prendre/fluctuating body). | Included in the respondent's list; the Court treated these authorities as informative but concluded they did not preclude upholding the village/customary right here. |
| Mahrajbahadur v. Gandhori Singh, [1917] A.I.R Pat. 640 | Patna High Court authority recognizing a right in favour of a fluctuating body (hunting right) — cited as taking a different view from Calcutta authorities. | Referred to in the opinion to show that jurisdictions have taken differing approaches; used to note that recognition for fluctuating bodies has been accepted in some courts but that such a view, if broadly applied, may work hardship on private owners. |
| Brajendra v. Ishwar Kitabia, [1933] A.I.R Cal. 539 | Authority mentioned in commentary on the potential implications of recognizing rights for fluctuating bodies. | Quoted (via secondary commentary) as part of the discussion on the consequences of broad recognition of rights for fluctuating bodies; the Court used the line of reasoning to contextualize its conclusion. |
| Rushi Bhiku v. Rushi Sheoram, 1927 23 N.L.R. 192 | An instance where a custom claimed by the kumbhars of a particular village was upheld by the Court of Judicial Commissioner; in that case the right was shown to have been exercised for 20 years. | The Court cited this decision as a direct precedent supporting recognition of the kumbhars' customary right where it has been exercised over a substantial period (here, more than 30 years), and used it to justify upholding the appellants' claim. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations, applying the authorities and the facts before it as follows:
- Nature of the principal question: The Court treated the existence of the custom as a mixed question of fact and law (para 2).
- On "time immemorial" and antiquity: The Court rejected the respondent's contention that the custom must be shown to exist from time immemorial in the strict English sense (i.e., prior to 1189). It observed that Indian authorities (including Musammat Subhani and Baba Narayan Lakras) require proof of usage of such antiquity and invariability as to show that the usage has been accepted by common consent as the governing rule of the district; the precise antiquity required depends on circumstances (paras 4–7). Accordingly, the Court held long usage (here, about 30 years) can suffice.
- On alleged consent by the owner: The respondent pointed to an admission by the plaintiffs that they used to give some earthen pots to the malguzar. The Court declined to infer from that fact that the earth removals were done with the owner's approval or consent because the record did not clarify whether such gifts were occasional, periodic, or a consideration (para 8). Thus, the Court would not defeat the custom on that basis.
- On certainty and limits of the custom: The Court acknowledged that the plaint alleges a right over the "western half portion" without precise delimitations, but noted evidence showed usage only over the portion occupied by the pit. Relying on Mohidin v. Shivlingappa, the Court held that where evidence limits the portion actually used, the custom can be upheld and restricted to that portion (paras 9, 13–15).
- On reasonableness and effect on cultivation: The respondent argued that recognition of the custom would prevent cultivation. The Court observed that if the right is restricted to the pit, the respondent's ability to cultivate the field would not be impeded. The Court cited the form of direction given in Bholanath's case (allowing the owner's cultivation so long as sufficient pasture remains) as an instance of balancing competing interests and inferred a similar limitation/direction could be made here (para 12).
- On the profit-à-prendre / fluctuating-body objection: The respondent's strongest argument was that the claimed right is in the nature of a profit-à-prendre or right in gross, and that such rights cannot be acquired by custom when claimed by a fluctuating body of persons (relying on Lutchmeeput Singh and other authorities). The Court analyzed this principle and concluded that a village or a particular community within a village need not be treated as a fluctuating body incapable of acquiring a customary right. The Court relied on Bholanath (where a communal village right of pasturage was recognized), and on Rushi Bhiku (where potters' rights exercised for 20 years were upheld), and thus found no reason to disallow the present claim on that ground (paras 13–16, 21).
- Overall conclusion: Given the evidence of long, continuous usage (about 30 years), the existence of the pit, the absence of reliable evidence of owner consent negating a custom, the ability to limit the custom to the area actually used, and the view that the village/community cannot be treated as an inherently fluctuating body for these purposes, the Court concluded that the appellants had established a customary right to take earth from the pit (paras 16–17).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored.
Implications and direct effects:
- The appellants (the village kumbhars) are held to have a customary right to take earth from the pit on the western side of field No. 111, based on long continued usage (about 30 years) and the evidence of actual use.
- The customary right is to be confined to the portion of the field actually evidenced by usage (i.e., the pit), thereby addressing concerns about uncertainty and protecting the respondent's ability to cultivate the remainder of the field.
- Costs of the litigation are awarded against the respondent (respondent to bear costs throughout).
- The opinion does not purport to establish a new broad rule overriding existing authorities; rather, it applies established Indian principles (that antiquity depends on circumstances and that long, continuous usage may suffice) to the facts and relies on existing case law to limit and shape the recognized custom.
This summary is confined exclusively to the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or propositions not stated in that opinion.
Mudholkar, J.:— This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs and arises out of a suit instituted by them for a declaration that they have a right to take earth from field No. 111 of mauza Shegaon Buzruk belonging to the respondent for preparing earthen pots and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from obstructing them from taking earth from this field.
2. It is common ground that this field was the banjar land of the lamberdar and was purchased from him by the respondent on December 13, 1948. The appellants' claim is that the kumbhars of the village have a customary right to remove the earth from the western side of this field and that there is actually in existence a pit on that side. The existence of this pit is admitted by the respondent, according to whom, its dimensions are 25″ × 20″ × 4″. The sole question to be determined in this case is whether the appellants have acquired a customary right to take earth from the aforesaid pit. Whether this custom exists or not is a mixed question of fact and law.
3. What has been established in this case is that the kumbhars of the aforesaid village used to take earth from the pit on the western side, mix it with the earth of the village tank and then prepare earthen pots out of their mixture and that they have been doing so for about 30 years. Could it be said that this is a good custom, and if so, whether it could be recognized by the Court on the ground that it has been in existence for a long time? It may be mentioned at the outset that Shri Mangalmurti, who appears for the respondent, relying upon the decisions in Bholanath Nundi v. Midnapore Zemindary Company Limited . 1904 L.R 31 I.A 75. and Lakashmidhar Misra v. Rangalal . 1949 52 Bom. L.R 458, P.C. contended, in the first place, that a custom of this kind should have been in existence from time immemorial. In the first mentioned case, their Lordships mentioned the fact that the plaintiffs had claimed a right of pasturage over the waste lands on the ground that the right was enjoyed by them and their predecessors from time immemorial. Dealing with this point their Lordships observed in their judgment:
“…the right of pasturage claimed has been enjoyed by the plaintiffs and their predecessors from time immemorial—from the time of the Hindu Rajahs long before the Watsons had anything to do with the property.”
4. From this it would be clear that the expression ‘time immemorial’ was understood by their Lordships not in the sense in which it was understood, i.e, prior to the year 1189, but in a different sense. No doubt, in the second mentioned case, their Lordships have observed (p. 59):
“…What the Courts have required of a custom, if the law is to uphold it as a right, is that it should be immemorial in origin, certain and reasonable in nature and continuous in use. It is by these tests that the appellants' claim in this case must be tried.”
5. The Courts referred to by their Lordships were the Courts in England. In that case, however, their Lordships have not considered what was exactly in tended to be understood by the expression ‘time immemorial’. Indeed, all that was established in that case appears to be that the right claimed was exercised from generation to generation and nothing more. In the circumstances and in view of other decisions of their Lordships, I do not think it will be proper to infer that the expression ‘immemorial origin’ is to be understood in India in the same sense as in England. In this connection I may refer to Musammat Subhani v. Nawab . 1940 L.R 68 I.A 1, S.C, 31, S.C 43 Bom. L.R 432, 438. in which their Lordships have observed:
“…It will depend upon the circumstances of each case what antiquity must be established before the custom can be accepted. What is necessary to be proved is that the usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability as to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of the particular district.”
6. Again, in Baba Narayan Lakras v. Saboosa . [1943] Nag. 705, P.C at p. 711 their Lordships have observed that in India a custom need not be immemorial, and all that is required is the evidence of long usage, and quoted with approval the following from Kuar Sen v. Mamman . 1895 I.L.R 17 All. 87.:
“…The statute law of India does not prescribe any period of enjoyment during which, in order to establish a local custom, it must be proved that a right claimed to have been enjoyed as by local custom was enjoyed.” (p. 92).
7. I, therefore, do not accept the argument advanced on this point by Shri Mangalmurti.
8. Then Shri Mangalmurti says that the right exercised by the appellants cannot be upheld as a customary right inasmuch as what the appellants claim to have done was with the tacit approval and consent of the owner. In this connection he referred to an admission of the plaintiffs contained in the application made by them to the Tahsildar to the effect that they used to give some earthen pots to the malguzar. Now, in the first place, it is not clear from this whether such pots were given annually or at any fixed interval or otherwise; nor is it clear whether the pots were given by way of consideration for permitting the appellants to remove and utilise the earth from the field or merely as presents. It would not, therefore, be safe or proper to infer from this circumstance that the kumbhars removed the earth from the field with the approval and consent of the malguzar.
9. Then Shri Mangalmurti says that there is no certainty about the custom because the appellants are not themselves sure as to the exact portion of the field from which they could remove earth. No doubt, the plaint only says that the appellants have a right to remove the earth from the western half portion of the field and does not make any further specification as to the exact place from which they have the customary right to remove the earth. However, it has come in evidence that they exercised their right only over that portion of the field which is covered by the pit in question.
10. In Mohidin v. Shivlingappa . 1899 I.L.R 23 Bom. 666. a similar objection was taken. Dealing with it, the learned Judges observed (p. 670):
“…Here the defendants have, it is true, failed to set any limit to the space which they wish to use as a burial ground. But we must not confuse their wishes and their rights. They wish for the privilege of burial all over survey No. 1134, Their right according to custom as found by Assistant Judge seems to be to bury round about the darga. Because they fail to prove all they wish, there seems no reason for denying them the rights which they establish. A plaintiff may claim Rs. 1000, but if the evidence shows that he is only entitled to Rs. 100, he will get a decree for the latter sum albeit his claim as stated is not fully proved. What then is the uncertainty connected with this right of burial? There is no uncertainty as to the class of persons who have been in the habit of burying near the darga. It is not denied that the defendants belong to that class… The only point which can be said to be uncertain relates to the limits within which burials must be made. Those limits have not been defined. But we think that they are sufficiently indicated by the restriction of the right to a limited class and by the obligation to bury near the darga.”
11. The learned Judges, therefore, upheld the custom, limiting it of course to that portion of the darga which was referred to in the evidence as having been used as the burial ground. The same can be done in this case.
12. Shri Mangalmurti then stated that the custom pleaded is not reasonable, because as a result of it the respondent will not be able to use this field for cultivation. Now, if the right is restricted to this pit, it is difficult to see how the respondent will be prevented from cultivating the field. In a case of this kind a direction similar to the one given by their Lordships in Bholanath's case could be made. In that case the villagers had claimed a right of pasturage over the waste lands belonging to the defendants. Their right was affirmed by their Lordships but they amended the decree of the Sub-Ordinate Judge in terms providing that the plaintiffs should not prevent the defendants or their successors-in-title from cultivating or executing improvements upon the waste lands in question so long as sufficient pasturage is left for the plaintiffs and the other persons entitled to the right of pasturage claimed, with liberty to the parties, from time to time, in case of difference, to apply to the Sub-Ordinate Judge as they may be advised.
13. The last argument, and which is the strongest argument, urged is that the claim is in the nature of a right in gross or profits a prendre, and where such a right is claimed by a fluctuating body of persons, it cannot be acquired by a custom. According to Shri Mangalmurti, it could be acquired by dedication or grant. He points out that it has not been alleged by the appellants that their right originated in either of these ways, In support of his contention lie relies upon a large number of cases, starting from Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo . 1882 I.L.R 9 Cal. 698.. The other cases are: Syed Ali v. Sarjan Ali . 1913 18 C.W.N 735.; Abdul Hosain v. Sadai Gobinda . 1938 42 C.W.N 1102.; Kunja Paria v. Nitya Nanda . 1948 53 C.W.N 346.; Brajendra Kishore Roy Chowdhury v. Bama Charan Kaivarta . 1932 37 C.W.N 18.; Arjun Kaibarta v. Manoranjan De Bhoumik . 1933 I.L.R 61 Cal. 45.; and many other cases.
14. Indeed, it has been pointed out at page 9 in Joshi's Easements and Licenses, Second edn.:
“Though in England, as well as in India, customary rights in gross in aleno solo in favour of a fluctuating body of persons have been recognised freely, yet in England it may be taken as settled law that a fluctuating and uncertain body of persons cannot claim a profit-a-prendre by custom; for, such rights are deemed unreasonable, as they tend to destroy the subject-matter of the right itself. In the case of Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo the Calcutta High Court refused to recognize fishery rights in favour of a fluctuating body of persons, and thus followed the principles of English law. A different view has however been taken by the Patna High Court in Mahrajbahadur v. Gandhori Singh . [1917] A.I.R Pat. 640. where a right to hunt in a certain forest and to appropriate the game hunted therein was recognized in favour of a fluctuating body of persons. With sub-mission it is suggested that the judgment of the Patna High Court in the last mentioned case, if as widely applied as proposed therein, would cause much, hardship to private owners by making their tenements liable to subserve to the uncertain needs of a fluctuating body of persons. (Brajendra v. Ishwar Kitabia . [1933] A.I.R Cal. 539.)”
15. Therefore, if it is accepted that a fluctuating body of persons cannot acquire by custom a profit-a-prendre, it cannot be said that the villagers or a particular community in a village can be regarded as a fluctuating body of persons. In Bholanath's case the right to graze cattle on waste lands was claimed by the persons living in the village on the ground that all the villagers had such a right. It was not negatived on the ground that such body of persons must be regarded as fluctuating and, therefore, incapable of acquiring a customary right by long usage. Now, it may be mentioned that the right of pasturage claimed was not by way of an easement but it was claimed by way of a customary right. It seems to me, therefore, that this decision would afford a complete answer to the argument of the learned counsel Shri Mangalmurti.
16. In Rushi Bhiku v. Rushi Sheoram . 1927 23 N.L.R 192. a right of this kind was claimed by the kumbhars of a particular village on the ground of custom and was upheld by the Court of Judicial Commissioner. It may be mentioned that in that case it was found that the right was exercised for a period of 20 years. In the present case, the right has been exercised for over 30 years. In the circumstances, therefore, I see no reason for not upholding the right.
17. Accordingly, I allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court.
18. Costs throughout will be borne by the respondent.
19. Appeal allowed.
Alert