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Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay, .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mudholkar, J.; Tambe, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act conducting business as "Berar Oil Industries" at Akola, manufacturing hydrogenated vegetable oil "Vanasada" and by-products (soap, oil-cakes, etc.). Manufacturing commenced on 11-10-1948. The petitioner also fabricates tin containers (drums and containers) within the precincts of the oil factory; fabrication began on 13-10-1948. These tin containers are used solely for packing the petitioner's vegetable oil, are not sold separately, and customers are not charged separately for the tins. At relevant dates there were 31 workers engaged in container fabrication and 211 workers engaged in the manufacture of oil and by-products (figures include the state as on 1-11-1952 as given).
The Central Government framed a scheme under S.5 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, which came into force in part on 2-9-1952 and in part on 6-10-1952. Under that scheme employers were required to contribute a specified percentage of the wage bill (employer's contribution plus administrative charges). Following correspondence, by letter dated 8-8-1955 the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay, called upon the petitioner to deposit its contribution and incidental charges; the petition states the total amount was Rs.34,000 for the period and that fact is not denied in the return. The demand related to workers employed in the oil industry (not limited to container fabrication). The petitioner did not deposit and faced recovery proceedings under S.8 of the Act; it therefore filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ restraining the Commissioner from recovering the contribution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, applied to the petitioner's unit—i.e., whether the Act applied when (a) manufacturing of certain scheduled articles (drums and containers) took place within the precincts of the factory but (b) the principal industry (edible oil production) was not included in Schedule I at the relevant time.
- Whether the mere manufacture, for internal use only, of an article that appears in Schedule I (here, "drums and containers") brings the whole unit or factory within the ambit of the Act.
- Whether the fifty-or-more employees threshold in Section 1(3) is to be applied by reference to (a) the number employed in the entire factory, or (b) the number employed in the particular unit/process engaged in manufacture of the scheduled article.
- Whether the demand by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner for contributions (including the administrative charge) was legally sustainable in the circumstances.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The industry of the unit is the production of edible (vegetable) oil, which at the relevant time was not included in Schedule I to the Act; therefore the Act does not apply to the petitioner's unit.
- The fabrication of tin containers is only an incidental process carried out for internal use (an intermediate product) and not an independent manufacturing industry; these intermediate products are not marketed separately and thus their manufacture does not convert the unit into an industry covered by Schedule I.
- The petitioner disputed its liability to pay the administrative charge of 3% (though the primary relief sought related to liability for employer contributions and recovery proceedings).
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that "drums and containers" are manufactured within the precincts of the factory and that "drums and containers" appear in Schedule I; therefore the Act must apply to the unit and the petitioner is liable to make contributions.
- Counsel for the respondent relied on a decision of the Travancore‑Cochin High Court (O.P. No. 78 of 1953, dated 2‑2‑1954) which was said to support the proposition that where part of a factory manufactures scheduled articles and the total number employed in the entire factory exceeds fifty, the Act applies to the factory.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| O.P. No. 78 of 1953 (Travancore‑Cochin High Court), Dated 2-2-1954 | Held that where one part of a factory is engaged in manufacture of articles falling within the First Schedule, and although employees in that unit were only 33, the total employees in the factory exceeded 50 — the provisions of the Act applied to the factory (i.e., the total number of employees across the factory was the relevant test). | Tambe, J. (concurring but dissenting on reasoning) noted the decision relied upon by the respondent but expressly disagreed with it: he considered the Travancore‑Cochin decision to be incorrect in principle and declined to follow it. Tambe, J. held that the fifty-or-more threshold must be satisfied in respect of the unit engaged in manufacture of the scheduled article (i.e., the number employed in that process), not by aggregating employees across unrelated processes in the same factory. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion contains two judges' analyses: Mudholkar, J. (leading) and Tambe, J. (concurring as to result but with a different analysis on one point). Their reasoning is summarized below in the sequence the court applied legal principles to the facts.
Mudholkar, J. — Principal Reasoning
- Mudholkar, J. reproduced and analysed the statutory scheme: Section 1(3) (application in the first instance to factories in industries specified in Schedule I where fifty or more persons are employed), the definitions of "factory", "industry", and "employee", the contents of Schedule I (as amended), the Explanation (which includes "drums and containers"), and the definition of "manufacture" in S.2 (as amended).
- He distilled three conjunctive conditions for applicability of the Act to a unit: (i) a manufacturing process is carried on on the premises; (ii) the unit is engaged in an industry that is specified in Schedule I (i.e., the industry must be one that manufactures scheduled products); and (iii) fifty or more persons are employed in that industry/unit.
- From these provisions read together he concluded that the process must relate to the industry itself — i.e., the unit must be engaged in the manufacture of the scheduled product as its industry. Thus, if any of the three conditions fails, the Act does not apply.
- Applying those principles to the facts, Mudholkar, J. noted the admitted position that the principal industry of the petitioner was production of edible oil, which at the relevant time was not included in Schedule I (the opinion records that it was subsequently included). Therefore, the Act would not apply to the oil industry.
- On the respondent's contention that manufacture of "drums and containers" (a scheduled item) within the precincts triggers application, Mudholkar, J. distinguished production of intermediate goods made only for internal use. He observed that the petitioner did not engage in the business of manufacturing tin containers for sale or trade; the containers were made only for use in the petitioner’s oil business and were not marketed separately. He held that where the production is incidental and for internal use (an intermediate product), even if such an intermediate product is listed in the Schedule, that fact alone does not convert the unit into an industry specified in Schedule I.
- He emphasised that the word "industry" should be understood in the business sense: if the industry is production of edible oil, intermediate products made for the operation of that industry cannot be treated as separate industries for the purpose of the Act. The Act is not intended to be universally applicable to every factory (unlike the Factories Act or the Industrial Disputes Act); it is directed to specified industries, and where Parliament intended wider reach it provided for notification under S.1(3).
- Given this analysis, Mudholkar, J. concluded that the demand made by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was not legal and a writ should issue. He further stated it was unnecessary to decide separately on the petitioner's contention regarding the 3% administrative charge because the primary demand itself was unlawful on the reasoning given.
Tambe, J. — Concurring Judgment (with a different interpretive emphasis)
- Tambe, J. agreed with the ultimate conclusion that the petition should be allowed, but disagreed with Mudholkar, J.'s broader proposition that the principal object of the industry must itself fall within Schedule I in order for any manufacture of a scheduled article within the factory to attract the Act.
- He focussed on statutory definitions. Relying on the definition of "factory" (which includes "any premises...in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on...") and the definition of "manufacture" (which includes making goods even for the use of the factory itself), he held that if in any part of a factory an article that falls within the First Schedule is manufactured (even for internal use), the Act may apply — but only where the number of persons employed in that unit/process is fifty or more.
- Thus, for Tambe, J., the critical test is whether the scheduled article is manufactured on the premises and whether the number employed in that activity reaches the statutory threshold of fifty. In the present case, the labour employed in the unit manufacturing drums and containers was only 31, so the Act did not apply.
- Tambe, J. expressly addressed and disagreed with the Travancore‑Cochin High Court decision relied upon by the respondent. He considered it incorrect to aggregate employees across unrelated units in the factory to meet the fifty-or-more threshold; rather, the fifty-or-more qualification governs the unit engaged in manufacture of the scheduled article (i.e., the industry specified in Schedule I), not the factory as an aggregate.
Holding and Implications
PETITION ALLOWED.
Direct consequences stated in the opinion:
- The demand made by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay, for contributions in respect of the petitioner was held to be not legally sustainable; a writ was ordered to issue restraining further recovery action.
- The petition was allowed with costs; counsel's fee was fixed at Rs.100/-. The outstanding amount of deposit was ordered to be refunded to the petitioner.
Both judges reached the same result (petition allowed), but for partially different legal rationales: Mudholkar, J. based his conclusion on the view that the principal industry must itself be one specified in Schedule I (intermediate internal manufacture of scheduled items does not suffice), whereas Tambe, J. would apply the Act where scheduled articles are manufactured on the premises provided the number employed in that particular process is fifty or more (and he rejected aggregation of employees across unrelated processes). In the facts of this case, because only 31 workers were engaged in container fabrication, the Act did not apply under either analysis.
The opinion did not expressly state that it was laying down a binding new precedent; it resolved the petition in the petitioner's favour and ordered refund and costs. The opinion also notes that edible oil was not in Schedule I at the relevant time but had subsequently been included (as recorded in the text).
This summary is prepared strictly from the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been added or inferred.
Mudholkar, J.:— This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay, prohibiting him from recovering from the petitioner contribution towards the Provident Fund under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952.
2. The admitted facts are as follows: The petitioner is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act. It carries on business of manufacturing hydrogenated vegetable oil named ‘Vanasada’ and its by-products, such as soap, oil-cakes etc. at Akola under the name and style of ‘Berar Oil Industries.’ It commenced manufacturing its products on 11-10-1948. It also manufactures and markets its vegetable oil after completing all the processes at Akola whereafter the oil is tinned in tin containers of certain sizes. The aforesaid tin containers are fabricated by the petitioner in the precincts of the oil factory. These tin containers are used only for the purpose of packing vegetable oil and are not used for any other purpose. They are not sold separately nor are the customers charged separately for the price of the tins. The fabrication of these containers commenced on 13-10-48. Only 31 workers are engaged in this work while on 1-11-1952, 211 workers were working on the manufacture of oil and its by-products.
3. The Central Government framed a scheme under S. 5 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, which came into force partly on 2-9-1952 and partly on 6-10-1952. Under this scheme an employer is required to contribute 6½ per cent of the total wage bill every year as the employer's contribution towards the fund and 3 per cent as the administrative charges on the total contribution of the employer and the employees.
4. Certain correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the respondent with respect to the liability of the petitioner to make contribution towards the provident fund. Eventually, by a letter dated 8-8-1955, the respondent called upon the petitioner to deposit its contribution and incidental charges as required by the scheme. It is stated in the petition that the total amount came to Rs. 34000/- for this period and this fact is not denied in the return. It may be mentioned that this contribution is in respect of the workers employed in the oil industry, i.e not only in respect of the persons who are employed in the fabrication of tin containers but also in respect of the workers who are employed solely for the production of vegetable oil. The petitioner has not deposited the amount and has alleged that as a result of this demand it is faced with proceedings for the recovery of this amount under S. 8 of the Act. The petitioner disputes its liability to pay the amount and has therefore come up to this Court for the issue of an appropriate writ to the respondent restraining him from taking any further action.
5. The application of the Act is provided for in sub-s. (3) of S. 1 thereof, which reads as follows:
“Subject to the provisions contained in S. 16, it applies in the first instance to all factories engaged in any industry specified in Sch. I in which fifty or more persons are employed, but the Central Government may, after giving not less than two months' notice of its intention so to do, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of this Act, to all factories employing such number of persons less than fifty as may be specified in the notification and engaged in any such industry.”
6. The expressions, ‘factory’ ‘industry’ and ‘employee’ are defined in the Act. Factory as defined means:
“any premises, including the precincts thereof, in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on whether with the aid of power or without the aid of power.”
7. Industry as defined means:
“any industry specified in Sch. I, and includes any other industry added to the Schedule by notification under S. 4.”
Employee means;
“any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of a factory, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the factory.”
8. In Sch. I as amended by act 37 of 1953 it is stated:
“Any industry engaged in the manufacture……of any of the following, namely.—
Cement.
Cigarettes.
Electrical, mechanical or general engineering products.
Iron and steel.
Paper.
Textiles….. .”
9. Then there is the Explanation which contains 25 items, one of which is “drums and containers”. It will thus be seen that for the application of the Act, the unit must be a factory. It must be engaged in any industry. The industry must be one which is specified in Sch. I and that industry must employ 50 or more persons. From the Schedule it will be seen that the industry itself must be engaged in the manufacture of any of the scheduled products. The word ‘manufacture’ is also defined thus in S. 2, as amended by act 37 of 1953;
“manufacture means making, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal.”
10. Reading all these provisions together it would appear that the Act applies to a unit on the premises of which (i) a manufacturing process is carried on (ii) in any industry engaged in the manufacture of any of the schedule products and (iii) in which fifty or more persons are employed. Thus all the three conditions must co-exist. From this it follows that the process must relate to the industry itself. It also follows that if any of these conditions does not exist, the Act would not apply. As already stated it is an admitted position that the industry in question is the production of edible oil. This industry was not at the relevant time included in the Schedule though we understand that it has subsequently been so included. It would therefore appear that the Act would not apply to this industry.
11. It is however argued on behalf of the respondent that ‘drums and containers’ are admittedly being manufactured within the precincts of the factory and as these articles are included in the Schedule the Act must apply to this unit. It is to be borne in mind that though the petitioner manufactures drums and containers it is not engaged in a business of manufacturing these articles in the sense that its object is not to trade in these articles but its object is only to use these containers for enabling it to carry on its business of producing and marketing vegetable oil. If it may be put that way, this is only a process in the business of manufacturing and selling vegetable oil and what is produced is only an intermediate product. The Act applies where the final product is within the Schedule I not where only an intermediate product is in the schedule.
12. The word ‘industry’ as already stated has been defined to mean a specified industry. What we have therefore to ascertain is, what was the industry in which the unit was engaged and not merely what was manufactured by the unit for the purpose of its industry. A unit may manufacture a number of things some of which may fall within the Schedule. But if that was not the main or the dominant purpose of the industry, it would make no difference. In other words, where while carrying on an industry certain products are produced, not with the object of marketing them separately but with the object of using them in the industry itself, then the production of those articles cannot result in the engagement in an industry of producing these articles. The word ‘industry’ should be understood in the sense in which it is understood in the business community. If the industry, as here, is the production of edible oil, then all the intermediate products which are produced for carrying on that industry cannot be regarded as separate industries. Therefore, the mere fact that any of these products was included in the Schedule will not bring the Act into operation.
13. No doubt this Act is a piece of social legislation and must receive benevolent construction. It is however to be noticed that it was not the intention of the legislature to make this Act applicable to each and every factory or industry as is the case with the Factories Act or with the Industrial Disputes Act. This Act was made specifically applicable to certain industries only. Power has been conferred on the Central Government for increasing the ambit of the Act by enabling them to issue a notification under S. 1(3) of the Act for applying it ta other industries. Where such is the case, the question of benevolent construction would not come in. In the circumstances, therefore, it is clear that the demand made by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay, is not legal and it is therefore necessary that a writ should issue. In this view it is not necessary to consider separately the petitioner's contention regarding its liability to pay 3 per cent in respect of administrative charges. We would, therefore, allow the petition with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-. The outstanding amount of deposit is ordered to be refunded to the petitioner.
Tambe J.:—
14. I agree with my learned Brother in the conclusion reached, viz. that this petition should be allowed. However, with utmost respect to my learned Brother, I do not find myself in agreement with the view taken by him that where the principal object of an industry does not fall within the meaning of the First Schedule of the Act then even if certain scheduled articles for being used in that industry only are manufactured, the provisions of the Act are not attracted. In my view, the determining factor is whether in any part of a factory any manufacturing process is going on and whether the manufactured article is such which falls within the meaning of the First Schedule. But to attract the Act this alone is not sufficient. The number of persons employed in the unit engaged in the manufacture of such article must be fifty or more.
15. Section 1(3) of the Act provides that the provisions thereof apply to all factories engaged in any industry specified in Sch. I in which fifty or more persons are employed. Now, ‘factory’ is defined in S. 2, Cl. (g) of the Act. This definition has already been reproduced above. From this definition it will be clear that the manufacturing process of scheduled article need not go on in the entire premises of the factory but it may go on in any portion of it. Further, the word ‘manufacture’ has been defined in S. 2, clause (ia). This definition has also been reproduced above. Looking to this definition it will be seen that the word ‘manufacture’ will include making of goods even for the use of the factory itself. These definitions read together, in my opinion, would show that if in any part of a factory an article which falls within the ambit of the First Schedule is manufactured, though not for the purposes of marketing it, and if the number employed in that process is fifty or exceeds fifty, then the provisions of the Act would be attracted. But in the instant case it is not in dispute that the labour employed in the unit engaged in manufacturing drums and containers is only 31. The provisions of the Act therefore are not attracted to the instant case.
16. The learned counsel for the opponent, however, places reliance on a decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in O.P No. 78 of 1953, D/- 2-2-1954 (A). The facts in this case were that one part of a factory was engaged in manufacture of articles that fell within the First Schedule of the Act, the number of employees in that unit of the factory was only 33, the manufacture carried on in the other part of the factory did not fall within the First Schedule of the Act, and the total number employed in both these units exceeded fifty. It was held that as the factory was carrying on the manufacturing process in one part of it which fell within the First Schedule and as the total number of employees exceeded fifty, the provisions of the Act were attracted. With utmost respect to the learned Judge I find myself unable to agree with this view. In arriving at the conclusion the learned Judge observed that the unit for determining the application of the Act is the total number of the employees in the factory and not only those engaged in the manufacture of the scheduled article. In my view, for reasons stated above, when one of the units of the factory is engaged in the manufacture of an article which falls within the First Schedule of the Act, the provisions of the Act are attracted only to that unit if the other condition, namely that the employees employed in that unit are fifty or more, is fulfilled. In my view, the clause “in which fifty or more persons are employed” used in S. 1(3) of the Act governs or qualifies the phrase “industry specified in Schedule I” used therein and not the word “factories”.
V.B.B
Petition allowed.
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