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Khalilulla Hasmiya Ghole And Another v. Yesu Raghu Dhadvel And Another, Opponents.

Bombay High Court
Nov 26, 1956
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Factual and Procedural Background

This special civil application was filed by landlords seeking to eject their tenant on the ground of bona fide personal cultivation of the land, invoking section 34(2-A)(1) of the relevant tenancy law. The landlords claimed that on the 1st of January 1952, the land was recorded in the name of their predecessor as superior holder. The tenant contested possession. The Revenue Courts and Tribunal rejected the landlords' claim, holding that since the landlords' names did not appear as superior holders on 1-1-1952, the landlords failed to satisfy the statutory condition for termination of tenancy. The landlords challenged this construction before the court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the condition in section 34(2-A)(1) requires the claimant landlord's own name to appear as superior holder in the record of rights on 1st January 1952, or whether it suffices that the name of the predecessor lessor (from whom the claimant derives title) appeared on that date.
  2. Whether the literal construction adopted by the Revenue Tribunal, which bars successors of the recorded landlord from claiming possession if their own names were not on record on 1-1-1952, is correct or whether an alternative construction is permissible to avoid unreasonable or anomalous consequences.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contended that the statutory condition under section 34(2-A)(1) should be construed to require only that the landlord or his predecessor, who leased the land to the tenant on 1-1-1952, had his name entered as superior holder in the record of rights on that date.
  • They argued that the construction adopted by the Revenue Tribunal, which demands the claimant's own name on the record as superior holder on 1-1-1952, is unduly restrictive and ignores the realities of succession and inheritance.

Respondent's Arguments (Amicus Curiae for Tenant)

  • Mr. Vaidya, appearing as amicus curiae, supported the Revenue Tribunal's literal and consistent interpretation that only landlords whose names appeared as superior holders on 1-1-1952 have the right to terminate tenancy under section 34(2-A)(1).
  • He emphasized that this construction aligns with the plain language of the statute and has been uniformly applied by the Tribunal in similar cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that the literal construction adopted by the Revenue Tribunal is a possible interpretation of section 34(2-A)(1), which requires that the name of the lessor must appear in the record of rights as superior holder on 1-1-1952. However, the court emphasized the well-settled principle that if a statutory provision is capable of two constructions, the court may adopt the one that avoids unreasonable or absurd consequences and better serves the statute's purpose.

The court found that the literal construction leads to anomalies, such as barring successors (e.g., heirs or widows) of the landlord whose name appeared on the record on 1-1-1952, from claiming possession despite otherwise satisfying the statute. This would be especially problematic in cases like Mohammedan families, where succession rules differ from Hindu undivided families.

The court noted that the legislature, by amending the statute on 12th January 1953 and introducing section 31A, recognized ambiguities in the original provision and clarified that possession may be claimed if the land stood in the name of the landlord or his ancestors or family members on 1-1-1952 or between that date and the appointed day.

Therefore, the court adopted the construction that it suffices for the claimant to show that the person who was the lessor on 1-1-1952 had his name recorded as superior holder, and that the claimant derives title from that lessor. This construction aligns with legislative intent, avoids unreasonable results, and does not strain the statutory language.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the application, set aside the orders of the Revenue Tribunal and lower courts, and remanded the matter to the learned Mamlatdar for disposal in accordance with law.

The direct effect is that successors of landlords whose names appeared as superior holders on 1-1-1952 are entitled to seek possession under section 34(2-A)(1). No new precedent beyond this case's facts and statutory interpretation was established.

Show all summary ...

Jendragadkar, J.:— This special civil application by the landlords raises the vexed question of construing one of the conditions laid down by S. 34 when a landlord seeks to eject his tenant on the ground that he wants his land bona fide for cultivating personally. This condition is Prescribed by S. 34(2-A)(1). If the landlord bona fide requires the land for any of the purposes specified in sub-S. (1), then his right to terminate the tenancy shall be subject to the conditions mentioned in Cls. (1) to (4) of this sub-section. It is with Cl. (1) of this sub-section that we are concerned in the present application.

2. Now, Cl. (1) of sub-S. (2-A) provides that if the land held by the protected tenant on lease stands in the record of rights in the name of the landlord on the first day of January 1952 as the superior holder, then the landlord will have a right to terminate the tenancy on the ground of his bona fide requirement. The Revenue Courts and the Tribunal have rejected the petitioner's claim for possession of their land for the reason that this condition is not satisfied by them. The petitioners are admittedly the owners of the land. It is common ground that opponent No. 1 is the tenant of the land. On the 1st of January 1952 this land stood in the record of rights in the name of the petitioner's father, who was then alive, as a superior holder. The petitioners gave notice in 1953 and filed the present application for possession on the 15th of April 1954. There is no dispute that on the 1st of January 1952 the name of the petitioners' father alone appeared in the record of rights as the superior holder in respect of this land. It has been held against the petitioners that, since their names did not appear in the record of rights as superior holders on 1-1-1952, they do not satisfy the condition laid down by S. 34(2-A)(1) and so they cannot obtain possession of the land from the tenant. It is the correctness of this construction of S. 34(2-A)(1) that is disputed before us by Mr. Limaye on behalf of the petitioners. On the other hand, Mr. Vaidya, who at our request has assisted us by appearing amicus curiae for the tenant, has strongly contended that the view taken by the Revenue Tribunal is plainly consistent with the reasonable and literal construction of S. 34(2-A)(1), and he has invited our attention to the fact that this view has been taken by the Tribunal consistently in all such cases.

3. It must be conceded that sub-section in question is capable of the construction put upon it by the Revenue Tribunal. If we were satisfied that this was the only construction of which this sub-section was capable, then we would certainly not have been justified in accepting Mr. Limaye's argument on any considerations of policy. It is a well-settled rule of construction that, if any statutory provision is capable of only one construction then it would not be open to the Court to put a different construction upon the said provision merely because the alternative construction would lead to unreasonable or even absurd consequences. The question of consequences and considerations of policy would be relevant only where the provision sought to be construed is capable of two constructions. In case any provision is capable of two constructions, then it would be open to the Court to adopt such a construction as would help the administration of the statute and avoid unreasonable consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether this clause is capable of any alternative construction. What this sub-section requires is that on the 1-1-1952 the name of the person who has leased out the land to the tenant must appear in the record of rights as a superior holder. In other words, as soon as it is shown that on the 1st of January 1952 the tenant was in possession of the land as a tenant and that the lease had been executed in his favour by a particular lessor, the name of this lessor must appear in the record as the superior holder on that date. In our opinion, it would be possible to take the view that this section merely requires the claimant for possession of the land under S. 34 to show that the person who was the lessor of the tenant on the 1st of January 1952 had taken care to have his name entered in the record of rights as superior holder. This section does not necessarily require that it is the claimant whose name must appear in the record of rights on the 1st of January 1952 as a superior holder. All that this section seems to require is that, whoever was the lessor or the landlord on the 1st of January 1952, must have his name entered as a superior holder in respect of his land. If that be so, it would naturally be necessary for the claimant who seeks to evict the tenant to show that he claims through the lessor whose name stood in the record of rights on the 1st of January 1952 and that he satisfies the other requirements of S. 34. We have carefully considered the material words used in this sub-section and we think that the construction which we are disposed to put on this sub-section does not involve any straining of the language.

4. If the construction put upon this provision by the Revenue Tribunal is accepted, it leads to obvious anomalies. In the case of a Mohammedan family, where considerations of undivided Hindu family or succession by survivorship do not apply, the death of the lessor whose name appeared in the record on the 1st of January 1952 as a superior holder would create an insuperable bar in the way of the successors of the lessor to obtain possession of the land, though their claim in that behalf may be otherwise fully justified by S. 34 of the Act. If the husband's name appeared in the record on the specified date and he died, his widow may not be entitled to obtain relief on the technical and artificial ground that her name did not appear on the record on the 1st of January 1952. This provision was enacted by the amending Act on the 12th of January 1953. The Bill effecting this amendment was introduced in the Legislative Assembly on the 18th of July 1952 and it appears that, since Legislature found that some anomalies were discovered in the working of the Act, Legislature wanted to provide additional safeguards for the protection of tenants. Since the Act was passed on the 12th of January 1953, 1st of January 1952 was chosen arbitrarily as the appointed date and the provision in question seems to require that it must clearly appear that either the claimant or his predecessor appeared in the record of rights as a superior holder in respect of the land which is the subject-matter of subsequent proceedings under S. 34. It seems to us very difficult to assume that the right to obtain possession, which obviously vested in the land-lord whose name appeared as superior holder on the 12th of January 1952, should have been intended to be taken away from his successor merely because such a landlord dies subsequently to the 12th of January 1952. In our opinion, though the literal construction which has been accepted by the Revenue Tribunal may be a possible construction, it would be more reasonable to accept the other construction which requires that it should be shown that the name of the person who was a landlord on the 1st of January 1952 appeared on the record as superior holder on that date. This alternative construction helps to carry out the object of Legislature and avoids any unreasonable or anomalous consequences.

5. Incidentally we may refer to the provisions of section 31a to which Mr. Vaidya has invited our attention. Sub-section (d) of this section has materially amended section 34(2-A)(1) with which we are concerned in the present application. The amended provision requires that the land leased should stand in the record of rights on the 1st of January 1952 or during the period between the said date and the appointed day in the name of the landlord himself or any of his ancestors, or if the landlord is a member of a joint family, in the name of member of such family. Legislature appears to have realised that the material words used by the Legislature in section 34(2-A)(1) were ambiguous and obviously the Legislature wanted to express its intention more clearly. That has been done by the latest amendment introduced by section 31A of the Act. In our opinion, it would not be unreasonable to hold that the material words even in section 34(2-A)(1) are capable of the construction which we feel disposed to put upon that provision.

6. If that be the true position, the order passed by the Revenue Tribunal and the Courts below must be set aside and the matter sent back to the learned Mamlatdar for disposal in accordance with law. Accordingly the application is allowed and the rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.

D.H.Z
Application allowed.