- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Zaverchand Panaji v. Mayadevi Chimanlal Parikh
Case Summary — Opinion of Bavdekar, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an application for execution that had been transferred to a Court other than the Court which originally passed the decree. While execution was proceeding before the transferee Court, the judgment-debtor applied in that Court for payment of the decretal amount by instalments under s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act. The transferee Court held that it had no power to grant instalments under s. 24 because, in its view, the power under that section could be exercised only by the Court which passed the decree. The judgment-debtor appealed from that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the phrase "the Court" in s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act includes the Court to which a decree is transferred for execution, or whether it is limited to the Court which passed the decree.
- Whether, if s. 24 is construed as applying only to the Court which passed the decree, the executing (transferee) Court can exercise the powers under s. 24 by virtue of s. 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether the power to grant instalments is a power of execution that an executing Court may exercise).
Arguments of the Parties
Judgment-debtor's Arguments (as presented)
- The words "the Court" are wide in their ordinary sense and would include both the Court which passed the decree and the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution, because both are courts.
- If the word "the Court" were intended to be limited to the trial Court, there must be restrictive language in the section itself; absent such restriction, it should be read broadly to include the executing Court.
Decree-holder / Respondents' Arguments (as presented)
- The definite article "the" indicates reference to a Court already referred to in immediately preceding sections (ss. 21–23), namely the Court which passed the decree.
- The grant of instalments has the effect of varying the decree; ordinarily an executing Court has no power to vary a decree, and therefore cannot grant instalments under s. 24.
- Although s. 42 of the Code gives the executing Court the powers of the Court which passed the decree "in executing it", if the power under s. 24 is not a power of execution, the executing Court would not have that power.
- If the Legislature had intended both the trial Court and the executing Court to have the power under s. 24, it would have used clearer and unmistakable language to that effect rather than the ambiguous expression "the Court".
- The phrases in s. 24 such as "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" and "after notice to the decree-holder" indicate that the application contemplated is to the Court which passed the decree (where the decree-holder would have to be given notice), rather than to an executing Court where the decree-holder is already present.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India, [1943] A.I.R. Nag. 340 (F.B.) | The ordinary principle that an executing Court does not have power to alter or amend a decree; if Legislature intended to confer such power on an executing Court, it would use unmistakable language. | The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that, given ordinary drafting practice, the Legislature would have used clearer language if it intended to empower executing Courts to grant instalments; the authority reinforced the restrictive interpretation of "the Court". |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded step by step from statutory text, context and comparative legislation:
- Text of s. 24 (quoted in the opinion) gives the Court power to direct payment of decretal amounts by instalments "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" and "after notice to the decree-holder". The Bombay Money-lenders Act does not define the words "the Court".
- Because "the Court" is undefined, the Court must derive its meaning from the ordinary (dictionary) sense as modified by context. The immediately preceding sections (ss. 21–23) apply to the Court which passed the decree; that contextual fact supports reading "the Court" in s. 24 as referring to the decree‑granting Court.
- The respondents argued, and the Court accepted as relevant, that the grant of instalments effectively varies the decree; ordinarily an executing Court lacks power to vary a decree. While s. 42 CPC provides that an executing Court has the powers of the Court which passed the decree "in executing it", that applies only to powers properly characterized as powers of execution. The Court considered whether s. 24 is such a power and concluded that it is not necessarily a mere power of execution.
- The Court examined the drafting choices and analogous provisions in other statutes. It compared s. 24 with provisions in:
- The Central Provinces Money-lenders Act (s. 11), which is similar in form.
- Section 20 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, which uses the words "the Court" but, in context (including its marginal note), was treated as authorizing the executing Court to grant instalments. The Court observed that where the Legislature intended to authorize the executing Court, clearer drafting (or marginal note) demonstrated that intention.
- The presence of the non-obstante clause ("notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure") and the requirement of notice to the decree-holder were interpreted as further indicia that s. 24 was intended for application to the Court which passed the decree. Specifically:
- In execution proceedings, the decree-holder is already before the executing Court, so the express requirement of giving "notice to the decree-holder" suggests an application to the trial Court where the decree-holder would otherwise need to be notified.
- The non-obstante clause was seen as resolving a potential conflict between s. 24 and certain provisions of the Code (notably O. XX, r. 11 and perhaps O. XX, r. 3), implying that s. 24 confers on the trial Court a substantive power to grant instalments even after decree, notwithstanding rules of the Code limiting alterations at or after decree-signing.
- The Court emphasized drafting expectations: where the Legislature intends to give both the trial and the executing Court concurrent power, it would use clearer, unmistakable language than the ambiguous phrase "the Court" employed in s. 24. The fact that an earlier or other enactment (s. 20 Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act) made clear the application in execution reinforced this inference.
- Because s. 24 is not necessarily a mere power of execution, and because contextual and comparative statutory reading favored limiting "the Court" to the Court which passed the decree, the transferee (executing) Court did not have power under s. 24 to grant instalments. Consequently, the Judge before whom execution was proceeding correctly held that he had no such power.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED (with costs).
Direct effect on the parties:
- The judgment-debtor's appeal fails; the Court below (the executing/transferee Court) was correct in holding that it had no power under s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act to direct payment of the decretal amount by instalments.
- The statutory power under s. 24 rests with the Court which passed the decree (i.e., the trial Court), and not with the Court to which a decree is transferred for execution, as interpreted in this opinion.
The opinion does not elaborate broader doctrinal consequences beyond the direct holding; it does not purport to set out any new expansive precedent beyond applying textual and contextual statutory interpretation to s. 24 in the circumstances of this case.
Bavdekar, J.:— This is an appeal arising from an application for execution in which execution is going on before a Court to which it has been transferred. The judgment debtor made an application in that Court for instalments under s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act. That Court held that it had no power to grant the instalments, inasmuch as the powers under s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act could only be used by the Court which passed the decree. Hence this appeal.
2. Now, s. 24 of the Money-lenders Act runs as follows:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court may, at any time, on application of a judgment-debtor, after notice to the decree-holder, direct that the amount of any decree passed against him, whether before or after the date on which this Act comes into force, in respect of a loan, shall be paid in such number of instalments and subject to such conditions, and payable on such dates, as, having regard to the circumstances of the judgment-debtor and the amount of the decree, it considers fit.”
3. The marginal note of the section is, “Power of Court to direct payment of decretal amount by instalments.” The Act seems to be modelled upon the Central Provinces Money-lenders Act, s. 11 of which is as follows:—
“Power to direct payment of decretal amount by instalments. The Court may, at any time, on the application of a judgment-debtor, after notice to the decree-holder, direct that the amount of any decree passed against him, whether before or after this Act comes into force, in respect of a loan shall be paid in such number of instalments and subject to such conditions on the dates fixed by it as, having regard to the circumstances of the judgment-debtor and the amount of the decree, it considers fit”
4. That Act appears to have defined the words “the Court”, but the Bombay-Act does not define them. The meaning of the words “the Court” is consequently left to be gathered from its dictionary meaning as modified by anything which there may be in the context. The previous sections, namely, ss. 21 to 23 apply to the Court which has passed the decree though s. 21 alone uses the words “a Court”, and it is contended on behalf of the respondents-creditors who rely upon the definite article that the words must be taken to refer to the Court which is referred to in s. 21 and which is impliedly intended even by ss. 22 and 23. It is contended secondly that the effect of grant of instalments is to vary the decree. Ordinarily the executing Court has got no power to vary the decree which has been passed by the trial Court, and it will have to execute the decree as it is. It is true that the executing Court has got all the powers of the Court which passed the decree, under s. 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that is, when “executing it”, and if the power under s. 24 of the Money-lenders Act cannot be said to be power of executing the decree, then the executing Court will ordinarily not have the power under s. 24. It is said, in the third instance, that if the intention was to clothe both the Courts which passed a decree and the Court to which a decree is transferred for execution with the power under s. 24, the Legislature would have not left the matter to be argued and would have provided that both the Courts would have the power under s. 24. Finally it is contended that the words in s. 24 “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908”, and the words “after notice to the decree-holder” suggest that the application which has got to be made is an application to the Court which passed the decree, and not to the executing Court. Now, it is quite true that if we loot at ss. 21, 23 and 24, the argument that the words “the Court” in s. 24 have got reference to the Court which is referred to in s. 21 and which is implied in s. 22, is plausible enough. The definite article is usually intended to refer to a noun which has already been used before, and the words “the Court” would ordinarily speaking, therefore, in the absence of a definition, be regarded as referring to the Court which has already been referred to. But these words find place also in other Bombay enactments. They find a place in one enactment, at any rate, in a place where it has got no reference to a Court which had already been referred to and which also specifically means or at any rate includes the Court to which a decree is transferred for execution. That enactment is s. 20 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, where the words are:
“The Court may at any time direct that the amount of any decree passed, whether before or after this Act comes into force, against an agriculturist, or the portion of the same which it directs under s. 19 to be paid, shall be paid by instalments with or without interest.”
5. Sometimes consequently the Legislature does use the words not to indicate the Court which has already been referred to, but to mean that Court which is indicated by the words of the section in which the words are used. It must be conceded, however, that the words which are used in s. 24, namely, “the Court”, when taken with the fact that the Court which is referred to in the immediately preceding sections is the Court which passed the decree are in favour of the contention which has been advanced on behalf of the decree-holder. Secondly, there can be no doubt whatever that whether the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution has got the powers under s. 24 or not, the Court which passed the decree has got powers under those sections. That is indicated by the words “after notice to the decree-holder” and also by the words “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908”. In an application for execution the decree-holder would be before the Court. If in execution, the judgment-debtor makes an application for instalments under s. 24 of the Money-lenders Act, there would be no necessity of giving a notice to the decree-holder, because the decree-holder would be before the Court, and he would have notice of any application which is made by the judgment-debtor in the application for execution. Similarly, the words “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” are obviously intended to resolve the conflict which arises between s. 24 and the provisions of O. XX, r. 11, and probably also O. XX, r. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The former rule gives the power to the Court which passes a decree to grant instalments, but only at the time of the passing of the decree. The latter rule prevents a judgment which is once signed from being altered or added to, save as provided by s. 152 or on review. The view has been taken that this section prevents the alteration of even a decree, but in any case it is obvious that the words “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” have been put in order to avoid the conflict which would otherwise arise between O. XX, r. 11, and s. 24 of the Bombay Moneylenders Act. They may in addition have been put in order to remove the conflict between s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act and O. XX, r. 3. It is not, however, easy to understand what conflict these words have been intended to remove, in case what was contemplated was that the application which was to be made was only an application to the executing Court. It is true that an executing Court cannot vary the decree which it is executing, but that is not because the Code of Civil Procedure expressly so provides but because the only powers which the executing Court has are the powers which the Court which passed the decree has in executing it, and even the Court which passed the degree has no powers to vary it whether in execution or otherwise. It can do so only under s. 152 or on review. A non-obstante clause is intended to remove the conflict which may arise between two express enactments. There is no conflict when one enactment confers a power which the other does not. It is obvious, therefore, that s. 24 in any case empowers the Court which passed the decree to grant instalments.
6. The only question which remains is whether the words include also the Court to which execution is transferred. Now, the principal argument of Mr. Shastry, who appears on behalf of the judgment-debtor, is that the words “the Court” are very wide. In their ordinary sense they would include not only the Court which passed a decree, but also the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution, because both are Courts. Consequently in case it is contended that the words only include the Court which passed the decree, then there must be something in the language of the section itself which restricts their meaning. Now, that is obviously correct. But one thing which restricts the meaning of the word ‘Court’ is, as I have already mentioned, the definite article which indicates that what is contemplated is the Court which is referred to already, and the Court which has been referred to already is undoubtedly the Court which passed the decree. In the second instance, as was pointed out by their Lordships of the Nagpur High Court in Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India . [1943] A.I.R Nag. 340, F.B., ordinarily speaking an executing Court has not got power to alter or amend a decree, and if the Legislature intended to confer this power upon that Court, one would expect it to use unmistakable language. That is especially so when by the same section it is intended to clothe the Court which passed the decree with the power to grant instalments. It seems obvious to me that in case it was contemplated that both the Courts should have the power, the Legislature would not have been content to use an expression like “the Court” which, considering the context in which the words have been used, that is, they have been used in a section succeeding to sections in which only the trial Court has been referred to, are to say the least, ambiguous and clearer words would have been used to indicate that the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution also has got power to grant instalments.
7. It has got to be remembered, further, that it is not as if the Legislature has not got before it other enactments in which similar powers have been conferred. The Legislature had before it s. 20 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, and though it is not an Act which was passed by that Legislature itself, it had got application to the Bombay State and it principally had application to that State. When s. 20 of that act conferred power upon the executing Court to grant instalments, the words “the Court” indeed were used; but the marginal note made it perfectly clear that this power can be used in execution. Having this enactment before it, in my view, if the Legislature had intended that the power to grant instalments should he possessed by the executing Court, it would not have rested with using the expression “the Court.”
8. It is true that the executing Court has all the powers of the Court which passed the decree in executing it, but while s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act empowers the Court to grant instalments after it has passed a decree, it is unlike s. 20 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act in that it does not empower it to do so in execution.
9. Instalments may be granted by a Court even when passing a decree and the power to grant instalments is not necessarily a power of execution. Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not, therefore, empower the Court to which a decree is transferred for execution to exercise the powers under s. 24 of the Bombay Money-lenders Act. The learned Judge before whom execution was going on was, therefore, quite right in holding that he had no power to grant instalments.
10. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
11. Appeal dismissed.
Alert