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Ranchhoddas Karsondas v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City, Bombay

Bombay High Court
Mar 18, 1954
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Judgment Summary — Chagla, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

A public notice under section 22(1) was issued for the assessment year 1945–1946 on May 1, 1945, fixing a 65-day period for returns. The assessee filed a return on January 5, 1950, showing assessable income of Rs. 1,935 and adding a footnote that his wife had sold old ornaments and deposited Rs. 59,026 in the firm Assar Syndicate in which he was a partner.

On February 27, 1950 the Income-Tax Officer issued a notice under section 34 and subsequently made an assessment order on February 26, 1951, holding that Rs. 50,026 (as stated in the order) constituted the income of the assessee and assessing him to tax on that income. The assessee challenged that assessment before the Tribunal, which upheld the assessment. The present reference requires answers to questions arising from those proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Taxing Department could initiate proceedings under section 34 after the assessee had made a return under section 22(3).
  2. Whether a voluntary return that shows income below the assessable limit (i.e., a return where the assessee on his own view shows no assessable income) qualifies as a return under section 22(3).
  3. Whether the assessment made under section 34(1) on February 26, 1951 was valid in light of the period of limitation prescribed by section 34(3).

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel Mr. Joshi's Contentions

  • The assessment had to be made within the period of limitation under section 34(3) — i.e., by March 31, 1950 — and the Department could not use section 34 to extend that period by issuing a notice after the return was made.
  • The return filed on January 5, 1950 was not a return under section 22(3) because, on the assessee's own showing, he had no assessable income; therefore the Department could proceed under section 34(1) as if no return had been made within the time limited by section 22(1).
  • In cases where, in Mr. Joshi's view, it is not possible to make an order of assessment on the materials available, the Department may proceed under section 34(1) if no return was made within the time under section 22(1).

The opinion records these contentions by Mr. Joshi. The text does not set out a detailed, separate statement of the Department's (or other party's) affirmative arguments beyond the Department's actions and the rationale inferred by the Court for those actions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Habakchand Makanji & Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City Principle that notice under section 34 is necessary only if no return has been made; where an assessee voluntarily makes a return, no question arises under section 34 of assessment escaping. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that once a voluntary return is made under section 22(3), the Department cannot proceed under section 34 and must assess the return under section 23.
Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Sultan Ali Gherami (Calcutta High Court) The Calcutta High Court held (in provisions analogous to the Income Tax Act) that a return is not a return under the relevant subsection unless it is a return of assessable income. The Court considered and rejected this view as unacceptable in the context of the Income Tax Act, described it as obiter in that case, and held that a voluntary return showing income below the assessable limit can constitute a return under section 22(3).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory interpretation of sections 22 and 34 and proceeded step by step:

  1. Structure of section 22: Sub‑section (1) provides for a public notice with a time limit to make returns; sub‑section (2) allows the Income‑Tax Officer to give individual notices; and sub‑section (3) permits any person who has not furnished a return within the time allowed by sub‑sections (1) or (2) to furnish a return "at any time before the assessment is made." The Court emphasised that sub‑section (3) expressly permits a voluntary return if no assessment has yet been made.
  2. Scope of section 34: Section 34 can be used in two situations — where no return is made by the assessee, or where a return has been made and it results in an assessment that omits or under‑assesses income. The Court concluded from a plain reading that once a return has been made (under section 22(3)), the Department cannot then invoke section 34 simply to extend the limitation period; the Department must proceed to assess the return under the provisions dealing with assessment (section 23).
  3. On delay by the Department: The Court rejected the Department's apparent attempt to use section 34 (and its extension of limitation by issue of notice) to remedy its own delay. The Court held that if the Department fails to act (for example, by issuing a notice under section 22(2) or by making an assessment under section 23) and thereby allows an assessee to exercise the right under section 22(3) to file a return, the Department cannot thereafter resort to section 34.
  4. On whether the return was a "return" under section 22(3): The Court rejected the contention that a return is not a return for section 22(3) purposes if it shows income below the assessable limit. The Court reasoned that nothing prevents a person from filing a return showing income below the assessable limit and that the Department might take a different view (as it did in the present case where the Department treated the Rs. 59,026 as the assessee's income). The Court found the Calcutta High Court view (that such a return cannot be a section 22(3) return) to be unacceptable and, in the context of that decision, largely obiter.
  5. Limitation under section 34(3): Independently, the Court held that the assessment order dated February 26, 1951 was bad because it was made after the period of limitation specified by section 34(3). The period is four years from the last date of the year in which the income became first assessable; since that year ended on March 31, 1946, the assessment order was made beyond the statutory limitation.
  6. Combined result: Because the notice under section 34 was not valid once a voluntary return had been filed, and because the later assessment was also time‑barred, the assessment had to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Both questions submitted on the reference were answered in the negative.

Direct implications and disposition:

  • The notice issued under section 34 was not valid once the assessee had made a voluntary return under section 22(3).
  • The assessment order made on February 26, 1951 was also bad on the additional ground that it was made after the period of limitation prescribed by section 34(3).
  • The Commissioner was ordered to pay the costs.

The opinion does not elaborate broader doctrinal consequences beyond the effect on the present proceedings. The direct effect is that the Department's resort to section 34 after a voluntary return was filed is impermissible and the impugned assessment must be set aside; the opinion does not state that it establishes a broader rule beyond the statutory interpretation applied in this case.

Additional Identifying Information from the Opinion

Attorney for applicant: J.P. Pandit.

Attorney for respondent: N.K. Petigara.

Show all summary ...

Chagla, C.J:—

The answer which we have to give to the questions submitted to us on this reference is both simple and obvious. A public notice was issued under s. 22(1) and the period fixed under that section was 65 days. The notice was issued in respect of the assessment year 1945-1946 and that was on May 1, 1945. The assessee made a return on January 5, 1950 and in the return he showed his assessable income as Rs. 1,935. He added a foot-note to his return to the following effect:

“My wife has sold her old ornaments and deposited the sum of Rs. 59,026 in the firm of Assar Syndicate in which I am partner.”

On February 27, 1950 the Income-Tax Officer issued a notice upon the assessee under s. 34 and he made an assessment order on February 26, 1951, holding that the sum of Rs. 50,026 constituted the income of the assessee and assessing him to tax on that income. Now, it is this assessment order that was challenged before the Tribunal by the assessee and the Tribunal upheld that order.

Now, the order is challenged firstly on the ground that the proceedings which were initiated under s. 34 were not valid proceedings and inasmuch as the proceedings were not valid the order was an invalid order. The scheme of s. 22 is fairly clear. Sub-s. (1) of s. 22 provides for a public notice, sub-s. (2) provides for a notice by the Income Tax Officer upon individual assessees, and sub-s. (3), which is the material sub-section, provides that if any person has not furnished a return within the time allowed by or under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2), to quote the material words, “he may furnish a return at any time before the assessment is made.” Therefore, there is a time limit under sub-s. (1) of s. 22 to make a return, there is a time limit also under sub-s. (2) to make a return, but notwithstanding the fact that the time so limited has passed a person is entitled to make a return provided before he makes a return, no assessment is made. Now, this is exactly what the assessee did in this case. Although the time limited by the public notice under sub-s. (1) of s. 22 had long passed, no assessment was made upon him. Therefore, availing himself of the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 22, he made a voluntary return on January 5, 1950.

Now, the question is whether it is open to the Taxing Department to avail itself of s. 34 once a return is made under sub-s. (3) of s. 22. Section 34 can be availed of in one of two eventualities. If no return is made by the assessee the Department can proceed under s. 34, or if a return is made and the return results in an assessment and it is found that certain income has escaped assessment or has been under assessed then proceedings can be taken under s. 34. But it is clear on a plain reading of s. 34 that action cannot be taken under s. 34 once a return has been made. Then the Department must proceed to assess the assessee on the return made by him.

Mr. Joshi contends that in this case the return was made by the assessee on January 5, 1950 and within the period of limitation laid down under s. 34(3) the assessment had to be made by March 31, 1950. It seems that the Department was not in a position to complete the assessment of the assessee within the period of limitation, and by resorting to s. 34 it wanted the period of limitation to be extended by one year because s. 34 extends the period by one year if notice is issued under that section. Mr. Joshi says that it is not open to the assessee to wait for any length of time and then to make a return practically towards the end of the period of limitation and thereby prevent a proper assessment. Now, it is entirely the fault of the Department if there is delay in the making of the return. Two clear options are open to the Department. It is open to the Department to issue a notice under sub-s. (2) of s. 22 and if no return is made within the time fixed by that notice they can proceed under s. 23(4) to a best judgment assessment, or if the time for making a return under sub-s. (1) of s. 22 has expired and no return has been made it is open to the Department to proceed under s. 34 on the basis that no return has been made, and the assessee is liable to be taxed under s. 34. But if the Department takes no action at all either one or the other, allows time to pass and permits the assessee to make a valuntary return which he is entitled to do under sub-s. (3) of s. 22, then it is not open to the Department to proceed under s. 34. The return having been made, it must be disposed of and the income of the assessee must be assessed as laid down in s. 23, Now, it is difficult to understand why the Department could not have proceeded under s. 23 and why it should have resorted to s. 34. Even assuming that it took the view that the sum of Rs. 59,026 was the income of the assessee, it was open to the Department to assess him to that income under s. 23, but, as we pointed out earlier, the sole reason, it seems, for the Department to proceed under s. 34 was to extend the period of limitation. Now, it is not open to the Taxing Department by availing itself of a wrong procedure to extend the period of limitation laid down in a Statute.

Now, Mr. Joshi's further contention is that the return which the assessee made was not a return at all under sub-s. (3) of s. 22. Mr. Joshi says what s. 23(3) requires is that the return must be made if a person has an assessable income, and Mr. Joshi says that on his own showing the assessee has no assessable income, and therefore the return that he made was not a return contemplated by sub-s. (3) of s. 22. We are not prepared to accept that contention. There is an obligation cast by s. 22 to make a return of assessable income if a notice is served. But that does not mean that it is not open to the assessee to make a return even though the income he may show is not an assessable income. We do not understand why the assessee should take the risk of not making a return merely because he himself takes the view that his income is not an assessable income. The Department may take a different view. Take this very case. The view of the assessee was that his income was only Rs. 1,935. He showed Rs. 59,026 as an income belonging to his wife and yet the Department took the view that Rs. 59,026 did constitute the income of the assessee. Therefore even from that point of view the return made by the assessee, when all the figures were taken into consideration, was a return, in the opinion of the Department, of an assessable income.

The other contention put forward by Mr. Joshi is that in a case like this it is not possible to make an order of assessment and therefore it was open to the Department to proceed under s. 34(1) when no return was made under s. 22(3) within the time limited by s. 22(1). Now, sub-s. (3) of s. 22 provides as the terminus of the period of limitation the making of the assessment, and we do not understand why an assessment could not be made in this case which would have prevented the assessee from making a return under sub-s. (3) of s. 22. As already pointed out, if the assessee did not make a return within the time limit prescribed sub-s. (2) of s. 22, it was open to the Department to initiate proceedings under s. 34 on the ground that no return was made. But it does not choose to initiate proceedings under s. 34 and only resorts to those proceedings under s. 34 after a return has been made under sub-s. (3). That the law does not permit.

Now, there is a decision of this Court very much in point reported in Habakchand Makanji & Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City.(3) In that case we held that:

“Notice under s. 34 is only necessary if at the end of the assessment year no return has been made by the assessee, but where the assessee himself chooses voluntarily to make a return, no question can arise under s. 34 of assessment escaping, and therefore, there is no necessity to serve any notice under s. 34.”

Mr. Joshi has relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Sultan Ali Gherami(4). The Calcutta High Court was not considering Income Tax Act but it was considering provisions analogous to those contained in the Income Tax Act, and Mr. Justice Chakravartti who delivered the judgment in that case has taken the view that the return was not a return within the meaning of s. 24(3) unless it is a return of assessable income. Now, with very great respect, we are unable to accept that view. At page 442 the learned Judge says:

“It is true that there is nothing to prevent a person from filing a return showing an income below the assessable limit, in response to a notice under s. 24(1) (which corresponds to s. 22(1) of the Income Tax Act) but the question we are considering is whether a particular return, not filed in fact under s. 24(1) or s. 24(3) (which corresponds to s. 23(3) of the Act), is yet having regard to its contents capable of being treated as a return under the one or the other section. In my opinion the return in the present case is not so capable.”

It is difficult to understand if it is open to a person to file a return which shows an income below the assessable limit under what other section would such a return be made except under s. 22(3); and it must also be said that this opinion of the learned Judge is obiter because in that particular case after a notice under s. 24(1) was issued there was also a notice under s. 24(2) corresponding to on s. 22(2). Notice under s. 24(2) was held bad, but the view taken by the learned Judge was that although notice under s. 24(2) was bad it was impossible to hold on the facts of the case that the return was made in response to the public notice. Therefore, on the facts of the particular case the decision reached at by the Calcutta High Court may be understandable. But to take the view that a voluntary return made is not a return under s. 22(3) merely because the return is of an income which is not assessable is, in our opinion, with great respect, unacceptable and contrary to the scheme of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, in our opinion, the notice issued under s. 34 was not a valid notice.

With regard to the assessment order made on February 26, 1951, apart from the fact that the order is made as a result of proceedings under s. 34(1), it is also bad on the ground that it is made after the period of limitation. The period of limitation under s. 34(3) is four years from the last date of the year in which the income became first assessable and as that year ended on March 31, 1946, the assessment order was made four years beyond the period of limitation.

The result, therefore, is that we must answer the question submitted to us (1) in the negative and (2) also in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs.

Attorney for applicant: J.P Pandit.

Attorney for respondent: N.K Petigara.

Answer accordingly.
P.M.P