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Krishnaji Ramchandra Deshpande v. Raghunath Shankar Deshpande

Bombay High Court
Feb 13, 1953
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Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two appeals arising from suits Nos. 79 and 117 of 1943 brought by the same plaintiff to recover possession of various lands and a house-site. The properties in dispute were originally those of the plaintiff's adoptive father, Ramchandra, who adopted the plaintiff in 1930 and died on January 24, 1931. The plaintiff alleged he acquired possession as the adopted son but that in October 1936 Shankar (the deceased father of defendants Nos. 1 and 2) had the lands entered in his name in the records and dispossessed the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued Shankar's sons (defendants Nos. 1 and 2) and the tenants in possession.

Three separate suits were instituted: suit No. 633 of 1942 (filed July 13, 1942) concerning two fields (survey Nos. 270 and 295); suit No. 79 of 1943 (filed January 25, 1943) concerning survey No. 271 and a vacant house-site; and suit No. 117 of 1943 (filed January 25, 1943) concerning four fields (surveys 83/2, 84 of Kuroli, 244/2 of Mahim and 17 of Bhandi-Shegaon). Suit No. 633 was decreed (and later became the "principal" suit for hearing).

Defendants in suits 79 and 117 pleaded, among other things, that those suits were barred by Order II, rule 2 (O. II, r. 2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. By agreement (purshis and entries in the roznama) the three suits were to be heard together and the evidence was recorded in suit No. 633; however, there was no formal court order consolidating the suits nor any formal amendment bringing the claims of suits 79 and 117 into suit 633. The trial Court, on remand, dismissed suits 79 and 117 (except as to the house-site in suit No. 79) holding those suits barred under O. II, r. 2. The District Court affirmed. The plaintiff then appealed (S.A. No. 601 and S.A. No. 602 were identified earlier in the text; later in the judgment two appeal numbers are given in the result paragraph).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether suits Nos. 79 and 117 of 1943 were barred by Order II, rule 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure because the plaintiff had earlier filed suit No. 633 in respect of the same cause of action.
  2. Whether hearing the three suits together by agreement (purshis and a roznama entry) or recording evidence in the principal suit (No. 633) amounted to consolidation or an effective inclusion of all claims so as to avoid the bar of O. II, r. 2.
  3. Whether, for the purposes of O. II, r. 2(2), the relevant point of time for deciding the bar is the date of institution of the suits or the date when decrees are passed (i.e., whether the "afterwards" in the rule refers to omission relative to institution or decree).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff) — Mr. G. R. Madbhavi

  • Argued that because the three suits were heard together and evidence was given in the principal suit (No. 633), the bar under Order II, r. 2 should not apply to suits Nos. 79 and 117.
  • Contended that the correct point of time for applying O. II, r. 2(2) is the date of the decree (or hearing) rather than the date of institution of the suit.
  • Suggested that different occupants (tenants) in the respective suits justified separate suits against each tenant in possession.

Respondents (Defendants Nos. 1 and 2)

  • Raised the plea that suits Nos. 79 and 117 were barred under Order II, r. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiff had omitted or relinquished parts of his claim by earlier instituting suit No. 633.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mehbub Ali (Privy Council) Principle that possession of tenants is derivative of the title of the person under whom they hold; and authority for strict application of procedure despite individual hardship. The Court relied on it to hold that if defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no right to possession, their tenants likewise had none; and cited the Privy Council's observation that rules must be applied notwithstanding individual loss arising from non-compliance.
Ganesh Ramchandra v. Gopal Lakshman (this Court) Authority distinguishing cases where two suits are filed simultaneously — difficulty in deciding which was instituted first. Distinguished: the Court held Ganesh Ramchandra was inapplicable because in that case the suits were filed simultaneously; here the suits were filed on different dates (suit 633 much earlier).
Upendra Narain Roy v. Janaki Nath Roy (Calcutta decision) Illustrates circumstances where subsequent amendment was allowed to avoid the bar under Order II, r. 2. Distinguished: the present case lacked any subsequent amendment; Upendra Narain Roy is not analogous because there an amendment was permitted.
Ramchandra Vithal v. Gajanan Narain Shows that where causes of action differ (different properties/different defendants), O. II, r. 2 may not apply. Distinguished on facts: the Court observed that in that case causes of action were not the same, whereas in the present case the plaintiff's claim in all suits rested on the same adoption-based cause of action.
Kishan Narain v. Pala Mall Quoted in Mohammad Khalil Khan — cited for the principle that courts must give effect to rules without regard to individual loss caused by non-compliance. Referred to (via Mohammed Khalil Khan) in support of the proposition that procedural rules must be enforced even though enforcement may cause individual hardship to a party who failed to take corrective procedural steps.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the question primarily by reference to the language and timing required by Order II, rule 2(2). The reasoning proceeded as follows:

  1. Temporal focus: The Court examined whether O. II, r. 2(2) should be applied with reference to the date of institution of suits or the date of the decree. Reading the words "omits to sue" together with "afterwards" in O. II, r. 2(2), the Court concluded that the relevant point of time is the date of institution of the suit (i.e., omission is judged from the moment of institution), not the date of decree or when the matter was heard.
  2. Filing chronology and omission: Because suit No. 633 was instituted on July 13, 1942, and suits Nos. 79 and 117 were instituted on January 25, 1943, the plaintiff had omitted (or deliberately relinquished) parts of his claim when he first sued in suit No. 633. Thus, by the plain terms of O. II, r. 2(2), the later suits were barred unless properly included in the first suit by amendment or consolidation.
  3. Effect of hearing together: The Court found that although the parties subsequently agreed (via purshis and a roznama entry) that the suits be heard together and evidence be recorded in suit No. 633, there was no formal order of consolidation nor any amendment bringing claims of suits 79 and 117 into suit 633. The entry in the roznama was held not to be equivalent to a judicial order of consolidation.
  4. Practical remedies not pursued: The Court noted that the plaintiff could have sought an amendment to suit No. 633 or an order of consolidation to avoid the bar but did not do so. The absence of such formal steps meant the suits remained separately instituted and thus subject to O. II, r. 2(2).
  5. Tenants' possession: Relying on the Privy Council decision (Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mehbub Ali), the Court treated tenant possession as derivative of the defendants' title — if defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no right, neither did their tenants — and therefore separate suits against different tenants did not avoid the bar.
  6. Distinguishing authorities: The Court examined and distinguished earlier decisions relied upon by the plaintiff: Ganesh Ramchandra (simultaneous filings), Upendra Narain Roy (where amendment was allowed), and Ramchandra Vithal (different causes of action). On the facts of this case (same cause of action based on adoption and different filing dates), those authorities did not prevent the application of O. II, r. 2(2).
  7. Conclusion of law: Given (a) the earlier institution of suit No. 633, (b) the absence of formal consolidation/amendment, and (c) the correct interpretation of O. II, r. 2(2) as referring to the time of institution, the Court concluded that suits Nos. 79 and 117 were barred by O. II, r. 2(2).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court confirmed the decrees of the Courts below and dismissed the appeals. The judgment states: Appeals dismissed.

Direct implications:

  • The plaintiff's suits Nos. 79 and 117 of 1943 are barred by Order II, rule 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure because the plaintiff failed to include the whole of his claim when instituting suit No. 633 on July 13, 1942.
  • The lower courts' decrees dismissing those suits were affirmed and the appeals were dismissed with costs (the Court declined to extend sympathy because the plaintiff could have amended or sought consolidation earlier but did not).

No broader or novel precedent was announced; the decision applies existing rules (including the Privy Council authority cited) to the facts and emphasizes that formal procedural steps (amendment or consolidation) are required to avoid the bar in O. II, r. 2(2).

Appeals dismissed.

Reported judgment authored by Dixit, J.; costs awarded to respondents in the appeals.

Show all summary ...

Dixit, J.:—

These two appeals arise respectively from suits Nos. 79 and 117 of 1943 filed by the plaintiff-appellant to recover from defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and their tenants possession of the suit property. The facts leading up to the suits are shortly these.

The property in dispute in suit No. 79 is survey No. 271 and a vacant house-site. The property in dispute in suit No. 117 consists of four fields. The fields bear survey Nos. 83/2 and 84 of Kuroli, survey No. 244/2 of Mahim and survey No. 17 of Bhandi-Shegaon. These properties originally belonged to the adoptive father of the plaintiff. There was a third suit (No. 633 of 1942) and the property in dispute in that suit consisted of two fields bearing survey Nos. 270 and 295. The plaintiff's case was that these properties belonged to Ramchandra who adopted the plaintiff in 1930 and died on January 24, 1931. It was alleged by the plaintiff that he obtained possession of these lands as the adopted son of Ramchandra, but in October 1936 Shankar, the deceased father of defendants Nos. 1 and 2, got the lands entered in his name in the record of rights and relying upon the entries in the record of rights he dispossessed the plaintiff. As the plaintiff was dispossessed illegally, he filed the three suits for possession against Shankar's sons as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and against the tenants in possession of the suit property.

Suit No. 633 was filed on July 13, 1942; suit No. 79 was filed on January 25, 1943 and suit No. 117 was filed also on January 25, 1943.

The principal defence in suit No. 633 was that the plaintiff was not entitled to those properties because the properties came to Shankar, the father, who was the nearest Heir of Ramchandra in the Watan family.

Suit No. 633 has been decreed and it is unnecessary to refer to that suit, save for the purpose of considering the bar under Order II, r. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In suits Nos. 79 and 117 defendants Nos. 1 and 2 raised the plea, among others, that the plaintiff's suits were barred under Order II, r. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was, it appears, an ex-parte decree. Appeals were taken to the District Court and the learned Assistant Judge reversed the decrees and remanded the suits to the trial Court for disposal on the merits.

Upon the two suits going back to the trial Court, the trial Court then heard the two suits and dismissed them, save in the case of suit No. 79 with respect to the house-site, holding that suits Nos. 79 and 117 were barred under O. II, r. 2.

From these decrees appeals were preferred in the District Court and the learned Assistant Judge affirmed the view of the learned trial Judge, dismissed the plaintiff's appeals and confirmed the decrees of the trial Court. From the appellate decrees the plaintiff in suit No. 79 has preferred S.A No. 601 and the plaintiff in suit No. 117 has preferred S.A No. 602. Both these appeals involve a common question of law and it will be convenient to dispose, as was done in the lower Court, of these two appeals also by a common judgment.

Mr. G.R Madbhavi who appears for the plaintiff in each case contends that the plainti's suits are not barred under O. II, r. 2. O. II, r. 2, so far as material, provides as follows:

“(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

(2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

Mr. Madbhavi says that inasmuch as suits Nos. 633, 79 and 117 were heard together, the bar imposed by O. II, r. 2, does not apply. It is not in dispute that suit No. 633 was filed on July 13, 1942, while suits Nos. 79 and 117 were filed on January 25, 1943. It is clear that these two suits were not, therefore, filed together, although suits Nos. 79 and 117 were filed on the same day. The plaintiff in each case was the same. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in each case were also the same, but defendants, other than defendants Nos. 1 and 2, were different and those defendants were the tenants of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. In considering the question of the bar imposed by O. II, r. 2, it is necessary to consider what the plaintiff's claim was in respect of the cause of action. The plaintiff's case was that as the adopted son, he was entitled to possession of the properties in all the three suits. His title was, therefore, based upon his adoption. The defence was that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to remain in possession as the nearest heirs of the plaintiff's father Ramchandra. But it is clear that the bar of O. II, r. 2 is to be looked to from the point of view of the plaintiff's claim and not from the point of view of the defence.

Although suit No. 633 and suits Nos. 79 and 117 were filed on two different dates, a purshis was filed in each suit asking that all the three suits should be heard together. The purshis (Exhibit 20) in suit No. 633 was filed on July 1, 1943. The purshis in suit No. 79, which is Ex. 17, was filed on December 18, 1944 and the purshis in suit No. 117, which is Ex. 23, was also filed on December 18, 1944. It is clear, therefore, that by common consent the three suits were to be heard together. With regard to the issues, the issues in all the three suits were framed on February 12, 1944. In suit No. 79 issue No. 8 ran Dixit J. as follows: “Is the suit barred under O. II, r. 2?” and a similar issue was framed in suit No. 117 which was issue No. 8 and it ran as follows: “Is the suit barred by O. II, r. 2?” It is clear, therefore, that the issues in all the three suits were framed on the same day. The purshis, Ex. 20, in suit No. 633 which was filed on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendants ran as follows:

“The aforesaid suit has been fixed to-day for the framing of issues. There are two other suits between the plaintiff and the defendants viz. suit No. 79 of 1943 and suit No. 117 of 1943 and the latter suits have been fixed for the filing of the written statement. All the aforesaid three suits are of the same nature and are between the same parties. So the issues in all the three suits should be framed at one and the same time.”

The purshis, Ex. 17, signed by the pleader for the plaintiff and the pleader for the defendants stated that:

“suit No. 79 and suit No. 633 of 1942 and suit No. 117 of 1943 have been pending between the same parties in this Court. The contentions of the parties in the three suits are the same and the evidence is to be given in suit No. 633 of 1942 and the same is to be read in suit No. 79. All the three suits are to be heard together. Therefore, with suit No. 633 this suit should be fixed.”

The purshis, Ex. 23, in suit No. 117, which was signed by the pleader for the plaintiff and the pleader for the defendants is in similar language. The question then arises whether the Courts below were right in saying that suits Nos. 79 and 117 are barred under Order II, r. 2. It has not been contended by Mr. Madbhavi that the cause of action in all the three suits, is not the same. The plaintiff claimed his rights to the properties in the three suits by reason of his adoption and the plaintiff stated that he was entitled to possession of the properties as the adopted son of Ramchandra because the defendants had no right to possession and also the defendants' tenants had no right to possession. But Mr. Madbhavi's principal argument is that in this case all the three suits were heard together and, therefore, the bar of Order II, r. 2 will not apply. A reference to the record in the three suits shows that there was no order of consolidation by the Court. The roznama in suit No. 79 states that suits Nos. 79 and 633 were consolidated, but, as I said, there is no actual order of consolidation and none has been pointed out 1953 to me. The entry in the roznama, therefore, cannot be said to amount to a consolidation and the entry in the roznama cannot be said to be a judicial order. A roznama merely records as to what happened on the day on which the suit was fixed Raghunath for hearing. It is to be noted that the issues were framed in all the three suits on the same day. If there was an order for consolidation, then it is hardly likely that issues based upon O. II, r. 2 would at all arise in suits Nos. 79 and 117. If the suits were consolidated, it means that there was but one suit and where there is one suit the bar of O. II, r. 2 will not arise. The fact that issues under O. II, r. 2 were framed in suits Nos. 79 and 117 shows that there was no order of consolidation. It is not suggested that there was ever any order passed by the Court by way of an amendment i.e, bringing the claims in suits Nos. 79 and 117 in the suit No. 633. The result, therefore, was that for the sake of convenience the three suits were heard together and evidence was recorded in suit No. 633. I have no doubt that it was easy for the plaintiff either to ask for an amendment bringing the claims in suits Nos. 79 and 117 in suit No. 633 or to apply to the Court asking that the three suits should be consolidated. There was neither any amendment made nor any order of consolidation. If so, the result is that the suits must be taken to be filed respectively on July 13, 1942, January 25, 1943 and January 25, 1943. But we are here concerned with the principal suit No. 633. It cannot be suggested that suits Nos. 79 and 117 were filed simultaneously with suit No. 633 because the interval between the institution of the three suits is an interval of 6-7 months. It is true that suits Nos. 79 and 117 were filed on the same day and it may-well be that those suits were filed simultaneously, although the two suits came to be numbered subsequently as 79 and 117.

Now, Mr. Madbhavi argues that what we have to look to for the purpose of determining the bar of O. II, r. 2 is the point of time when the decree is passed and not the point of time when the suit is instituted. In this connection the language of O. II, r. 2(2) may be contrasted with the language of O. II, r. 2(3). Order II, r. 2(3) speaks of an omission to sue or intentionally relinquishing a portion of the claim, while O. II, r. 2(3) speaks of person being entitled to more than one relief in respect of the cause of action, and while considering O. II, r. 2(3) one has to consider the question of the leave of the Court. No question of the leave of the Court arises under O. II, r. 2(2). In a case where the leave of the Court is to be sought, it may be possible to argue that the point of time is not the point of time of the institution of the suit, but the point of time is the point of time of the passing of the decree. But here again it is unnecessary to express any final opinion upon the question because that question does not strictly arise. Confining, therefore, my observations to Order II, r. 2(2), the question for consideration is whether, as Mr. Madbhavi contends, the point of time is not the date of the filing of the suit but the date of the passing of the decree. But if one closely looks at the language of O. II, r. 2(2), it is clear that the point of time under O. II, r. 2(2) is the point of time of the institution of the suit. This is clear from the language of the rule itself because some meaning has to be given to the expression “afterwards” occurring in O. II, r. 2(2) and the expression “afterwards” can be construed only with reference to what precedes it viz. “omits to sue.” When, therefore, the two expressions “omits to sue” and “afterwards” are considered together, it must follow, I think, that the point of time is not the date of the passing of the decree but the date of the institution of the suit. If that is so, then it is clear that when the plaintiff filed suit No. 633 of 1942, he did not include in that suit the whole of his claim in respect of the cause of action and, therefore, the plaintiff must be taken to have invited the operation of O. II, r. 2(2) because the plaintiff must be taken to have either omitted to sue or intentionally relinquished a portion of his claim. Whether it is the result of an omission or the result of a relinquishment, it makes no difference—not any difference even when the plaintiff subsequently files a suit and that is the bar imposed by O. II, r. 2(2). It was suggested that in this case the persons in possession were different tenants and, therefore, the plaintiff was required to bring separate suits. But that, I think, cannot clearly be the case in view of the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mehbub Ali.(5) The possession of the tenants was under defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and if defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no right to possession, it must follow that the tenants under defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had equally no right to possession. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of this Court reported in Ganesh Ramchandra v. Gopal Lakshman(6). But that was a case where two suits were filed simultaneously and it is difficult to say in a case where two suits are filed simultaneously which of the two suits was filed first. According to Order IV, every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint and the plaint has to be presented either to the Court or to the clerk on behalf of the Court. It is difficult to say afterwards in such circumstances when two suits are filed simultaneously which suit was instituted first. That is precisely the view, taken by this Court in Ganesh Ramchandra's case. That case is, in my opinion, therefore, distinguishable and cannot govern this case. Reliance was then placed upon a Calcutta decision reported in Upendra Narain Roy v. Janaki Nath Roy(7). But that case can again be distinguished because in that case there was actually a subsequent amendment allowed. This will be clear from a reference to page 315 of the report. Mr. Madbhavi also relied upon the case reported in Ramchandra Vithal v. Gajanan Narain(8). That case also shows that the causes of action in the two suits were not the same, that different properties were involved in the two actions and different defendants were in possession. It is clear, however, that the circumstances of the properties being different or different defendants being in possession may or may not make any difference. What is more is that for the operation of O. II, r. 2, it must be in respect of the cause of action, which means that it must be the particular cause, of action. It is true that in O. II, r. 2(1) the words used are “the cause of action”, whereas the words used in O. II, r. 2(3) are “the same cause of action.” Even so, “the cause of action” as used in O. II, r. 2(1) must mean “the particular cause of action.” Where there are different causes of action, O. II, r. 2 will not apply; where the causes of action are the same, the bar imposed by O. II, r. 2 may apply.

For all these reasons the Courts below were, in my opinion, right in holding that the plaintiff's suits Nos. 79 and 117 of 1943 were barred. It follows that the decrees appealed from will be confirmed and these appeals will be dismissed.

As regards the costs of this appeal, there was, I think, some misapprehension in the mind of the pleader appearing for the plaintiff. It was probably thought that the moment the three suits are ordered to be heard together, there would be no question of O. II, r. 2 applying. It is noteworthy that the issues in the three suits were framed on the same day; the purshis were filed and evidence was agreed to be given in the main suit No. 633. It was certainly open to the plaintiff either to have his Plaint in suit No. 633 amended or to apply for an order of consolidation. But the importance of these steps was not realised and the result was that the plaintiff has been made to suffer for what appears to be evidently a technicality. In this connection it is pertinent to recall the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mohammed Khalil Khan's case(9) cited above. At page 80 this is what they say, after quoting an earlier judgment in the case of Kishan Narain v. Pala Mall(10).

“…it is the duty of the Courts to interpret and carry into effect those rules uninfluenced by the consideration of the individual loss that may be occasioned by disobedience of the provisions.”

If this test is applied, and remembering that the defendants took the plea of O. II, r. 2 at the earliest possible opportunity, it seems to me that there is no good reason as to why the plaintiff should be treated with any sympathy. The plaintiff had, I think, sufficient opportunity to correct what was initially a mistake, but the mistake was persisted in. If that is so, I do not see any valid ground for depriving the defendants of the costs of these two appeals.

The result is that S.A No. 601 of 1950 fails and the same will be dismissed with costs and for the same reasons S.A No. 692 of 1950 also fails and that too will be dismissed with costs.

Appeals dismissed.
K.B.S