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Sujaniram Daryaosingh v. Lal Shyamshah And Lal Bhagwan Shah And Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
This application was brought by Sujaniram under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash an order dated 16-11-1952 of the Election Tribunal, RaJ-nandgaon (respondent 4), and to restrain the Election Commission of India (respondent 5) from holding a fresh election.
The facts as stated in the opinion: Chauki Constituency (Durg district) had one seat reserved for Scheduled Tribes. In the 1951 election the candidates were Sujaniram (the petitioner), Lal Shyamshah (respondent 1) and Prayagsingh (respondent 2), all members of Scheduled Tribes. Nomination papers required a declaration, verified by a Magistrate under Rule 6 of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951.
The three candidates filed nominations on 15-11-1951. The Returning Officer rejected Prayagsingh's nomination at scrutiny on 17-11-1951 on the ground that the verifying officer, Shri Kashiram (who described himself as an Additional District and Sessions Judge), was not a "Magistrate" within Rule 6. The election was held on 2-12-1951 and Sujaniram was declared elected (10,717 votes) over Lal Shyamshah (10,592 votes).
Ramlal (a voter in the constituency) filed an election petition on 11-3-1952 challenging Sujaniram's election, principally contending that the Returning Officer had illegally rejected Prayagsingh's nomination because the declaration had been properly verified by Shri Kashiram as a Magistrate. The Election Tribunal accepted Ramlal's contention (by majority) that the declaration was valid and that the illegal rejection had materially affected the election, and declared the election void. The Chairman dissented on the material-effect point.
Sujaniram then applied to this Court under Article 226 to quash the Tribunal's order. The Court heard arguments on both maintainability and merits and ultimately disposed of the application on its merits.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this Court could, under Article 226 of the Constitution, entertain an application challenging the Election Tribunal's order declaring the election void (i.e., maintainability of writ jurisdiction in the circumstances).
- Whether the verification of the candidate's declaration by Shri Kashiram satisfied Rule 6's requirement that the declaration be verified by a "Magistrate" (i.e., the legal meaning and scope of "Magistrate" for the purpose of Rule 6 and the General Clauses Act definition).
- Whether the Returning Officer's rejection of Prayagsingh's nomination paper was illegal and, if so, whether that illegal rejection "materially affected" the result of the election within the meaning of Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant / Petitioner (Sujaniram) — Counsel: Shri R. M. Hazarnavis
- The Election Tribunal was manifestly wrong in holding that Shri Kashiram was a "Magistrate" within the meaning of Rule 6 and that the declaration was valid.
- The burden to establish that the illegal rejection had materially affected the election lay on Ramlal (the petitioner in the election petition), and that burden was not discharged.
- There was no basis for the conclusion reached by the two members of the Tribunal that the rejection materially affected the result.
- He did not press two objections set out in paragraph 4(b) and (c) of the application (these objections were not pursued before the Court).
Respondent (Ramlal) — (as recorded in the Tribunal proceedings)
- Main contention: Returning Officer illegally rejected Prayagsingh's nomination; the declaration complied with Rule 6 and Shri Kashiram was a Magistrate for the purpose of verification.
Respondents' Counsel (Shri M. N. Phadke) — Preliminary / Maintainability Objections
- Raised a preliminary objection under Article 329(b) of the Constitution: election matters should be called in question only by an election petition presented as provided by law (i.e., challenge to the use of Article 226).
- Argued Article 226 jurisdiction could not be exercised because no legal/civil right had been infringed; the right to vote is a special statutory right and must be regulated by election law (relied strongly on the Supreme Court decision in Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency).
- Also relied on reasoning from The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta regarding the foundation of Article 226 jurisdiction being the existence of a right.
- On the merits, he urged that the Tribunal's interpretation of "Magistrate" was correct and that the rejection of the nomination materially affected the result.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency (Supreme Court) | Principle that the right to vote or to stand is not a civil right but created by statute; election matters are to be determined in accordance with the special law creating the remedy. | Referred to by respondents' counsel to argue Article 226 was not available; the Court declined to decide the objection and proceeded to decide the application on merits, assuming for the purpose of the application that Article 226 jurisdiction existed. |
| The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta | Observation that the existence of a right is the foundation for Article 226 jurisdiction (the concluding words of Article 226 must be read in context). | Referred to by respondents' counsel; the Court noted the authority but did not decide the maintainability objection and proceeded on merits, assuming Article 226 power for the purposes of the application. |
| Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899) AC 99 | Interpretation principle: the word "include" in interpretation clauses is generally enumerative and enlarging in scope, not exhaustive. | Adopted to support that the General Clauses Act's use of "include" indicates an inclusive (not exhaustive) definition of "Magistrate." |
| Bapu Vithal v. Secretary of State, AIR 1932 Bom 370 | Where a term is interpreted as "including" it declares what may be encompassed within the term when circumstances require, not a strict exhaustive definition. | Used to support the view that the General Clauses Act's definition of "Magistrate" is inclusive and may cover persons not strictly appointed under the Code in all circumstances. |
| In re Strauss & Co., Ltd., AIR 1937 Bom 15 | The word "include" in an interpretation clause is enumerative and not exhaustive; has extending force. | Referred to for the same interpretative principle in construing the word "Magistrate" in the General Clauses Act. |
| Panchanatham Pillai v. Emperor, AIR 1929 Mad 487 | Held that the definition of "Magistrate" in the General Clauses Act is not confined to Magistrates exercising jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Code; it merely includes them. | Cited as authority that the General Clauses Act definition of "Magistrate" is not confined to CrPC-appointed magistrates and may include others exercising magistrate-like powers. |
| Maha Ram v. Emperor, AIR 1918 All 168 | On the contrast between the words "means" and "includes": "means" is commonly used when a definition is intended to be exhaustive. | Applied to distinguish an inclusive definition ("includes") from an exhaustive one ("means") when interpreting "Magistrate." |
| Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (1914) 1 KB 641 | Courts may consult standard authorities, including dictionaries, to assist in determining the ordinary meaning of words in statutes. | Adopted to justify consulting dictionaries for the ordinary meaning of "Magistrate" where the General Clauses Act definition permitted an ordinary-sense inquiry. |
| Ripon Housing Order, 1938 In re (1939) 2 KB 838 | Use of the Oxford English Dictionary in statutory interpretation (example approved by court). | Referred to as an example of courts approving dictionary meanings for interpreting statutory words; used to support reliance on dictionaries for "Magistrate." |
| Wamanrao Deorao v. Shrikumar Jaikumar, AIR 1946 Nag 42; Beohar Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1948 Nag 228; Harish Chandra v. Rex, AIR 1949 All 15 | Instances where courts have freely used dictionaries in construing statutory words. | Collected as supporting authorities showing the practice of using dictionaries in statutory interpretation; the Court relied on the same approach for the term "Magistrate." |
| Emperor v. Ali, 5 Ind Cas 915 (Lah) | An instance where a Sessions Judge purported to exercise powers under Section 156 Criminal P.C.; the decision held the Sessions Judge was in error because the section refers specifically to a Magistrate empowered under Section 190. | The Court distinguished this authority as not applicable to the present case because that case dealt with a particular CrPC provision; the Court here relied on the General Clauses Act definition rather than provisions of the Code. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main stages: (A) maintainability and jurisdiction, and (B) merits (interpretation of "Magistrate," validity of the verification, and material effect of the rejection).
(A) Maintainability and Jurisdiction
- The Court recorded and summarized the maintainability objections advanced by respondents' counsel under Article 329(b) and by reliance on Ponnuswami and other authorities that election rights are statutory/special rights and remedy should be under the election law.
- The Court expressly stated it was not necessary to decide these preliminary objections because it would dispose of the application on the merits. For the purpose of the application the Court assumed that Article 226 jurisdiction to question the Election Tribunal's order existed.
(B) Merits — Interpretation of Rule 6 and the Meaning of "Magistrate"
- Rule 6 required that, for a reserved seat, the candidate's declaration be verified by a Magistrate. The term "Magistrate" was not defined in the Representation of the People Act or the Rules; Rule 2(6) provided that the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies.
- The Court relied on Section 3(32) of the General Clauses Act, which states: "'Magistrate' shall include every person exercising all or any of the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force." The Court emphasized that the word "include" is used (an inclusive definition) and accordingly may broaden the ordinary meaning.
- Petitioner's argument (Shri Hazarnavis) was that only persons appointed under Section 12 of the Code could be "Magistrates" and that a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge is not such a Magistrate. He relied on the structure of the Code and appointment powers under Section 12.
- The Court examined the factual position of Shri Kashiram: he was a confirmed Subordinate Judge who, by a provincial government notification dated 12-12-1944, was invested with powers of a Magistrate of the first class; he later was appointed (by notifications under Article 233 of the Constitution) as an Additional Judge of the District Court and of the Court of Session. Those notifications did not cancel the earlier notification investing Subordinate Judges with first-class magistrate powers. No withdrawal under Section 41 of the Code had been shown.
- The Court held that the appointment as Additional Sessions Judge did not oust or automatically divest him of the magistrate powers conferred earlier: the doctrine of merger did not apply, and Section 40 of the Code contemplates that a person may hold and exercise two sets of powers unless the Provincial Government otherwise directs.
- As an alternative line of reasoning, the Court explained that the General Clauses Act's definition is inclusive; it referred to authorities (Dilworth, Bapu Vithal, In re Strauss, Panchanatham Pillai, Maha Ram) to show that "include" enlarges rather than restricts the meaning and that where an inclusive definition is used it is permissible to look to the ordinary meaning of the word (with assistance from dictionaries and ordinary usage authorities).
- The Court also cited Camden and other decisions to justify consulting dictionaries. Using dictionary meanings (Oxford, Webster's, Chambers), the Court noted a "Magistrate" is a civil officer charged with administration of laws; Shri Kashiram, as an Additional Sessions Judge, was administering and enforcing law and empowered to administer oath or affirmation under the Indian Oaths Act, and thus fell within the ordinary meaning as well.
- On these grounds, the Court concluded that Shri Kashiram was a "Magistrate" within the meaning of Rule 6 and that the verification of Prayagsingh's declaration complied with Rule 6; consequently, the Returning Officer's rejection of the nomination was illegal.
(C) Material Effect of the Illegal Rejection
- The Court examined the evidence (including Prayagsingh's written statement and oral evidence, and the witnesses of Sujaniram). Prayagsingh stated he intended to contest and believed he had a fair chance; after rejection he only later worked for Lal Shyamshah following dismissal of his Article 226 petition.
- Ramlal's evidence expressed the belief that an educated man like Prayagsingh would have been returned and that Prayagsingh's presence as a candidate would have affected the result.
- The Court disagreed with the Chairman of the Tribunal who held votes cast for Lal Shyamshah would necessarily have been cast for Prayagsingh. The Court reasoned one cannot with certainty predict vote transfers but concluded that it was reasonably possible that some votes for Sujaniram might have gone to Prayagsingh had he been a candidate.
- Finding that there was evidence to sustain the Tribunal majority's conclusion, the Court held the illegal rejection had materially affected the election result within the meaning of Section 100(1)(c) of the Act.
- The Court reiterated that the question whether the result was materially affected is one of fact within the exclusive domain of the Tribunal and that under Article 226 the Court does not act as an appellate body on pure questions of fact. As the Tribunal's factual finding was not vitiated by any error of law, the Court would not disturb it.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application under Article 226 was dismissed. The Court agreed with the majority of the Election Tribunal that (a) the verification by Shri Kashiram satisfied Rule 6 since he was a "Magistrate" within the meaning of the General Clauses Act and in ordinary understanding, (b) the Returning Officer's rejection of Prayagsingh's nomination paper was illegal, and (c) the illegal rejection had materially affected the result of the election under Section 100(1)(c). The Court therefore declined to interfere with the Tribunal's order declaring the election void. The application was dismissed with costs (counsel's fee Rs. 100/-).
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Election Tribunal's declaration that the election from the Chauki Constituency was wholly void stands; the petitioner (Sujaniram) failed to obtain the writ relief sought under Article 226.
- On legal interpretation: The Court affirmed that the General Clauses Act's inclusive definition of "Magistrate" supports treating persons who exercise magistrate-like powers (including an Additional Sessions Judge who had earlier been invested with first-class magistrate powers by notification and who continued to administer oaths and enforce law) as "Magistrates" for the purpose of Rule 6. The Court relied upon the inclusive character of "include" and auxiliary authorities and dictionary meanings to reach this conclusion.
- On scope of Article 226 in election matters: The Court expressly avoided deciding the broader constitutional-maintainability questions urged by respondents' counsel and proceeded to determine the case on merits; it therefore did not lay down a new binding rule limiting Article 226 in election contexts.
- No broader precedent-limiting pronouncement on Article 226 vs. election petitions was made: the Court assumed jurisdiction for the sake of deciding the application and dismissed it on merits; it did not rule definitively that Article 226 is always available or unavailable for challenging election-tribunal decisions.
Costs awarded: Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-.
1. This is an application by Sujaniram under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ, order or direction quashing the order, dated 16-11-1952, passed by the Election Tribunal, RaJ-nandgaon (respondent 4), and for a writ prohibiting the Election Commission of India, New Delhi (respondent 5) from holding a fresh election.
2. Chauki Constituency in the district of Durg has one seat reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. The candidates for election in 1951 were the petitioners Sujaniram, Lal Shyamshah (respondent 1) and Prayagsingh (respondent 2). They are members of the Scheduled Tribes,
3. A nomination paper of a candidate for the reserved seat has to be accompanied by a declaration that he is a member of the Scheduled Tribes for which the seat has been reserved. He has also to specify the particular tribe of which he is a member and also the area in relation to which such tribe is one of the Scheduled Tribes.
The declaration has to be verified by a Magistrate under E. 6. Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951 (hereafter called the Rules)
4. The candidates filed their nomination papers before the Returning Officer, Durg on 15-11-1951. The declaration of Prayagsingh was verified by Shri Kashiram who described himself as an Additional District and Sessions Judge. It bore the seal of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge.
The scrutiny of these nomination papers took place on 17-11-1951 at Durg. The nomination paper of Prayagsingh was rejected on the ground that the declaration was not verified by a Magistrate. The Returning Officer held that Shri Kashiram was not a 'Magistrate' within the meaning of Rule 6.
5. The election of tne Chauki Constituency took place on 2-12-1951. The petitioner was declared elected. The votes polled by the petitioner and Lal Shyamshah were 10,717 and 10592 respectively.
6. Ramlal (respondent 3) who is a voter in the Chauki Constituency, filed a petition on 11-3-1952 challenging the election of Sujaniram and asked for a declaration that the election from the Chauki Constituency for the Legislative Assembly, Madhya Pradesh, was wholly void. The main ground of attack was that the Returning Officer had illegally rejected the nomination paper of Prayagsingh and that the declaration made by the latter was in accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules, Shri Kashiram was a Magistrate within the meaning of that Rule.
The petition was opposed by Sujaniram. He urged that the nomination paper of Prayagsingh was defective in three particulars and was rightly rejected, that the result of the election was not materially affected by the rejection of the nomination paper and that Prayagsingh was an alternative candidate for Lal Shyamshah and had worked for him.
7. The Election Tribunal accepted the contention of Ramlal and held that the declaration was valid and that Shri Kashiram was a Magistrate at the time he verified the declaration. The majority view of the Tribunal was that the illegal rejection of the nomination paper of Prayagsingh by the Returning Officer had materially affected the election. The Chairman took a contrary view regarding the effect of the rejection of the nomination paper. The election of the Chauki Constituency was declared to be void by the Tribunal.
8. Shri R. M. Hazarnavis, learned Counsel for Sujaniram (petitioner) contends that the Election Tribunal was manifestly wrong in holding that Shri Kashiram was a Magistrate and that the declaration was valid. He also contends that the burden of establishing that the rejection had materially affected the election was on Ramlal and that burden he failed to discharge.
There Was no basis for the conclusion reached by the two members of the Tribunal. He does not press his objection contained in para 4(b) and (c) of the application. He refers to Section 100 (1)(c) of the Act of 1951 which is in the following terms:
If the Tribunal is of opinion-
(c) that the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination, the Tribunal shall declare the election to be wholly void.
It is not sufficient, according to him, to establish that the rejection was improper. The order of the Tribunal is without jurisdiction.
9. Shri M.N. Phadke raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the application. His first ground is based on Article 329 (b) of the Constitution which is in the following terms:
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution- (b) No election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature.
His second ground is that the powers under Article 226 cannot be exercised as no legal right has been infringed. The right to vote, according to him, is not a civil right. It is a special right and the remedy must be regulated by the law dealing with elections. He strongly relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in - 'Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer Namakkal Constituency' That decision says:
The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. Strictly speaking, it is the sole right of the Legislature to examine and determine all matters relating to the election of its own members and if the Legislature takes it out of its own hands and vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law which creates it.
Where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of.
He also refers to the observation in - 'The The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta.' :
The language of the Article shows that the issuing of writs or directions by the Court is not founded only on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party under Part III of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights) has been infringed. It can also issue writs or give similar directions for any other purpose.
The concluding words of Article 226 have to be read in the context of what precedes the same. Therefore the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under this Article.
On merits, he urges that the decision of the Tribunal regarding the interpretation of the term 'Magistrate' is correct and that the illegal rejection of the nomination paper had materially affected the election.
10. We do not consider it necessary to decide the objections raised by Shri Phadke in view of our conclusion that the application must fall on merits. It is not necessary to examine the scope of Article 338 (b) and the effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court. We will assume far the purpose of this application that this Court has power under Article 226 to question the order of the Election Tribunal dismissing or allowing an election petition.
11. The proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Act requires a candidate to file his nomination paper accompanied by a declaration duly verified by a Magistrate. A nomination paper is liable to be rejected if there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of Section 33: see Section 36(d) The material portion of Rule 6 runs as fllows:
In a constituency where any seat is reserved for the.... Scheduled Tribes ...the declaration referred to in the first or the second proviso, as the case may be, to Sub-section (S) of Section 33 shall be verified by the candidate on oath or solemn affirmation before a Magistrate....
The verification by a Magistrate is to be made in the following terms:
Solemnly affirmed before me by ...who is personally known to me (or who has been identified to my satisfaction by ...(Name).... Address).
Signature of Magistrate Full designation....
Date....
12. The term 'Magistrate' has not been defined either in the Act or in the Rules. Rule 2(6), however, says that 'the General Clauses Act 1897 (10 of 1897) shall apply for the interpreta. tion of these rules as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of Parliament. The definition given in Section 3(32), General Clauses Act is as follows:
'Magistrate' shall include every person exercising all or any of the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force.
The argument of Shri Hazarnavis is that Shri Kashiram is not a 'Magistrate' within the meaning of this definition as he did not exercise all or any of the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He points out that the State Government has power to appoint persons to be Magistrates of either First, Second or Third Class under Section 12 of the Code. The definition in the General Clauses Act applies to persons so appointed by the State Government.
He says that the Code of Criminal Procedure recognises three classes of Courts, High Court Courts of Session and the Courts of Magistrates. In the absence of an appointment under Section 12, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge cannot be regarded as a Magistrate. The fact that while disposing of an appeal, the Court of session is limited to the powers of punishment exereisable by the Magistrate at the trial does not make the person exercising such powers a Magistrate.
13. Shri Kashiram, when he verified the declaration, was a Magistrate under the Court of Criminal Procedure. All Subordinate Judges were invested with the powers of a Magistrate off the First Class by the Provincial Government on confirmation. The relevant notification No. 2704-122-XIX, dated 12-12-1944 issued by the Government is as follows:
In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 12 read with Section 39, Criminal P.C. 1888 (5 of 1898), the Provincial Government is pleased to direct that all Subordinate judges shall, on confirmation, stand invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the first class.
Shri Kashiram was a confirmed Subordinate judge on the date of the notification. The Subordinate Judges now are described as Civil Judges Shri Kashiram is now a Civil Judge. By virtue of the notification, he continues to be a Magistrate of the first class. His powers as a Magistrate of the first class have not been withdrawn by the State Government under Section 41 of the Code.
Shri Kashiram was first invested with the powers to try Sessions cases in June 1950 and was appointed as an Additional Judge of the Court of Session in the Chhindwara Sessions division by Government notification No. 1576-1579/XVIII-B-J., dated 16-6-1950, which is as follows:
In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 233 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh is pleased to appoint Shri Kashiram, Civil Judge, Chhindwara, to be an Additional Judge of the District Court in the Chhindwara civil district and Additional Judge of the Court of Session in the Chhindwara Sessions division with effect from the date on which he takes over charge of his duties.
Later, he was transferred to Durg. A notification in similar terms was issued appointing him as an Additional Judge of the District Court in the Durg Civil District and Additional Judge of the Court of Session in the Durg Sessions division. The notification No. 2133-2187/XVII-B dated 30-8-1951, is as follows:
In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 233 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh is pleased to appoint Shri Kashiram, Civil Judge, Durg, to be an Additional Judge of the District Court in the Durg Civil District and Additional Judge of the Court of Session in the Durg Sessions division with effect from the date on which he takes over charge of his duties.
It will be noticed that the notifications appointing him as Additional Judge of the District Court and Additional Judge of the Court of Session did not cancel his powers of a Magistrate of the first class. The fact that he is now invested with higher powers does not divest him of the powers conferred on him by the notification No. 2704-122-XIX, dated 12-12-1944.
He is competent to exercise the Sessions powers as also the powers of a Magistrate of the first class. The doctrine of merger does not apply. In fact, Section 40 of the Code contemplates that a person may have two sets of powers. That section is as follows:
Whenever any person holding an office in the service of Government who has been invested with any powers under this Code throughout any local area is appointed to an equal or higher office of the same nature, within a like local area under the same Provincial Government, he shall, unless the Provincial Government otherwise directs or has otherwise directed, exercise the same powers in the local area in which he is so appointed.
We hold that Shri Kashiram was a Magistrate and was competent to verify the declaration made by Prayagsingh as a Magistrate.
14. Assuming that Shri Kashiram ceased to be a Magistrate on his appointment as Additional Sessions Judge the question is whether he is not a Magistrate as defined in Section 3(32) General Clauses Act. It will be noticed that the words 'shall include' and not 'shall mean' have been used in the definition. It is thus an inclusive definition In 'Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps' (1899) AC 99 (c) it is laid down that the word 'Include' or 'shall be deemed to include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, or where it is intended that while the term denned should retain its ordinary meaning its scope should be widened by specific enumeration or certain matters which its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise so as to make the definition enumerative and not exhaustive, and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be considered as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things' which the interpretation, clause declares that they shall include (sic) In - 'Bapu Vithal v. Secy of State' AIR 1932 Bom 370 (D), a Division Bench held:
Where a term is interpreted in a statute as 'including', the comprehensive sense is not to be taken strictly defining what the meaning of the word must be under all circumstances but merely as declaring what things may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that they should.
In 'In re Strauss & Co., Ltd.' AIR 1937 Bom 15 (E), it was held:
The word 'include' in the interpretation clause is intended to be enumerative and not exhaustive. It has an extending force and it does not limit the meaning of the term to the substance of the definition. When it is intended to exhaust the signification of the word interpreted, the word 'means' is used.
In 'Panchanatham Pillai v. Emperor' AIR 1929 Mad 487 (P), it was held that the definition of 'Magistrate' in the General Clauses Act is not confined to Magistrates exercising Jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Code. It merely includes them.
15. When a definition is intended to be exhaustive, the Legislature, as a rule, uses the word 'means' and not the word 'includes' In - 'Maha Ram v. Emperor' AIR 1918 All 168 (G) it was held that the word 'Christian' in Section 3 Christian Marriage Act was defined to mean persons professing the Christian religion and that the word 'means' was an inclusive term and therefore no one except a person who professed the Christian religion came within it.
16. As the term 'Magistrate' in the definition given in the General Clauses Act is not limited to Magistrates appointed under the Code, it is permissible to find out its meaning in the ordinary sense. In - 'Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commr.' (1914) 1 KB 641 at p. 647 (H) Cozens-Hardy M.R. said:
It is for the Court to interpret the statute as best it may. In so doing the Court may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help they can find, including of course the consultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries.
The definition of 'park' in the Oxford English Dictionary has been approved and adopted by the Court in - 'Ripon Housing Order, 1938 In re' (1939) 2 KB 838 (I). In recent times, dictionaries have been freely made use of by Courts in determining the meaning of various words occurring in statutes: See - 'Wamanrao Deorao v. Shrikumar Jaikumar' AIR 1946 Nag 42 (J): - 'Beohar Singh v. Commr of Income-tax' AIR 1948 Nag 228 (K); - 'Nisha Kanto v. Smt. Saroj Bashini' ; and - 'Harish Chandra v. Rex' AIR 1949 All 15 (M).
In the Oxford English Dictionary, the meaning given is that a Magistrate is a civil officer charged with the administration of the laws. In the Webster's International Dictionary one of the meanings assigned to the expression 'Magistrate' is that he is a person clothed with powers as a public or civil officer. According to the Chamber's twentieth Century Dictionary, a Magistrate is a person entrusted with the power of putting the laws into force, Shri Kashiram as an Additional Sessions Judge was undoubtedly administering and enforcing law.
He is a Civil Officer of the State and is empowered to administer oath or affirmation to persons under the Indian Oaths Act. He is, therefore, a Magistarte within the meaning given in the dictionary. Further, when an Additional Sessions Judge or a Sessions Judge hears an appeal from the decision of a Magistrate of the first class, his powers of administering punishments are circumscribed by that of the trial Magistrate.
He is then exercising the powers of a Magistrate in respect of punishments. The case cited by Shri Hazarnavis reported in - ' Emperor v. Ali' 5 Ind Cas 915 (Lah) (N) in support of the contention that a Sessions Judge is not a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 is not applicable to the present case. There the Sessions Judge passed an order:
I direct the police to make further enquiry into his conduct under Section 156, Criminal P.C.
In Section 156 of the Code, the term 'Magistrate' alone is used. The Sessions Judge was manifestly in error as it is only a Magistrate empowered under Section 190, who may order an investigation under that section. Whenever the expression 'Magistrate' is used in any particular section of the Code, the reference is to a Magistrate appointed under Section 12 of the Code.
Here we are not (Sealing with any provision of the Code, but with the definition given in the General Clauses Act. In this view, it is not necessary to examine the argument of Shri Hazarnavis that an Additional Sessions Judge or a Sessions Judge is not a justice of the peace, as held by the majority of the Tribunal. We are satisfied that the declaration was verified in accordance with Rule 6 and that the rejection of the nomination paper was illegal.
17. The next question is whether the result of the election was materially affected by the illegal rejection of the nomination paper. We have perused the written statement of Prayagsingh as also his evidence and that of the witnesses of Sujaniram. Prayagsingh was anxious to contest the election and believed that he had a fair chance of success. In his evidence he says:
I would have contested the election as a candidate if my nomination paper had not been rejected by the Returning Officer.... I have studied upto the B. A. class. I imagined that as I was better educated than the other candidates, I had a good chance of being elected as a member of the Assembly.
After the rejection of his nomination paper, he made a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to this Court. It is only after it was dismissed that he worked for Lal Shyamshah. Prayagsingh was a candidate from the party known as Ramrajya Party, while Lal Shyamshah stood as an independent candidate. Sujaniram was a candidate of the Congress Party. Ramlal in his evidence says:
I filed this election petition because I desired that an educated man like Prayagsingh should have been returned as a candidate in the Assembly from our Constituency which is predominantly populated by the Scheduled Tribes.... I imagine that if Prayagsingh had also been a candidate, he would have been elected.
It appears to us that if Prayagsingh had contested tile election, the voting would have been affected materially. We do not agree with the Chairman that the votes cast for Lal Shyamshah would have been cast for him. One cannot predicate with certainty that some of the persons who voted for Sujaniram would not have voted for Prayagsingh if the latter had contested the election. Their votes might have been east in his favour in preference to Sujaniram.
The fact that Prayagsingh was at one time in the service of Lal Shyamshah or that Ramlal is an employee are not relevant considerations. There is evidence to sustain the conclusion of the majority view of the Tribunal. We do not accept the contention of Shri Hazarnavis that there is no legal evidence for the finding. Under Section 100(1)(c), if the Tribunal is of opinion that the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination, the Tribunal shall declare the election to be wholly void.
The question whether the result is materially affected fell within their exclusive jurisdiction and is one of fact. In exercise of the powers under Article 226, this Court does not function as a Court of appeal on questions of fact. As the finding is not vitiated by any error of law, the petition fails.
18. The application is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-.
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