Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Jadavji Narsidas Sha & Co. v. Hirachand Chaturbhai

Bombay High Court
Jul 13, 1953
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

A summary suit was filed by the plaintiff on April 17, 1952. The defendants appeared on April 25, 1952. The plaintiff took out a summons for judgment on July 4, 1952. The defendants filed an affidavit in reply on July 12, 1952 disclosing their defence and asking for leave to defend. On July 24, 1952 the defendants took out a notice of motion for stay of proceedings under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act; that notice of motion was dismissed by Mr. Bakhle, Judge of the City Civil Court on the ground that the defendants had taken a step in the proceedings by filing the affidavit. The plaintiff's appeal from that dismissal was heard by Chagla, C.J., who dismissed the appeal with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the filing by the defendants of an affidavit in reply to a summons for judgment constituted a "step in the proceedings" within the meaning of s. 34 of the Arbitration Act, thereby disentitling them to apply for a stay of proceedings.
  2. Whether the timing of the notice of motion for stay (taken out after the affidavit but before disposal of the summons for judgment) affected the defendants' entitlement to a stay under s. 34.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Shah)

  • The defendants merely filed an affidavit to show cause against the plaintiff's summons for judgment and did not thereby make an application or take a step in the proceedings.
  • Under the new practice the plaintiff takes out the summons for judgment and the defendant only shows cause; this does not alter the substance so as to make the affidavit a step.
  • Reliance on Pitchers Ltd. v. Plaza Ltd.: if the affidavit to show cause and the application for stay are contemporaneous, or if the affidavit itself applies for stay, the filing should not be treated as a step; here the summons for judgment was not disposed of when the notice of motion for stay was taken out, so the defendants were not too late.

The Opinion Does Not Contain a Detailed Account of the Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments beyond the trial judge's reasoning recorded in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ives & Barker v. Willans Defines "a step in the proceedings" as something in the nature of an application to the Court (not mere letters or requests); a defendant's request for a copy of the statement of claim is not a step. Relied upon to show that mere requests or correspondence do not constitute a step and that a defendant has a right to obtain particulars before deciding whether to seek stay under s. 34.
Zalinoff v. Hammond Filing an affidavit in answer to a notice of motion (for a receiver) is not a step in the proceedings under the principles in Ives & Barker. Applied to illustrate that meeting an application by affidavit does not necessarily amount to taking a step or making an application to the Court.
Chimanram Motilal v. Vandravandas Distinguishes between a party making an application and merely agreeing to an application made by the other side; consenting to a praecipe for adjournment was held not to be a step. Used to emphasize the distinction between active application and passive consent; supports the principle that not every procedural act is a step under s. 34.
Edward Radbone…Plaintiff; v. Jagjivan Kamlapat, A Firm…Defendants.* Held that if a defendant filed a praecipe (for adjournment) and the plaintiff consented, the filing of the praecipe would be a step in the proceedings. Cited to show the outer limit where filing a praecipe by a party was treated as a step, contrasting with cases where mere consent was not a step.
Pitchers Ltd. v. Plaza Ltd. Holds that if an affidavit to show cause and an application for stay are made at the same time, or if the affidavit itself sets out the arbitration clause and applies for stay, the filing of the affidavit will not be a step. Distinguished: the court held Pitchers permits treating the affidavit as not a step only when the defendant contemporaneously indicates a wish for arbitration; it does not assist where the affidavit clearly expresses a wish for the civil Court and the application for stay is made later.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began from the proposition in s. 34 that a party who applies for a stay must not previously have taken a step in the proceedings; such a step must be an application to the Court indicating a preference for adjudication by the Civil Court rather than a domestic forum. The cited authorities establish two tests: (1) the act must be an application or step to the Court (not mere correspondence or requests), and (2) the act must be of a nature that demonstrates the party's choice of forum.

Applying these tests to the facts, the court examined the affidavit filed by the defendants under O. XXXVII r. 3. The affidavit disclosed the defence, sought the leave required by the rule to appear and defend a summary suit, and in its concluding paragraph expressly asked that the summons for judgment be dismissed and that unconditional leave to defend be granted. The court concluded that the affidavit was, in substance, an application by the defendants to obtain leave to defend and an unequivocal expression of their intention that the Civil Court should decide the dispute.

The court rejected Mr. Shah's reliance on Pitchers Ltd. v. Plaza Ltd., observing that Pitchers applies only where the affidavit and the application for stay are contemporaneous or the affidavit itself applies for a stay; it does not permit a defendant to file an affidavit expressing intention to litigate in the civil court and thereafter, days later, apply for a stay. Section 34 requires that the defendant not have taken a step before applying for a stay; it does not require that any earlier application be disposed of before the defendant is disabled from seeking a stay.

On that basis the court upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the defendants had taken a step on July 12, 1952 by filing the affidavit and, having done so, were disentitled to the stay sought on July 24, 1952.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Direct effect: The defendants' notice of motion for stay under s. 34 was held to be barred because they had taken a step in the proceedings by filing the affidavit requesting leave to defend; the trial judge's dismissal of the notice of motion was upheld and the appeal failed. The opinion does not purport to announce any broader new precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Chagla, C.J:—

This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Bakhle, Judge of the City Civil Court, dismissing the notice of motion taken out by the defendants for stay of proceedings under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act. The plaintiff filed a summary suit on April 17, 1952, and appearance was filed by the defendants on April 25, 1952. On July 4, 1952, the plaintiff took out a summons for judgment and on July 12, 1952, the defendants filed an affidavit in reply setting out the defence and asking for leave to defend. The defendants took out a notice of motion for stay on July 24, 1952, and this is the notice of motion which was dismissed by Mr. Bakhle. The ground on which the learned Judge dismissed the notice of motion was that by filing the affidavit in reply the defendants had taken a step in the proceedings within the meaning of s. 34.

Now, it is clear that under s. 34 it is necessary that the party who applies for stay should himself take a step in the proceedings before he becomes disentitled to the stay which is asked for. It must be some application made by the party in the proceedings, and as the authorities show that application must be of such a nature as to lead the Court to the conclusion that the party prefers to have his rights and liabilities determined by the Civil Court rather than by the domestic forum upon which the parties might have agreed. These really are the two tests which the authorities show ought to be applied, and the cases on which Mr. Shah has relied in order to convince us that the decision of the learned Judge was wrong, far from supporting him, emphasise these principles.

Turning first to the case of Ives & Barker v. Willans.(6) That was a case where a notice was given by the defendant to the plaintiff requiring from him a copy of the statement of the claim, and the English Court held that was not a step in the proceedings. Obviously, this was not a step in the proceedings because the defendant had made no application and had taken no step. All that he had done was to call upon the plaintiff to supply him with a copy of the statement of the claim. It is in this connection that Lord Justice Lindley laid down certain principles. At p. 484 the learned Law Lord says:

“The authorities show that a step in the proceedings means something in the nature of an application to the Court, and not mere talk between solicitors or solicitors' clerks, nor the writing of letters, but the taking of some step, such as taking out a summons or something of that kind, which is, in the technical sense, a step in the proceedings.”

The learned Law Lord also points out that before a party can exercise his option as to whether he would allow the suit to go on in the civil Court or ask for stay of proceedings under s. 34 he had to know what the nature of the claim was, and therefore when the defendant applied for a copy of the statement of the claim he had a right to do so before he made up his mind as to whether he should apply for stay under s. 34 or not.

The next case on which reliance is placed is Zalinoff v. Hammond.(7) That was a case where the defendant filed an affidavit in answer to a notice of motion for receiver taken out by the plaintiff. Again, it is difficult to understand how it could possibly be said that when the plaintiff applies for a receiver and the defendant meets that case by filing an affidavit in reply, it could be said that he had taken any step or that he had made any application; and Mr. Justice Stirling in deciding this case merely applies the principles enunciated by Lord Justice Lindley in the earlier case to which reference has been made.

Then reference is made to a judgment of Mr. Justice Bhagwati in Chimanram Motilal v. Vandravandas(8). That case is rather significant as pointing out the difference between a party making an application and a party merely agreeing to an application made by the other side. In the case before Mr. Justice Bhagwati the plaintiff filed a praecipe for the adjournment of the suit and the defendants consented to the praecipe being filed, and the learned Judge held that was not a step in the proceedings. But Mr. Justice Bhagwati drew the attention to an earlier decision of this Court in Edward Radbone…Plaintiff; v. Jagjivan Kamlapat, A Firm…Defendants.*,(9) where Mr. Justice Kania had held that if the defendant had filed a praecipe and the plaintiff had consented to the praecipe being filed, then the filing of the praecipe for an adjournment of the suit would have been a step in the proceedings. That, in our opinion, is as far as any Court has gone. All that the defendant did in the case before Mr. Justice Kania was merely to ask for an adjournment before the Prothonotary, and yet the learned Judge held that was a step taken in the proceedings.

In the light of these decisions, let us consider the facts of this case. What Mr. Shah says is that the summons for judgment was taken out by the plaintiff and all that the defendants did was to resist that summons and asked the Court to dismiss that summons, and according to Mr. Shah the defendants did not make any application but filed this affidavit. Now that is an entirely erroneous view to take of the affidavit filed by the defendants. Under O. XXXVII r. 3 the Court has, upon the application by the defendant, to give leave to him to appear and to defend the suit, and it is only on such leave being given that a defendant is entitled to be heard in a summary suit. The nature of the affidavit filed by the defendants is clear. As required by O. XXXVII r. 3 they disclosed in the affidavit such facts as the Court may deem sufficient to support the application for leave to defend. They have disclosed the nature of their defence, they have attempted to satisfy the Court that they are entitled to be heard and leave to defend should be given, and, what is more, in the last paragraph of the affidavit they have in terms asked the Court that the summons for judgment be dismissed and that the defendants be granted unconditional leave to defend. What Mr. Shah say is that under our old practice when a defendant used to take out a summons for leave to defend he did apply for leave to defend and such an application would have been a step in the proceedings, but says Mr. Shah that under our new rules it is not the defendant who applies for leave to defend, but the plaintiff takes out a summons for judgment and all that the defendant does is show cause against the summons for judgment. The mere fact that instead of the defendant taking out a summons the plaintiff takes out a summons does not really change the substance of the matter. The susbstance of the matter is that when the summons for judgment comes up before the Court it is the defendant who has to obtain leave to defend and on that leave being granted he becomes entitled to defend. Therefore it is clear that by filing this affidavit the defendants expressed an unequivocal intention that the matter should be heard by the civil Court and gave clear effect to that intention by asking the Court to give them leave to defend so that they should resist the plaintiff's claim.

Mr. Shah has relied on a decision reported in Pitchers Ltd. v. Plaza Ltd.,(10) and Mr. Shah says that decision lays down that if you file an affidavit to show cause against a summons for judgment and then you take out a notice of motion for stay and if the summons for judgment is not disposed of and both the notice of motion and the summons for judgment come up for decision at the same time, the filing of the affidavit cannot be looked upon as a step in the proceedings. Mr. Shah says that in this case although the notice of motion was taken out after the summons for judgment, the summons for judgment was not disposed of and therefore the defendants were not too late in applying for a stay under s. 34. That is not the effect of the decision in Pitchers Ltd. v. Plaza Ltd. What the learned Judges there point out is that if at the same time as the affidavit is filed to show cause against the summons for judgment, an application is made by the defendant for stay, or if in the affidavit itself the arbitration clause is set out and an application is made for stay under s. 34, then the filing of the affidavit would not be a step in the proceedings. Now that judgment is perfectly understandable on the principle already stated. When the defendant goes to Court to show cause against a summons for judgment and he makes his intention clear that he does not want the Civil Court to adjudicate upon his rights or liabilities, but he wants the domestic forum to decide that, then clearly the mere fact that he has filed an affidavit in reply to the summons cannot be relied upon as a step in the proceedings. But in this case the defendants file an affidavit in reply, make their intention perfectly clear, and then 12 days after that they take out a notice of motion for stay of the proceedings. Therefore when they take out the notice of motion for stay of proceedings, they have already taken a step in the proceedings by filing their affidavit on July 12, 1952 and unequivocally expressing their intention as to which Court should decide the case. We fail to understand what possible bearing the fact that the summons for judgment was not disposed of has got to do with s. 34. What s. 34 requires is that there should be an application made by the defendant; a step taken by the defendant. Section 34 does not require that the application must be disposed of or decided before the defendant would be disabled from asking for stay under s. 34. Once the defendants took a step in the proceedings on July 12, 1952, it was entirely immaterial that the summons for judgment was not decided when they took out the notice of motion on July 24, 1952. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge below was right in the conclusion he came to.

The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.
K.B.S