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Huseinmiya Dosumiya v. Desai Khandubhai Jethabhai

Bombay High Court
Aug 3, 1953
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Structured Summary of Opinion — Chagla, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns competing claims to possession of agricultural land and whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging an order of the Mamlatdar under the Tenancy Act as ultra vires.

Brief chronology (as set out in the opinion):

  • On August 24, 1948 a consent order under s. 29 of the Tenancy Act was recorded before the Mamlatdar by which the petitioner agreed to hand over possession to the landlords (the opponents).
  • The petitioner contends that a fresh tenancy agreement was entered into in July 1949 and that he continued in possession; in July 1950 he exchanged certain land with the consent of the landlords.
  • On February 15, 1952 the landlords applied to execute the August 24, 1948 order.
  • On March 13, 1952 the petitioner applied to the Mamlatdar asserting he was a tenant under a new agreement and should not be dispossessed; on March 17, 1952 the Mamlatdar ordered the petitioner to hand over possession in execution of the 1948 order.
  • On March 20, 1952 the landlords took possession. On March 22, 1952 the petitioner applied under s.29(1) alleging he was a tenant; on August 9, 1952 the Mamlatdar made an order in the petitioner's favour directing that possession be given on August 16, 1952.
  • On August 15, 1952 the landlords filed a suit in the Civil Court contending the Mamlatdar's August 9, 1952 order was invalid and ultra vires and seeking an injunction to prevent the petitioner from taking possession.
  • A preliminary issue was raised in the suit as to whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction; the learned Civil Judge decided that the Court did have jurisdiction in favour of the opponents, and the petitioner has filed the present revision application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit that challenges an order of the Mamlatdar under the Tenancy Act as ultra vires.
  2. Whether s.85 of the Tenancy Act (which, inter alia, limits Civil Court jurisdiction in matters falling to be decided by authorities under the Act) prevents the Civil Court from deciding whether the Mamlatdar's order was ultra vires.
  3. Whether the existence of an express right of appeal under s.74 (appeal to the Collector against orders of the Mamlatdar) precludes a party from seeking relief in a Civil Court when the order impugned is asserted to be a nullity (ultra vires).
  4. Under what circumstances a civil court should grant injunctions restraining parties from acting on orders made by revenue authorities under the Tenancy Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced by Mr. Purshottam (for the opponents as presented)

  • Where a person applies under s.29(1) and the Mamlatdar makes an order under s.70 that a person is a tenant, that order is an order "for the purposes of the Act" and therefore cannot be questioned in a Civil Court by operation of s.85, which ousts Civil Court jurisdiction.
  • Under s.85(2) no order of the Mamlatdar or other authorities shall be questioned in any civil or criminal court.
  • The plaint on its face shows the Mamlatdar acted with jurisdiction; a mere allegation in the plaint that the order is ultra vires does not deprive the Mamlatdar's order of the protection of s.85 and therefore the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction.
  • In matters of this kind injunctions should not be lightly granted; civil Courts should be reluctant to interfere with the statutory machinery established by the Tenancy Act and should require a strong prima facie case before granting an injunction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdullamiyan Abdulrehman v. The Government of Bombay (Full Bench) Principle that when an order is ultra vires and therefore a nullity, a party is not obliged to pursue the statutory appeal route and may treat the order as void and seek relief in a Civil Court. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that an ultra vires order is a nullity and may be challenged in a Civil Court rather than being subject only to the statutory appeal mechanism provided by the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of legal propositions tied closely to the statutory scheme as described in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of s.85 and the scope of ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction:

    The Court distinguishes between (a) valid orders made by the Mamlatdar with jurisdiction which the Act intends to be final and not to be questioned by Civil Courts, and (b) orders which are not for the purposes of the Act, are incompetent or are ultra vires (nullities).

    The Court holds that s.85 operates to oust Civil Court jurisdiction only in respect of valid orders made with jurisdiction (i.e., orders "for the purposes of the Act"). If the Mamlatdar's order is ultra vires and therefore not an order made for the purposes of the Act, it is a nullity and can be challenged in a Civil Court.

  2. Jurisdictional inquiry vs. merits:

    When ascertaining whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction the Court should not try the merits of the underlying dispute.

    The Court explains that even if a suit is frivolous, if the relief claimed is within the Civil Court's powers then the suit is properly filed in a Court of competent jurisdiction. Here, the primary question raised in the suit is whether the Mamlatdar's order is ultra vires — an issue which, if it arises, is one the Civil Court may determine without contravening s.85(1) or (2) because the Court is not purporting to decide matters that the Act requires to be decided exclusively by the Mamlatdar.

  3. Effect of the appeal provision (s.74):

    The existence of a statutory appeal does not preclude a Civil Court from entertaining a challenge to an ultra vires order.

    The Court reasons that s.74 provides for appeals against valid orders made with jurisdiction; if an order is ultra vires it is a nullity and the party affected is not obliged to appeal against it. The court relied on the Full Bench decision in Abdullamiyan Abdulrehman v. The Government of Bombay to support this principle.

  4. Caution about injunctions:

    Even where jurisdiction exists, equitable relief in the form of injunctions ought to be sparingly granted.

    The Tenancy Act creates a statutory machinery to restore dispossessed tenants, and civil courts should be reluctant to disrupt that process. An injunction restraining actions under decisions of revenue authorities should only be granted where the plaintiff establishes a strong prima facie case that the authority's order is ultra vires; mere allegation of ultra vires is insufficient to justify an injunction.

  5. Practical directions:

    The Court refrains from expressing views on the merits and gives procedural directions.

    The Court directed the papers be remitted immediately to the lower Civil Court and ordered that the learned Civil Judge dispose of the suit on its merits without delay. The Court also noted procedural avenues: the petitioner may apply to the District Court regarding the question of injunction on appeal or may apply to the Civil Judge to consider dissolution of any injunction already granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Rule discharged.

The decision embodies these core rulings (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The Civil Court has jurisdiction to try a suit which raises the question whether an order of the Mamlatdar is ultra vires (a nullity), because s.85 only ousts Civil Court jurisdiction in respect of valid orders made with jurisdiction under the Act.
  • The availability of a statutory appeal under s.74 does not compel a party to appeal where the order impugned is ultra vires; an ultra vires order may be treated as a nullity and challenged in a Civil Court (supported by the Full Bench authority cited).
  • Notwithstanding jurisdiction, the Civil Court should be cautious about granting injunctions to interfere with the statutory machinery under the Tenancy Act and should require a strong prima facie case of ultra vires before granting such relief.

Direct consequences and procedural disposition:

  • The matter is remitted to the lower Civil Court with directions that the learned Civil Judge dispose of the suit on the merits without delay.
  • The petitioner (whose possession claim was upheld by the Mamlatdar) may seek appropriate relief from the District Court in relation to injunction matters on appeal, or may apply to the Civil Judge to have any injunction dissolved on proper materials.
  • Costs of the revision application were assessed as "costs in the cause."
  • The same order was made in Civil Revision Application No. 1586 (the same point arose there).

The Court expressly refrained from deciding the substantive merits of whether the Mamlatdar's order was in fact ultra vires; it limited itself to the jurisdictional and procedural conclusions summarized above.

Rule discharged.
M.W.P
Show all summary ...

Chagla, C.J:—

The question that arises in this revision application is with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to maintain a suit in which an order made by the Mamlatdar under the Tenancy Act has been challenged as ultra vires, and the brief facts which lead up to this revision application may be stated.

An application was made by the landlords who are the opponents, for possession against their tenant who is the petitioner, under s. 29 of the Tenancy Act to the Mamlatdar and a consent order was taken on August 24, 1948, by which the petitioner agreed to hand over possession to the opponents. It is the case of the petitioner that thereafter there was a fresh tenancy agreement between him and the opponents and that was in July 1949, and by reason of this fresh tenancy agreement the petitioner continued to remain on the land and the landlords never took possession of it. It is further the case of the petitioner that in July 1950 he exchanged with the consent of the landlords 3 acres and 11 gunthas of the land demised to him with the same area which had been demised to another tenant. On February 15, 1952, the landlords applied to execute the order of August 24, 1948. On March 13, 1952, the petitioner filed an application before the Mamlatdar setting out the facts to which attention has already been drawn that he was a tenant under a new tenancy agreement and he should not be dispossessed. On March 17, 1952, the Mamlatdar ordered the petitioner to hand over possession to the landlords in exevution of the order of August 24, 1948. On March 20, 1952, in execution of the order of August 24, 1948, the landlords took possession from the petitioner. On March 22, 1952, the petitioner applied to the Mamlatdar under s. 29(1) for possession alleging that he was a tenant of the opponents and on August 9, 1952, the Mamlatdar made an order in favour of the petitioner and he directed that possession should be given on August 16, 1952. On August 15, 1952, the opponents filed this suit in the Civil Court contending that the order passed by the Mamlatdar on August 9, 1952, was invalid and ultra vires and asking for an injunction against the petitioner preventing him from taking possession of the land from them. A preliminary issue was raised in this suit as to whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to maintain the suit. The learned Civil Judge has decided this issue in favour of the opponents and the petitioner has come in revision.

Now, Mr. Purshottam's contention is that inasmuch as the petitioner's application was under s. 29(1) and inasmuch as the order of the Mamlatdar was under s. 70 by which he held that the petitioner was a tenant, the order passed by the Mamlatdar is clearly an order for the purposes of the Act and it cannot be challenged in a Civil Court under s. 85 which ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or the other authorities set up under the Act. It is further pointed out that under sub-s. (2) of s. 85 no order of the Mamlatdar or of the other authorities shall be questioned in any civil or criminal Court. It is clear that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been only ousted in respect of valid orders made by the Mamlatdar. It is only when the Mamlatdar makes an order with jurisdiction, or, in other words, makes an order for the purposes of the Act or an order required by the Act, that order cannot be questioned in a Civil Court. If the Mamlatdar while passing a valid order deals with any of the matters under s. 70, then those matters cannot be dealt with by the civil Court. But if the order made by the Mamlatdar is not for the purposes of the Act or not required by the Act and the order is incompetent or ultra vires, then the order is a nullity and it can be challenged in a civil Court. Mr. Purshottam does not dispute that proposition, indeed he cannot do so, but his contention is that looking to the plaint in this suit filed by the opponents it is clear that on the face of he plaint the order of the Mamlatdar is with jurisdiction and the mere submission made by the plaintiffs that order is ultra vires cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have carefully looked at the plaint, Mr. Purshottam has read out the original to us, and really what the case of the plaintiffs comes to is this that the Mamlatdar having directed that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession under the order of August 24, 1948, it was not competent to the Mamlatdar, even under an application made by the tenant under s. 29(1), to dispossess the landlords and to give possession of the land to the tenant. It is on this ground that the order of the Mamlatdar is challenged as invalid and ultra vires.

Now, in considering the jurisdiction of the Court, one does not consider the merits of the matter. A suit may be entirely frivolous and vexatious, there may be no merits about it, the contention taken up by the plaintiff may be unstatable, yet if the relief that the plaintiff seeks is a relief which the Court can grant, then the suit is filed in a Court with jurisdiction and the Court can maintain it. In this particular case the issue which directly arises and which issue has been raised by the learned Judge is whether the order of the Mamlatdar is an ultra vires order. It may be that the plaintiffs will fail on that issue and the suit will be dismissed, but so long as that issue arises the civil Court has jurisdiction to deal with that issue. In deciding that issue the civil Court is in no way contravening the provisions of s. 85(1) or (2), because in deciding whether the order of the Mamlatdar is ultra vires it is not purporting or attempting to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar, nor is it allowing the valid order of the Mamlatdar to be questioned before it.

The other matter that has got to be considered is, what is the effect of s. 74 of the Act which provides for an appeal against the order of the Mamlatdar. It was open to the opponents to prefer an appeal against the decision of the Mamlatdar because s. 74 in terms provides for an appeal to the Collector against an order made by the Mamlatdar under s. 29. Instead of preferring an appeal the oponents have filed this suit in a Civil Court.

Now, does the fact that a statute provides for a right of appeal against an order made by an authority set up under that statute make any difference to the position when the order made by the authority is an invalid or ultra vires order? It is clear that if the order itself is ultra vires it is a nullity and there is no obligation upon a party against whom the order is made to prefer an appeal against that order. The appeals that are provided for under s. 74 are strictly appeals against valid orders made by the Mamlatdar and orders made with jurisdiction. It may be that the Collector could have corrected the Mamlatdar and could have held that the order of the Mamlatdar was ultra vires. But the question is not whether the opponents could have appealed to the Collector and could have got the necessary relief. The question is whether the opponents are bound to appeal and are prevented or precluded from going to a civil Court. In our opinion, on principle it is erroneous to argue that merely because a statute provides for a right of appeal, the party against whom the order is made is bound to appeal although the order made is a nullity. If the order is a nullity, the party is entitled to ignore it, to treat it as waste paper, and to go to a civil Court for a declaration that the order is a nullity and no action should be taken against the party under that order which would prejudice his rights. See for this purpose the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Abdullamiyan Abdulrehman v. The Government of Bombay(2). Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge below was right in coming to the conclusion that he did that the Court had jurisdiction to try this suit.

But in our opinion Mr. Purshottam is right when he complains that in matters like this injunctions should not be lightly granted. The Tenancy Act has set up a definite machinery which provides for possession being given to the tenant in cases where he has been dispossessed by the landlord and where he alleges that he is a tenant and entitled to possession. The civil Courts should be most reluctant to interfere with the working of that machinery and in our opinion the civil Court should not pass an order of injunction unless a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff that the order made by the revenue authorities is an ultra vires order. It would lead to an impossible situation if a landlord were to rush to the civil Court and on the mere allegation that the order of the Mamlatdar is ultra vires get an injunction from the civil Court. Every litigant has a right to put a suit on the file of a Court, he can have the luxury of having it ultimately dismissed, but every litigant has not the right, having put a suit on file, to get an injunction from the Court. In this case the suit has yet to be decided by the trial Court and therefore we refrain from expressing any views on the merits. But if the contention put forward by Mr. Purshottam is correct, viz. that the petitioner filed an application under s. 29(1) which he was entitled to do, that the Mamlatdar has held him to be a tenant which the Mamlatdar was entitled to do, and that it is from this order that the opponents have gone to the Civil Court, then it seems to us that the Court must immediately consider whether there is any basis whatsoever for the suit filed by the opponents.

We would therefore direct that the papers in this matter should go back immediately to the lower Court and that the learned Civil Judge without any delay will dispose of this suit on merits.

Mr. Purshottam is apprehensive that there may be an appeal to the District Court, in which case his client would be still out of the land in respect of which the Mamlatdar has held that he is a tenant. It would be perfectly open to the petitioner to apply to the District Court with regard to the question of injunction and it will be for the District Court to consider whether on the facts of the case the injunction should be continued or it should be dissolved. It would be open to the petitioner also to apply to the learned Civil Judge on proper materials to consider whether the injunction granted by him should not be dissolved.

Costs of the revision application costs in the cause.

The same point arises in Civil Revision Application No. 1586, and we make the same order in that application.

Rule discharged.
M.W.P