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Mahibub Usman Mondi v. Vithal Sakharam Gadade
Opinion Summary — Shah, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The deceased Sakharam Gadade's widow, Savitra, inherited his property. On 12 July 1929 Savitra executed a deed of mortgage in favour of Dhondi Iman to secure repayment of Rs. 2,000, mortgaging specified survey-numbered lands; the mortgage period was five years. Savitra adopted Vithal (a minor) as a son of her deceased husband, and Savitra later died. After Savitra's death, Vithal sold the mortgaged lands to Ramrao Awate (respondent No. 2).
The plaintiff, as assignee of the rights of the mortgagee Dhondi Imam, filed Suit No. 595 of 1946 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Barsi against Vithal, Ramrao Awate and others for enforcement of the mortgage dated 12 July 1929, claiming a decree for Rs. 4,000.
At trial, Vithal's written statement denied knowledge of the mortgage and its consideration and alleged that Awate had agreed to pay off the mortgage debt. Awate contended the mortgage was bogus, not binding on Vithal, and not supported by legal necessity. The trial Court held the mortgage genuine, for full consideration, and executed for legal necessity, and entered a preliminary mortgage decree that the amount due was Rs. 400.
Awate appealed to the District Court at Sholapur. The District Judge held the mortgage was executed for legal necessity for Rs. 100 only, found the consideration to be Rs. 1,600, and held that Awate could contend the mortgage was not binding on Vithal and therefore not binding on him. The District Court modified the decree and declared that Rs. 200 was due on the mortgage at the date of the suit.
The plaintiff brought a Second Appeal to this Court against the District Court's decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Awate, a purchaser from Vithal (the reversioner), being a stranger to the reversion at the time of the widow's alienation, was entitled to challenge Savitra's mortgage on the ground that it was not supported by legal necessity.
- Whether, as contended by the plaintiff, there was legal necessity for Rs. 500 and therefore a decree for that amount (with interest) should have been passed instead of the lesser amounts found below.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff)'s Arguments
- Awate, being a stranger to the reversion, was not entitled to challenge Savitra's mortgage on the ground that it lacked legal necessity; only the actual reversioner could avoid such an alienation.
- There was legal necessity for Rs. 500; the plaintiff sought a decree for Rs. 500 with interest at the stipulated rate.
Respondents' Arguments (Vithal and Awate)
- Vithal denied knowledge of the mortgage and its consideration and alleged Awate had agreed to pay off the mortgage.
- Awate contended the mortgage was bogus, not binding on Vithal, and not supported by legal necessity; and that he (as purchaser from Vithal) could raise that contention.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raja Madhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke | Supports that a reversioner may elect to assent to an alienation by a limited owner. | Referenced to show that the reversioner can elect to affirm or treat an alienation as null; part of the Court's general discussion on election and estoppel. |
| Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb | Illustrates that a reversioner may be estopped from avoiding an alienation by assenting or by joining in it. | Cited to explain ways in which a reversioner may be precluded from avoiding an alienation (estoppel by conduct). |
| Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi | States that a Hindu widow's alienation is not void but prima facie voidable at the election of the reversioners; the reversioner may treat the transaction as a nullity without court intervention. | Used to support the proposition that the right to avoid is attached to the property and can be manifested by the reversioner's conduct (including transfer), not purely a personal right. |
| Sitaram v. Khandu | Held that a mortgagee from a Hindu could not challenge the right of a donee of the equity of redemption (a limited owner) who succeeded to the estate to redeem; an alienation by a limited owner is voidable and the right to avoid is at the instance of the reversioner. | Distinguished by the Court as addressing a different factual constellation (dispute between transferee from limited owner and mortgagee from last full owner) and not directly determinative of the present question. |
| Govind v. Deekappa | Held a subsequent mortgagee with clear notice of a prior mortgage could not challenge the existence of legal necessity for the prior mortgage. | Noted by the Court as inapplicable here because the coparcener (who could have avoided the mortgage) had not transferred or otherwise indicated avoidance in that case. |
| Maharaja Kesho Prasad Singh v. Chandrika Prasad Singh | Held that a gift by a Hindu widow of the whole property of her deceased husband is valid against everyone except the reversioners, and valid against reversioners unless they elect to treat it as nullity within 12 years. | Cited to show limits on challenges to widow's alienations but distinguished as involving different parties and issues (redemption suit against gratuitous transferee). |
| Bipat Mahton v. Kulpat Mahton | Held that an alienation by a limited owner without legal necessity was valid against strangers to the reversion; questions of legal necessity can only be raised by a limited class of persons. | Noted as involving a dispute between an alienee from a limited owner and a trespasser; distinguished from present dispute where transferee from reversioner claimed the benefit. |
| Shanmughasundaram Pillai v. Parvati Ammal | Held that an alienation by one of two co-widows is voidable and could be avoided by co-widow or reversioners after death, not by third parties (a stranger creditor could not impugn the alienation). | Referred to as an example where third parties could not impugn a voidable alienation; Court treated it as not directly deciding the transfer-from-reversioner question now before it. |
| Thakur Singh v. Mst. Uttam Kaur | Directly addressed whether assignees from a reversioner (after succession opened) could sue for possession; held such assignees were entitled to sue. | Identified by the Court as a direct authority supporting the proposition that successors/assignees of the reversioner may obtain the benefit of avoiding an alienation by a limited owner. |
| Nishakar Chakravarti v. Ram Kumar Tewari | Explained that the right to avoid an alienation by a Hindu widow is not strictly personal to the reversionary heirs and that a reversioner may treat the alienation as a nullity and transfer his interest. | Quoted and relied upon in the Court's reasoning to support that what is transferred is an interest in the property and the transferee may assert the right to recover possession. |
| Thakur Prasad v. Musammat Dipa Kuer | Held that the property vested in the reversioner upon the widow's death and that an heir of the reversioner who succeeds may be in a position to sue for recovery of possession even if the reversioner did not sue in his lifetime. | Applied by the Court to show that failure of the reversioner to sue in his lifetime does not necessarily indicate election to affirm the transactions, and that successors can sue. |
| Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu | Privy Council advised that alienations by a limited owner not supported by legal necessity could be set aside and that the alienee alone was entitled to obtain a decree in that instance. | Used to support the proposition that the benefit of a plea that an alienation lacked legal necessity may be annexed to ownership of the property and not solely personal to the reversioner. |
| Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke | Quoted in the opinion as authority that an alienation of this description is not void but only voidable and that reversionary heirs may elect to assent to it. | Reiterated by the Court as part of the background legal principle on voidability and reversioner's election; used in conjunction with other authorities to reject the plaintiff's narrow view of the right to avoid. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first disposed of the plaintiff's second point (legal necessity for Rs. 500). It accepted the District Judge's factual finding that out of the Rs. 500 alleged to have been received by Savitra before execution of the mortgage deed, only Rs. 100 were required for purposes of legal necessity. The Court treated this as a finding of fact binding on it in Second Appeal.
The principal contention examined by the Court was the plaintiff's submission that only the actual reversioner (Vithal) could avoid the mortgage as the right to avoid was personal to the reversioner and could not be exercised by a transferee from the reversioner (Awate), who was a stranger to the reversion at the time of the widow's alienation.
The Court rejected the contention that the right to avoid an alienation by a limited owner is strictly personal to the reversioner. It explained the governing principles as follows (all statements drawn from the opinion):
- The reversioner may elect to assent to an alienation or may be estopped from avoiding it by his conduct (for example, by assenting or joining in the alienation).
- If the reversioner has not elected to affirm and is not estopped, he has the right to avoid the transaction; that right relates to the property disposed of and is not merely a personal right.
- A transfer of the property by the reversioner which ignores the prior alienation is a clear indication of the reversioner's intention to avoid the alienation — such transfer constitutes an unequivocal declaration of intent not to be bound by the alienation.
- It is not necessary for the reversioner to seek court intervention to make his election effective; the act of transferring the estate can itself amount to the election to avoid the earlier alienation.
Applying those principles to the facts, the Court observed that Vithal transferred the property to Awate free from the mortgage. There was nothing to show that before the transfer Vithal had elected to affirm the mortgage or was otherwise estopped from avoiding it. Therefore, Vithal's transfer to Awate manifested an unequivocal intention not to be bound by the mortgage executed by Savitra, and the transferee (Awate) was entitled to take the estate free from the unauthorized alienation.
The Court noted that although Vithal's written statement did not plead that he had avoided the mortgage (and did assert that Awate had orally undertaken to redeem the mortgage), no issue was raised on that plea and it was not proved by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also did not plead election or estoppel against Vithal or Awate. The plaintiff's legal argument that an alienation by a Hindu widow not binding upon the estate remains binding upon a transferee from the reversioner unless the reversioner had before the transfer expressly repudiated the alienation was, in the Court's view, unfounded.
The Court reviewed the authorities cited by the plaintiff and explained that none directly decided the narrow question whether a transferee from the reversioner could obtain the benefit of avoiding an alienation by a limited owner; several authorities, including Thakur Singh, Nishakar Chakravarti, Thakur Prasad and Bhagwat Dayal Singh, supported the position that successors/assignees from the reversioner may obtain relief or that the right to avoid is annexed to the interest in property rather than remaining strictly personal.
On the combination of these legal principles and the factual finding on legal necessity, the Court concluded that the District Court's decree should be confirmed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the decree passed by the Court below is confirmed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The District Court's modified decree (which declared that Rs. 200 was due on the mortgage at the date of the suit, and which had found only Rs. 100 to be required for legal necessity) is confirmed; the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed with costs.
- On the legal question, the Court held (expressly in the opinion) that the right to avoid an alienation by a limited owner is a right relating to the property and not strictly a personal right of the reversioner; where the reversioner, by transferring the property free from the alienation, manifests an unequivocal election to avoid the alienation, the transferee from the reversioner is entitled to the estate free from the unauthorized alienation. This principle was applied to allow Awate to challenge the mortgage as not supported by legal necessity.
- No new procedural form of relief was created in this opinion; the Court applied existing principles and precedents to the facts and affirmed the decree below.
Appeal dismissed.
Order reported in the opinion: M.W.P (as recorded in the source text).
Shah, J.:—
On the death of Sakharam Gadade, his widow Savitra inherited his property. On July 12, 1929, Savitra executed a deed of mortgage to secure repayment of Rs. 2,000 in favour of one Dhondi Iman mortgaging some lands including Survey Nos. 27, 85, 85/1, 85/3, 56/1 and 56/3 inherited by her from her husband. The period of the mortgage was 5 years. Savitra then adopted Vithal (who was a minor) as a son to her deceased husband. Savitra died some time thereafter. After the death of Savitra, Vithal sold the mortgaged lands to one Ramrao Awate who is respondent No. 2 in this Second Appeal. The Plaintiff as an assignee of the rights of the mortgagee Dhondi Imam filed suit No. 595 of 1946 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Barsi against Vithal, Ramrao Awate and others for enforcement of the mortgage, July 12, 1929, and claimed a decree for Rs. 4,000.
Vithal by his written statement denied knowledge of the mortgage and of the consideration thereof. He also contended that Awate had agreed to pay off the mortgage debt due to the Plaintiff. Awate contended that the mortgage was bogus and was not binding upon Vithal and consequently it was not binding upon him, and that in any case it was not supported by legal necessity.
The trial Court held that the mortgage was genuine and for full consideration and was executed for the legal necessity. The learned trial Judge accordingly passed the usual preliminary mortgage decree declaring that the amount due on the mortgage was Rs. 400.
Awate appealed to the District Court at Sholapur against the decree of the trial Court. In appeal the learned District Judge held that the mortgage was executed for legal necessity for Rs. 100 only and that the consideration for the deed was Rs. 1,600. The learned District Judge also held that Awate was entitled to contend that the mortgage was not binding upon Vithal and consequently not binding upon him, as it was not supported by legal necessity. The District Court, therefore, modified the decree of the trial Court and declared that an amount of Rs. 200 was due on the mortgage at the date of the suit. The plaintiff has come to this Court in Second Appeal, against the decree passed by the District Court.
Counsel for the plaintiff has urged two points in support of the appeal: (1) that Awate being a stranger to the reversion was not entitled to challenge the mortgage by Savitra on the ground that it was not supported by legal necessity; (2) that in any case there was legal necessity for Rs. 500 and a decree for payment of that amount, together with interest at the stipulated rate, should have been passed.
The second point is easily disposed of. Even though there is some discrepancy between the finding recorded by the District Judge on the 4th issue and the observations made in paragraph 14 of his judgment, it is evident that the District Judge found that out of the amount of Rs. 500 alleged to have been received by Savitra before the execution of the mortgage deed only Rs. 100 were required for purposes of legal necessity. That is a finding of fact, which is binding upon this Court in Second Appeal.
The principal contention, however, is that Vithal alone, as the reversioner to the estate of Sakharam, was entitled to avoid the mortgage by Savitra on the ground that it was not supported by legal necessity, and that Awate as a purchaser from Vithal of the property could not avoid the mortgage. It was urged that Awate was a stranger to the reversion and a right to avoid an alienation by a limited owner in excess of her authority could only be exercised by that actual reversioner and by no one else. It was submitted ??? an alienation by a Hindu widow in excess of her authority was not void but only voidable and the actual reversioner entitled to the estate on the death of the widow alone could avoid it by pleading that the alienation was not supported by legal necessity or benefit of the estate. It was submitted that the right to set aside an alienation was personal to the reversioner and that no person other than the actual reversioner is entitled to challenge the alienation, even if such other person be interested in the estate, and that, therefore, the contention of Awate as purchaser from Vithal of the suit property that the mortgage by Savitra was not supported by legal necessity could not be entertained, when no such contention was raised by Vithal in his written statement.
I am unable to agree with the contention that the right to avoid the alienation by a limited owner is personal to the reversioner and the benefit thereof cannot be availed by persons who are not reversioners. It is true that the reversioner is not bound to avoid an aliention by a limited owner. He may elect to assent to it and treat as valid (see Raja Madhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke(13)). He may by his conduct be estopped from avoiding the alienation by a limited owner by assenting to the same or by joining in the alienation. (See Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb).(14) But where the reversioner has not elected to affirm the transaction, either before or after the succession opens, and is not otherwise estopped from challenging the transaction, the reversioner has the right to avoid the transaction. The right to avoid the transaction relates to the property disposed of, and is not a personal right. If a reversioner has not previously elected to affirm the transaction and is not estopped from challenging it, a transfer of the property by the reversioner ignoring the alienation by the limited owner would be a clear indication of the intention of the reversioner to avoid it. Till the reversioner elects to set aside the election, the right of the reversioner in the estate alienated is inchoate. When he elects to exercise the right to the estate alienated, the right becomes concrete. If by expressing an unequivocal intention to avoid an alienation by a limited owner the reversioner treats it as a nullity and then transfers the estate as if it is free from the alienation, the tranferee is undoubtedly entitled to get the estate if the transfer is not supported by legal necessity or benefit to the estate. Similarly, when the reversioner expresses an unequivocal intention to avoid the alienation by the limited owner by transferring the property, the transferee, in my judgment, would get it free from the alienation if the alienation by the limited owner is unauthorised. Now, Vithal transferred to Awate the property in suit free from the mortgage. There is nothing to show that before the transfer to Awate he had elected to affirm it or that he was otherwise estopped from avoiding it. Vithal having transferred the property in suit free from the mortgage he must be regarded as having made an unequivocal declaration of intention that he was not bound by the mortgage executed by Savitra. In order to make his election to avoid the alienation effective it is not necessary that the reversioner should seek the intervention of the Court. By the very act of transfer of the estate to Awate, Vithal must be held to have unequivocally declared his intention not to be bound by the mortgage by Savitra. (See Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi).(15) The assumption underlying the argument of Counsel for the plaintiff that the alienee from Vithal was attempting to exercise the option to avoid the mortgage, is in my judgment unfounded. The transfer by Vithal to Awate itself amounted to an election not to be bound by the mortgage executed by Savitra. It is true that Vithal by his written statement did not plead that he had avoided the mortgage or that he was avoiding the mortgage thereby. Vithal even pleaded by his written statement that Awate had orally undertaken to redeem the mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. But no issue was raised on that plea and it was never attempted to be proved by the plaintiff. In fact the plaintiff never raised any plea of election or estoppel against Vithal or Awate, but argued as a pure question of law that an alienation by a Hindu widow for purposes not binding upon the estate is binding upon a transferee from the reversioner, unless the reversioner has before the transfer expressly repudiated the alienation by the widow. For reasons already mentioned the contention cannot be accepted.
Counsel for the plaintiff referred to several decisions of this and other High Courts in India in support of his contention that Awate was not entitled to raise the contention that the mortgage by Savitra was not supported by legal necessity, when Vithal who could have raised the contention did not do so. I propose to refer to them briefly in order to show that none of the cases relied upon have a direct bearing on the question to be decided. In Sitaram v. Khandu,(16) a Division Bench of this Court held that a mortgagee from a Hindu could not challenge the right of a donee of the equity of redemption from a limited owner, who succeeded to the estate, to redeem the property from the mortgagee. The Court held in that case that the alienee from the last male owner cannot challenge the right of the alienee from his heir who is a limited owner to redeem, because an alienation from a limited owner is not void but is voidable at the instance of the reversioner. In that case the dispute was between the transferee from the limited owner and the mortgagee from the last full owner. In Govind v. Deekappa,(17) it was held that a second mortgagee from the manager of a Hindu joint family who had clear notice of the previous mortgage and subject to which he took his own mortgage was not at liberty to raise the question that there was no legal necessity for the first mortgage. In that case the coparcener who was entitled to avoid the mortgage, had not avoided it, nor had he transferred his interest in the property indicating an intention to avoid the mortgage. In Maharaja Kesho Prasad Singh v. Chandrika Prasad Singh.(18) It was held that a gift by a Hindu widow of the whole of the property of deceased husband of which she is in possession is valid against every one except the reversioners and it is also valid against the latter, unless they elect to treat it as a nullity and sue for possession within 12 years of their interest becoming vested. In that case the question arose in a redemption suit brought by a gratuitous transferee from the widow against the Zarpeshgidars from her and it did not raise any question as to the right of a transferee from a reversionery heir to set aside the alienation. The dispute in that case arose between the donees from the widow and the mortgagees of the estate from the widow. In Bipat Mahton v. Kulpat Mahton,(19) it was held that an alienation by a limited owner without legal necessity was valid against strangers to the reversioner, and such question as those of legal necessity and the adequacy and the existence of consideration could only be raised by a limited class of persons and not by strangers to the reversion. In that case the dispute arose between an alienee from a limited owner and a trespasser. In Shanmughasundaram Pillai v. Parvati Ammal,(20) it was held that an alienation by one of two co-widows in whom the estate was vested was voidable and not void and it could be avoided at the instance of the co-widow or the reversioners after her death and not by third parties, and that a stranger creditor could not impugn the alienation. In that case the dispute was between the alienee from the widow and the subsequent purchaser of the right, title and interest of the widow in execution of a money decree obtained against the widow as representing her husband's estate; and the Court held that alienation not being void but only voidable could be avoided only at the instance of the co-widow or reversioners and not by third parties. In Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi,(21) it was held by the Privy Council that a Hindu widow is the owner of her husband's property subject to certain restrictions on alienation, and subject to its devolving upon the heirs of the last owner. It was observed that the alienation by a Hindu widow was not void but it was prima facie voidable at the election of the reversioners. The dispute arose in that case between the alienee from a widow and the reversioners.
In none of the cases cited by Counsel for the plaintiff did the question arise whether a transferee from the reversioner of an estate which has been alienated by a limited owner is entitled to claim the benefit of a plea that the alienation by the limited owner was for purposes not binding upon the estate. There have been some cases which have come before the Courts in India in which the benefit of a plea that the alienation by a limited owner was without legal necessity was obtained by persons other than actual reversioners. In Thakur Singh v. Mst. Uttam Kaur,(22) the question which arises in this appeal directly arose for decision. In that case one D, a Hindu governed by the Punjab Customary Law, died leaving him surviving three widows. The widows had from time to time made numerous alienations of portions of their husband's estate to the defendants. After the death of the widows a suit was filed for possession by a reversioner and certain assignees from the reversioner to whom the reversioner after the death of the last surviving widow, had transferred a share in the property. It was held in that case that where, succession has opened on the death of the widow and the reversioner has become the real owner of the property, though he is still out of possession, there is no bar to his assigning the whole of a part of it to third parties, and the assignees from the reversioner were, therefore, entitled to sue. Mr. Justice Tek Chand who delivered the principal judgment of the Court observed at page 637:—
“It was urged on behalf of the respondents, an alienation by a widow is not void but voidable, and until the reversioner has exercised his option to avoid the transaction the alienee continues to be the owner of the alienated property and the reversioner has no legal right to transfer it. This argument appears to me to be fallacious and is completely met by the following observations of Sir A. Mookerjee J., in Nishakar Chakravarti v. Ram Kumar Tewari(23) and I cannot do better than quote the following passage from his judgment:—
“It has been contended that an alienation effected by a Hindu widow must be avoided before the reversionery heirs can recover possession and that the right to avoid an alienation is personal to the reversionery heirs and cannot be exercised by a transferee from them. There is, in our opinion, no foundation for this contention. It cannot be disputed that, as was pointed out by Sir Richard Couch in the case of Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke,(24) an alienation of this description is not void but only voidable and that the reversionery heirs may elect to assent to it and treat it as valid. But it was explained by Lord Davey in Bijoy Gopal Mukerjee v. Krishna Mahishi Debi,(25) that although such an alienation is not absolutely void and is prima facie voidable at the election of the reversionery heirs, there is in fact nothing for the Court either to set aside or cancel as a condition precedent to their right of action. They may, if they think fit affirm the transaction or they may, at their pleasure, treat it as a nullity without the intervention of any Court and thus show their election by commencing an action to recover possession of the property vested in the reversionery heir upon the death of the widow and it was competent to him to transfer it to the present plaintiffs. What has been transferred is not a right personal to the heir but the interest in the property which, upon the death of the widow, has descended to him from the original owner.”
In Thakur Prasad v. Musammat Dipa Kuer,(26) the question arose whether an heir of a reversioner who had not elected to affirm the alienation by a limited owner was entitled to challenge the alienation. Mr. Justice Dhavle who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 360:—
“The reversioner in the present case died four or five years after the death of the widow, and long before his right to recover possession of the property could be barred by limitation. What passed to the plaintiff was the property that had vested in her father as the reversioner upon the death of Lakhpati Kuer, and this meant the entire property. The appellant's contention is that the alienated property continued to be the property of the alienees until the reversioner made his election. This is true only in the sense that it was not open to third parties, strangers to the reversion, to challenge their title. But the property of Surajan Singh vested, all of it, in Ishwar Prasad upon the death of Lakhpati Kuer, though without possession in respect of the items alienated. It was consequently open, in my opinion, to Ishwar Prasad's heir, the plaintiff, to sue for recovery of possession—she is in one sense in a stronger position than a mere transferee from the reversioner—within the period of limitation. The mere failure of Ishwar Prasad to sue in his lifetime is no indication of his election to affirm the transactions.”
Thakur Prasad's case is a clear authority for the proposition that the right to challenge an alienation by a limited owner is not personal to the reversioner and may be vested in a person who is a stranger to the reversion by operation of law and may be exercised by him.
Two other cases only need be mentioned. In Nishakar Chakravarti v. Ram Kumar Tewari,(27) the plaintiffs as transferees from the reversioners sued for recovery of possession of property permanently leased by a Hindu widow to the predecessor in interest of the defendants. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to obtain possession. In Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu,(28) one Jilab Kaur—who inherited the property of her grandson Narayan Singh as a limited owner—and two others sold the villages of Chiyani and Ganka to one Debi Dayal Singh. After the death of Jileb Kuer in the year 1894 the estate of Narayan Singh devolved upon Bhanpertap Singh and Kirpa Narayan Singh. Bhanpertap Singh and Kripa Narayan Singh by deed, dated November 29, 1895, sold the villages to Bhagwat Dayal Singh. Bhagwat Dayal Singh, Bhanpertap Singh and Kirpa Narayan Singh then filed a suit for possession of the village and mesne profits. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the alienations were not supported by legal necessity and advised His Majesty that a decree be passed in favour of Bhagwat Dayal Singh. It is true that in that case the reversioners Bhanpertap Singh and Kirpa Narayan Singh had joined the alienee in the suit. But the Privy Council ultimately took the view that the alienee alone was entitled to obtain a decree. That again is an authority for the proposition that the right to obtain benefit of the contention that an alienation by a limited owner is not supported by legal necessity or benefit to the estate is not personal but is annexed to the ownership of the property which was the subject-matter of alienation by the limited owner.
In that view of the case the decree passed by the Court below must be confirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
M.W.P
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