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Dewanchand And Sons v. Dora Amiya Few
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a summary suit instituted by a plaintiff who obtained a summons for judgment. On that summons a learned Judge made an order granting leave to the defendants to defend subject to certain conditions. On appeal the Advocate General challenged, in addition to merits, the validity of the summons for judgment on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements of rule 211 (r. 211). The central factual circumstance relevant to the appeal is that the affidavit filed in support of the summons for judgment was sworn by a constituted attorney of the plaintiff, and that constituted attorney was not in a position to swear to the facts from his own personal knowledge. The narrow legal question before the Court is whether an affidavit sworn by the plaintiff's constituted attorney, who lacks personal knowledge of the facts, satisfies the requirements of r. 211. The judgment below did not discuss this point because the point had not been taken in the affidavit before the learned Judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under rule 211, an affidavit in support of a summons for judgment that is sworn by a constituted attorney of the plaintiff (and not by the plaintiff himself) satisfies the rule when that constituted attorney is not in a position to swear to the facts from his own personal knowledge.
- Whether the phrase in r. 211 that the affidavit shall be "made by himself" (or the emphatic pronoun used in the rule) excludes the possibility of the plaintiff's agent or constituted attorney acting in the plaintiff's place for the purpose of making the required affidavit.
- Ancillary: the consequences as to the validity of the summons for judgment and the appropriate orders as to costs where r. 211 is not complied with.
Arguments of the Parties
Advocate General's Argument
- The Advocate General contended on appeal that, apart from the question of the merits, the summons for judgment must fail because it does not comply with rule 211.
- The implicit basis was that r. 211 conditions the making of a summons for judgment on the filing of an affidavit meeting the rule's requirements, and that the affidavit in the present case did not so comply.
Argument Attributed to Mr. Peerbhoy
- It was urged by Mr. Peerbhoy that a constituted attorney of the plaintiff can do what the plaintiff can do; therefore, if r. 211 requires the plaintiff to make an affidavit, that requirement can be satisfied by the plaintiff's constituted attorney.
- Separately, during submissions on costs, Mr. Peerbhoy argued that allowing the appellants to argue the point in the appeal was a matter of indulgence (i.e., that the appellants should not obtain the costs of the appeal on that point).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Symon & Co. v. Palmer's Stores (1903), Limited | Observations that the jurisdiction to pass a decree in a summary suit depends upon compliance with the conditions of the corresponding rule (r. 211); conditions are treated as conditions precedent. | The Court invoked these observations to emphasise that summary suit procedure is extraordinary and that strict compliance with r. 211 is required before a Court may pass a decree on a summons for judgment. |
| Ashish Namdar v. Ruttonshaw (before Mr. Justice Tendolkar) | Considered whether the plaintiff must have personal knowledge to make an affidavit under the rule; the learned Judge took the view that the plaintiff is an exception and may depose on information and belief while other persons must have personal knowledge. | The Court discussed this decision and related English authority in order to examine whether the exception allowing the plaintiff to depose on information and belief can be extended to a constituted attorney. The Court declined to extend that exception. |
| Pathe Freres Cinema, Limited v. United Electric ... Limited (observations of Lord Justice Buckley) | Interpreting the corresponding English rule (Order XIV, r. 1): the rule assumes a plaintiff is qualified to make an affidavit by virtue of being plaintiff, while other persons must be able to swear positively to the facts. | The Court relied on Lord Justice Buckley's emphasis that the exception is made solely in favour of the plaintiff; it supported the view that the rule's language intends the affidavit in the plaintiff's case to be by the plaintiff himself and not by others lacking personal knowledge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by noting that the summary suit procedure is novel and departs from ordinary trial procedure: it allows a plaintiff to obtain judgment without trial and is therefore an extraordinary and stringent remedy. For that reason, the Court held that strict compliance with the conditions laid down in r. 211 is required.
The Court analysed the language of r. 211, which (as quoted) provides that if the defendant enters an appearance the plaintiff shall, "on affidavit made by himself, or by any other person who can swear to the facts of his own personal knowledge," apply by summons for judgment. From this wording the Court drew two linked conclusions:
- First, the affidavit requirement is conditional upon an affidavit being filed as laid down in r. 211; compliance with that requirement is a condition precedent to the Court's jurisdiction to make an order on a summons for judgment.
- Second, the affidavit may be by the plaintiff himself (in which case it may be on information and belief), or by any other person (including a constituted attorney) but, if made by such other person, it must be based on that person's own personal knowledge of the facts.
The Court considered O. III, r. 1 (which generally permits agents or pleaders to perform acts on behalf of a party) and acknowledged that, ordinarily, an agent can do what his principal can do. However, the Court held that when a specific rule (r. 211) uses the emphatic phrase "made by himself" the context and the purpose of the rule indicate that the rule-maker intended that the particular act of making the affidavit be performed by the plaintiff personally unless the person who swore was otherwise able to depose from personal knowledge.
The Court rejected the contention (advanced by Mr. Peerbhoy) that the exception allowing a plaintiff to swear on information and belief should be extended to the plaintiff's constituted attorney. The Court reasoned that the exception in favour of the plaintiff is justified by the plaintiff's unique position (having filed the plaint and being the person who ordinarily knows the facts), but that principle does not justify extending the exception to agents who lack personal knowledge. On both construction of the rule and the underlying principle, the Court concluded that an affidavit made by any person other than the plaintiff must be from that person's own personal knowledge.
Applying that construction to the facts of the case, the Court held that the affidavit in support of the summons for judgment—being by the plaintiff's constituted attorney who was not in a position to swear to the facts from his own personal knowledge—did not comply with r. 211. Consequently, the summons for judgment was improperly taken out and the Court below had no competence to make an order on that summons.
On costs, the Court analysed two separate points:
- As to the costs of the defective summons for judgment: although a misconceived summons would ordinarily be dismissed with costs, the Court noted that the point now prevailing was not taken in the defendants' affidavit in reply; accordingly the Court ordered the summons for judgment dismissed but made no order as to costs in respect of the summons.
- As to the costs of the appeal: the point on which the appeal succeeded had been taken in the memorandum of appeal and the appellants had given full notice; it was therefore proper for the appellants to obtain the costs of the appeal. The Court rejected the submission that permitting argument on this point in the appeal was mere indulgence that should preclude an award of costs to the successful appellant.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court allowed the appeal and held that the summons for judgment was not properly taken out because the affidavit in support did not comply with r. 211. The affidavit, being sworn by a constituted attorney who lacked personal knowledge, did not satisfy the rule.
Direct consequences and implications as stated in the opinion:
- The summons for judgment is dismissed; the Court concluded it was incompetent to make any order on a summons that did not comply with r. 211.
- As to costs of the summons for judgment: the Court made no order as to costs for the summons itself, given that the relevant point had not been taken in the affidavit in reply below.
- The appellants are entitled to the costs of the appeal; the appeal was allowed with costs.
- The Court clarified the construction of r. 211: an affidavit required under that rule must either be (a) by the plaintiff himself (which may be on information and belief), or (b) by any other person (including a constituted attorney) who must swear from his own personal knowledge. The decision constrains the ability of an agent to substitute for the plaintiff when lacking personal knowledge.
The opinion does not state that it establishes any broader novel precedent beyond its interpretation of r. 211 and its application to the facts before the Court; it focuses on the direct effect upon the summons for judgment and the allocation of costs in this litigation.
Additional Case Information Recorded in the Opinion
Attorneys for appellants: Thakordas & Co.
Attorneys for respondent: Crawford, Bayley & Co.
Appeal allowed.
P.M.P
Chagla, C.J:—
This appeal arises out of a summary suit filed ??? the plaintiff. On a summons for judgment taken out by her, ??? learned Judge made an order granting leave to the defendants to defend on certain conditions. In appeal it has been ??? by the Advocate General that apart from the question of merits the summons for judgment is bound to fail as it does not comply with the provisions of r. 211. rule 211 provides that if the defendant enters an appearance, the plaintiff ???, on affidavit made by himself, or by any other person who ??? swear to the facts of his own personal knowledge ??? the cause of action and the amount claimed, and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the action, apply by summons for judgment returnable within a certain period. Therefore, the application of the plaintiff for summons for judgment is conditional upon an affidavit being filed as laid down under r. 211. The affidavit can be by the plaintiff himself or it ??? be by the any other person but if it is by any other person ??? that other person must be in a position to swear to the ??? of his own personal knowledge. In this case the affidavit contemplated by r. 211 is not by the plaintiff himself, nor is it ??? any other person who was in a position to swear to the ??? of his own personal knowledge. The affidavit is by a constituted attorney of the plaintiff, and the very narrow question that arises for our determination on this appeal is whether when an affidavit is sworn not by the plaintiff himself but by his constituted attorney and that constituted attorney is not in a position to swear to the facts of his own personal knowledge, that affidavit satisfies the conditions laid down in r. 211.
It is necessary to point out, as was observed by a very leaned English Judge, that the procedure by a summary suit is a novel procedure. It constitutes a departure from the ??? well established rules governing trial of suits. In an ??? suit the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment only after a ???. In a summary suit he is entitled to a judgment without a ??? Therefore, the remedy is a very stringent remedy, the ??? is an extraordinary procedure, and therefore it has pointed out that in order that the plaintiff should be ??? to avail himself of such a procedure he should strictly ??? with the conditions laid down in r. 211. Moreover, the ??? Courts have gone to the length of observing that the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree in a summary suit ??? upon the conditions laid down in r. 211 being complied. It has also been said that the conditions laid down in r. 211 conditions precedent to the jurisdiction of the Court to ??? decree in a summary suit. See the observations of ??? Williams in Symon & Co. v. Palmer's Stores (1903), Limited.
A similar question arose before Mr. Justice Tendolkar Ashish Namdar v. Ruttonshaw. What was sought to be ??? before the learned Judge was that even in the case of plaintiff, if he makes an affidavit under r. 211, he must knowledge of the facts deposed to in the affidavit. That ??? was rejected by the learned Judge on a construction r. 211 and the learned Judge took the view that under ??? every person making an affidavit must swear to the ??? his own personal knowledge, but the exception to that rule the plaintiff himself. In the case of the plaintiff he could ??? an affidavit on his information and belief. Our attention been drawn to the observations of Lord Justice Buckle Pathe Freres Cinema, Limited v. United Electric ??? Limited, which are also relied upon by Mr. Justice ??? in Ashish Namdar v. Ruttonshaw. Lord Justice Buckley struing the corresponding English rule, O. XIV, r. 1, observed as follows (p. 1255):
“…The question is whether the affidavit made on behalf of the ??? under Order XIV, r. 1, is sufficient.”
Then the learned Judge sets out the original rule. The ??? proceeds to say (p. 1255):
“…The rule seems to assume that a plaintiff is qualified to make affidavit simply because he is plaintiff; the other person who may ??? the affidavit must be able to swear positively to the facts.”
Therefore, what Lord Justice Buckley emphasises is that the exception is made in the case of the plaintiff simply because he is the plaintiff.
Now, what has been urged before us by Mr. Peerbhoy is that a constituted attorney of the plaintiff can do what the plaintiff can do, and if r. 211 requires the plaintiff to make an affidavit, that condition can be complied with by his constituted attorney. The powers of agents and constituted attorneys quae pleadings and quae acts in Courts are dealt with in O. III, r. 1. That rule provides:
“Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf:”
Therefore, O. III, r. 1, lays down the ordinary rule which is that an agent can do what his principal can do. Then there is a proviso to that rule:
“Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person.”
Therefore, if r. 211 had provided that the plaintiff shall make an affidavit in certain terms, it is undoubtedly true that by reason of O. III, r. 1, such an affidavit could have been made by his constituted attorney. But it was competent for the farmers of the rule to have provided that as far as r. 211 was concerned the plaintiff in person and no agent should make the affidavit and the whole question resolves itself into this whether the expression “the plaintiff shall on affidavit made by himself” excludes the right of the agent to act on behalf of the plaintiff in this particular act or whether the expression “the plaintiff by himself” is not different than the expression “the plaintiff” which would permit an agent to act on his behalf. Now, whether a particular pronoun permits or excludes agency is a matter of construction dependent upon the context in which the pronoun is used and the particular legislation in which the pronoun is used. In this particular case it would have been perfectly grammatical for the rule to have stated “the plaintiff shall on affidavit made by him.” Instead of that the rule uses the more emphatic form of that pronoun “himself” and the reason for using that more emphatic form of that pronoun seems to us to be that the rule making authority was pointing out that this particular act, viz. the making of the affidavit, should be made by only the plaintiff and by no other person. We do not accept the contention that the emphasis placed on this pronoun is unintentional and that no effect is to be given to that emphasis. Further, the reason of the rule also seems to support the construction we are putting upon r. 211. The reason of the rule is that ordinarily where a judgment is to be obtained without a trial, the affidavit should only be made by a party who has knowledge of the facts. But an exception was made only in the case of the plaintiff. The reason for making that exception was obvious because, as we have observed before, he was the plaintiff. He had filed a plaint setting out the facts and in the affidavit ordinarily he would set out those very facts. But when it came to supporting the summons by somebody other than the plaintiff, the rule insisted that such other person should have knowledge of the facts. What Mr. Peerbhoy is really attempting to do is to extend the exception which is made only in favour of the plaintiff, to his agent, and we do not think that the principle underlying the rule justifies the extension of the exception. Therefore, in our opinion, both on construction and on principle the affidavit contemplated to be made under r. 211 is either by the plaintiff himself, in which case it can be on information and belief, or in the case of any other person including his constituted attorney, in which case it must be of his own personal knowledge with regard to the facts to which he swears.
The result, therefore, is that the summons for judgment was not properly taken out and it was not competent to the Court to make any order on the summons for judgment which did not comply with the conditions of r. 211. In fairness to the learned Judge below it may be pointed out that this point was not taken in the affidavit before him and therefore there is no discussion of this point in the judgment of the learned Judge which is before us.
On the question of costs, as far as the costs of the summons for judgment is concerned, as the summons is misconceived it would be ordinarily liable to be dismissed with costs. But we must take into consideration the fact that this point which has now prevailed was not taken in the affidavit in reply by the defendants, and therefore the proper order for costs as far as the summons for judgment is concerned is that the summons for judgment will be dismissed; no order as to costs. With regard to the costs of the appeal, the point on which the appeal has succeeded has been taken in the memorandum of appeal.
As a matter of fact it is in the forefront of the memorandum. Notwithstanding this point having been taken in the memorandum of appeal, the appeal has been strenuously resisted by the respondent. Mr. Peerbhoy says that it is a matter of indulgence that the appellants have been allowed to argue this point. That is not the correct position. This is not a case where an appellant comes to the appeal Court on a particular case set out in his memo, of appeal and then at the hearing of the appeal he springs a new point on the other side and succeeds on the other point. In those circumstances the Court of appeal ordinarily would not give the successful appellant the costs of the appeal. But this is a case where the appellant, after giving full notice to the other side, succeeds on a point which has been taken in the memo, of appeal. It is a question of law, it is a question of jurisdiction, and the party is entitled to take that point in appeal although it was not taken in the lower Court. Therefore, in our opinion the appellants are entitled to get the costs of the appeal. The appeal will, therefore, be allowed with costs.
Attorneys for appellants: Thakordas & Co.
Attorneys for respondent: Crawford, Bayley & Co.
Appeal allowed.
P.M.P
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