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Zikar v. State
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against convictions for contempt of Court. The applications arise in connection with the applicant and his two advocates, who were held guilty of contempt. The order in this case also governs miscellaneous Civil Cases Nos. 168 and 169 of 1950. Leave to appeal was sought under Article 132(1) of the Constitution and, alternatively, under Article 134(1)(c).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decision holding the applicants guilty of contempt involves a "substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution" so as to permit leave to appeal under Article 132(1).
- Whether an order or sentence passed in a proceeding for contempt can be regarded as a "sentence in a criminal proceeding" within the meaning of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.
- Whether the applications should be certified as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court under the residuary or discretionary appellate jurisdiction (including consideration of Clause (1)(c) / residuary clause of Article 134).
- Whether the Bar Councils Act (as contended by the applicants) operates as a bar against conviction of an advocate for contempt committed in his professional capacity.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants / Applicant (as represented by Shri Bobde and others)
- Argued that the power of the Court to punish for contempt is derived from Article 215 of the Constitution; on that basis the case satisfies the requirement of Article 132(1) (i.e., involves a substantial question of constitutional interpretation).
- Contended that historically the Privy Council entertained appeals in contempt cases (attributable to the Crown's general prerogative), and cited authorities to that effect.
- Contended that the Bar Councils Act operates in some way to prevent conviction of an advocate for contempt committed in his professional capacity.
- Requested leave to appeal; one applicant (Zikar) sought to be excused and said he sought leave mainly because his two advocates were involved.
Court's Observations on Parties' Conduct
- The Court noted that the offence was aggravated by the manner in which it was sought to be justified by the two advocates and described that justification as having a "defiant and indecorous tone."
- The Court recorded that Zikar begged to be excused and that this fact had been taken into account in awarding punishment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Re Bai Amrit, 8 Bom 380 (p. 387) | Illustration that contempt proceedings are anomalous and not regulated by ordinary criminal procedure. | Used to support the proposition that contempt proceedings are of an anomalous nature and not strictly criminal in the ordinary sense. |
| Ebrahim Mammoji v. Emperor, 4 Rang 257 | Support for the anomalous character of contempt proceedings. | Cited alongside other authorities to show the particular nature of contempt jurisdiction. |
| In the matter of K.L. Gauba, ILR (1942) Lah 411 (p. 419 FB) | Authority on the special character of contempt proceedings. | Relied on as part of the body of authority describing contempt as sui generis. |
| Kafeldev Malaviya v. Chief Justice and Judges of High Court Allahbad | Holds contempt proceedings to be of a criminal nature with exclusive and final jurisdiction. | Referenced as a decision treating contempt as criminal and exclusive jurisdiction, contrasted with other views. |
| In Re Tusharkanti Ghosh, 63 Cal 287 | Decision refusing leave; view that contempt proceedings are peculiar and not part of original criminal jurisdiction. | Quoted (Derbyshire, C.J.) to support the view that contempt proceedings may not be exercised as part of original criminal jurisdiction. |
| In Re Sham Lal, AIR (19) 1932 Lah 502 | Relevant Full Bench precedent on contempt matters. | Identified as one of the decisions covering the range of issues raised; used to show the impugned decision was covered by precedent. |
| In Re P. Subramania Ayyar, 1934 Mad Cr C 78 | Relevant Division Bench precedent on contempt matters. | Identified as covering the issues raised; used to show lack of novel question. |
| M.G. Kadir v. Kesri Naraub, ILR (1945) All 7 | Relevant Division Bench precedent on contempt matters. | Included among decisions showing that the present decision was not novel. |
| Hamilton v. Anderson (1858) 3 Macq 363 (p. 374) | House of Lords authority on responsibility of legal advisers for scandalous pleadings. | Referred to as support for the proposition that responsibility of legal advisers for scandalous pleadings is an established rule. |
| Radhakishan v. Shridhar, ILR (1950) Nag 532 FB | Principle that discretionary appeals under Clause (c) must be exercised on sound judicial considerations (not arbitrarily). | Quoted to explain that the discretion under Clause (c) is not arbitrary but must be judicially exercised. |
| Rainy v. Sierra Leone Justices (1852-53) 8 Moo P.C 47; 14 E.R. 19 (p. 21) | Superior courts are sole and exclusive judges of what constitutes contempt of themselves. | Relied upon to emphasize the established principle that superior courts have exclusive adjudication over contempts. |
| Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of The High Court, 10 Cal 109 (P.C.) | Support for the exclusivity of contempt jurisdiction by superior courts. | Used to reinforce the point about exclusive supervisory role of superior courts over contempt. |
| Brass Crosby's case (1771) 95 E.R. 1005 | Historical authority on courts' exclusive power to adjudicate and punish contempts (including Blackstone's observations). | Quoted at length (via Blackstone) to show the historical principle that adjudication and punishment of contempts belong exclusively to each court. |
| Bacon's Abridgement, Vol. 1, p. 386 | Historical note that the summary method of punishing for contempt has long been practiced as necessary for execution of justice. | Referred to for the historical practice that attachments for contempt were summary and without right of appeal. |
| Andhra Paul Terence Amberd v. Attorney-General (cited as AIR (23) 1936 P.C 141 at p. 143) | Illustration that the Privy Council entertained appeals in contempt cases by virtue of the Crown's prerogative. | Used to explain historical reasons why the Privy Council sometimes entertained contempt appeals; cited by learned counsel in submissions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise analysis focused on the statutory gateway to appeal and the nature of contempt proceedings.
- Article 132(1) (substantial question of constitutional interpretation): The Court concluded that the decision holding the applicants guilty of contempt did not raise any substantial question of law regarding interpretation of the Constitution. The submission that the Court's power to punish for contempt was derived from Article 215 (advanced by Shri Bobde) was rejected as a basis for treating the matter as a constitutional question: the Court observed that it had been constituted a Court of record by letters patent and, as such, its power to punish for contempt is inherent and not a new power conferred by Article 215. The Court therefore held that the exercise of contempt power does not, by itself, amount to a question of constitutional interpretation for Article 132(1) purposes.
-
Article 134(1)(c) (sentence in a criminal proceeding): The Court acknowledged that determining whether a contempt sentence is a "sentence in a criminal proceeding" under Article 134(1)(c) is a difficult question. It analyzed the character of contempt proceedings, noting the widely accepted categorization into two classes:
- Contempt punished to enforce rights of private parties — civil/remedial in character.
- Contempt punished to vindicate the dignity of the Court — criminal/punitive in character.
- Merits and precedent: The Court reasoned that the impugned decision did not exercise any novel jurisdiction nor hold anything to be contempt beyond existing precedent. It observed that the questions raised were not res integra nor did they involve divergence of view; the discussion was covered by earlier Full Bench and Division Bench decisions (identified in the opinion). The Court also rejected the contention that the Bar Councils Act barred convictions of advocates for contempt, noting that no reported case supported that contention and that the point had been dealt with and repelled in the Court's decision (paragraphs 64–68, as referenced).
- Discretionary considerations and institutional concerns: The Court noted that the right of appeal under Clause (c) is discretionary (not an appeal as of right) and that the discretion must be judicially exercised. The Court emphasized institutional concerns: permitting appeals as of course in contempt cases would impair the efficiency of the Court's contempt jurisdiction. The Court relied on historical and common law authorities (including Brass Crosby's case and Blackstone's observations) to underline that superior courts of record are the exclusive judges of what constitutes contempt of themselves and that summary methods to punish contempt have long been recognized as necessary for the administration of justice.
- Conduct of parties and aggravating factors: The Court took account of the applicants' conduct: one applicant (Zikar) had begged to be excused (which was a mitigating factor in punishment), but the offence was aggravated by the manner in which the two advocates sought to justify the conduct; their justifications were said to be defiant and indecorous. This assessment of conduct contributed to the Court's view that the matter was not fit for leave to appeal.
- Conclusion of analysis: Taken together — absence of a novel constitutional question, presence of controlling precedents, the discretionary nature of the appellate gateway, institutional considerations against routine appeals in contempt matters, and aggravating conduct by advocates — the Court concluded that the applications for leave to appeal must fail.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal; the applications are DISMISSED.
The Court also ordered assessment of an additional Government Pleader's fee at Rs. 30/- in each case.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the applicants' applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court are refused and dismissed, and costs in the form of the additional Government Pleader's fee are imposed.
- The Court explicitly stated that it did not exercise any new jurisdiction nor announce any new rule; the decision was covered by existing Full Bench and Division Bench precedents. Consequently, the opinion did not set a novel precedent and the questions raised were not considered to be res integra or to disclose divergence of views warranting Supreme Court scrutiny.
Note: This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the text supplied has been added or inferred.
1. The order in this case will also govern miscellaneous Civil Cases Nos. 168 and 169 of 1950.
2. The application is for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the conviction of the applicant and his two advocates for contempt of Court.
3. Leave is sought under Article 132(1) of the Constitution or alternatively under Article 134(1)(c) thereof.
4. The decision holding the applicants guilty of contempt is not affected by any substantial Question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Shri Bobde, however, contended that the power of the Court to punish for contempt is derived from Article 215 and so the case fulfils the requirement of Article 132(1). This Court has been constituted a Court of record by its letters patent. The power of this Court to punish for contempt is thus inherent in itself as a Court of record. Article 215 does not confer any new power on this Court which it did not already possess A question of law as to the Interpretation of the Constitution cannot be said to arise every time this Court exercises the power to punish for contempt.
5. The next question is whether the case comes within Article 134(1)(c). The answer to the question depends upon whether an order or sentence passed in a proceeding for contempt can be regarded as a sentence in a criminal proceeding within the meaning of Clause (1)(c) of Article 134. The question is not free from difficulty.
6. A proceeding for contempt cannot be regarded as a criminal proceeding merely because it ends in imposing a punishment on the condemner. Contempts have been divided broadly into two classes according to the purpose which is sub-served by the proceeding. Contempt which is punished for disobedience of an order of the Court with a view to enforcing the rights of private parties is distinguished from contempt which is punished for vindicating the dignity of the Court. The latter is regarded as criminal and punitive while the former is regarded as civil and remedial. Whatever be the purpose of the proceeding, a proceeding for punishing contempt has been regarded as 'subgenres' and of an anomalous nature. A proceeding for contempt is not regulated by the ordinary law of criminal procedure. In Re Bai Amrit 8 Bom 380 at p. 387; Ebrahim Mammoji v. Emperor 4 Rang 257 and In the matter of K.L. Gauba ILR (1942) Lah 411 at p. 419 FB.
7. In Kafeldev Malaviya v. Chief Justice and Judges of High Court Allahbad , in rejecting an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council under Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a conviction for contempt, the Court held the proceedings were of a criminal nature and the jurisdiction of the Court was exclusive and final. But in In Re Tusharkanti GhoshH 63 Cal 287, leave to appeal to the Privy Council was asked under Clause 41 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court which provided for an appeal from any order or sentence made in the exercise of original criminal Jurisdiction. Leave was refused by the Division Bench. Derbyshire, C.J. observed:
These proceedings for contempt of Court are of a peculiar nature though it may be that in certain aspects they are 'quasi' criminal; in my view they are not exercised as part Of the original criminal jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently the application must fail.
8. Further it would appear that the Constitution has not made in Part V an exhaustive division of all proceedings before this Court into two broad categories, civil and criminal. A glance at Clause (I) of Article 132 dispels any such suggestion. There the expression "other proceeding" is mentioned in addition to the words "civil" and "criminal."
9. It is, however, not necessary to pursue this point further and give our decision on it as in our view the applications must fail on merits.
10. We do not think that we should certify that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court has not exercised either a newfangled jurisdiction or held anything to be a contempt which is not already covered by precedent. The questions raised in our decision cannot be regarded as either 'res Integra' or such as have given rise to any divergence of view. To put in a nutshell, the entire range of our discussion in the decision against which appeal is sought In covered by one Pull Bench and two Division Bench decisions: In Re Sham Lal AIR (19) 1932 Lah 502 and In Re P. Subramania Ayyar 1934 Mad Cr C 78 and M.G. Kadir v. Kesri Naraub ILR (1945) All 7. The responsibility of a legal adviser for scandalous pleadings is no new rule. See the decision off the House of Lords in Hamilton v. Anderson (1858) 3 Macq 363 at p. 374. The contention that the Bar Councils Act operates somehow as a bar against the conviction of an advocate for a contempt committed in his professional capacity has been sufficiently dealt with in our decision and repelled (vide paragraphs 64-68). Not a single case is to be found in the reports in support of the contention.
11. The above considerations are normally sufficient to reject the present applications. There are, however, other equally weighty considerations which we may now advert to.
12. Zikar begged to be excused. We took that fact into account in awarding the punishment. He asks for leave only because, as he has stated to the Court, his two advocates were involved in the case.
13. In our view, the offence was aggravated by the way it was sought to be justified by the two advocates. In such a case the words in bold type are not adequate to convey to a Court of appeal the defiant and indecorous tone of the justification.
14. A right of appeal is no doubt a creation of statute. Where an appeal as of right is given by a statute, it cannot be limited by any considerations foreign to the statute. But the right of appeal given in Clause (c) is not as of right but at the discretion of the Court. See Radhakishan v. Shridhar ILR (1950) Nag 532 FB. True, the discretion has to be exercised riot arbitrarily but on sound judicial considerations. But in considering a case under the residuary Clause (1) to of Article 134, it may not be improper to bear in mind the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a superior Court of record in a matter of contempt. It is well established that every superior Court of record is the sole and exclusive judge of what constitutes contempt of itself: Rainy v. Sierra Leinoe Justices Of (1852-53) 8 Moo P.C 47 : 14 E.R 19 at p. 21; Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of The High Court 10 Cal 109 (PC) and Brass Crosby's case (1771) 95 E.R 1005. It is pertinent to refer to the observations of Blackstone Justice in the last case:
...All Courts, by which I mean to include the two Houses of Parliament, and the Courts of Westminster-Hall, can have no control in matters of contempt. The sole adjudication of contempts, and the punishment thereof, in any manner, belongs exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective Court. Infinite confusion and disorder would follow, if Courts could by writ of habeas corpus, examine and determine the contempts of others. This power to commit results from the first principles of justice; for if they have power to decide; they ought to have power to punish: no other Court shall scan the judgment of a Superior Court, or the principal seat of justice, as I said before it would occasion the utmost confusion, if every Court of this Hall should have power to examine the commitments of the other Courts of the Hall, for contempts; so that the judgment and commitment by each respective Court, as to contempts, must be final, and without control. It is a confidence, that may, with perfect safety and security, be reposed in the judges, and the Houses of Parliament. The legislature since the Revolution (see 9 and 10 W. 3 c. 15) have created many new contempts. The objections which are brought of abusive consequences prove too much, because they are applicable to all Courts of dernier resort: et ab abusu ad usum non valent consequentia, is a maxim of law as well as of logic.
15. It is of interest to note that under the common law practice an attachment for contempt is without any right of appeal. Though by the statute of 'magna charta', none are to be imprisoned 'sine Judicio parium', vel per legem terrae' the summary method of punishing for contempt has long been practiced as being absolutely necessary to the furtherance and execution of justice See Bacon's Abridgement, Vol 1, p. 386.
16. Learned Counsel Shri Bobde submitted that whatever might have been the origin and the nature of jurisdiction and the matter of contempt the Privy Council entertained appeals in such cases. But that was because of the general prerogative of the Crown to review all judicial decisions of Courts of record in the dominions overseas. See Andhra Paul Terence Amberd v. Attorney-Genral of Trubudad Tivagi AIR (23) 1936 P.C 141 at p. 143. Learned Counsel referred to Article 136(1) of the Constitution under which the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court in India. The power of the Supreme Court under that Article is undoubtedly wide. But that Article has no bearing on the question, before us. It is not our function, and it would indeed be presumptuous on our part even to attempt to discuss the considerations which might weigh with their Lordships if the Supreme Court under Article 136 (1) in dealing with an application for grant of special leave to appeal against a conviction for contempt.
17. Even granting for the nonce that a proceeding resulting in conviction for contempt is a criminal proceeding within the meaning of Article 134(1), half the efficiency of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court would be impaired if the condemner were to be permitted to appeal as a matter of course under Clause (c) in every case of conviction. We do not regard the decision as a whole or the case of any of the applicants as in any way exceptional enough to require further consideration by an appellate Court.
18. In our view, the case is not a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.
19. We dismiss the applications and assess the additional Government Pleader's fee at Rs. 30/- in each case.
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