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M. Gopalkrishna Naidu v. State Of Madhya Pradesh

Bombay High Court
Oct 19, 1951
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant was appointed on 1 January 1924 as an Overseer in the Upper Subordinate Engineering service of the Central Provinces and Berar, Public Works Department (P.W.D.). A contractor named Salve complained to the Anti-Corruption Department that the applicant habitually received bribes, alleging that he paid the applicant Rs. 150 per month and that, for a particular month, the applicant demanded Rs. 300 of which Rs. 100 had been paid and Rs. 200 remained. A trap was laid and the applicant was allegedly caught receiving Rs. 200 on the night of 12 December 1947.

On 17 December 1947 the Executive Engineer relieved the applicant from charge and placed him under suspension with effect from the date of relief, because a charge of corruption was pending. On the same day the Chief Engineer granted sanction under Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for prosecution in respect of the alleged offence under Section 161 I.P.C. The applicant was arrested, released on bail, a challan was produced on 5 February 1948, and he was tried, convicted and sentenced under Section 161 I.P.C.

The applicant appealed; on 14 May 1951 the Additional Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and sentence on the ground that the sanction for prosecution was defective. The applicant moved this Court on 3 August 1951 seeking reinstatement and arrears of salary, contending that continued suspension was erroneous. The State produced a fresh sanction dated 26 July 1951 under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act permitting prosecution for accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 200 on 12 December 1947 from Ramchandra Salwe. The State argued that the fresh sanction justified continuation of suspension.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicant can be prosecuted again for the same offence after his conviction was set aside on the ground that the original sanction for prosecution was defective (interaction of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 403 Cr.P.C.).
  2. Whether an appellate order quashing proceedings for want of sanction amounts to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution.
  3. Whether the applicant's suspension pending criminal proceedings was unlawful, specifically: (a) whether suspension pending criminal proceedings is a punishment requiring prior opportunity to show cause; and (b) whether the appointing authority (Chief Engineer) had power to suspend before formal commencement of criminal proceedings.
  4. Whether the fresh sanction dated 26 July 1951 was legally sufficient in form and detail, having regard to the Privy Council decision in Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Shri Mani) Arguments

  • The sanction now relied on is defective and contrary to Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution (double jeopardy protection); counsel urged that the word "and" in Article 20(2) should be read as "or" to give broader protection analogous to Section 403 Cr.P.C.
  • The order of suspension was itself bad and therefore the applicant had a right to challenge it despite intended prosecution.
  • The effect of the Additional Sessions Judge's decision setting aside conviction was, in substance, an acquittal, and hence a second prosecution would be barred.
  • Suspension is a punishment requiring an opportunity to show cause before imposition; Appendix XXV, Part E (Fundamental Rules) did not permit suspension before the commencement of criminal proceedings and the Chief Engineer lacked power to suspend at that stage.
  • The fresh Government sanction is inadequate because it does not disclose the facts in the manner required by the Privy Council decision in Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King.

State's (Shri T.P. Naik) Arguments

  • The State produced a fresh sanction dated 26 July 1951 under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act; as prosecution has now been sanctioned, the suspension validly continues.
  • Implicitly the State relied on statutory provisions and service rules permitting suspension pending criminal charges connected with official duty (Appendix XXV, Part E), and relied on precedents regarding nullity of proceedings for want of sanction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Banerjee v. Bepin Behari, 30 Cal WN 382 Principle that where a trial is a nullity (e.g., due to lack of required sanction), it cannot be treated as a valid trial that gives rise to immunity under Section 403 Cr.P.C.; an accused in a nullity of trial is not regarded as having been tried and acquitted for the purpose of barring a fresh prosecution. The Court relied on this decision to support the view that a trial held after defective sanction was a nullity and did not bar a fresh trial once proper sanction was obtained.
Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 43 (Federal Court) The Federal Court held that where sanction necessary for prosecution is wanting the proceedings are void and an acquittal would be wrong because it would prevent further proceedings even after necessary consent had been obtained. The Court treated this Federal Court decision as binding authority and applied it to conclude that the applicant could not claim protection under Section 403 Cr.P.C. or Article 20(2) when the earlier proceedings were void for want of sanction; therefore a fresh prosecution after sanction is permissible.
Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King (Privy Council) Principle that a sanction which does not disclose the facts on which the sanction is based and which fails to show a prima facie case may be treated as void for want of sufficient material indicating that the sanctioning authority considered relevant matters. The Court compared the present Government sanction with the defective sanction in that Privy Council case and found the present sanction sufficiently detailed (identifying the alleged offence, facts and date). Consequently, the Court held the present sanction was not void on the same grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing each contention in turn, applying textual, statutory and precedential analysis strictly based on the materials before it.

1. Interpretation of Article 20(2): The applicant argued that the word "and" in Article 20(2) should be read as "or" to provide protection equivalent to Section 403 Cr.P.C. The Court rejected this re-writing of constitutional text, emphasizing that the Constitution's language must be taken literally and that words in Part III were used purposefully after deliberation. The Court accepted that a literal reading yields less protection than Section 403 Cr.P.C., but held that that is a permissible constitutional design—ordinary law may provide greater protection, and the Constitution cannot be expanded by judicial substitution of words.

2. Effect of appellate setting aside conviction on grounds of defective sanction: The Court held that where conviction and sentence are set aside because the sanction was defective, the prior trial must be regarded as a nullity; accordingly there was no proper trial that could create immunity against subsequent prosecution. The Court relied on P. Banerjee v. Bepin Behari and on the Federal Court decision in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor to establish that acquittal would be wrong in such cases and that a fresh prosecution after obtaining proper sanction is permissible.

3. Nature and interpretation of the appellate order: The applicant urged that the appellate court's order should be treated as an acquittal (or that the appellate court had only certain options under Section 423(1) Cr.P.C.). The Court refused to reinterpret the Additional Sessions Judge's order quashing the proceedings as an acquittal. It held that where proceedings are void ab initio, the appellate court could rightly use the power under Clause (d) to Sub-section (1) of Section 423 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings; quashing does not equate to acquittal.

4. Legality of suspension pending prosecution: The Court distinguished suspension as a disciplinary punishment from suspension ordered because of the pendency of criminal charges. It found no rule requiring notice before imposing suspension pending criminal proceedings. Quoting Appendix XXV, Part E, paragraph 2, the Court observed that suspension is appropriate where "a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending" or where there is an accusation connected with official position or likely to embarrass discharge of duties or involves moral turpitude. The Court interpreted this to require merely that an accusation exist, not that formal criminal proceedings (such as filing a challan) have already commenced; on that basis the original suspension was legitimate.

5. Continuance of suspension after appellate decision: Because the appellate decision did not amount to acquittal but only quashed void proceedings, the underlying accusation continued to exist. The existence of a fresh government sanction indicated intention to recommence prosecution; therefore the suspension could properly continue despite the earlier setting aside of conviction.

6. Sufficiency of the fresh sanction: The Court examined the form and content of the July 26, 1951 sanction and compared it with the defective sanction in Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King. The Court found the present sanction identified the statutory provision invoked (Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act), the specific offence (Section 161 I.P.C.), the accused and the date and facts (accepting Rs. 200 on 12 December 1947 from Ramchandra Salwe). Therefore the Court concluded there was adequate material to infer the sanctioning authority had considered relevant matters and the sanction was not void on the ground of inadequate disclosure.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the applicant's writ application must fail and accordingly the application is dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The applicant remains under suspension; he is not entitled to immediate reinstatement or arrears of salary by reason of the appeal having set aside the conviction.
  • The fresh Government sanction dated 26 July 1951 is treated as legally sufficient to permit prosecution to be launched; therefore suspension pending prosecution may continue.
  • The Court made no order as to costs. It noted, however, that the applicant had been kept uninformed for a long time, had been under suspension for over four years and received only a quarter of his salary as suspension allowance. The Court expressed hope that the trial would not be unduly delayed.

Implications regarding precedent: The decision applies existing authorities (including the Federal Court in Hori Ram Singh and the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas) and statutory/service-rule interpretation rather than establishing a new principle of law. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule; it followed established precedent and statutory interpretation to reach its decision.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution.

2. The relevant facts are briefly these. The applicant was appointed on the 1st January 1924 as an Overseer in the Upper Subordinate Engineering service of the Central Provinces and Berar, P.W.D. The Anti-Corruption Department received a complaint from one Salve, who had taken a contract for the construction of some work in the Takli Police Lines, that the applicant, who supervised the work, was in the habit of receiving bribes from contractors. He further complained that he was paying the applicant Rs. 150 p.m. and that during the particular month the applicant was demanding Rs. 300 out of which he had paid Rs. 100.

The police then, with the help of Salve laid a trap and it is said that the applicant was caught In the act of receiving the balance of Rs. 200 on the night of the 12th December 1947. On the 17th December 1947, the Executive Engineer passed an order to the effect that the applicant be relieved from his charge forthwith and placed under suspension with effect from the date of relief. The reason for taking this step was that a charge of corruption was pending against the applicant. It may be mentioned that on that very day the Chief Engineer P.W.D. granted sanction under Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to the applicant's prosecution in respect of anti-corruption crime No. 111/161 Indian Penal Code.

The applicant was relieved on the afternoon of the 17th December 1947 and arrested on the next day and then released on bail. A challan was put up against him on the 5th February 1948. Eventually, the applicant was tried and convicted and sentenced of the offence under Section 161 I.P.C. He preferred an appeal against this conviction and; sentence before the Court of Session and the Additional Sessions Judge who presided over it set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the applicant on the ground that the sanction accorded for the prosecution of the applicant was defective. This was on the 14th May 1951.

3. The applicant made this application to this Court on the 3rd August 1951. The complaint of the applicant is that despite the fact that the conviction and sentence passed upon him had been set aside he continued to be under suspension which, according to him, was erroneous. He therefore wants to be reinstated in service at once and also wants to be paid arrears of his salary from the date of the suspension till the date of reinstatement.

4. Shri T.P. Naik, Additional Government Pleader, who appears for the State, has however brought to our notice the fact that on the 26th July 1951 the Government of Madhya Pradesh have accorded a fresh sanction for the prosecution of the applicant. He has filed a copy of the sanction and we would reproduce it because, according to the applicant's learned Counsel, it does not disclose the facts upon which the sanction is based:

Dated Nagpur, the 26th July 1951.

No. 1871-1852/XVII-B. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II (2) of 1947), the State Government are pleased to accord their previous sanction to the prosecution of Shri M.G.K Naidu. Overseer, Public Works Department, Nagpur, for an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code (XLV (45) of 1860) alleged to have been committed by him accepting illegal gratification other than legal remuneration amounting to Rs. 200 (two hundred) only on the 12th December 1947 from one Ramchandra Salwe, Contractor, Nagpur.

According to Shri Naik, as the prosecution of the applicant has been sanctioned his suspension continues and therefore he has no right to be reinstated. Shri Mani, however, contends that this sanction besides being defective is repugnant to the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution and is therefore void. According to him, the original order of suspension was itself bad and that, therefore, he had a right to challenge it even though prosecution is intended to be launched by the State.

5. Clause (2) of Article 20 runs thus:

No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.

The learned Counsel for the applicant wants that the word 'and' in Clause (2) should be read as 'or' because, in his opinion, if it were read as 'and' the protection afforded by that provision would fall short of the one afforded by Section 403 of the Code of Criminal procedure. In support of his contention be relies upon an observation at page 107 of Basu in his Commentary on the Constitution of India. At that page Basu has indicated the results which would follow if either of the two possible views is taken. It would appear that he favours the view that 'and' should be read as 'or', but even if he were in favour of that view, we are afraid we cannot accept it.

The provisions of the Constitution and particularly those contained in Part III were enacted after great deliberation and we must take it that every word was used purposefully and after bearing in mind fully the meaning attached thereto. We agree that by construing the article literally the protection given by the Constitution will not be as extensive as that given by Section 403 of the Code of Criminal procedure to a person who has been tried for an offence but, even so, we do not see why we should depart from the literal meaning.

The inference resulting from such an inference would be that the protection given by the Constitution, that is the minimum guaranteed under the Constitution, is less than what the ordinary law has guaranteed. An ordinary law can be altered by an appropriate legislation but not so the Constitution - except in the manner laid down in the Constitution itself. It seems that the framers of the Constitution thought it fit to guarantee something less than what the ordinary law has provided for perhaps because they felt that what the ordinary law provided for went too far and that the power of Legislature to diminish the protection should not be unduly circumscribed.

6. The next point taken by the learned Counsel for the applicant is that the effect of the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge in fact was that the applicant was acquitted and therefore he could not be prosecuted for the same offence a second time. It seems to us that where a conviction and sentence passed on a person after a trial are set aside on the ground of want of proper sanction then it cannot be said that there was a proper trial at all and so the result of the decision cannot operate as a bar to a fresh trial after receipt of a fresh sanction.

In this connection we may refer to the decision in P. Banerjee v. Bepin Behari 30 Cal WN 382. In that case a person was charged for the contravention of the Provisions of Section 6, Sub-clause (1) of the Bengal Food Adulteration Act, 1919. Even though the law provided that no prosecution for any offence under this Act could be launched without the order or consent of the local authority within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed, no such order or consent was obtained. The accused was therefore acquitted. A second prosecution was launched against the applicant in respect of the same offence, but after securing due sanction of the local authority. It was contended that the second prosecution was barred by Section 403 of the Code of Criminal procedure. But that contention was negatived upon the view that it is only when an accused has been tried and acquitted of an offence that the immunity arises, and that where a trial is a nullity it cannot be said that the person who had undergone it was in fact tried.

7. In a more recent case the Federal Court had to consider this question. That was in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor AIR (26) 1939 PC 43 at p. 50. In that case the Sessions Judge set aside in appeal the conviction and sentence passed upon Hori Ram Singh on the ground that the sanction of the Governor which was necessary for the prosecution of Hori Ram Singh was wanting. He held that the proceedings were void and acquitted Hori Ram Singh. Their Lordships of the Federal Court observed:

The acquittal of the accused was obviously wrong, as that would have prevented further proceeding even after the necessary consent of the Governor had been obtained. If the prosecution Is defective for want of proper consent, the proceedings would be void and the complaint would be dismissed.

Thus, upon this view which is binding on us, the applicant cannot claim protection under Section 403 of the Code of Criminal procedure or under Article 20(2) of the Constitution.

8. It is then contended that the order of the Additional Sessions Judge quashing the proceedings is bad, and that after he reversed the finding and sentence passed on the applicant the only order which could be passed was one under Clause (b) of Section 423(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, either of acquittal or of discharge or of retrial. Alternatively, the learned Counsel wants us to interpret the order to be an order of acquittal. We are not sitting in judgment over the order of the Additional Sessions Judge and we see no round for interpreting the order quashing the proceeding as an order of acquittal.

We also cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel that no other course than one of the three indicated by him was open to the appellate Court after reversing the finding and sentence passed on a person, where, as here, the proceedings were 'ab initio' void, and indeed could not even be commenced, no question of acquittal or discharge arises and certainly it was not open to the appellate Court to order a retrial. The appellate Court could resort to the power conferred by Clause (d) to Sub-section (1) of Section 423 and make a consequential order upon its view that the trial was wholly void. This is what the appellate Court did and in our judgment the quashing of the proceedings ordered by it does not amount to an acquittal.

9. The next argument is that the suspension of the applicant is bad. It is based on the following grounds. In the first place it is said that suspension is really a punishment and as such it could not be ordered without giving an opportunity to the applicant to show cause against it. Then, it is said, that under Appendix XXV, Part E, to the Fundamental Rules, the Chief Engineer had no power to order suspension of the applicant before the commencement of criminal proceedings against him and that such proceedings actually commenced long after the passing of the order. We are unable to accept these contentions.

No doubt one of the punishments described in the Civil Service Regulations is suspension of a Government servant but such suspension must b& distinguished from the one ordered because of the pendency of criminal proceedings against a Government servant. There is no provision in any rule requiring a notice to be given to the applicant before suspension pending such proceedings. We cannot also agree that suspension cannot be ordered till the criminal proceedings begin. The actual words of paragraph 2 of Appendix XXV, part E are:

A servant of Government against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending should also be placed under suspension by the issue of specific orders to this effect during periods when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned (e.g. while released on bail), if the charge made or proceeding taken 'against him is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude. In regard to his pay and allowances, the provisions of Rule 1 shall apply.

It is clear from this that what is required Is that there should be an accusation of a criminal offence against the person and not that criminal proceedings should actually commence in the sense that a challan is filed. Thus, in our view, the suspension was perfectly legitimate.

10. It is then said that the suspension of the applicant could not enure after his appeal was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the conviction and sentence set aside. We cannot agree with this contention either because, as, we have already pointed out, the decision of the appeal cannot be interpreted as acquittal. The only result of the decision was that the trial which was held after the sanction was given was found to be null and void. The suspension of the applicant did not depend upon the sanction or upon the fact that there was a trial. It was based upon the fact that there was an accusation of a criminal offence. That accusation still persists and, indeed, it is clear from the fact that a fresh sanction was accorded by the Government that the Government Intend to commence criminal proceedings against the applicant.

11. Finally, iris said that the sanction now given and relied on is of little use because it does not contain such details as were contemplated in the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King . In that case the sanction given under Clause 23 of the Cotton Cloth and Yam (Control) Order 1943, was in these words:

Sanction to Prosecute.

(signed) H.N.G.

Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1943.

Contravention of the Provisions Prosecutions for:

Government of Bombay.

Finance Department (supply) Resolution No. 518.

Bombay Castle, 5th January 1945.

Endorsement from the District Magistrate, Sholapur, No. XIX/4500, dated the 8th November 1944.

'Resolution': Government is pleased to accord sanction under Clause 23, Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1943, to the prosecution of Mr. Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka for breach of the provisions of clause 18(2) of the said Order.

By Order of the Governor of Bombay.

(Signed) Deputy Secretary to Government, Bombay.

To, The District Magistrate, Sholapur, There is no reference in this sanction to the facts Upon which the offence is alleged to have been committed by the applicant or to the time when that offence was committed. In the present case, as would appear from the verbatim quotation of the order of the Government given above, we know the nature of the offence committed, the facts alleged against him and also the date on which it was so committed. There is thus sufficient material from which it can be inferred that the authority which granted sanction did not act mechanically but considered all relevant matters and only then accorded its sanction. In the Privy Council case the sanction was held to be void on the ground that it did not disclose a 'prima facie' case against the person said to be prosecuted but that is not the case here. In the circumstances this point also fails.

12 For the reasons given above, we hold that fee application must fail. Accordingly we dismiss it. We, however, make no order as to costs because though the sanction was given by the Government at the end of July 1951 it was not till yesterday that the applicant was apprised of the fact of sanction. He has been kept hanging for a pretty long time and even now there is a delay in launching a prosecution. He was therefore fully justified in making an application to this Court. It is hoped that his trial will not be unduly delayed because it is now over 4 years that he has been under suspension and being a Government servant, has got to depend solely on the suspension allowance which is only 1/4th of his salary. He cannot pursue any other vocation as long as he continues to be in Government service and add to his allowance. We trust that this aspect of the matter does not escape the notice of the authorities.