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Atau Raheman v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr.

Bombay High Court
Jan 31, 1951
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the son of one Niyamat (son of Makdum Bux), who at the time of the opinion was detained in police custody at Nagpur. The petitioner filed a petition under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, seeking the release of Niyamat. This Court had earlier passed an order in Miscellaneous Original Case No. 13/51 staying the removal of Niyamat from the Court's jurisdiction until disposal of that application.

Niyamat had been convicted by a Second Class Magistrate on 24.11.1950 under Section 5 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act. Subsequently, he was arrested under Section 7 of that Act with a view to deportation from India. After his arrest on 8.1.1951 he was taken to the borders of India but returned to Nagpur on 17.1.1951 and remained in police custody; the reason for bringing him back to Nagpur was not explained in the petition.

The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus against the State of Madhya Pradesh and the District Magistrate, Nagpur, ordering that Niyamat be allowed to remain and settle in India and, if necessary, directing steps to facilitate his stay. The Court referred to a similar matter previously considered (Mohommad alias Muthubhai v. High Commissioners for India in Pakistan, Misc. Petn. No. 46 of 1950) and summarized its conclusions in that earlier matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person convicted under Section 5 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act or who has contravened the terms of his permit is liable to be removed (deported) from India.
  2. Whether the provisions of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act (in particular Section 7) apply to citizens of India as well as to non-citizens.
  3. Whether Section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act is repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and therefore void after the commencement of the Constitution.
  4. Whether a writ of mandamus should issue directing the State authorities to permit Niyamat to remain and settle in India.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Arguments specifically mentioned in the opinion

  • Learned counsel for the petitioner informed the Court that in respect of applicants in the earlier Muthubhai matter an interim order of the Supreme Court had stayed deportation and included observations suggesting that a citizen of India cannot be deported; that Supreme Court order was not before this Court.
  • An argument was advanced before the Court that after the Constitution came into force Section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act became void as being repugnant to Article 19 of the Constitution.
  • The petitioner sought mandamus relief to compel the State and District Magistrate to permit Niyamat to remain and settle in India (including any necessary facilitative steps).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohommad alias Muthubhai v. High Commissioners for India in Pakistan, Misc. Petn. No. 46 of 1950 (Nag), Dated 2.1.1951 Interpretation that, under Section 1 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, a person who committed an offence under Section 5 or contravened permit terms is liable to removal; and that the Act applies to citizens equally. The Court relied on the view taken in this earlier matter to support the conclusion that the Act's provisions apply to citizens and non-citizens alike and that liability to removal follows conviction under Section 5.
Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. North Carolina (1917) 245 U.S. 298 The legal maxim and principle that "the greater power includes the less" — a legislative body having a broad power may permissibly impose lesser restrictions instead of an absolute prohibition. The Court invoked this decision to analogize that if Parliament has power under Article 11 to make provisions affecting citizenship (including termination), it also has the lesser power to place restrictions on citizens entering the territory — i.e., the Act's restrictions are a lesser exercise of a broader power.
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves (1939) 308 U.S. 132 Reinforcement of the principle that where a Legislature may absolutely prohibit a thing, it may permit it under prescribed conditions — "the greater power includes the less." Used to support the proposition that permissive conditions or restrictions (such as permits and penalties under the Influx Act) are within legislative competence as a lesser exercise of a broader power.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edn., Vol. I, p. 332 (treatise) Principle of judicial reluctance to declare legislative enactments void; caution and deference in overturning legislative action except in clear cases of unconstitutionality. The Court cited this passage (noting it had been quoted with approval in a recent decision of the Court) to emphasize the presumption in favor of the validity of legislation and the caution with which courts should invalidate statutes.
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 288 Authority for the cautious circumspection with which courts approach questions of constitutionality; courts will avoid pronouncing legislative acts unconstitutional in doubtful cases. The Court quoted Marshal C.J. from Ashwander to reinforce the standard of judicial restraint and the presumption in favor of constitutionality when considering challenges to statutes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps, based only on the reasoning present in the opinion:

  1. Fact and statutory basis: The Court accepted that Niyamat had been convicted under Section 5 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act and arrested under Section 7 for deportation. It noted the petitioner did not explain why Niyamat, having been taken to the borders, was returned to Nagpur.
  2. Reliance on prior decision: The Court relied upon its view in Mohommad alias Muthubhai (Misc. Petn. No. 46 of 1950) that under Section 1 of the Act a person who has committed an offence under Section 5, or who has contravened permit terms, is liable to removal from India.
  3. Applicability to citizens: The Court adopted the view that the Influx Act applies equally to citizens and non-citizens; the Constitution's guarantees of fundamental rights do not mean a person once a citizen will always remain a citizen without possibility of legislative action under Article 11.
  4. Statutory power and the "greater includes the less" principle: The Court reasoned that Article 11 confers broad power on Parliament regarding acquisition and termination of citizenship. From that broad grant, Parliament necessarily has the lesser power to impose restrictions on citizens' entry into India. To illustrate and support this structural argument, the Court cited United States decisions (Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. North Carolina and Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves) which express the principle that the greater power includes the lesser.
  5. Purpose and mechanism of the Act: The Court explained the practical object of the Influx Act — to prevent emigrants to Pakistan from returning to India — and noted that the Act requires permits for persons returning from Pakistan and prescribes penalties for breaches. The Court characterized these requirements and penalties as exercises of legislative power less than, though related to, termination of citizenship.
  6. Constitutional challenge and standard of review: In addressing the contention that Section 7 became void on the ground of repugnance to Article 19, the Court emphasized the high threshold for declaring legislation void. It invoked authority (Cooley and Ashwander) to demonstrate judicial restraint: courts should presume validity of statutes and only declare them unconstitutional when violation of the Constitution is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
  7. Police power and independent basis: The Court observed that a State/legislature may pass laws to secure public health, safety and welfare (analogous to police power in U.S. jurisprudence) and that restrictions on Article 19 rights can be within legislative competence. Further, the Court reiterated that Article 11's express grant to Parliament to regulate acquisition/termination of citizenship is an independent basis for permitting Parliament to place restrictions on a citizen returning from abroad, over and above the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Article 19.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: Applying these principles, the Court found it could not see how Section 7 was inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution and therefore concluded the Section was not rendered void by the Constitution's commencement.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court rejected the petition summarily, concluding that Section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act is not unconstitutional and that the Act's provisions apply to citizens and non-citizens alike.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner’s request for a writ of mandamus to allow Niyamat to remain and settle in India was denied and the petition was dismissed summarily.
  • Statutory validity: The opinion upholds the continued validity of Section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act against the challenge that it is repugnant to Article 19; the Court found that legislative power under Article 11 and the State's competence to impose restrictions support the Act's restrictions on returning persons.
  • Scope regarding citizenship: The Court expressly held (consistent with its earlier view in Muthubhai) that the Influx Act's provisions can apply to citizens as well as non-citizens; Parliament's power over citizenship (Article 11) and the lesser power to impose entry restrictions were treated as adequate bases for the statute.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion applies and follows the Court's prior view (Muthubhai) and cites established authorities to support judicial restraint; the Court did not state that it was creating a novel precedent beyond applying these principles and its prior view.
Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner is the son of one Niyamat (son of Makdum Bux) who is at present detained in police custody at Nagpur. It would appear that the petitioner has made a petition to this Court under Section 491, Criminal P.C., for the release of Niyamat and that an order has bean passed by this Court (Misc. or. case No. 13/51) stay it g she removal of Niyamat out of the jurisdiction of this Court till the disposal of that application.

2. The reason why the applicant is detained is that having been convicted of an offence under Section 5, Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act by a Magistrate Second Class, on 24.11.1950, he has been arrested under section 7 of that act with a view to being deported from India. The petitioner states that Niyamat after being arrested on 8.1.1951 was taken to the borders of India but was again brought back to Nagpur on 17.1.1951 and is since then in police custody. Why Niyamat was brought back to Nagpur after being taken to the borders of India has not been explained by the petitioner.

3. The petitioner now wants that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Madhya Pradesh and District Magistrate Nagpur, ordering them to allow Niyamat to remain and settle in India and if necessary, "ordering them to take all possible steps to facilitate to stay of Niyamat in India." We have considered a similar matter recently in Mohommad alias Muthubhai v. High Commissioners for India in Pakistan Misc. Petn. No. 46 of 1950, D/- 2.1.1951, and come to the conclusion that, under Section 1, Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, a person who has committed an offence under Section 5 of the Act, or contravened the terms of his permit, is liable to be removed from India. We are, however, told by the learned Counsel that with regard to the very persona who were applicants before us in Muthubhai's case, an interim order has been issued by the Supreme Court staying their deportation from India and that there are observations in that order which would suggest that a citizen of India cannot be deported. That order is not before us.

4. In the view we have taken in Muthubhai's case, Misc. Petn. No. 46 of 1950 (Nag), the provisions of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act would apply to the citizens of India, equally with those who are not citizens of India. There is no doubt that the Constitution guarantees several freedoms to a citizen but it does not guarantee that a person who is once a citizen of India will always continue to be a citizen of India. Indeed "citizenship" occurs in Part II of the Constitution whereas fundamental rights are to be found in Part in. Further, Article 11 of the Constitution confers power on Parliament to make any provision with respect to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship.

So wide and extensive a power, would, in our opinion, include the lesser power to place restrictions even on citizens in the matter of entering the territory of India. If authority were needed for this proposition, we would refer to two decisions of the United States of America. They are Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. North Carolina (1917) 245 U.S. 298 and Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves (1939) 308 U.S. 132.

5. In Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. North Carolina (1917) 245 U.S. 298, a state regulation placing restrictions on the import of intoxicating liquor from neighbouring states was challenged on the ground that it infringed the Federal Constitution in that it hampered inter-state commerce. It may be mentioned that this provision was part of a law enacted by the State of North Carolina prohibiting, except in restricted cases, the Consumption, sale, manufacture, etc., of intoxicating liquor in the State. It was not questioned that the State could prohibit the consumption, sale etc. of intoxicating liquor, but what was said was that it could not prohibit the importation of that commodity from other States. Dealing with this argument, McReynolda J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observed as follows:

The challenged Act, instead of interposing an absolute bar against all such shipment, as it was within the power of the State to do, in effect permitted them upon conditions intended to secure publicity, to the end that public policy might not be set at naught by subterfuge and indirection. The greater power includes the less.

6. The restrictions placed upon persons returning from Pakistan to India by the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act were intended to prevent emigrants to Pakistan from returning to India. It is for that reason that every person, whether of Indian domicile or not, returning from Pakistan to India is required to have a permit. To ensure the enforcement of the Act penalties have been imposed for the infringement of a provision of the Act or of the rules made or permits issued thereunder. The placing of these restrictions is, therefore, nothing but the exercise of a lesser power by the Legislature than the one possessed by it that is, the power if complete termination of citizenship of an individual who has gone to Pakistan or, for that matter, to any other country.

7. The other decision of the United States of America, Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves (1939) 308 U.S. 132, also dealt with intoxicating liquor The learned Judge, who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed at p. 138:

Having power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, sale, transportation, or possession of intoxicants, was it permissible for Kentucky to permit these things only under definitely prescribed conditions? Former opinions here make an affirmative answer imperative. The greater power includes the less.

8. We may mention that an argument was advanced before us that after the Constitution came into force Section 7, Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act became void as it was repugnant to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. We would like to point out that a law passed by a competent Legislature should not be declared to be void except in a clear case and that every possible presumption regarding the validity of that law should be drawn until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. We must not forget that one branch of Government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. In this connection, we may refer to the following passage from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edn., Vol. I, p. 332, which was quoted with approval in a recent decision of this Court:

It must be evident to anyone that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the Judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. The legislative and judicial are co-ordinate department of the Government of equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of Government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another when exercising the trust committed to it. The Court may declare legislative enactments' unconstitutional and void in some oases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the oases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution as the paramount law, whenever a legislative ejectment comes in conflict with it. But the Courts sit not to review or revise the legislative action but to enforce the legislative will; and it is only where they find that the Legislature has failed to keep within its Constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action and in doing as, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the Courts when the Judges assume to act and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. In exercising this high, authority, the Judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the Legislature Is held void, it is not because the Judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law.

Nevertheless, in declaring a law unconstitutional, a Court must necessarily cover the same ground which has already been covered by the legislative department in deciding upon the propriety of enacting the law, and they must indirectly overrule the decision of that co-ordinate department, The task is therefore, a delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. It is a solemn act in any case to declare that that body of men to whom the people have committed the sovereign function of making the laws for the commonwealth have deliberately disregarded the1 limitations imposed upon this delegated authority, and usurped power which the people have bean careful to withheld.

9. To these observations we may add the following observations of Marshal C.J. quoted in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 288 at p. 364:

On more than one occasion, this Court has expressed the cautious circumspection with which it approaches the consideration of such questions; and has declared that; in no doubtful case would it pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the Constitution.

We may also give another quotation. This is from a judgment of Washington J. in the same report:

But if I could rest my opinion in favour of the constitutionality of the law on which the question arises, on no other ground than this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone would, in my estimation, be a satisfactory vindication of it. It in but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. This hag always been the language of this Court when that subject has called for its decision; and I know that it expresses the honest sentiments of each and every member of this Bench.

10. Construing the provisions of section 7 in the light of these principles of construction, we are unable to appreciate how they can be regarded as inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. It cannot be gainsaid that a State has ample power to pass any law to promote or to secure public health, safety and welfare. This power is sometimes called Police Power in the United States of America. In the exercise of that power, it is within the competence of the Legislature to place restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution. Furthermore, as we have already observed, Article 11 empowers Parliament even to terminate citizen, ship. Consequently, Parliament has also the power to do a lesser thing, i.e., to place restrictions on the right of a citizen to enter India after having left it and having entered India, to observe the conditions subject to which he was allowed be enter. This provision is quite independent of the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Article 19 and, in our opinion, confers the widest powers on Parliament to place restrictions on a citizen returning from a foreign country.

11. We are, therefore, unable to see how the provisions of Section 7, Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act can be regarded as unconstitutional or as having become void after the inauguration of the Constitution. For these reasons, we reject the petition summarily.