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Gajanan Govind Patha... v. Pandurang Keshav Pun...
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from execution proceedings in respect of a compromise (consent) decree passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Poona, on 22 August 1947 in Civil Suit No. 551 of 1946. The suit was brought by a landlord against his tenant for recovery of possession on the ground of default in payment of rent. The plaint alleged past rent of Rs. 84; by the compromise decree the defendant (tenant/judgment-debtor) was ordered to pay Rs. 84, costs and rent accrued up to end of August 1947. The parties admitted the total to be Rs. 188, of which Rs. 100 had been paid, leaving Rs. 88 plus Rs. 4-8-0 (rent for September) = Rs. 92-8-0 to be paid by the judgment-debtor before the end of September 1947. The consent decree allowed the defendant to remain in possession on these terms and provided that default would permit the plaintiff (decree-holder) to recover possession through the Court.
The judgment-debtor did not make the payment by 30 September 1947 but paid Rs. 92 on 1 October 1947. The decree-holder filed an execution application seeking possession. Pending that application the judgment-debtor paid the remaining annas eight (which had not been paid even on 1 October) and tendered subsequent rent. The Courts below accepted the judgment-debtor's plea for relief against forfeiture and dismissed the decree-holder's application for possession. The decree-holder appealed; the appeal reached the High Court and was heard by Mr. Justice Chainani and referred to a Division Bench for final disposal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judgment-debtor (a tenant) is entitled to be relieved against forfeiture resulting from non-payment of rent pursuant to the terms of a compromise (consent) decree.
- Whether the Full Bench decision in Krishna Bai v. Hari is inconsistent with, or overridden by, the subsequent Full Bench decision in Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram (i.e., whether those two Full Bench decisions conflict such that Krishna Bai should no longer be treated as good law).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The decree-holder (appellant) argued that there was a conflict between the Full Bench decision in Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram and the earlier Full Bench decision in Krishna Bai v. Hari (and decisions following Shirekuli Timapa Hegda v. Mahablya), implying that Krishna Bai should not govern the present case.
- By implication the appellant contended that the execution court should not grant relief to the judgment-debtor under the principles applied in Krishna Bai when a later Full Bench had taken a different approach in Waman's case.
- The appellant sought enforcement of the forfeiture clause in the consent decree and recovery of possession through execution because of the judgment-debtor's failure to pay within the stipulated date.
Judgment-Debtor's (Respondent's) Position
- The judgment-debtor pleaded for relief against forfeiture on equitable grounds, relying on the principle that where landlord-tenant relations exist the tenant can be relieved against forfeiture for non-payment of rent if arrears and costs and interest are tendered.
- The judgment-debtor had tendered the unpaid annas eight and subsequent rent in Court and argued that the default was effectively technical (payment was made one day late).
- The Courts below accepted his plea and dismissed the decree-holder's application for possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishna Bai v. Hari (Full Bench) | Held that when a compromise decree creates or continues a landlord-tenant relationship, the tenant (judgment-debtor) is entitled to relief against forfeiture; recognised equitable jurisdiction and applied principles underlying s. 114 Transfer of Property Act. | The Court found the present case falls within the principle of Krishna Bai and applied that decision to allow relief to the judgment-debtor; the Court held Krishna Bai remains good law. |
| Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram (Full Bench) | Dealt with a mortgage decree with instalments; distinguished clauses that are penalties (against which equity can relieve) from clauses that are concessions (which must be strictly complied with); held the executing Court may grant relief where the clause amounts to a penalty. | The Court examined this decision and concluded it dealt with a different class of cases (mortgage instalment/concession context) and was not inconsistent with Krishna Bai; Waman's principles apply where decrees fall in that class. |
| Shirekuli Timapa Hegda (Hedga) v. Mahablya | Earlier view that doctrine of penalties is not applicable to stipulations contained in decrees and that such stipulations must be strictly enforced (i.e., consent decrees cannot be varied except by consent). | The Court noted this earlier view had been overruled by Krishna Bai in the context of landlord-tenant compromise decrees, and treated Shirekuli's approach as the "extreme view" which Krishna Bai had displaced for that class of cases. |
| Balprasad v. Dhamidhar Sakharam | Authority relied upon for the position that the doctrine of penalties is not applicable to decrees (West J.'s observations emphasising strict enforcement). | The Court noted that Shirekuli and similar judgments had relied on Balprasad, but Krishna Bai rejected that approach for compromise landlord-tenant decrees. |
| Wentworth v. Bullen | English authority for the proposition that a contract's incidents remain even when a Judge's command/superadded order exists; supports applying contractual/equitable incidents to consent decrees. | Jenkins C.J. (in Krishna Bai) referred to this decision; the Court relied on the same principle to support relief in cases where the compromise decree creates landlord-tenant relations. |
| Lachiram v. Jana Yesu | Adopted the "extreme view" that a consent decree can only be varied by consent (similar to Shirekuli); however, recognised Krishna Bai's ratio but declined to apply it to the facts before that Court. | The present Court observed the decision but noted that Lachiram acknowledged Krishna Bai's ratio and that other authorities applied Krishna Bai in appropriate facts. |
| Balambhat v. Vinayak | Application of Krishna Bai's principle in execution proceedings; Scott C.J applied Krishna Bai and refused to distinguish between relief sought in a separate suit and relief sought in execution. | The present Court cited Balambhat to show Krishna Bai's principle has been applied in execution proceedings and that the distinction urged by decree-holders is without substance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first determined that the present case plainly falls within the principle laid down by the Full Bench in Krishna Bai v. Hari because the compromise decree created (or continued) the landlord-tenant relationship and the forfeiture sought to be enforced arose from non-payment of rent under that decree. The Court summarized Krishna Bai's reasoning: equitable principles (and the spirit of s. 114 Transfer of Property Act) entitle a tenant to relief against forfeiture where the tenant offers to pay arrears, interest and costs; English authorities (including Wentworth v. Bullen) and Indian High Courts support treating a forfeiture clause for non-payment of rent as security rather than an uncompromising penalty.
The Court then addressed the appellant's contention that Krishna Bai is inconsistent with the later Full Bench decision in Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram. The Court analysed Waman's decision and identified that it concerned a different factual and legal situation — a mortgage decree with instalments and a clause that made default in two instalments trigger the right to sell the mortgaged property. Waman drew a distinction between (a) clauses that impose a penalty (where equity may relieve) and (b) clauses that confer a concession (e.g., liberty to pay by instalments or to pay a lesser sum) where strict compliance is required and no relief is available from the executing Court.
The Court found the two Full Bench decisions addressed different classes of cases: Krishna Bai concerned compromise decrees creating landlord-tenant relations and recognised an equitable exception to strict enforcement; Waman concerned instalment/concession clauses in mortgage decrees and set out a different rule for that class. Because the decisions relate to different circumstances and distinct principles, they are not in conflict. The Court also noted Waman's observation of a more extreme view (adopted in Shirekuli and Lachiram) that consent decrees can only be varied by consent, and explained that Krishna Bai had already overruled Shirekuli for landlord-tenant compromise decrees — a point that had not been pressed in the Waman hearing.
Finally, applying Krishna Bai to the present facts, the Court concluded that relief against forfeiture was appropriate: the judgment-debtor's default was "purely technical" since payment was made one day late, and he had tendered the unpaid annas and subsequent rent during execution proceedings. Given that the Courts below had followed Krishna Bai in granting relief, the High Court held they were correct.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed.
Direct effect on the parties:
- The appeal by the decree-holder fails and is dismissed with costs.
- The Courts below were correct in granting relief to the judgment-debtor and dismissing the decree-holder's execution application for possession; the judgment-debtor is relieved against forfeiture in the circumstances of this case.
Broader implications as stated in the opinion:
- The decision reaffirms that Krishna Bai v. Hari remains good law for the class of cases in which a compromise decree creates landlord-tenant relations: equitable relief against forfeiture is available to tenants who tender arrears and related sums.
- The later Full Bench decision in Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram addresses a different category of decrees (mortgage instalment/concession clauses) and establishes principles applicable to those facts; the Court held there is no inconsistency between the two Full Bench decisions when each is applied to its appropriate class of cases.
- The opinion recognises that both decisions constitute limited exceptions to the general rule that consent decrees can be varied only by consent, but each exception applies to different circumstances and principles; the Court accordingly applied the appropriate principle to the facts before it.
Note: The Court also observed that the judgment-debtor's default was a technical one (payment made a day late), which reinforced the appropriateness of granting relief under the Krishna Bai principle.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs. (Appeal dismissed. J.G.R.)
Gajendragadkar, J.:—
This appeal arises in execution proceedings and the only question which it raises is, whether the judgment-debtor is entitled to be relieved against forfeiture. The decree in question is a compromise decree and it was passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Poona, in Civil Suit No. 551 of 1946 on August 22, 1947. This suit had been filed by the landlord against his tenant claiming to recover possession of the premises let to the tenant on the ground that he had committed default in the payment of rent. According to the plaint the tenant was liable to pay Rs. 84 as past rent before the date of the suit. By the compromise decree the defendant was ordered to pay the said amount of Rs. 84, costs of the suit and the rent which had accrued due since the institution of the suit up to the end of August 1947. It was admitted by the plaintiff that this amounted in all to Rs. 188, out of which Rs. 100 had already been paid by the defendant. In effect, therefore, the defendant was ordered to pay the balance of Rs. 88 and Rs. 4-8-0 as the rent for September. The whole of this amount of Rs. 92-8-0 had to be paid by the defendant before the end of September 1947. On these terms the consent decree allowed the defendant to remain in possession of the premises as a tenant of the plaintiff. The consent decree further Provided that in case the defendant made a default in paying the amount as aforesaid, the plaintiff should recover Possession of the property through Court. The judgment-debtor did not pay the amount on or before September 30, 1947, but paid Rs. 92 on October 1, 1947. Thereupon the decree-holder filed the present execution application and claimed to recover possession of the premises in question. Pending the hearing of this application the judgment-debtor paid annas eight which he had failed to pay even on October 1, 1947, and he also tendered in Court the amount of rent which had become due subsequent to the filing of the execution application. It was on these facts that the question which the Courts below had to consider was, whether the judgment-debtor should be relieved against forfeiture. Both the Courts have accepted the judgment-debtor's plea for relief against forfeiture and have dismissed the darkhast for possession. It is this order which the decree-holder seeks to challenge in the present second appeal before us.
This appeal had come on for hearing before Mr. Justice Chainani on August 10, 1950, and has been referred to a division bench by him. Before Mr. Justice Chainani it was urged that there was a conflict between the view taken by a Full Bench of this Court in Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram, and that accepted by an earlier Full Bench in Krishna Bai v. Hari, as also by a Division Bench in Balambhat v. Vinayak(3). Mr. Justice Chainani felt prima facie impressed with this argument and so he referred this case to a division bench. That is how this matter has come before us today for final disposal.
There can be no doubt that the present case falls within the principle laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Krishna Bai's case. In the said case the plaintiff was seeking to enforce by a suit her right to forfeiture which had been declared in a consent decree. The decree was merely declaratory and could not have been executed. That is why the decree-holder had to file a separate suit to enforce the terms of the said decree. The defence raised by the judgment-debtor in the said suit was that he should be relieved against forfeiture and the said plea of the defendant was accepted by the Full Bench. It was then thought necessary to refer the question to a Full Bench because an earlier decision of this Court in Shirekuli Timapa Hegda v. Mahablya was entirely against the defendant's plea and it was thought that the view expressed in Shirkuli's case required reconsideration. This view was that the doctrine of penalties was not applicable to stipulations contained in decrees; and that such stipulations have to be strictly enforced without regard to any equitable consideration. In taking this view Birdwood and Jardine JJ. had purported to follow the observations made by West J. in Balprasad v. Dhamidhar Sakharam where West J. had emphasised the fact that the doctrine of penalties is not applicable to the class of cases covered by decrees and added that “those who, with their eyes open, have made alternative engagements and invited alternative orders of the Court, must, if they fail to perform the one, perform the other, however greatly severe its terms may be.” It may be pointed out that both in the case of Shirekuli Timapa Hedga v. Mahablya as well as the earlier judgments on which it relied, the plea for relief had been urged by the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings, whereas in Krishna Bai's case the full bench were dealing with the same plea made by the defendant in the suit filed against him to enforce a decretal clause. Jenkins C.J who delivered the principal judgment of the Full Bench referred to this distinction, but he proceeded to deal with the question of the principle involved and he came to the conclusion that on principle the earlier view was unsound. On principle there can be no doubt that as between the landlord and the tenant, the tenant would be entitled to relief against forfeiture resulting from the non-payment of rent. The principles underlying s. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act have been applied on equitable grounds even apart from the provisions of the said section. In England it has always been recognised that a forfeiture clause for non-payment of rent amounts merely to a security for the rent and so relief was always given to the defaulting tenant on the ground that if the tenant pays the lessor the rent in arrear together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, the lessor is deemed to have recovered full compensation and to have been put in the same position as if sent had been paid to him when it was originally due. The same view has been taken by all the Indian High Courts in dealing with the claims for possession made by landlords against their tenants on the ground that the tenants have committed default in the Payment of rent. It is this equitable principle which has received statutory recognition in the provisions of s. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. In dealing with the question raised before the Full Bench Jenkins C.J observed that if the tenant was entitled to relief against forfeiture under this equitable principle, it is difficult to see why he should not get the same relief merely because the agreement between the parties has merged in a consent decree. It was an incident of the relationship of landlord and tenant, observed Jenkins C.J, that the right of forfeiture was subject to relief and so that incident must still apply when those relations are established by a decree passed in accordance with the agreement. He then referred to the decision in Wentworth v. Bullen and observed that the principle had been repeatedly affirmed that “the contract of the parties is not the less a contract and subject to the incidents of a contract because there is superadded the command of a Judge.” The result of this Full Bench decision was that the earlier view in Shirekuli's case was overruled and it was treated as settled that in cases where the relationship of landlord and tenant is created between the parties by a compromise decree, the judgment-debtor who is a tenant would be entitled to relief against forfeiture resulting from his failure to pay the rent at the stipulated time. In the present case there is no doubt that the compromise decree did create or continue the relationship of landlord and tenant between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, and the forfeiture which the decree-holder seeks to enforce has resulted from the judgment-debtor's failure to pay the amount in question within the stipulated period. The Courts below have held, following the earlier Full Bench decision, that the judgment-debtor is entitled to the relief as claimed by him, and so long as that decision stands, there can be no doubt that he is entitled to such relief.
We must, however, proceed to examine the contention urged before us by the appellant that this decision is inconsistent with the subsequent Full Bench decision in Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram. Now, in Waman Vishwanath v. Yeshwant Tukaram the Full Bench was dealing with a mortgage decree which was passed on an award. The decree directed the judgment-debtor to pay the decretal amount by certain instalments and it provided that if the judgment-debtor failed to pay any two instalments regularly, the decree-holder would be entitled to realise the moneys due to him by getting the mortgaged property sold through Court. The judgment-debtor failed to pay two instalments regularly and the decree-holder sought to exercise his right to recover the whole amount due by sale of the properties. Thereupon the judgment-debtor pleaded to be relieved against the said claim. The question as to whether in such a case the executing Court was entitled to grant relief to the judgment-debtor had given rise to conflicting decisions and so the matter was referred to the Full Bench. As was pointed out by Chagla Ag. C.J, as he then was, who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, the two protagonists of these conflicting views were Sir John Beaumont and Sir Norman Macleod. The Full Bench in Waman's case preferred the view expressed by Beaumont C.J and ruled that the contrary view adopted by Macleod C.J on several occasions should be treated as no longer good law Shortly stated the view accepted by the Full Bench was that if it appears that the decree in question directs a certain sum of money to be paid by a particular date and adds a condition that if the said money is not paid on the said date a larger sum shall be paid, that condition is in the nature of a penalty against which a Court of equity can grant relief and award to the party seeking payment only such damages as he may have suffered by the non-performance of the term as to the payment of the money. On the other hand, if the decree makes a particular sum payable on a certain date and it follows the said direction by a condition allowing to the debtor a concession, as for example the liberty to pay a lesser sum or to pay the said sum by instalments, then the party who seeks to take advantage of that concession must carry out strictly the conditions on which the concession was granted. If the terms on which the concession was thus given are not carried out, there is no power in the Court to relieve the defaulting party from the obligation of so doing. The terms of the mortgage decree with which the Full Bench was concerned in Waman's case were construed as amounting to a concession, with the result that the Full Bench held that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to any relief as claimed by him.
It would thus be clear that the two Full Bench decisions do not cover the same or similar ground and were in fact dealing with entirely different situations. The earlier Full Bench was dealing with a compromise decree creating the relationship of landlord and tenant and it was held that the equitable jurisdiction to give relief to the tenant against the landlord's claim for forfeiture and re-entry can be exercised by Courts even though the said relationship of landlord and tenant is the result of the terms of a compromise decree. In a sense, therefore, this decision recognises an exception to the rule that consent decrees can be varied only by consent. On the other hand, the subsequent Full Bench decision in Waman's case was not concerned with compromise decrees of this kind. In this latter Full Bench case the question was as to the powers of the executing Court to grant relief to the judgment-debtors where consent decrees direct such judgment-debtors to pay certain amounts on specified dates or within a specified period, and in dealing with this question the Full Bench held that there is jurisdiction to grant such relief if on a construction of the decree in question it appears that the clause sought to be enforced amounts to a penalty. This again can well be regarded as another exception to the rule that consent decrees can be varied only by consent. If it is borne in mind that the question of granting relief which the two Full Bench decisions deal with arose under dissimilar circumstances and involved the consideration of different principles, it would be difficult to hold that there is any conflict between them. On the other hand, there is one feature which is common to both the decisions and that consists in the fact that both the decisions do not accept unreservedly or without exception the broad principle that consent decrees can be varied only by consent. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument of the appellant that there is any conflict between the two Full Bench decisions at all. We think that whenever Courts are dealing with the question of granting relief to judgment-debtors, they must decide in which class of cases the decree in question falls. If the decree falls in the class of cases which was dealt with by the judgment in Krishna Bai's case, the principle therein laid down must be applied. If, on the other hand, the decree falls in the other class of cases which was the subject matter of the decision in Waman's case, it is the principle laid down in that case that must be applied.
In this connection it may not be inappropriate to refer to some observations made in the judgment in Waman's case. While dealing with the two conflicting views adopted by Beaumont C.J and Macleod C.J, Chagla Ag. C.J has referred to a third view which has been characterised by him as the more extreme view and he has added that this extreme view has been adopted in Shirekuli Timapa Hedga v. Mahablya and Lachiram v. Jana Yesu. He then added that it was unnecessary to consider whether the extreme view adopted in these two decisions had not gone too far in restricting the jurisdiction of the Court to give relief against penalties. It has been suggested before us by the appellant that these observations show that this more extreme view has not been disapproved and may still have to be considered by us in the present case. Since I was a party to this decision of the Full Bench, I think I ought to add that it was not brought to our notice pointedly that the decision in Shirekuli's case had been expressly overruled by the Full, Bench decision in Krishna Bai v. Hari.(4) As the observations in question show, we felt some hesitation in accepting the extreme view propounded in the two decisions in question, and if only our attention had been invited to the Full Bench decision in Krishna Bai's case, we would certainly have made it clear that the view adopted in Shirekuli's case was no longer good law. As regards the decision in Lachiram v. Jana Yesu, it is no doubt true that Scott C.J and Beaman J. adopted the extreme view that a consent decree can only be varied by consent; but it must be pointed out that even while this extreme view was adopted, the learned Judges recognised the validity of the ratio in Krishna Bai's case, but refused to apply the said ratio to the facts before them on the ground that the said ratio was applicable only where the relationship of landlord and tenant is created by the decree. In fact, Scott C.J himself applied the principle laid down in Krishna Bai's case in Balambhat v. Vinayak(5). It is significant to notice that while applying the said principle Scott C.J refused to make any distinction between cases where the relief is claimed in a separate suit and those where it is claimed in execution proceedings. In Balambhat v. Vina yak the judgment-debtor had asked for the relief in execution proceedings and had relied upon the decision in Krishna Bai's case in support of his plea. The decree-holder, on the other hand, contended that the said decision was inapplicable because the principle laid down therein could be applied only where a separate suit is brought to enforce the terms of a declaratory decree and not where the decree is being executed. The decree-holder's contention had been upheld by the lower appellate Court; but Scott C.J reversed the decision of the lower appellate Court on the ground that the distinction sought to be made was without any substance and that the principle applied equally in both classes of cases.
We, therefore, think that there is no substance in the appellant's contention that the decision in Krishna Bai's case is inconsistent with the subsequent decision in Waman's case and we are satisfied that the case before us is governed by the principles laid down in Krishna Bai's case and that the decision in the said case is still good law. We must, therefore, hold that the Courts below were right in granting relief to the judgment-debtor. The default made by the judgment-debtor in this case in the payment of rent is purely technical since the amount in question was paid by him only a day later than the stipulated period.
The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
J.G.R
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