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Shiavax C. Cambata And Another v. Sunderdas Ebji .
Summary of Opinion — Chagla, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Bhagwati, who held that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit and transferred it to the Small Causes Court under s. 50 of Bombay Act LVII of 1947. Section 28 of that Act confers jurisdiction on the Small Causes Court over suits between landlord and tenant relating to recovery of rent or possession and ousts the jurisdiction of every other Court for those matters; s. 50 provides for transfer of suits of the description mentioned in s. 28 to the Small Causes Court or other competent Courts.
The underlying suit is brought under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act — a special, summary remedy for a dispossessed person to recover possession within six months of dispossession, in which questions of title are not to arise. In the plaint the plaintiff alleges that one Dalaya (a tenant of the defendants) assigned his tenancy rights to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was lawfully in possession and was dispossessed by the defendants; in their written statement the defendants deny the plaintiff's possession and allege they themselves were in possession. The learned Judge concluded that the plaintiff was in possession as a tenant (relying on the assignment by Dalaya) and therefore treated the suit as one between tenant and landlord, transferring it under s. 50.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (a summary remedy for dispossessed persons) falls within the description in s. 28 of Bombay Act LVII of 1947 such that it is a suit "between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession" and therefore is triable only by the Small Causes Court.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit or whether jurisdiction was ousted and the suit properly transferred under s. 50 of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Pleadings / Position (as set out in the plaint)
- The plaintiff set out that Dalaya was a tenant of the defendants and assigned tenancy rights to the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff alleged he was lawfully in possession and was dispossessed by the defendants without his consent and otherwise within due course of law.
- The plaintiff seeks possession under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (summary remedy for dispossession).
Respondents' Pleadings / Position (as set out in the written statement and the learned Judge's view)
- The defendants in their written statement controvert the plaint averments and allege that the plaintiff was not in possession and that the defendants were in possession.
- The learned Judge (Mr. Bhagwati) took the view that the plaintiff was in possession as a tenant by virtue of the assignment from Dalaya and therefore treated the suit as a tenant's suit against a landlord.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the nature and scope of a s. 9 Specific Relief Act suit. It emphasized that s. 9 provides a summary remedy to a dispossessed person to obtain possession within six months of dispossession and that in such a suit "no question as to the title of the plaintiff or the defendant can arise." The object of s. 9 is to protect possession without regard to title or the origin of possession.
Applying that understanding, the court concluded that a s. 9 suit does not fall within the description in s. 28 of the Bombay Act (which confines Small Causes Court jurisdiction to suits between landlord and tenant relating to recovery of rent or possession). The court explained that only when a party files a suit in his capacity as a landlord or tenant and relies on his title as such does the suit become one of the description in s. 28 and subject to transfer under s. 50. Although the plaintiff in this case alleged an assignment (and thereby set out title-related facts), those averments were unnecessary and irrelevant for a s. 9 proceeding and could not be contested on title grounds by the defendants. The only substantive issue in the s. 9 suit is whether the plaintiff was in possession within six months of filing and whether the plaintiff was dispossessed by the defendants.
Because the landlord–tenant question could not properly arise in the s. 9 summary proceeding, the learned Judge erred in holding that the High Court had no jurisdiction and in transferring the suit under s. 50.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The order of the learned Judge is set aside; the High Court has jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit; the appeal is allowed.
Consequences for the parties: the suit will remain in the High Court and be placed on the board for hearing and final disposal (the Prothonotary was directed to list it). There was no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The opinion confines its holding to the character of s. 9 proceedings and their incompatibility with the s. 28/s. 50 transfer regime; it does not purport to establish a broader precedent beyond the direct holding that a s. 9 dispossession suit is not, by its nature, a landlord-and-tenant suit within the meaning of s. 28 of Bombay Act LVII of 1947.
Administrative Details Recorded in the Opinion
- Attorneys for appellants: Gagrat & Co.
- Attorneys for respondents: Madhavji & Co.
- The opinion concludes with the notation "Appeal allowed." and the initials "A.J.P".
Chagla, C.J:—
This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Bhagwati holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit from which this appeal arises and transferring that suit to the Small Causes Court under s. 50 of Bombay Act LVII of 1947. Section 28 of that Act confers jurisdiction upon the Small Causes Court to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between a landlord and tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of Part II apply and that section ousts the jurisdiction of every other Court with regard to those matters; and s. 50 provides for transfer of suits of the description mentioned in s. 28 to the Small Causes Court or other Courts which have jurisdiction to try those suits.
So the question that we have to determine is whether the suit which in the opinion of Mr. Bhagwati was not triable by the High Court but by the Small Causes Court was a suit between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of premises. The suit is a simple suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. That section gives a special remedy to a party who has been dispossessed to file a suit for possession. The suit has to be filed within six months from the date of dispossession and in that suit no question as to the title of the plaintiff or the defendant can arise. Such suit does not bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. It is therefore a summary remedy given to a dispossessed person to obtain possession of the property of which he has been dispossessed. Once the nature of the suit under s. 9 is understood, it will be clear that such a suit would not fall within the description of the suit mentioned in s. 28 of the Act. The object of s. 9 is to protect possession without regard to the title or the origin of possession. In the plaint in the suit the plaintiff sets out the history which led to his coming into possession and what he says is that one Dalaya was a tenant of the defendants and this tenant assigned his tenancy rights to the plaintiff and thereby he became entitled to be in possession of the property. Then he goes on to say that he was lawfully in possession of the premises and he was dispossessed by the defendants without his consent and otherwise within due course of law and he asks for possession under s. 9. In the written statement the defendants controvert the averments contained in the plaint and allege that the plaintiff was not in possession, but the defendants were in possession. Therefore it is clear that the only issue that would arise in this suit and which would have to be determined by the Court would be whether the plaintiff was in possession of the premises in suit within six months from the filing of the suit, and if he was in possession whether he was dispossessed by the defendants. If that issue is answered in favour of the plaintiff, a decree must go in his favour. If the issue is answered against him, the suit must be dismissed.
The view that the learned Judge has taken is that the plaintiff was in possession as a tenant because he relies on the assignment in his favour by Dalaya and therefore according to him this is a suit by a tenant against his landlord for possession. It is not every suit for possession that is liable to be transferred under s. 50 of the Act. It is only those suits for possession which are filed between a landlord and a tenant. In our opinion, it is only when a landlord or a tenant files a suit for possession as a landlord or a tenant and in his capacity as a landlord or a tenant and relying on his title as a landlord or a tenant that it becomes a suit of the description mentioned in s. 50 and s. 28 of the Act. Although the plaintiff might have set out his title in the plaint, those averments were entirely unnecessary and irrelevant. It is clear that the defendants could not have raised an issue as to the plaintiff's title in the suit. He could not have contested the position that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession because he was not a tenant. He could only have contested the plaintiff's claim on the one simple and short ground, viz. that the plaintiff was not in possession within six months of the filing of the suit. Therefore, the issue as to landlord and tenant could never have arisen in this suit. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge, with respect to him, was in error when he held that this Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit which was before him. The learned Judge was also in error in transferring the suit under s. 50 of the Act.
The result is that the order of the learned Judge must be set aside and we hold that this Court has jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit. Appeal will be allowed. No order as to costs.
Mr. Jhaveri informs us that the suit is ready for hearing and therefore, we direct the Prothonotary to place it on some board for hearing and final disposal.
Attorneys for appellants: Gagrat & Co.
Attorneys for respondents: Madhavji & Co.
Appeal allowed.
A.J.P
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