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N.J. Gor v. M.G. Raval

Bombay High Court
Oct 18, 1950

Chagla, C.J:—

This is an application in revision against an order passed by the Full Court of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, setting aside the decree of the trial Court which dismissed the plaintiff's suit for ejectment. The Full Court passed the decree for ejectment in favour of the plaintiff.

The contention of Mr. Patwardhan is that in view of certain events that have happened prior to the filing of this suit in the Small Causes Court, the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. It would appear that the plaintiff applied for a certificate from the Controller under act vii of 1944 to the effect that he required the premises reasonably and bona fide. The Controller held against him. He then went in appeal to the Collector and the Collector confirmed the decision of the Controller.

Under that Act a landlord could eject his tenant on the ground that he required the premises reasonably and bona fide only if he obtained a certificate from the Controller to that effect, and the landlord had the right if the Controller held against him to appeal to the Collector under s. 14. But section 14(3) provided that the decision of the Collector, and subject only to such decision, the order of the Controller shall for the purposes of that part be final and no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which was by or under that part settled, decided or dealt with by the Controller and Collector. Therefore it is clear that under act vii of 1944 the decision of the Collector that the premises were not required by the landlord reasonably and bona fide became final and no civil Court had jurisdiction to deal with that question. The new rent act no. lvii of 1947 came into force on February 13, 1948, and the plaintiff filed a suit in the Small Causes Court on the same ground, viz. that he required the premises reasonably and bona fide, on April 1, 1948. The question that I have to consider is whether the repeal of act vii of 1944 had the effect of altering the provisions of s. 14 of that act in the sense that although that law made the decision of the Collector final and ousted the jurisdiction of the civil Court, whether the repeal of that Act and the passing of the new Act gave jurisdiction to the Small Causes Court to go behind the decision of the Collector and to go into the question as to whether the landlord reasonably and bona fide required the premises. The effect of the repeal of an Act is provided by s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, and that section provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal of an Act shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so made. Therefore, if the defendant had acquired any right under the repealed Act, that right could not be affected unless a different intention appeared in the Act repealing the earlier Act. Clearly, the defendant did acquire a right under the repealed Act and that right was that the decision of the Collector in his favour had become final and the jurisdiction of the civil Court to go into that question had been ousted. Therefore the question that I have to consider is whether under the new Act there is an intention which goes to show that this right of the defendant has been taken away. It is important to note that the ground put forward by the plaintiff before the Controller and the Collector was that two of his sons had got married early in 1946 and he required the premises because of that marriage and according to him that requirement was reasonable and bona fide. The requirement put forward by him in the suit before the Small Causes Court is identical. It is on the same ground that he says he requires the premises. The trial Court held that his requirement was not reasonable and bona fide; the Full Court has taken the contrary view. I may point out that the Full Court has also considered the balance of convenience and according to the Full Court the balance of convenience is in favour of the landlord and not in favour of the tenant.

Mr. Kamat's contention is that it is clear from the provisions of s. 13 of the new Act that the Legislature intended that the landlord should have a right to file the suit an the ground that he required the premises reasonably and bona fide notwithstanding the fact that the Collector had decided against the landlord under the old Act, and Mr. Kamat says that s. 13 introduces a new principle which was not to be found under the old Act, and the new principle is that the Court has to consider not merely the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord but also the balance of convenience under s. 13(2). This is clearly an erroneous submission because even under the new Act the question of balance of convenience only arises provided the landlord has satisfied the Court that he reasonably and bona fide required the premises. The new Act gives a further protection to the tenant and that protection is that notwithstanding the landlord's requirement if the Court comes to the conclusion that the balance of convenience is in favour of the tenant, a decree would not be passed in favour of the landlord. Therefore, before we come to the stage of balance of convenience, the landlord has to establish his reasonable and bona fide requirement. But if the question of the landlord's reasonable and bona fide requirement has already been decided by the Collector under the old Act and under the old Act that decision has become final and a valuable right has accrued to the tenant, there is nothing in s. 13 which suggests that valuable right should be affected by the landlord being given a right to re-agitate the question of his reasonable and bona fide requirement. In my opinion, therefore, the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to go into the question of the landlord's reasonable and bona fide requirement inasmuch as that question had been finally concluded by the decision of the Collector and no new circumstances were put forward by the landlord in the suit filed by him in the Small Causes Court.

The result is that the application must succeed. The decree of the Small Causes Court must be set aside and the rule made absolute with costs. Plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs throughout.

Rule made absolute.
J.G.R