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Jivaji Annaji Gumaste Patil v. Hanmant Ramchandra Gumaste Patil

Bombay High Court
Jun 27, 1949
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Judgment Summary — Chagla, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter was referred to a full bench for determination of whether an adoption made after the death of a collateral permits the adopted son to be treated as an heir of that collateral. The material facts set out in the opinion are:

  • Krishnappa had five sons: Keshav, Annappa, Bhimrao, Apparao and Madhav.
  • After the deaths of Bhimrao and Apparao, Keshav, Annappa and Madhav each received a one-third share of the joint family property. Annappa died in 1901 and Madhav in 1903.
  • Annappa left a widow, Tungabai. Keshav left a son Vishnu, who died in 1918. Because the property was Watan property, the nearest male heir at that time was Hanmant (a collateral of Keshav), who succeeded.
  • Annappa's widow (Tungabai) adopted defendant No. 1 on 18 July 1922.
  • Hanmant's sons are the plaintiff and defendant No. 2; they claimed the property which had belonged to Keshav and which had descended to Vishnu.

The specific question for the full bench was whether the adoption of defendant No. 1 after the death of the collateral divested the property which had vested in Hanmant's line and enabled the adopted son to claim that property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an adoption effected after the death of a collateral entitles the adopted son to be treated as an heir of that collateral (i.e., whether such an adoption can divest property already vested in the heir of the collateral).
  2. What limitations attach to the doctrine that adoption "relates back" to the death of the adoptive father, particularly in the context of rights of succession where property has already vested in a collateral heir.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion records limited specific submissions. The court summarised the key contentions made before it as follows.

Argument Presented by Counsel (Mr. Madbhavi)

  • Relied upon Privy Council authority (Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri) but attempted to distinguish that case by stressing that, in the Privy Council's consideration, the adopted son was not in existence at the time of the death of the widow in whom the property was vested; this fact, counsel argued, was material to the Privy Council's conclusion.

Argument Urged in Support of Extending the Anant v. Shankar Ratio

  • A principal contention advanced before the bench was that it would be a logical extension of the doctrine as applied in Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil to allow an adopted son (adopted after the death of a collateral) to displace the collateral's heir.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri Stated principle: "According to the law as laid down in the decided cases, an adoption after the death of a collateral does not entitle the adopted son to come in as heir of the collateral." The court treated this decision as laying down a binding rule of Hindu law on the point and relied on it as a primary authority limiting the effect of post-collateral adoptions.
Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil Re-affirmed the principle in Bhubaneshwari Debi but, on its facts, held that a person adopted into the family of the last surviving coparcener could take both ancestral property (by survivorship) and property that the last coparcener had inherited from a collateral. The court observed that this decision re-affirmed Bhubaneshwari's rule generally, but also noted that Anant's facts were special (adoption into the family of the last surviving coparcener) and that Anant's application should be confined to those facts rather than extended as a general rule.
Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh Mentioned alongside Anant Bhikappa Patil as not bringing into question the rule of law stated in Bhubaneshwari Debi. Used by the court to show that other Privy Council decisions did not displace the principle in Bhubaneshwari Debi.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a series of steps, confined to the materials and authorities it set out:

  1. Accepted the general rule recognised by the Privy Council that, for many purposes, adoption "relates back" to the death of the adoptive parent and that an adopted son is to be regarded as if he existed at that earlier date.
  2. Emphasised that the doctrine of "relation back" is not absolute; it has limitations (for example, it does not impair lawful alienations made by the last absolute owner), and the court asked whether there is a further limitation when property by inheritance has vested in a collateral heir before the adoption.
  3. Noted the Privy Council decision in Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri, which held that an adoption made after the death of a collateral does not entitle an adopted son to succeed as heir of that collateral. The court treated that decision as laying down a rule of law still regarded as good law by the Privy Council.
  4. Considered attempts to distinguish Bhubaneshwari (notably Mr. Madbhavi's point regarding the adopted son's non-existence at a particular death) and rejected that narrow factual distinction as the decisive ratio; the court held that the presence or absence of the adopted son at a particular death was immaterial to the underlying legal principle.
  5. Examined Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil, acknowledging some apparent tension: on its facts Anant displaced the heir to collateral-inherited parcels as well as ancestral property. The court carefully analysed Anant and identified its distinguishing feature — the adoption brought the adopted son into the family of the last surviving coparcener, producing no disruption of family lines and enabling succession by survivorship.
  6. Concluded that Anant's ratio should be confined to its particular facts (last surviving coparcener/ adoption by the widow of that sole surviving coparcener) and should not be extended as a general principle to override Bhubaneshwari's rule. The court expressed concern about disturbing perfected titles and vested rights unless compelled by clear legal authority.
  7. On this basis the court found itself unable to extend Anant beyond its strict facts and therefore answered the referred question negatively.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Adoption effected after the death of a collateral does not entitle the adopted son to succeed as heir of that collateral.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The adoption of defendant No. 1 on 18 July 1922 did not divest the property which had already vested in the collateral heir (Hanmant and his line) so as to permit the adopted son to claim as heir of the collateral.
  • The court declined to extend the Privy Council ratio in Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil beyond the specific factual circumstances found in that case (adoption into the family of the last surviving coparcener), and therefore did not create a broader precedent that would disturb existing perfected titles.
  • No new general rule displacing Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri was laid down; the court treated the earlier rule as authoritative and applicable to the question before it.
Answer given by the full bench: in the negative. (Answer accordingly.)
Show all summary ...

Chagla, C.J:—

The question referred to this full bench is, will an adoption after the death of a collateral allow the adopted son to come in as an heir of the collateral; and the few facts which are necessary to be stated for the determination of this question are these. One Krishnappa had five sons, Keshav, Annappa, Bhimrao, Apparao and Madhav. After the death of Bhimrao and Apparao the brothers became divided and Keshav, Annappa and Madhav each got a one-third share of the joint family property. Annappa died in 1901 and Madhav died in 1903. Annappa left a widow Tungabai. Keshav left a son Vishnu who died in 1918, and as this was Watan property, although Keshav had a daughter, the property went to the nearest male heir who was at that time Hanmant, a collateral of Keshav. Annappa's widow adopted defendant No. 1 on July 18, 1922. Hanmant's sons are the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, and the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 claimed the property which Keshav had and which descended to Vishnu. The question that has got to be considered is whether on the adoption of defendant No. 1 on July 18, 1922, the property which would go to the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 by inheritance is divested and the adopted son can lay a claim to that property.

Now, it has been observed by the Privy Council in several cases that an adoption relates back to the death of the adoptive father and an adopted son must be looked upon as if he was in existence at the date of the death of the adoptive father. But it is not a correct proposition to say that the rights of an adopted son are in all respects identical with that of a natural born son. The principle of relation back is not an absolute principle but it has certain limitations. For instance, one limitation is that any lawful alienations made by the last absolute owner would be binding on the adopted son, and the question that we have to consider in this full bench is whether there is a further limitation on the rights of the adopted son, and the limitation that is contended for is that if the property by inheritance goes to a collateral and the adopted son is adopted after the death of the collateral, the adoption cannot divest the property which has vested in the heir of the collateral. Reliance is placed on the Privy Council decision in Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri. There it was expressly held that according to Hindu law an adoption after the death of a collateral does not entitle an adopted son to come in as heir to the collateral. Mr. Madbhavi has attempted to distinguish this case by pointing out that Sir Barnes Peacock, both while arguments were going on at the bar and in the judgment of the Privy Council which he delivered, emphasised the fact that the adopted son was not in existence at the time of the death of the widow in whom the property was vested. But in our opinion that particular fact cannot be looked upon as the deciding factor in the decision. That is certainly not the ratio which led the Privy Council to come to the conclusion. It is immaterial whether an adopted son is or is not in existence at the time of the death of the person whose property is attempted to be divested. The question is, what is the effect of the adoption which for certain purposes relates back to the death of the adoptive father. But whatever might have been said of the decision of the Privy Council in Bhubaneshwari's case, all doubt has been set at rest by the manner in which the Privy Council has re-affirmed and re-emphasised that principle in the recent decision of Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil. At p. 9 their Lordships say:—

“Neither the present case nor Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh brings into question the rule of law considered in Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri and stated by the Board to be that:—

‘According to the law as laid down in the decided cases, an adoption after the death of a collateral does not entitle the adopted son to come in as heir of the collateral.’”

This is not a stray observation. It is the considered view of the Privy Council that the rule of law as laid down in Bhubaneshwari's case is still good law notwithstanding the decision of Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil.

Now, when we return to the facts of Anant v. Shankar we must frankly confess that the actual decision of the Privy Council does create some difficulty because Keshav, who died in 1917, left property which was both ancestral and his own personal property, and when Anant was adopted in 1930 the Privy Council held that the property which had gone out of the family must come back to the family, because Anant, although he was adopted in 1930, must be deemed to have been born on the death of Bhikappa, the father of Keshav and Anant, and therefore as far as the ancestral property was concerned no difficulty is created with regard to the decision. But Keshav also had two parcels of land which he inherited from one Narayan, a collateral, who died in 1908, and even with regard to these parcels of land the Privy Council held that Anant displaced the title of Shankar and he was entitled to be put in possession of these two parcels of land. It is difficult to understand, with great respect to their Lordships of the Privy Council, in what capacity could Anant have inherited the two parcels of land from Keshav except as being the heir of a collateral. When a person succeeds to the property of his brother, he undoubtedly succeeds to the property of a collateral. It is only when he succeeds to his father or to his ancestors in the direct line that it can be said that the succession is in the same line. Therefore, although Anant was adopted after the death of the collateral Keshav, the Privy Council held that Anant was entitled to the property of the collateral although the property had been inherited by Shankar, the next heir of Keshav. Therefore, although the Privy Council re-enunciated and re-emphasised the principle laid down in Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri, it may be urged with some force that they did not give effect to that principle and did not apply it to the facts found in Anant's case. But one important and distinguishing feature in the case of Anant v. Shankar must be borne in mind. Anant by adoption was brought into the same family of which Keshav was the last sole surviving coparcener, and according to the Privy Council there was no disruption of the family and Anant must be deemed to get by survivorship the ancestral property which Keshav had, and further, according to the Privy Council, Anant, who was introduced in the family, was entitled not only to get by survivorship ancestral property, but even the property which Keshav had as his own personal property and which be had inherited as an heir from a collateral. Therefore the ratio of Anant v. Shankar seems to be that when the last surviving - coparcener dies and the widow of a deceased coparcener adopts a son, the property left by the sole surviving coparcener, whatever the nature of the property may be, becomes divested from the person who was the next heir of the last surviving coparcener and revests in the new member introduced in the family.

We are really being asked now to extend that principle contrary to the decision in Bhubaneshwari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri, and the strongest argument urged before us is that it would only be a logical extension of the doctrine of adoption laid down by the Privy Council. Now, it is not always safe logically to extend a ratio to be deduced from a particular case decided by a particular tribunal. A decision is good with regard to the facts found in a particular case and the principle that emerges on a consideration of those facts. Different facts may lead to a different decision and it is not proper to apply a principle based on the facts of one case to the facts of another case merely because relentless logic may so require. There is another consideration which has also got to be borne in mind. The Hindu law of adoption has undergone a drastic change as a result of a series of decisions recently given by their Lordships of the Privy Council. In giving these decisions the Privy Council was not unmindful of the fact that they were disturbing vested rights and perfected titles. But their Lordships had no alternative as a proper interpretation had to be put upon the Hindu scriptures and the law had to be enunciated in accordance with the underlying principles of adoption. But as far as we are concerned, unless we are led to the conclusion that the decision of the Privy Council leaves us no option we do not think it right that we should come to a decision which would further disturb titles which have already become perfected; and therefore we do not wish to extend the principle of Anant v. Shankar beyond its strict application to the facts as found by the Privy Council; the more so as the principle which we are accepting and adopting is a principle which the Privy Council itself has laid down and which has again been, as already pointed out, re-affirmed and re-emphasised in the case of Anant v. Shankar.

Therefore we must answer the question put to us in the negative.

Answer accordingly.
M.W.P