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Imperator v. Manju Hanmant Naik And Another (Accused Nos. 1 And 2)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an order of acquittal passed by the Resident Magistrate, First Class, Honavar. The accused No. 1 was charged under section 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, read with section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, and accused No. 2 was charged under section 6 of the same Act. The prosecution alleged that accused No. 1 contracted a second marriage with accused No. 2 on or about May 17, 1947, while having another wife living. The defence did not dispute the fact of the second marriage or that the first wife was still living. The central procedural question was whether the second marriage took place after the new Act came into force on November 6, 1946.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether accused No. 1 contracted a second marriage after the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, came into force, thereby committing an offence under section 5 of the Act read with section 494 of the Indian Penal Code.
- Whether the form of the second marriage (Gandharva form) negates the commission of an offence under the Act and the Indian Penal Code.
- Whether cognizance of the offence could be taken without a complaint by a person aggrieved, in light of section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the provisions of the new Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Defence)
- The second marriage was contracted in the Gandharva form, which is valid under Hindu law and does not constitute a bigamous marriage.
- The prosecution was defective because no proper complaint was made by a person aggrieved, as required by section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Respondent's Arguments (Prosecution)
- The second marriage was contracted after the new Act came into force, making it void and punishable under section 5 of the Act read with section 494 of the Indian Penal Code.
- It is not necessary that the second marriage be valid; it is sufficient that a form of marriage was contracted while the first marriage subsisted.
- Section 9 of the new Act makes offences under it cognizable without a complaint by a person aggrieved, overriding section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the circumstantial evidence and found it sufficiently established that the second marriage was contracted around May 17, 1947, after the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, came into force. The court emphasized that the validity of the second marriage was not a prerequisite for the offence; it was enough that a form of marriage was contracted while the first marriage subsisted. The court rejected the defence argument regarding the Gandharva form of marriage, noting that the Act renders such second marriages void and punishable.
Regarding the procedural objection about the absence of a complaint by a person aggrieved under section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the court held that section 9 of the new Act makes the offences cognizable without such a complaint. The court analyzed the language of sections 5, 8, and 9 of the Act to conclude that offences under the Act, including bigamy under section 5, do not require a private complaint for cognizance. The court interpreted the legislative intent to broaden cognizance to ensure enforcement of the new law.
Holding and Implications
The order of acquittal was set aside and the accused were convicted.
Accused No. 1 was sentenced to one month's simple imprisonment and accused No. 2 to one day's simple imprisonment. The court noted that since this legislation was new and public opinion had yet to be educated, the sentences were moderate to meet the ends of justice. This decision directly affects the parties by reversing the acquittal and imposing punishment but does not establish a broader precedent beyond the interpretation and enforcement of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946.
Chagla, C.J:—
This is an appeal from an order of acquittal passed by the Resident Magistrate, First Class, Honavar. Accused No. 1 was charged under s. 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, read with s. 494 of the Indian Penal Code, and accused No. 2 under s. 6 of the same Act.
The prosecution case was that accused No. 1 contracted marriage on or about May 17, 1947, with accused No. 2 when he had another wife living. It is to be borne in mind that the fact that accused No. 1 married accused No. 2 is not disputed or challenged by the defence, nor is it disputed or challenged that accused No. 1 has another wife living. The only question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether accused No. 1 married accused No. 2 on May 17, 1947, or at least some time after the new Act came into force, which was on November 6, 1946 [His Lordship then discussed the evidence and proceeded:]
We, therefore, feel that in view of this strong circumstantial evidence the prosecution had established that accused Nos. 1 and 2 got married some time about May 17, 1947, and in view of this evidence, the evidence of the Pujari and of the two band-men also receives added importance and significance. As we have already pointed out, by itself that might not establish anything, but read in conjunction with other evidence, that evidence clearly goes to show that those ceremonies were performed and the band-men were employed not in connection with any Puja but in connection with the marriage which had taken place about that time.
Mr. Shanbhag has taken the point that the prosecution case was that this marriage was contracted according to the Gandharva form and that form is absolute to-day under Hindu law, and that, therefore, no marriage at all was in fact contracted and therefore, no offence was committed. Now, it is important to note that both the accused admitted having been married. They do not say that they have not contracted marriage, and the law with regard to bigamous marriage is clear that it is not necessary in order to commit an offence that a valid second marriage should be solemnized. It is enough in law if the parties accused of bigamous marriage go through a form of marriage when the first marriage is still subsisting.
The other point raised by Mr. Shanbhag is that the prosecution is bad inasmuch as there is no proper complaint as required by s. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That section provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under, among other sections, s. 494 of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence, and it is common ground that in this case there is no complaint by any person aggrieved. The answer to that point lies in the provisions of the new Act. Section 9 of the Act provides that the offences under that Act shall be cognizable. Therefore, every offence falling under the new Act can be taken cognizance of under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code without any complaint being made by any person aggrieved by such offence. Whereas s. 198 of the Code restricts cognizance of certain offences only to cases where a complaint by private party was made, offences under the new Act, although they may fall under s. 494, Indian Penal Code, have been made cognizable without a complaint of a private party. Mr. Shanbhag has sought to argue that s. 9 only refers to ss. 6 and 7 where several offences are created by the Act. These are for solemnizing bigamous marriage and also for persons having charge of minors concerned in bigamous marriage. Now, s. 5 provides:
“Notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the contrary, whoever not being a minor contracts a bigamous marriage which is void under section 4 shall be deemed to have committed an offence under s. 494 of the Indian Penal Code.”
And s. 4 of the Act makes bigamous marriages void. It is clear, therefore, that before the passing of this Act a Hindu could contract a polygamous marriage and would not be guilty of an offence under s. 494. It is only this Act which makes the second or bigamous marriage void and thereby constitutes it an offence under s. 494 of the Indian Penal Code. It is true that this Act does not prescribe the penalty for that offence because under s. 5 the offence under this Act is deemed to be an offence under s. 494. But even so, it is by reason of this Act and by reason of second marriage being made void that an offence is constituted under s. 494 of the Indian Penal Code. Besides, one has only got to look at the language of s. 8 and the language of s. 9 of the Act to realize that the offences under this Act are not only offences under ss. 6 and 7 but also the offence constituted under s. 5. Section 8 provides:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in s. 190 of the Coda of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no Court other than that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class shall take cognisance of or try any offence punishable under s. 6 or 7 of this Act.”
Now, the reason for this section was that but for this section offences under ss. 6 and 7 would have been triable by even Second Class and Third Class Magistrates. Therefore, the law provides that offences under ss. 6 and 7 should be tried only by Presidency Magistrates or Magistrates of the First Class. But the important thing to note is that s. 8 speaks of any offence punishable under s. 6 or 7 of this Act which implies that there are other offences under this Act besides those under ss. 6 and 7. If Mr. Shanbhag's argument was sound, then the language used in s. 8 would be similar to that used in s. 9, viz. that any offence under this Act instead of specifying offences under ss. 6 and 7. Therefore, it is clear that while s. 8 deals only with offences under ss. 6 and 7, s. 9 deals with all the offences under the Act and the most important offence created under the Act is the offence of bigamy referred to in s. 5 of the Act. We, therefore, think that when a second marriage is contracted by a Hindu which has been rendered void by this Act and which is made an offence under s. 494 of the Indian Penal Code, no private complaint is necessary as contemplated by s. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That offence has been made cognisable by s. 9 of the Act.
The result will be that the order of acquittal will be set aside and the accused will be convicted. As the marriage has been declared void under the Act and this is a new piece of legislation and public opinion has yet to be educated, we think the ends of justice will be met if accused No. 1 is sentenced to one month's simple imprisonment and accused No. 2 to one day's simple imprisonment.
Bhagwati, J.:—I agree.
Order set aside.
P.A.D
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