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Mahadeo Bhimashankar... v. Fatumiya Valad Husse...
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Dixit, J., with Bavdekar, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal concerns whether the appellants' application for execution (a "Darkhast") was time-barred under the Indian Limitation Act. Relevant facts, drawn from the opinion, are:
- In a mortgage enforcement suit, Pandurang Bhikaji Shete obtained a preliminary mortgage decree on June 27, 1933. That preliminary decree was made final on March 7, 1935.
- The judgment-debtor preferred an appeal (No. 308 of 1933) against the preliminary decree; the appellate court declared that appeal to have abated on November 16, 1935, because the judgment-debtor had died and his heirs were not on record.
- The decree-holder applied by Darkhast No. 618 of 1935 to execute the final decree on March 30, 1935; that Darkhast was disposed of on September 14, 1935.
- In 1936 the decree was assigned to Balvant; Balvant died June 25 (or 28), 1938; appellants (his relatives) filed the present Darkhast No. 15 of 1938 on November 16, 1938, claiming execution of the decree.
- The judgment-debtor's heirs contended the Darkhast was barred by limitation. The executing Court dismissed the Darkhast as time-barred; the District Court (Poona) affirmed. The assignees appealed to this Court.
- The Court framed the question as one of statutory construction of Article 182, clause (2), of the Indian Limitation Act (the starting point of limitation where "there has been an appeal").
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellants' Darkhast (filed 16 November 1938) was barred by limitation under Article 182, clause (2), of the Indian Limitation Act.
- How the expression "where there has been an appeal" in Article 182(2) should be construed: does "appeal" mean an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed, or can it include other appeals in the suit (or related appeals) likely to affect that decree?
- Whether a certified copy of a prior Darkhast (No. 1282 of 1938) should be admitted in evidence at the appellate stage under Order XLI, rule 27, CPC to affect the computation of limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants contended that their Darkhast filed on 16 November 1938 was in time because, they argued, limitation should be computed from 16 November 1935 — the date on which the appeal from the preliminary decree was declared to have abated.
- They sought permission to put in evidence a certified copy of a later execution application (Darkhast No. 1282 of 1938, disposed of on 29 September 1938) under Order XLI, r. 27, CPC, which, if admitted, would show the present application was within three years of that disposal.
- Affidavits were filed asserting that appellants only learned of Darkhast No. 1282 of 1938 in about 1941.
Judgment-debtors' / Respondents' Arguments
- The judgment-debtor's heirs argued the Darkhast was barred by limitation and that time should be computed from the date of the final decree (March 7, 1935) because there was no appeal from that final decree.
- They opposed admission of the certified copy (Darkhast No. 1282 of 1938) under O. XLI, r. 27, contending the Court should not permit additional evidence at this stage to cure defects or omissions in the lower Court proceedings.
Lower Courts' Reasoning (as advanced and relied upon in the appeal)
- The executing Court dismissed the Darkhast because the present Darkhast was not filed within three years from disposal of the previous Darkhast (disposed of 14 September 1935), and therefore limitation had run out.
- The District Judge agreed and gave four reasons (summarised in the opinion):
- (1) "Appeal" in art. 182(2) means an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed.
- (2) The preliminary decree from which appeal No. 308 of 1933 was filed was incapable of execution.
- (3) There was no appeal from the final decree, so art. 182(2) could not apply.
- (4) Time should be computed from the date of the final decree and not from the date on which the appeal from the preliminary decree was declared to have abated.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in this Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (Privy Council) | Held that where "there has been an appeal" time runs from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court; their Lordships stated the words are plain and require no qualification as to character of appeal or parties. | The Court examined the Privy Council's observations closely; while relying on some passages, it concluded those observations were delivered in context of an appeal from the final decree and did not, in the Court's view, intend to widen "appeal" beyond appeals from the decree sought to be executed. The opinion relied on the factual confines of the Privy Council decision to distinguish its broader application. |
| Ahmed Kutty v. Pottekkat Kuttu (also cited as Ahmed Kutty v. Kottekkat Kuttu) | Illustrates view that "Appeal" in art.182(2) means appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed; one Madras decision held limitation runs from date of final decree (if that final decree was not appealed from) rather than from appellate disposal of appeal against preliminary decree. | The Court noted this case reflects the narrower view (appeal means appeal from decree sought to be executed) and observed it was decided before the Privy Council decision; the case was discussed as illustrating one side of the conflict of authority. |
| Jivaji v. Ramchandra | Held that the appeal referred to in the corresponding clause is an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed (not an appeal from an order refusing to set aside the decree). | The Court expressly endorsed the view in Jivaji and relied on it as supporting the conclusion that "appeal" means an appeal from the decree sought to be executed. |
| Jacinto v. Fernandez | Expressed the view that "where there has been an appeal" means an appeal from the decree sought to be executed, not an appeal from another decree in the suit. | The Court cited Jacinto as aligning with Jivaji and used it to support the narrow interpretation adopted in the present opinion. |
| Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara | Held "Appeal" means "an appeal in the suit which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed" — a broader view that includes appeals not directly from the decree but which may affect it. | The Court recited this decision as representing the broader Madras view and contrasted it with the interpretation it chose to follow; it treated Sriramachandra as persuasive for the alternative view but ultimately rejected that view. |
| Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa | Decision of this Court that was treated as adopting the Privy Council observations; cited in discussion of whether appeals other than from the decree sought to be executed can trigger art.182(2). | The Court analysed Nagappa Bandappa, noting it followed Privy Council remarks but observed the case did not definitively decide that "appeal" covers appeals other than those against the decree sought to be executed; the present Court distinguished it in arriving at its conclusion. |
| Veeran v. Koya | Madras decision accepting Sriramachandra approach; held limitation for execution ran from date of appellate decree (appeal disposed) rather than earlier final decree when an appeal affected the decree. | The Court described Veeran as endorsing the broader Madras position and noted that if that view were right, the appellants' Darkhast would be in time; nevertheless, the Court ultimately disagreed with that broader view. |
| Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh | Patna decision cited as adopting the Madras approach (i.e., broader interpretation that appeals likely to affect decree start limitation). | The Court noted this Patna authority aligns with the Madras view and used it to illustrate the geographic spread of opposing decisions; it did not follow this authority. |
| Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni | Calcutta decision indicating 'Appeal' in art.182(3) means an appeal against the decree sought to be executed (narrower view). | The Court cited Fakir Chand Mandal as representative of the Calcutta view, part of the cluster of authorities favouring the narrower interpretation which the Court ultimately adopted. |
| Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das | Applied Privy Council reasoning to hold that the definition of "appeal" by the Privy Council would apply in analogous cases, including appeals against orders refusing to set aside ex parte decrees. | The Court noted this case as one relied upon by Madras courts to extend the Privy Council's reasoning; it treated the decision as part of the authorities supporting the broader interpretation but did not adopt that approach. |
| Narsingh Sewak Singh v. Madho Das | Held that "where there has been an appeal" may not be confined to the decree of which execution is sought but refers to an appeal in the suit (a broader conception than strictly appeal from the decree itself). | The opinion referred to this authority when discussing historical attempts to qualify "appeal"; it was cited as part of the intermediate authorities but not followed as the Court preferred the narrower meaning. |
| Kessowji Issur v. G.I.P. Railway Company | Construes Order XLI, r. 27 CPC: additional evidence rule applies when the appellate Court "requires" a document; not intended to admit newly discovered evidence simply to supply missing points. | The Court relied on this authority to deny admission of the certified copy (Darkhast No. 1282 of 1938) because the rule is directed to the Court's requirement and not to allow a litigant to supply newly discovered evidence to patch defects. |
| Parsotim v. Lal Mohar | Affirms Kessowji Issur approach: r.27 not intended to allow unsuccessful parties to patch weak points by introducing fresh evidence; additional evidence only when appellate Court "requires" it. | The Court cited Parsotim to reinforce the limitation on admitting new evidence and refused the appellants' application to rely upon the certified copy. |
| Bombay Sizing and Stores Supplying Co. v. Kusumgar & Co. (also cited as Bombay Sizing Co. v. Kusumgar) | Holds that an application to the appellate Court for further evidence on the ground that it has recently been discovered does not fall within O. XLI, r. 27; "substantial cause" words do not broaden jurisdiction to admit evidence on review grounds. | The Court treated this authority as decisive for refusing the appellants' request to rely on the certified copy and as showing that "substantial cause" in r.27 does not permit review-type grounds for additional evidence. |
| Indrajit Pratap v. Amur Singh | Discussed in relation to additional evidence practice; historically used in debates about scope of r.27 and r.1 of O. XLVII for review-type admissions. | The Court cited commentary and subsequent authorities observing the limited scope of r.27, and used these discussions to justify denying the application for additional evidence. |
| Subbayya v. Ranga Rao | Mentioned in the context of cases that admitted additional evidence and the subsequent criticism of those cases; invoked in discussion of scope of "substantial cause". | The Court referred to the debate in commentaries and authorities to support the view that r.27 does not permit admission on grounds proper to review applications. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's legal analysis proceeded through the following structured steps (as reflected in the text). The analysis is faithful to the reasoning actually articulated and does not introduce facts or legal propositions beyond the opinion.
- Statutory focus: The dispute required construction of Article 182, clause (2) of the Indian Limitation Act (the column prescribing three years "For the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court" and stating as clause (2): where there has been an appeal — the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal).
-
Two competing constructions identified:
- Narrow view: "Appeal" in art.182(2) means an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed (supported by authorities such as Ahmed Kutty, Jivaji, Jacinto).
- Broad view: "Appeal" means an appeal in the suit which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed (supported by Sriramachandra, Veeran, Patna authorities).
- Practical effect on present facts: If limitation began on March 7, 1935 (date final decree drawn up), the present Darkhast filed November 16, 1938 would be time-barred. If time began on November 16, 1935 (date appeal from preliminary decree declared abated), the present Darkhast would be in time. Thus resolution of the interpretation point was outcome-determinative.
- Examination of Nagendra Nath (Privy Council) as pivotal authority: The Court closely reviewed the Privy Council decision — noting the facts in that case involved an appeal from the final decree and that their Lordships emphasized construing the words of the Article in plain terms (time runs from Appellate Court's decree). The Privy Council rejected imputing qualifications as to character of appeal or parties.
- Critical textual and contextual analysis: The Court reasoned that the Privy Council's comments were delivered in context of an appeal from a final decree and therefore ought not to be read as an unlimited expansion of "appeal" to encompass any appeal in the suit. The Court emphasized that authority binds for what it actually decides and not for broader inferences beyond its facts.
- Structural reading of Article 182: The Court compared clauses (1) to (5) of Article 182 and observed proximity and drafting context. Clauses (3) and (4) explicitly refer to amendments or review of "the decree or order", and clause (5) to applications for execution; clauses (2) and (3) are nearer to clause (1) (date of the decree or order). On this textual and scheme-based reading, clause (2)'s reference to "appeal" is most naturally read as an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed.
- Policy and illustration considerations: The Court outlined difficulties if "appeal" were construed too broadly (e.g., appeals from interlocutory orders, appeals to re-admit an appeal, appeals related to fraud applications) — such an interpretation would significantly expand the universe of appeals that reset limitation and generate impractical consequences.
- Synthesis and choice between authorities: After reviewing the competing authorities and the Privy Council decision in context, the Court concluded that the narrower view (appeal means appeal from the decree/order sought to be executed) is correct. The Court expressly agreed with Jivaji v. Ramchandra and Jacinto v. Fernandez, and rejected the broader Madras/Patna approach exemplified by Sriramachandra and Veeran.
- Application to facts: Because there was no appeal from the final decree (which was the decree sought to be executed), limitation had to be computed from the date of the final decree (March 7, 1935), not from the date on which the preliminary-decree appeal was declared to have abated (November 16, 1935). Accordingly, the Darkhast filed 16 November 1938 was barred by limitation.
- Disposition of evidentiary application (O. XLI, r.27 CPC): The appellants sought to admit a certified copy of a prior Darkhast (No.1282/1938) to show their present application was within three years of a previous disposal. The Court reviewed authorities (Kessowji Issur; Parsotim; Bombay Sizing & Stores Supplying Co. v. Kusumgar) and concluded Order XLI r.27 is narrow: the appellate Court may allow additional evidence only when it "requires" the document to pronounce judgment or for some other substantial cause as understood by precedent — it is not a vehicle to admit recently discovered evidence or to permit litigants to patch omissions. The Court refused to admit the document and refused the related application, noting that the appellants had already sought review (which was rejected).
- Consequential rulings: The appeal was dismissed with costs; Civil Revision Application No.25 of 1942 required no order; Civil Application No.214 of 1941 (application to admit certified copy) was discharged with costs. Bavdekar, J. concurred and provided a concurring analysis emphasizing the textual, contextual, and policy reasons for confining "appeal" to appeals from the decree sought to be executed.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal is dismissed.
The Court held that Article 182, clause (2), of the Indian Limitation Act should be read to refer to an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. Applying that interpretation to the facts before it, the Court concluded that because there was no appeal from the final decree (the decree sought to be executed), limitation ran from the date of the final decree (March 7, 1935), and therefore the Darkhast filed on November 16, 1938 was barred by limitation.
Direct consequences for the parties
- The appellants' execution application (Darkhast No. 15 of 1938) fails as time-barred and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
- Civil Revision Application No. 25 of 1942: no order necessary; Civil Application No. 214 of 1941 (to admit additional document) is discharged with costs.
Broader legal implications noted in the opinion
- The Court expressly adopted the narrower construction of "appeal" as being an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed, aligning with earlier authorities Jivaji v. Ramchandra and Jacinto v. Fernandez, and rejecting the broader Madras/Patna approach exemplified by Sriramachandra and Veeran. The opinion contains a detailed analysis distinguishing the Privy Council decision in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey and situating it within its factual matrix.
- The opinion thus resolves, in favour of the narrower interpretation, a conflict of authority (Bombay/Calcutta view versus Madras/Patna view) as it affects the application of Article 182(2) in similar factual situations described in the opinion.
Disposition
Final orders (as recorded in the opinion):
- Appeal dismissed with costs.
- Civil Revision Application No. 25 of 1942: no order as to costs.
- Civil Application No. 214 of 1941: application discharged with costs.
End of summary — this document reproduces and synthesizes only the materials, authorities and reasoning explicitly contained in the provided opinion.
Dixit, J.:—
This second appeal raises a question of law which is whether the appellants' Darkhast is barred by limitation, and the facts necessary to understand the question are these.
In a suit to enforce a mortgage one Pandurang Bhikaji Shete obtained a preliminary mortgage decree on June 27, 1933. From that decree the defendant preferred an appeal and the appellate Court made on November 16, 1935, an order declaring the appeal to have abated since the judgment-debtor's heirs had not been brought upon the record, he having died after the filing of the appeal. Prior to that, the preliminary decree was made final on March 7, 1935. On March 30, 1935, the decree-holder applied by Darkhast No. 618 of 1935 to execute the final decree, and on September 14, 1935, that Darkhast was disposed of. In 1936 the decree-holder's sons, acting through their mother as guardian, assigned the decree to one Balvant, who is the uncle of appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and the husband of appellant No. 3. Balvant himself died on June 25, 1938, and the three appellants filed the present darkhast No. 15 of 1938 on November 16, 1938, claiming execution of the decree. The judgment-debtor's heirs raised a plea that the darkhast was barred by limitation.
The executing Court held that inasmuch as the present darkhast was not filed within three years from the disposal of the previous darkhast, the same had become barred by reason of the limitation period having run out. Consequently, the darkhast was dismissed with costs. The assignees preferred in the District Court, Poona, an appeal against the order of the executing Court, and the learned District Judge, agreeing with the view of the executing Court, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the lower Court's order. The reasons given were: (1) that the word “Appeal” in art. 182, cl. (2), of the Indian Limitation Act, means appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed, (2) that the preliminary-decree from which appeal No. 308 of 1933 was filed by the judgment-debtor was incapable of execution, (3) that there was no appeal from the final decree and hence art. 182, cl. (2), can have no application, and (4) that as in the present case there has been no appeal from the final decree, which is the decree sought to be executed, time should be computed from the date of the final decree and not from the date on which the appeal from the preliminary decree was declared to have abated. The assignees appeal.
When this appeal first came up for hearing before Mr. Justice Macklin on February 18, 1947, he directed the appeal to be heard by a bench, since he took the view that he ought not to decide the point arising in the appeal sitting alone in view of the conflict of authority in the Madras High Court and also in view of certain observations made by the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey.
Upon this appeal it is now contended that the present darkhast is not barred by limitation. The answer to this question depends upon the proper construction of cl. (2) of art. 182 of the Act. In order to understand the question properly, it is, I think, necessary to set out so much of the article as has a bearing upon the question.
Article 182, clause (2).
For the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court. Three years; (2) (Where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal.
In order to understand cl. (2) properly, it may not be out of place to set out cl. (1) which is “The date of the decree or order” and cl. (4) which is, (where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment.
In the present case the contention is that the present darkhast which was filed on November 16, 1938, is in time from November 16, 1935, which is the date on which the Court declared the appeal from the preliminary decree to have abated. It is obvious that if limitation commences to run from the disposal of the previous darkhast which was on September 14, 1935, the present application for execution is out of time. Article 182 by column 3 prescribes various starting points of limitation, the first of which is “the date of the decree.” Clause (1) is, I think, subject to cl. (2), as also cl. (4). The learned advocate for the judgment-debtor contends that cl. (5) is also subject to cl. (2), but I think that submission is clearly wrong. If cls. (2) and (5) are read together, it is apparent that different periods of limitation have been prescribed on the happening of different events contemplated by cls. (2) and (5). That is only by the way. If column 1 and cl. (2) occurring in column 3 of art. 182 are read together, it is, I think, plain that the expression “Appeal” occurring in clause (2) must mean an appeal from the decree sought to be executed, and it cannot mean an appeal from a preliminary decree, because a preliminary decree is not capable of execution.
But upon this point there are apparently conflicting views. One view is that the word “Appeal” in art. 182, cl. (2), means appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. This view is illustrated in cases such as Ahmed Kutty v. Pottekkat Kuttu, Jivaji v. Ramchandra and Jacinto v. Fernandez. The other view is that the word “Appeal” in cl. (2) of art. 182 means “an appeal in the suit which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed” and not merely an appeal against the actual decree or order sought to be executed. This view is illustrated in the case of Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara and also to a certain extent in a decision of this court in Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankarappa.
If limitation commences to run from March 7, 1935, the present darkhast is clearly out of time. But if limitation commences to run from November 16, 1935, the present darkhast is quite clearly in time. There is a good deal of authority for holding that in a case like the present, limitation will commence to run from November 16, 1935. That authority will be found in Veeran v. Koya which accepts a decision of the same Court to which I have already alluded. That view also found favour in a Patna case in Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh. If the view propounded in Veeran v. Koya is right, then there is no difficulty in holding that the present darkhast is in time, and the question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether that view is right. It may be mentioned that in the Madras High Court there has been another decision reported in Ahmed Kutty v. Kottekkat Kuttu which is in a sense contrary to the decision in Veeran v. Koya. It may be observed that the case in Ahmmad Kutty v. Kottekkat Kuttu was decided before the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey and it is really by a proper understanding of the decision in this case that the point arising in the present appeal has got to be determined. I only need say for the moment that Nagendra Nath's case was followed in this Court in Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa to which I will refer in a moment.
Returning to Nagendra Nath's case, the facts in that case were these. On June 10, 1913, there was a preliminary decree in supersession of the decree of the Subordinate Judge, which was a decree in terms of compromise. On June 4, 1916, Madan Mohan, who was an assignee, applied for a final mortgage decree. He prayed by an application that an order to that effect should be made in his favour. On June 24, 1920, the Subordinate Judge delivered his judgment disallowing Madan Mohan's claim, and a final decree was passed for the sale of the mortgaged properties. The decree was drawn up on August 2, 1920, but properly dated as of June 24. The decree contained a declaration, in conformity with the judgment, that the appellants were entitled to payment of Rs. 14,615-15-3 out of the proceeds of the sale of the properties. On August 27, 1920, Madan Mohan presented an application to the High Court purporting to be an appeal from the “order” of the Subordinate Judge of June 24, 1920, and alleging, what was clearly nature, that no decree had been drawn up. That appeal of his was dismissed by the High Court on August 24, 1922. On October 3, 1923, the appellants presented an application for execution by sale of the mortgaged properties. But respondents Nos. 1 to 4 objected to the execution on the ground that the application was barred by art. 182. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had to consider the question as to whether limitation commenced to run from June 24, 1920, which was the date of the decree, or whether limitation commenced to run from August 24, 1922, which was the date of the appellate decree. In that case the Subordinate Judge held that the application for execution was in time, but the High Court took the opposite view, and it was in those circumstances that their Lordships of the Privy Council were called upon to determine the question.
Before their Lordships of the Privy Council the dismissal was supported upon three grounds, two of which need be mentioned in this place, which were: (2) that an appeal in order to save limitation under clause (2) of the article must be one to which the persons affected, i.e in the present case the judgment-debtors, were parties; and (3) that it must also be one in which the whole decree was imperilled. In reference to these two grounds this is what their Lordships observed (p. 288):
“Their Lordships think that nothing would be gained by discussing these varying authorities in detail. They think that the question must be decided upon the plain words of the article; “where there has been an appeal”, time is to run from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court. There is, in their Lordships' opinion, no warrant for reading into the words quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it; the words mean just what they say. The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Nor in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court. But whether there be or be not a theoretical justification for the provision in question, their Lordships think that the words of the Article are plain, and that there having been in the present case an appeal from the mortgage decree of June 24, 1920, time only ran against the appellants from August 24, 1922, the date of the Appellate Court's decree”.
It may be noted that the appeal which was filed before the High Court was an appeal against the final decree dated June 24, 1920. The objection taken on behalf of the judgment-debtors was that inasmuch as they were not parties to the appeal and as the whole of the decree was not imperilled, the appeal before the High Court was not a good appeal within the meaning of art. 182, cl. (2), of the Indian Limitation Act. It must again be observed that their Lordships were not specifically dealing with the question which arises for determination in the case. But although that was the situation, the remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council at p. 288, which I have quoted above, are strongly relied upon in support of this appeal.
Now, it is obvious that if the actual decision is looked at, Nagendra Nath's case does not certainly assist the appellants, but it is claimed for them that the observations do support their contention and that inasmuch as there was an appeal against the preliminary decree and as the appeal was disposed of on November 16, 1935, the present darkhast filed on November 16, 1938, is well within time. I think nobody will dispute the principle that a case is an authority for what it actually decides and certainly not an authority for what logically follows therefrom. But as we have to bear in mind the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath's case, it is necessary to closely examine the arguments both for and against the present contention.
The argument in support of the present contention was noticed by Mr. Justice Patkar in Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa. In that case the facts were these. Under a decree dated December 14, 1925, R and S became entitled to recover Rs. 42,940-5-9 from G. On April 6, 1926, S preferred an appeal against the decree. Meanwhile, on March 6, 1926, G had applied for a review of the decree. On July 15, 1926, the review application was allowed, the amount under the decree being reduced to Rs. 27,940. R and S then preferred an appeal (No. 65 of 1926) against the order, granting the review, but they presented no appeal against the decree of July 15, 1926. On October 29, 1928, both the appeals were dismissed as incompetent. On August 6, 1929, R and S assigned their rights under the decree to N who applied on September 2, 1929, for transfer of the decree to the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Sholapur for execution when G contended that the application was barred by limitation, not having been filed within three years from July 15, 1926. The lower Court upheld the contention, and on appeal by N, it was held that the application for execution of the decree was in time as time began to run from October 29, 1928, the date of the appellate decree and not from July 15, 1926.
The reasons given by the learned Subordinate Judge in support of his order have been set forth at page 391, one of which was that the appeal before the High Court was not from the decree sought to be executed. A perusal of the judgment shows that the Court did not apparently examine the correctness of that reason. It will be seen that the decision was mainly based upon the consideration which was given to reasons Nos. (2) and (3), which were (2) that the appeal was not competent for the reasons given in the judgment of the High Court, and (3) that the appeal was disposed of on a preliminary objection raised by the respondent and was not heard and decided on the merits and there was no real adjudication on the merits. Mr. Justice Patkar after referring to Nagendra Nath's case held that having regard to the Privy Council decision, the view taken by the lower Court was erroneous.
It is to be noted that two appeals had been preferred in the High Court (1) against the decree dated December 14, 1925, and (2) against the order granting the review, and both these appeals were dismissed as incompetent. There was an appeal (No. 65 of 1926) against the decree of December 14, 1925, and it was disposed of on October 29, 1928. It is obvious that the Court rightly held that limitation commenced to run from the date of the appellate decree which was October 29, 1928. If that was the ground, it is fairly plain that the case fell within article 182, cl. (2) of the Indian Limitation Act. The principle which was laid down by their Lordships and which was accepted by this court was that in so far as there was an appeal which was heard and decided on October 29, 1928, the fact that the appeal was incompetent did not render its efficacy as of no assistance for cl. (2) of art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. As I have already stated a little while ago, the Court did not apparently examine the correctness of the first of the three reasons summarised at page 391 of the report.
In Jivaji v. Ramchandra the facts were these. The plaintiff obtained an ex parte decree against the defendant on March 10, 1886. The defendant applied to have the decree set aside. His application was finally rejected by the appellate Court on March 5, 1887. The decree-holder presented a darkhast for execution of the decree on September 24, 1889. It was objected that the darkhast was time-barred. The lower Courts upheld that objection and on appeal to this Court it was held that the darkhast was time-barred under art. 179, cl. (2), of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), and that the appeal referred to in that clause is clearly an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed, and not an appeal from an order of the Court refusing to set it aside. If this is good law, there is no difficulty in rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the Appellants in the present appeal. The view taken in Jivaji's case seems to be in accord with the observations of this Court in Jacinto v. Fernandez.
In the latter case the facts were these. The plaintiff in that suit obtained a partition decree in relation to house property and lands. On April 2, 1930, the Court made a final decree in respect of the house property. From that decree there was an appeal which was disposed of on January 16, 1931. The darkhast giving rise to the appeal was filed on January 9, 1934, that is within three years of the disposal of the appeal but much more than three years from the date of the decree for partition made on May 27, 1925. It was in reference to these facts that it was held that the words “where there has been an appeal” in the last column of art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, mean an appeal from the decree sought to be executed and not an appeal from another decree, though made in the suit.
I now refer to the two decisions cited in the interlocutory judgment of Mr. Justice Macklin. In Ahmmad Kutti v. Kottekkat Kuttu the principle stated is as follows: “Appeal” in Art. 182(2) of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act is appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. Where, during the pendency of an appeal from the preliminary decree in a partition suit, the trial Court passes a final decree in the suit and that decree is not appealed from, limitation for execution of the final decree runs from the date thereof and not from the date of the decree of the appellate Court in the appeal from the preliminary decree. The final decree will no doubt have to be altered in the event of the appeal from the preliminary decree succeeding; but nothing stands in the way of the party concerned in applying for the passing of a fresh final decree in accordance with the appellate decree. A decree which has already become barred by limitation cannot be revived for purposes of execution by a subsequent amendment. Hence art. 182(4) is inapplicable to a case where the decree had, prior to the date of its amendment, become barred by limitation. It may be noted that this case was decided prior to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey's case. But this case illustrates one of the two views which I have set forth at the commencement of my judgment.
The other Madras case is reported in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara. In that case the facts were these. There an ex parte decree was obtained on March 5, 1930. An application to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, and defendants Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 in the suit preferred in the High Court an appeal from the order of dismissal. On October 20, 1932, the High Court gave judgment allowing the appeal and extending its benefits to defendants Nos. 2, 6 and 7 on condition that they deposited the decree amount within three months. That deposit was not, however, made, and so as against defendants Nos. 2, 6 and 7 the ex parte decree stood confirmed as from October 20, 1932. On August 15, 1935, the decree-holder filed an application to execute the decree against defendants Nos. 2, 6 and 7, and it was held upon those facts that the period of three years prescribed by art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act ran from October 20, 1932, the date of the appellate decree of the High Court, and not from March 5, 1930, the date of the ex parte decree, and that the application of August 15, 1935, was not barred by limitation. With reference to the expression “Appeal” in column 3 of art. 182, it was observed that the expression “Appeal” means “an appeal in the suit which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed” and not merely an appeal against the actual decree or order sought to be executed.
This case, therefore, sets forth the second of the two views which I have mentioned at the commencement of my judgment. It may be noted that this case was decided after the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath's case. It will appear from p. 255 of the report that the Madras High Court did not accept the principle laid down in Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni. With reference to that case the Court said as follows:
“With all respect to the learned Judges in Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni, we are unable to see how the narrower view which they upheld is ‘clear upon principle’. The only principle we can discover in the rulings cited for the respondents is that the words “where there has been an appeal” must be taken in their context, that is to say, with reference to the words in column I of art. 182. But it does not necessarily follow that because a decree or order is mentioned in column I, the appeal which is mentioned in column III must be against that decree or order. It is equally logical to say that it must be something which affects that decree or order, and, after all, the Legislature has refrained from saying, what it could have said with case if that had been its intention, ‘where there has been an appeal against that decree or order’.”
After referring to Nagendra Nath's case and after setting out passages from that case the Court observed as follows (p. 256):
“Now it is true that their Lordships were not dealing with an actual appeal against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree, as we are here, but with an appeal against the decree itself which was sought to be executed, and the immediate result of their decision was to hold that, even if such an appeal were irregular in form and one to which the judgment-debtors were not parties, it was nonetheless an appeal within the meaning of art. 182. But the principles contained in the passages quoted are, we think, wide enough to cover the present case and other cases of a similar nature. In Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das, it was held that the definition of an appeal given by their Lordships would apply to an appeal against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree—and with this we respectfully agree. And it is of course, obvious that the ‘intelligible rule’ laid down by their Lordships in the concluding sentence of the second passage quoted must apply to the facts of the present case, where the success of an appeal against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree has precisely the same effect in regard to execution as a successful appeal against that decree itself.”
This case is similar on facts to the case in Jivaji v. Ramchandra. The ground of the decision seems to be that the Madras High Court considered that the principles laid down in the passage quoted at p. 256 were wide enough to cover the case they were dealing with and other cases of a similar nature.
This case was followed in a subsequent Madras decision in Veeran v. Koya. In that case a preliminary mortgage decree was passed by the District Munsif on July 21, 1925. The mortgagor appealed but did not obtain a stay of the proceedings in the trial Court pending the appeal. On November 9, 1925, the District Munsif passed a final decree for sale. The appeal against the preliminary decree was dismissed on March 16, 1927. On March 15, 1930, the mortgagee decree-holder applied for execution of the final decree, and on the question whether or not the execution application was in time it was held that limitation for execution ran from the date of the appellate decree and the application for execution was, therefore, not barred by the law of limitation. After referring to the case in Ahmmad Kutty v. Kottekkat Kutti and also after referring to the case in Sriramchandra v. Venkateswara, the Madras High Court said that the decision in Sriramchandra v. Venkateswara governed the case they were dealing with and that the question must, therefore, be decided against the appellant.
In the Calcutta High Court the view which prevailed is indicated in Fakir Chand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni, which is that the expression ‘Appeal’ in column 3 of art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act means an appeal against a decree sought to be executed.
In the Patna High Court the view taken is that which is adopted in the Madras cases: see Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh and Firm, Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das.
It is apparent from what I have stated above that the correct answer to the question raised in this appeal depends upon what is the actual decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath's case. Even at the risk of repetition it may be stated that the appeal in the High Court in that case was an appeal against the final decree, and the grounds on behalf of the respondents in support of the decision of the High Court were (1) that Madan Mohan's application of August 27, 1920, was by reason of its irregularity not an appeal at all, but merely an abortive attempt to appeal; (2) that an appeal in order to save limitation under cl. (2) of the article must be one of which the persons affected, i.e in the present case the judgment-debtors, were parties; and (3) that it must also be one in which the whole decree was imperilled. It is in reference to these grounds that their Lordships made the observations which are set forth at page 288 of the report. What they said was that the appeal was nevertheless an appeal even if it was irregular or incompetent, that the appeal was nevertheless an appeal because some of the persons affected by the application were not parties to the appeal and that the appeal was nevertheless an appeal even if the whole of the decree was not imperilled.
If, therefore, the decision of their Lordships is confined to the actual facts of the case, and the actual decision is to be understood in relation to the contentions taken on behalf of the respondents, it is obvious that the expression “Appeal” occurring in cl. (2) of art. 182 of the Limitation Act meant an appeal against the final decree. It is obvious that the expression “final” in column 3 is used by antithesis to the expression “interlocutory”, as held in Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa. I am well aware that even an obiter of their Lordships of the Privy Council would be binding upon this Court as if it was an actual decision given by their Lordships. But reading the facts of the case, the contentions taken in the appeal and the decision of their Lordships, I am not satisfied that it was intended to lay down that the expression “Appeal” occurring in art. 182, cl. (2), of the Indian Limitation Act, referred to or embraced an appeal other than an appeal against the decree sought to be executed. That was apparently the view taken in Sriramchandra v. Venkateswara, which was approved of in Veeran v. Koya, and I am not satisfied that is a correct view. I am in agreement with the view taken in Jivaji v. Ramchandra, and that taken in Jacinto v. Fernandez.
It must be recognised that there is a sharp difference of opinion as to the proper interpretation of cl. (2), art. 182, of the Indian Limitation Act, and having regard to the cases to which I have referred here to before, the Bombay view and the Calcutta view seem to coincide, whereas the view taken in Madras and Patna is opposed to that view; and having given my best consideration to the point, I think, I must hold that the view taken in Jivaji v. Ramchandra and Jacinto v. Fernandez is correct.
The learned District Judge from whose decree the present appeal is preferred took the view that as there was no appeal from the final decree which was the decree sought to be executed, time should be computed from the date of the final decree and not from the date on which the appeal from the preliminary decree was declared to have abated. That view he took after referring to Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankrappa, which referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagenda Nath's case. I think that view of the matter is right, and accordingly, I must hold that the present darkhast is barred by limitation.
Civil Revision Application No. 25 of 1942 has been preferred by the heirs of the judgment-debtor against the order of the lower Court made on an application for review of the judgment. The learned District Judge set down the application for review for hearing and against that order the application in revision was made. It appears that the learned District Judge ultimately dismissed the application for review and no order seems now to be called for upon that application.
Civil Application No. 214 of 1941 is an application made by the appellants requesting that a certified copy of darkhast No. 1282 of 1938 should be admitted in evidence in appeal under the provisions of O. XLI, r. 27, of the Civil Procedure Code, and in order to understand that application it is necessary to mention a few facts.
The decree was obtained originally by one Pandurang who died some time after and in 1936 the decree was assigned by his legal representatives to one Balwant who is the uncle of appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and the husband of appellant No. 3. Pandurang had filed the first application for execution in 1935. It was before the assignment. It appears that although there was an assignment in 1936, one Dagadu as guardian of the sons of the decree holder filed an application for execution of the decree on September 14, 1938, and that application for execution was disposed of on September 29, 1938. If we admit the certified copy of that darkhast in evidence, it is obvious that the present darkhast filed on November 16, 1938, is within time, since the previous application for execution was disposed of on September 29, 1938, and the question which arises in this application is whether we should permit the appellants to produce that document in evidence in order to decide the question of limitation. In support of the application an affidavit of a man called Laxman Martand Jangam, who, it is said, was the person who conveyed the information to the appellants about darkhast No. 1282 of 1938 in about 1941 which was after the disposal of the appeal in the District Court on November 6, 1940. In support of the application another affidavit has been filed by Kedar, appellant No. 2. It is stated that the decree-holder had died prior to the assignment, but assignee Balwant too died on June 28, 1938, and it was not until 1941 that the appellants came to know about darkhast No. 1282 of 1938. The appellants filed in the Court below an application for review of the judgment, and as I have already stated, that application was rejected.
The learned advocate for the appellants contends that this Court should allow him to rely upon the document. On the other hand the learned advocate for the heirs of the judgment-debtor contends that it is not permissible to this Court at this stage to permit the appellants to rely upon the document. The present case does not fall within O. XLI, r. 27, sub-r. (1)(a), of the Civil Procedure Code. If at all, it will fall within O. XLI, r. 27, sub-r. (1)(b), which, so far as material, provides that if the appellate Court requires any document to be produced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, the appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced. As the rule itself says, the question whether or not to allow the appellant to rely on the document is in the discretion of the appellate Court. Under O. XLI, r. 27, of the Code, it is established by authority that it is the requirement of the Court and not the requirement of a litigant in considering whether or not additional evidence will be allowed to be produced. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kessowji Issur v. G.I.P Railway Company, “the legitimate occasion for the application of present rule is when, on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, not where a discovery is made, outside the Court, of fresh evidence and the application is made to import it.” In Parsotim v. Lal Mohar, the Privy Council emphasized the construction put upon the rule in Kessowij's case and said that the rule is not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak points in his case and to fill up omissions in the Court of appeal. It is only when the appellate Court “requires it” (i.e, finds it needful) that additional evidence can be admitted.
I think the question is concluded by authority. As held in Bombay Sizing and Stores Supplying Co. v. Kusumgar & Co. an application to the appeal Court for further evidence to be taken on the ground that it has recently been discovered, whether it is made before the appeal is heard, or before judgment is given, does not come within the provisions of O. XLI, r. 27, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The words “or for any substantial cause” in sub-r. (1)(b) of the above rule do not give the Court jurisdiction to entertain an application for recording further evidence on the grounds which would enable an application to be entertained under O. XLVII, r. 1.
It is clear, therefore, that the grounds which may be available on an application for review are not the grounds which may be relied upon while invoking the Court's jurisdiction under the provisions of O. XLI, r. 27, and in the present case this is what has precisely happened. It is suggested that in 1941 the appellants came to know about darkhast No. 1282 of 1938. That may be a good ground for review, but it so happened that the application for review has been rejected. That is an additional reason as to why we should not permit the appellants to produce the document in evidence. Apart from that consideration we are bound by the ruling of this Court in the case just cited and we are in agreement with what is stated in Mulla's Civil Procedure Code at page 1193:
“In Indrajit's case [Indrajit Pratap v. Amur Singh] Mr. Ameer Ali referred to o. XLVII, r. 1, and in several cases which followed it, additional evidence has been admitted because it has been supposed that the grounds stated in o. XLII, r. 1, do constitute ‘substantial cause’ [Subbayya v. Ranga Rao]. But with reference to these cases it is necessary to bear in mind Sir George Lowndes' criticism of Indrajit's case [see Parsotim v. Lal Mohar,] and the Bombay High Court has held that the words ‘substantial cause’ do not give the Court jurisdiction to admit additional evidence on grounds on which an application for review would be entertained [Bombay Sizing Co. v. Kusumgar].”
Having regard to these considerations, we must refuse the application.
The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. In Civil Revision Application No. 25 of 1942 no order is necessary, and there will be no order as to costs. In Civil Application No. 214 of 1941 the rule will be discharged with costs.
Bavdekar, J.:—I agree.
It is true that in art. 182 the word is “appeal” without any qualification or limitation. But all the same from the first it has been felt necessary to place some limitation upon it. Thus in Narsingh Sewak Singh v. Madho Das which was the case of an appeal from a decree passed upon a review, it was held that even though the words “where there has been an appeal” in the corresponding article of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877 were not confined to the decree of which execution was sought the appeal contemplated was an appeal in the suit though not necessarily an appeal from the original decree in suit.
Even this obviously will not be sufficient because ??? a suit there may be an appeal, viz. from an interlocutory order, and it can hardly be contended that where, as may well happen, a decree in a suit is obtained before the decision of an appeal from an interlocutory order in the suit the starting point of limitation would be not the date of the decree but she date of the final order in the appeal. For this reason recently the limitation which has been sought to be imposed upon the word “Appeal” is an appeal which is capable of affecting the decree sought to be executed in any way. The argument is that in case the appeal may affect the decree in any way it is imperilled. There is no reason why the decree-holder should be compelled to file an application for execution while the decree is still imperilled and consequently the word “Appeal” must be interpreted ??? mean an appeal not necessarily from the decree which is sought to be executed but an appeal from any other order (not necessarily in that suit) whether amounting to a decree or not which is likely to affect the decree. I have used the words “not necessarily ??? that suit” because where an application for setting aside an ex parte decree is made and an appeal ??? preferred from an order upon the application refusing to set aside that order, such an appeal has been held to come within the purview of art. 182, cl. (2). What difficulties may be created by taking such a view of the word “Appeal”, I will come to it ???. It may be sufficient to say now that it will always be felt necessary to qualify the word “Appeal” in some way.
The second thing to remember is that the ??? of authority in this Court is in favour of the view that the word “appeal” refers to an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. The point first arose as far as we are aware in the case of Jivaji v. Ramchandra. It was a case of an appeal preferred from a decision upon an application to ??? aside an ex parte decree and it was specifically held that the word “Appeal” meant clearly an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. It is true that this view was departed from in a later decision of a division bench of this court in Nagappa v. Gurushantappa. It has got to be remembered, however, that decision proceeded upon an interpretation of the Privy Council case referred to by my brother Dixit in his judgment, viz. the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey. I shall have to refer to this case a little later in order to determine as to whether it has impliedly overruled the case of Jivaji v. Ramchandra. But Nagappa v. Gurushantappa was concerned with an appeal from the order granting review. There was in the first instance a decree, then an application for review which was granted and then a decree based upon the review. There was an appeal from the original decree and there was also an appeal from the order granting the review, but none from the decree which was ultimately passed upon the granting of the review. The decree-holder was not seeking to execute the decree which was originally passed and there was no appeal from the decree which was sought to be executed. In the result if he wanted to take advantage of the provisions of art. 182, cl. (2), he had to rely upon the appeal from the order granting the review. But this contention that he was entitled to take advantage of the said provisions was negatived by the learned Subordinate Judge from whose decision the appeal was preferred, on the ground that the appeal was not from the decree which was sought to be executed. Now, even though there is a discussion in that case about whether that appeal could furnish the decree-holder with a fresh point of limitation, we find no attempt to answer the argument of the learned Subordinate Judge that the appeal was not from the decree sought to be executed, unless it is to be found in the paragrah at p. 434, Nagappa v. Gurushantappa beginning with “On behalf of the appellant reliance is strongly placed on the recent decision of the Privy Council in the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey.” That argument again it will be convenient to deal with subsequently when I refer to Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey. But an analogous question did arise subsequently for determination in Jacinto v. Fernandez. It must be admitted that the remarks I mentioned below from that judgment are obiter because the point for determination was as to whether any time was prescribed for making an application for execution of the decree in so far as it directed partition of lands assessed to land revenue, and for the determination of that point it was not necessary to express any opinion but the opinion was expressed, and it was stated (p. 923):
“It is perfectly plain on the language of Article 182 that the words ‘where there has been an appeal,’ in the last column, mean an appeal from the decree sought to be executed, and not an appeal from another decree, though made in the suit.”
Coming next to the question as to what interpretation should be placed on cl. (2) it if necessary to refer to the scheme of art. 182. In column 3 it provides for seven points of limitation out of which 6 and 7 are what may be called special cases. The first is the simplest case where the starting point of limitation is furnished by the decree itself, and 2 to 4 are starting points in cases where either there has been an appeal or the decree is sought to be reviewed and review has been obtained, or the decree has been amended upon an amendment application. Clause 5 relates to the case where there has been an application for execution, or an application for step-in-aid of execution. Clauses 2, 3 and 4 consequently contemplete cases in which the decree may be altered upon proper proceedings having been taken for such alteration. 4 and 5 specifically have reference either to the decree or order sought to be executed. 2 and 3 do not specifically refer to the decree or order sought to be executed. But it need not be held because of that the Legislature intended to make any distinction. Clause (4) did not find any place in the old act of limitation, 1877. It was added subsequently, and when it was added the words which were used were “where the decree has been amended” just as in cl. (5) after the words application…for execution or take some step-in-aid of execution the words “of the decree or order” found a place. But clauses (2) and (3) were nearer to clause (1) than clauses (4) and (5), and when clause (2) began with the words “where there has been an appeal”, the proximity of these words to the words “the date of the decree or order” in clause (1) was quite enough to show that the appeal meant appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. There are no other words whether inch (2) in the third column of art. 182 or near about to which the word “appeal” could have reference. In my opinion, therefore, the word “appeal” must mean an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. The only other interpretation which has been sought to be placed upon the word, namely, appeal which is likely to imperil the decree or order cannot be given to it without inserting in clause (2) the words “likely to imperil the decree or order” or some equivalent words after the word “appeal”. Secondly, this interpretation is consistent with the scheme of clauses (1) to (5), clause (1) having reference to the cases in which (1) the decree or order remains unaltered, because there has been no appeal, no application for review or amendment and (2) there have also been no application for execution or step-in-aid of execution. Clause (2) has reference to the cases where there has been an appeal. Clauses (3) and (4) refer to cases in which the decree has been altered upon an application for review or amendment, and clause (5) to the case in which there has been an application for execution or step-in-aid of execution of the decree. If clauses (3), (4) and 5 have reference to cases where the review, the amendment and the application for execution or the application for a step-in-aid of execution are of the decree or order sought to be executed, then clause (2) must have reference to cases in which the appeal referred to is from the decree or order sought to be executed.
The difficulty in the way of holding that the word “appeal” means an appeal capable of affecting the decree may be obvious from one or two illustrations. Following that interpretation it has been held in Madras that an appeal from an order dismissing an application for setting aside an ex parte decree comes within the purview of art. 182, cl. (2). Suppose now a decree having been obtained the judgment-debtor sought to set it aside on the ground of fraud. Suppose, again, his suit was dismissed and an appeal was preferred by him against it. If we were to hold that the word “appeal” meant an appeal capable of affecting the decree, then the appeal of the judgment-debtor, who is seeking to avoid the decree on the ground of fraud, would come within the purview of art. 182, cl. (2). Suppose, again, that his appeal from the decree dismissing his suit to avoid the decree was dismissed ex parte, and he makes an application to the appellate Court to re-admit the appeal and the application was refused. He appeals from this order refusing, to re-admit. This appeal would necessarily imperil the decree which the judgment-debtor seeks to set aside on the ground of fraud with the result that this appeal again would have to be held to come within the purview of art. 182, cl. (2), and we could go on arguing like that as long as it is possible to file appeals from the order refusing to set aside an ex parte dismissal of an appeal on default or to re-admit the appeal. It appears to me that if this interpretation were to be accepted, we would be extending the meaning of the word “Appeal” beyond what can reasonably be done, and that is apart from the fact that we have got to interpret the words in the context in which they are placed.
Coming now to the Privy Council decision, it would not be necessary to state the facts which are set out at length in the judgment of my learned brother. But the decree-holder in that case sought to rely upon an appeal which was from the decree which was sought to be executed. That is the main fact which should never be lost sight of. The objections which were taken on behalf of the judgment-debtor to the appeal being included in art. 182, cl. (2), were that the appeal was irregular and incompetent, that it was not against all the parties who were parties to the suit and that it did not imperil the whole decree, and their Lordships, while dealing with the question, said that they were not concerned with any one of these things because the plain meaning of the word ‘appeal” in art. 182, cl. (2), was an appeal without any qualification. It is true that if these words are interpreted as if they were the words of a statute disregarding the fact that they were used in a case in which the appeal was from the decree sought to be executed and obviously in consciousness of that fact they can bear the interpretation that there was no imitation placed upon the appeal not even that it should be from the decree or order sought to be executed but in my view it would not be correct so to interpret them. Their Lordships did not indeed say ??? so many words that so long as the appeal was from the decree or order sought to be executed, it made no difference what was the character of the appeal and who were the parties to it. That was because the appeal before them was an appeal against the decree sought to be executed. They had only to deal with the irregularity of the appeal, incompetency of the appeal and the absence of all parties to the appeal. They had also to repel a contention that the appeal was not against the whole of the decree sought to be executed, and they in fact repelled those contentions by saying that there was no qualification in the article to the word “Appeal”. They, therefore, added that there was no such qualification upon the word “Appeal” as would enable the judgment-debtor ??? contend successfully that the appeal was not within the purview of art. 182, cl. (2). But that does not make a difference to the word “appeal” in the article necessarily meaning an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed.
It is true that there is a passage in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council which says that it was an intelligible rule that so long as there was any question sub judice between any of the parties those affected should not be compelled to pursue the ??? often thorny path of execution which, if the final result was against them, may lead to no advantage. But then as their own judgment will show thereafter they were giving a justification for the rule. The would be quite clear from the words that follow:
“Whether there be or be not a theoretical justification for the provision ??? question, their Lordships think that the words of the Article are plain……”
The point to remember is that the words in the sentence “It is at least in intelligible rule” were no intended to be a canon for interpretation of art. 182 cl. (2), nor do any of the words of this judgment which have been quoted in the judgment of this Court in Nagappa v. Gurushantappa at p. 434 in the paragraph commencing that “On behalf of the appellant reliance is strongly placed on the recent decision of the Privy Council in the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey……” lay down such a canon. Therefore, merely because their Lordships of the Privy Council held in that case that the appeal though irregular in form and insufficiently stamped was nevertheless an appeal within the meaning of art. 182, it cannot be said that they intended to say that the appeals were not confined to appeals from the decree or order sought to be executed and as a matter of fact no possible limitation could be placed upon the appeals comprised in that word except such as would lead to absurd result. In our opinion therefore, the authority of the decision of this Court in Jivaji's case is still unshaken, and even though there are remarks in the case of Nagappa v. Guru shantappa, which would seem to throw a doubt upon its authority, we should take it as still good law. Our own view is also the same.
I, therefore, agree with the order proposed by my learned brother.
Appeal dismissed.
M.W.P
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