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Charles E. Ring v. The Collector Of Bombay .

Bombay High Court
Apr 16, 1947
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a tenant occupying a flat in Wellesley House at Cooperage, Bombay. In 1943 the Bombay Xaveirian Corporation Limited (the "Corporation") purchased the property to conduct a school and served the petitioner with notice to vacate by the end of September 1943. The petitioner claimed protection under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942.

On 5 October 1943 the Corporation applied to the Rent Controller for a certificate under clause 8 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942, that the flat was reasonably and bona fide required by them for their own use. The Rent Controller refused to issue the certificate. The Corporation appealed to the Collector of Bombay, Mr. N. A. Farrouqui, who on 25 February 1944 declined to interfere with the Rent Controller's order and rejected the appeal.

Subsequently, a Full Bench held that the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942, was ultra vires. Parliament enacted Act VII of 1944 (the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944) which, among other things, included a provision (Section 38) permitting the Controller or Collector to review any order passed by him under the Act. On 14 October 1946 the Corporation sought a review of the Collector's order of 25 February 1944 on the ground of a mistake or error apparent on the face of the order. The successor Collector, Mr. R. G. Davies, entertained the review and on 31 January 1947 set aside the Rent Controller's order of 20 November 1943 and the Collector's order of 25 February 1944, holding that the applicants bona fide and reasonably required the premises.

The petitioner filed this petition for a writ of certiorari challenging Mr. Davies' order on multiple grounds, seeking that the review order be quashed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 38 of Act VII of 1944 (which permits the Controller or Collector to review any order passed by him under the Act) operated retrospectively so as to authorize the successor Collector to review and set aside the earlier final order of the Collector made under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942.
  2. Whether, even if a review power existed, that power could be exercised only on grounds set out in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., discovery of new evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason analogous to those grounds), and whether Mr. Davies purported to exercise the power on a ground not covered by O. 47, R. 1.
  3. Whether, under O. 47, R. 2, a review on grounds other than discovery of new evidence or a clerical/arithmetic mistake may be entertained only by the judge who made the original order (and not by his successor), and whether that rule barred Mr. Davies (the successor) from entertaining the review.
  4. Whether a period of limitation (specifically Article 173 of the Indian Limitation Act) applied to the review under Act VII of 1944, thereby barring the review application made more than two years and eight months after the original Collector's order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There was no power of review conferred on Mr. Davies in respect of the Collector's order (i.e., Section 38 should not be read as retrospective so as to affect earlier final orders).
  • If any power of review existed, it was limited to the grounds set out in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC; Mr. Davies purported to exercise review on a ground (deciding afresh that the Corporation bona fide required the premises) not falling within those grounds.
  • If the review was alleged to be for a mistake or error apparent on the face of the order, that mistake was not clerical or arithmetical; under O. 47, R. 2 such a review could only be entertained by the same individual (the original Collector) and not by his successor.
  • There was also a limitation bar: the review application was entertained two years and eight months after the Collector's order, a period claimed to be barred by the Limitation Act (Art. 173).

Respondent / Corporation and Government Arguments

  • The Corporation contended that because parts of the 1944 Act were made retrospective and Section 15(2) deems orders made under the earlier Rent Restriction Order to be orders under the new Act, the Collector's earlier order must be taken as an order under the 1944 Act and therefore subject to the review power in Section 38.
  • The Advocate‑General and counsel for the Corporation (Mr. Vimadalal) argued that Section 38 provides that Order XLVII of the CPC shall apply "as far as may be," and that it would defeat the statutory power of review to hold that a successor in office could not exercise the review; accordingly they contended the successor Collector could entertain the review.
  • On limitation, the position advanced (implicitly) was that if a period of limitation applied it would follow that the delayed review could nevertheless be entertained under the 1944 Act; however, the court treated the limitation point as contingent on whether the Limitation Act applied to such proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1878) 8 A.C. 582 Principle for construing whether a statutory provision is retrospective: where a statute is silent the court must examine the subject‑matter and the effect of a retrospectively‑construed provision to determine legislative intent. The court relied on this principle to examine whether Section 38 was intended to operate retrospectively; it directed attention to the practical consequences of holding S.38 to be retrospective (i.e., depriving numerous prior final orders of finality) and concluded that such a construction was not intended.
54 I.A. 421 (Privy Council) (citing (1905) A.C. 369) That procedural provisions may be given retrospective effect unless textually impossible, but provisions that affect existing rights (including depriving finality of existing final orders) should not be applied retrospectively unless there is clear language to that effect. The court invoked this canon to distinguish procedural from substantive effects and to hold that Section 38, which would deprive finality of prior orders if applied retrospectively, could not be read as retrospective in the absence of clear legislative language.
(1905) A.C. 369 (as authority cited in 54 I.A. 421) Authority for the proposition that statutes dealing merely with procedure can be retrospective, but statutes affecting substantive rights cannot be applied retrospectively without express provision. Used as supporting authority (through the Privy Council discussion) to justify refusing retrospective operation to a provision which would disturb final rights and final orders.
49 I.A. 144 Interpretation of the phrase "any other sufficient reason" in Order XLVII, R. 1: such words mean a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those previously specified in that rule. The court applied this principle to hold that review under Section 38 is to be limited to grounds analogous to those in O. 47, R. 1, and that a successor Collector could not simply re‑decide facts (such as bona fides of need) which are not a permissible ground of review under O. 47, R. 1.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a structured sequence responding to the petitioner's four principal contentions.

1. Construction and retrospectivity of Section 38: The court first examined whether S.38 of the 1944 Act could be read as retrospective so as to permit review of orders made under the earlier Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942. The court applied well‑established rules of statutory construction: where some parts of a statute are made retrospective and others are not, and where the statute is otherwise silent, the court must consider the subject matter and the effect of treating a provision as retrospective. The court observed that Parts II, III and IV of the 1944 Act were expressly made retrospective by Section 2, but Part V (containing S.38) was not. Further, the court emphasized that under the 1942 Order (S.12(3)) the decision of the Rent Controller, subject only to the Collector's appellate order, was finally determined at the time Farrouqui made his order. To hold that S.38 was retrospective would deprive many prior final orders of their finality, causing numerous orders already final under the 1942 regime to become susceptible to review years later. The court found no indication that the Legislature intended such a result and thus concluded S.38 was not retrospective in respect of orders already final under the prior law.

2. Scope of review and applicability of Order XLVII, R. 1: The court accepted that Section 38 itself subjects reviews under the Act to the provisions of Order XLVII of the CPC "as far as may be." Order XLVII, R. 1 permits review on three grounds (new evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or "any other sufficient reason" analogous to those grounds). The court held that Mr. Davies purported to set aside the prior orders on the basis that he was satisfied the Corporation bona fide and reasonably required the premises — a re‑examination of the underlying factual question which is not a ground of review under O. 47, R. 1. Therefore Davies exceeded the permissible ambit of review by effectively deciding the merits afresh rather than limiting himself to the statutory grounds of review.

3. Restriction as to the identity of the reviewer (O. 47, R. 2): The court considered O. 47, R. 2, which restricts who may entertain a review application. That rule provides that, except in cases of discovery of new important evidence or clerical/arithmetic mistakes, a review of an order of a judge (other than a High Court judge) must be made to the same judge who passed the decree or order; disposal by a successor is allowed only in limited situations. The court rejected the respondents' contention that this restriction should not apply to the office of the Collector. Reasoning by analogy to Civil Judges (whose review power is similarly restricted under O.47, R.2), the court held that the same principle should apply to the Collector: where the ground of review is not discovery of new evidence or a clerical/arithmetic error, the successor could not entertain the review. Because the ground relied upon in the review was not a clerical/arithmetic mistake, the successor Collector had no jurisdiction to decide the matter.

4. Limitation (Article 173 of the Limitation Act): The court addressed whether Article 173 of the Indian Limitation Act governs a review under the 1944 Act. It noted that the Limitation Act's preamble indicates the Act applies to "Courts" and that the word "Court" is not defined in the Limitation Act or the General Clauses Act. The court expressed reluctance to treat the Rent Controller (exercising statutory powers under the 1944 Act) as a "Court" for the purposes of the Limitation Act. It observed that the 1944 Act itself prescribes a 15‑day period of limitation for appeals to the Collector (S.14(1)), and that applying the Limitation Act might render that provision redundant. Nonetheless, the court stated that even if limitation were relevant, its decision did not depend on that issue because it had already found other grounds (non‑retrospectivity of S.38; improper exercise of power by successor; and review beyond O. 47, R. 1 grounds) to quash the review order.

Conclusion of analysis: On the basis of the foregoing points, the court concluded that at least one of the petitioner's contentions succeeded and that the Collector's order dated 31 January 1947 must be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court made the rule absolute and set aside the order of the Collector dated 31 January 1947. In the court's statement: Rule made absolute. The decision specifically directed that the Collector's order of 31st January 1947 be set aside.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The review order of the successor Collector (Mr. R. G. Davies) that had set aside the Rent Controller's order and the earlier Collector's order was quashed; the Collector exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining and deciding the review as he did. The petitioner's challenge therefore succeeded and the earlier finality of the Collector's order (as it stood before the 1947 review) is restored for the purposes of this litigation.
  • Costs: The petitioner did not press for costs against the respondent (the Rent Controller or the State), and the court declined to make an order for costs against the Corporation (which had supported the Collector's order) even though the Corporation had appeared and made legal submissions. The court explained that the Corporation's support of the order was understandable given its educational objectives, and it was not the Corporation's fault that the Collector had exceeded jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court made no order as to costs against the Corporation.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion resolves statutory‑construction issues concerning the retrospectivity of Section 38 of the 1944 Act, the scope of review under that section subject to the limits of Order XLVII CPC, and the restriction on successor review under O. 47, R. 2. The court did not purport to create any broader novel principle beyond applying established canons of construction and existing authorities to the statutory context before it. (No separate statement purporting to establish a new general rule of law is contained in the opinion.)

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the matters stated in the provided opinion. Sections, statements, and legal citations reflect only what appears in that opinion; no outside facts or inferences beyond the text were introduced.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari against the Collector of Bombay. The petitioner is a tenant of a building known as Wellesley House, situate at Cooperage, Bombay. It appears that sometime in 1943 the Bombay Xaveirian Corporation Limited (which I will hereafter refer to as the Corporation) purchased this property for the purpose of conducting a school therein. Having purchased it, they gave a notice to the petitioner to vacate the flat in his occupation by the end of September 1943. The petitioner claimed protection under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942. On 5-10-1943, the Corporation applied to the Rent Controller for a certificate that the flat was reasonably and bona fide required by them for their own use and occupation under the provisions of cl. 8 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942. After hearing the parties the Rent Controller intimated to the said Corporation that he was unable to issue the certificate applied for. The said Corporation presented a memo of appeal to the then Collector of Bombay, Mr. N.A Farrouqui, who after hearing the parties declined to interfere with the order of the Rent Controller and rejected the appeal of the Corporation on 25-2-1944. Thereafter, a Full Bench of this Court in 46 Bom. L.R 8771 held that the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942, was ultra vires. As a result of this decision Act VII of 1944, known as the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, was passed. This Act was, as I will point out later, retrospective in certain particulars and included for the first time a provision for review of the orders made by the Controller or the Collector. Taking advantage of this provision, on 14-10-1946, i.e, more than two years and eight months after Mr. Farrouqui's order in appeal was made, the Corporation presented a petition for a review of the order made by the Collector on the ground that the said order appeared to have been made “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face thereof.” Thia petition for review was entertained by the successor of Mr. Farrouqui, Mr. R.G Davies, and on 31-1-1947, he passed the following order:

“After accepting the application in review under O. XLVII… R. 1 of the CPC and after reading the papers, hearing the parties represented by their solicitors, and inspecting the premises in question I am satisfied that the applicants bona fide and reason ably require the premises now occupied by the respondent 1 therefore set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller dated 20-11-1943, confirmed by the Collector of Bombay dated 25-2-1944, and allow the appeal under review.”

2. On this petition it is contended on behalf of the petitioner (1) that there was no power of review conferred on Mr. Davies at all; (2) that if there was any such power, that power could only be exercised on one of the grounds set out in O. 47, R. 1 of the CPC, and in this case, as the order itself shows, Mr. Davies purported to exercise the power on a ground which is not covered by the provisions of O. 47, R. 1; (3) assuming that this was a petition for review of the order on the ground that there was a mistake or error apparent on the face of the order, that mistake or error was not of a clerical or mathematical nature and therefore the review could only have been entertained by the same individual who made the original order and not his successor, and (4) that in any event there was a bar of limitation in that the application for review was entertained after two years and eight months from the date of the order of the Collector. If any one of these contentions of the petitioner is sustainable, then a writ of certiorari must be issued and the order must be set aside. I will proceed to deal with these contentions in the order in which I have set them out above. The power of review is claimed on the basis of S. 38 of Act 7[VII] of 1944, which is in these terms:

“The Controller or Collector may review any order passed by him under any part of this Act.”

3. This section appears in Part V of the act. section 14 of the same act provides for a right of appeal against the order of the Controller to the Collector. Section 15(2) of the same Act says:

“Every order passed or act done by such Controller or by the Collector acting or purporting to act in the exercise of the powers under the said Order (Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942) shall be deemed to have been passed or done under this part.”

4. Both Ss. 14 and 15 appear in Part II of the Act, and Section 2 of the Act provides that Part II shall be deemed to have come into operation in the areas specified in col. 1 of Sch. A from the dates specified in col. 2 of the said schedule. So far as the City of Bombay is concerned, the schedule provides 22-4-1942, as the date on which part II shall be deemed to have come into effect. It is therefore urged on behalf of the Corporation that the order of Mr. Farrouqui, which was made under the Bombay Kent Restriction Order, 1942, shall be deemed to be an order under Act (7[VII] of 1944); and since it is an order under the Act of 1944, it is to be subject to the power of review given by S. 38. On the contrary, the petitioner urges that the power of review conferred by S. 38 is only in respect of orders made under any part of the Act and not in respect of orders deemed to have been so made.

5. Where the Legislature intends that any new legislation should apply both to orders made as well as orders deemed to have been made under any prior legislation, the Legislature so provides specifically. For exmaple, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, provides in S. 17(2) as follows:

“Any order made or deemed to be made under the said Ordinance and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue in force and be deemed to be an order made under this Act.”

6. I have therefore to determine whether Section 38 of the Act of 1944 is retrospective in its operation, and in doing so I cannot be guided wholly by a consideration of the two rival arguments that I have set out above. In determining whether any provision in a statute is or is not retrospective, where the statute is silent on the point, there are some well recognised principles of construction. One of such principles is that if parts of a statute are expressed to be retrospective and other parts expressed not to be retrospective, and there are yet others in respect of which the Legislature does not state whether they are retrospective or not, the Court has to examine the subject-matter of the enactment and to bear in mind the effect of the construction which would make it retrospective if order to determine whether the Legislature intended that it should be retrospective. These propositions will be found laid down by the House of Lords in (1878) 8 A.C 5822 where Cairns L.C states this (p. 589:)

“The second and only other question is as to the effect of the Act of 1874. My Lords, upon that I must say that I think there is considerable foundation for the elaborate examination which the learned counsel at the bar made of the different sections of that Act. No doubt there is, with regard to some of its sections, a very clear statement that they shall apply only to instruments written after the passing of the Act; and with regard to other sections, there is an equally clear statement that those sections shall apply to things done both before and after the passing of the Act; and there is a third class of cases, of which the 38th and 39th sections are examples, in which the Act contains no clear and explicit statement of whether it is to be retrospective or merely to be prospective. But in a case of that kind your Lordships have to examine the subject-matter of the enactment of the particular section which you have to construe, to bear in mind the effect of a construction which would make it retrospective, and to ask yourselves whether it is to be supposed that construction was intended by the Legislature to be given to it.”

7. There is yet another canon of interpretation to be kept in mind and that is that where any statute relates to matter of procedure only it should be deemed to be retrospective, unless that construction is textually not possible. But where a statute effects any right in existence at the time when the statute was enacted, it should not be construed to be retrospective unless there is clear language to that effect. This proposition was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 54 I.A 4213 where Lord Blanesburgh states the law thus, p. 425:

“The principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the Board in (1905) A.C 3694 where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights. Accordingly, if the section now in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided,”

8. Keeping these two principles of construction in mind I have got to determine whether the provision in Section 38 of the Act of 1944 is retrospective. Now it is to be remembered that under the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942, S. 12 of that Order provides for an appeal to the Collector against the order made by the Controller, and sub-s. (3) of S. 12 in terms provides that the decision of the Controller, subject only to the order in appeal by the Collector, shall be final. So that when Mr. Farrouqui made his order in this case, that order was final by virtue of the provisions of S. 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Order, 1942. If I construe S. 38 as rendering this order subject to a power of review, I would be depriving this order of its finality which it had at the date on which it was made. Moreover, parts II, III and IV of the Act of 1944 have been specifically made retrospective by S. 2 of that Act to the extent indicated in that section; and the Legislature has thought fit not to make Part V, in which S. 38 is to be found, retrospective. Were I to hold that S. 38 was retrospective, it would necessarily mean that the numerous orders that must have been made prior to that date by the Rent Controller and the Collector of Bombay under the Order of 1942 would all suddenly become subject to review years after they were actually made and had become final under the provisions of the law which then prevailed. I can find no reason why the Legislature should have intended to bring about such a state of affairs; and I am not prepared to hold that in enacting S. 38 the Legislature intended that the orders which were made prior to the Act of 1944 coming into force became subject to a power of review. That really disposes of the petition. But since other points have been argued before me, I wish to state shortly my conclusions on them as well.

9. The second submission of the petitioner is that the power of review is circumscribed by the provisions of O. 47, R. 1 of the CPC. That indeed cannot be disputed because S. 38 itself states that the provisions of O. 47 shall, as far as may be, apply to such review. Order 47, R. 1 states the grounds on which a review application may be entertained. The first of such grounds is the discovery of new and important matter of evidence with which we are not concerned in this case. The second ground is “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record” and the third ground is “any other sufficient reason.” Now the words “any other sufficient reason,” have been the subject-matter of decision, and it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that these words mean “a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those previously specified”: see, 49 I.A 1446 at p. 151. If the Collector wished to exercise the power of review, he could do so only on any of these three grounds. The ground suggested in the present case is an error apparent on the face of the order itself of Mr. Farrouqui. If the Collector entertained and disposed of the review application on any ground which does not fall within the four comers of O. 47, R. 1, he exercised a jurisdiction which he did not possess or exceeded the jurisdiction for review conferred on him, and the Court would interfere to prevent him from doing so. The order made by Mr. Davies states in terms that he has set aside the order of the Kent Controller dated 20-11-1943, and the order of the Collector of 25-2-1944, because “I am satisfied that the applicants bona fide and reasonably require the premises now occupied by the respondent.”

10. To my mind this is not a ground on which a review could have been granted. Mr. Davies had no jurisdiction to, decide afresh whether or not the requirement of the Corporation was reasonable and bona fide. He could only review the order of his predecessor if he came to the conclusion that there was an error apparent on the face of the record. I am therefore of the opinion that this contention of the petitioner is also valid.

11. The third contention of the petitioner is based on the provisions of O. 47, R. 2. That rule is in these terms:

“An application for review of a decree or order of a Court, not being a High Court, upon some ground other than the discovery of such new and important matter or evidence as is referred to in R. 1 or the existence of a clerical or arithmetical mistake or error apparent on the face of the decree, shall be made only to the Judge who passed the decree or made the order sought to be reviewed; but any such application may, if the Judge who passed the decree or made the order has ordered notice to issue under R. 4, sub-r. (2), proviso (a), be disposed of by his successor.”

12. Under this rule where a decree is passed by a Judge, other than a High Court Judge, the application for review may be made to him or his successor only when (a) there is a discovery of new and important matter or evidence or (b) some clerical or arithmetical mistake or error apparent on the face of the decree. In all other cases, it must be made to the Judge who made the order himself and to no one else. There is no doubt that in the present case it is not suggested that there was any clerical or arithmetical error either apparent on the face of the order made by Mr. Farrouqui or apparent on the face of the record, and obviously therefore if O. 47 applied, a review could be entertained by Mr. Farrouqui only. But the Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the respondent and Mr. Vimadalal who appeared for the Corporation have contended that Section 38 of the Act of 1944 provides that O. 47 of the CPC shall apply “as far as may be.” They contend that it would be defeating the power of review conferred on the Collector if I were to hold that the successor in office of the Collector could not exercise the power of review except to the extent indicated in R. 2 of O. 47. I am unable to accept this contention. The office of the Collector is occupied by different persons from time to time but so is the office of the Civil Judge in the mofussil. Individuals occupying these respective offices are liable to be transferred not at any fixed period but as their superiors may from time to time direct; and if in the case of Civil Judges the power of review is restricted in the manner indicated by O. 47, R. 2, I see no reason why in the case of the Collector the power of review should not be similarly restricted. I therefore hold that if there was a power of review in this case it could only have been exercised by Mr. Farrouqui and not by his successor in office.

13. That brings me to the last contention on behalf of the petitioner regarding limitation. The petitioner's contention is that there is a period of time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act for a review. That period is to be found in Art. 173, Limitation Act. The question is whether Art. 173 has any application to a review under Act 7 [VII] of 1944. The preamble to the Limitation Act states that it applies to Courts. The word “Court” has not been defined either in the Limitation Act or in the General Clauses Act. I am not prepared to hold that the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under the Sent Act as the Rent Controller exercising the powers conferred on him by the Act of 1944 is not a Court, I am strengthened in this conclusion by the fact that the Act of 1944 itself in fact prescribes a period of limitation for appeals to the Collector which is fifteen days under Section 14(1) of the Act. If the Limitation Act was to apply to proceedings under Act 7[VII] of 1944, this provision in S. 14(1) would be entirely redundant. It does appear at first sight extremely odd that an order made two years and eight months prior to the date on which the application is entertained should be upset almost three years after the original order was made but if there is a power of review vested in the Collector and there is as period of limitation which is applicable to the exercise of such power, that result must, I am afraid, follow, whatever hardship it may involve to the parties concerned. But the decision of this petition does not depend on the determination of this issue of limitation. If I am right in the conclusions which I have arrived at on any one of the three other submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. I therefore make the rule absolute and direct that the order of the Collector dated 31st January 1947, be set aside.

14. As regards the costs, the petitioner does not press for costs against the respondent who has not taken up a contentious attitude on this rule, but he asks for costs against the Corporation who appeared before me and supported the order made by the Collector. They are not parties to this petition; but I had directed that they should be served with notice of this petition as they would be the persons affected by any order that would be made on this petition. Counsel on their behalf has made submissions on pure questions of law.

15. They are a society apparently formed for the promotion of education in Bombay and purchased this property for conducting a school in Bombay. It is natural therefore that they should come to support the order which would enable them to conduct the school in their own premises. I have held that the Collector exceeded his jurisdiction but this is not the fault of the Corporation, and I think that the justice of this particular case will be met by my making no order as to costs of this petition.

16. Rule made absolute.