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Vithal Rajaram Sutar v. Ramchandra Pandu Jadhav

Bombay High Court
Apr 9, 1947
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion delivered by Chagla, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from a second appeal concerning the right of redemption in respect of a mortgage/sale transaction. Relevant facts as stated in the opinion:

  • On 24 July 1895 Gamabai executed a document in favour of Khandu described as a sale but contended by Gamabai to be a mortgage.
  • In 1903 Khandu filed a suit against Gamabai and her husband claiming ownership under the document; Gamabai asserted it was really a mortgage.
  • The trial Court accepted Gamabai's contention and by decree dated 16 June 1904 declared Gamabai entitled to retain possession if she paid specified interest; on default Khandu would get possession as mortgagee.
  • In August 1904 Gamabai filed a suit for redemption. While that suit was pending Gamabai died; her heirs were not brought on record and the suit abated in June 1905.
  • The present suit was filed by Gamabai's grandsons for redemption. The sole surviving question in the second appeal was whether that suit was barred because the earlier suit for redemption had abated in June 1905.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a fresh suit for redemption can be maintainable after an earlier redemption suit abated (or was dismissed/abandoned), particularly where Order XXII, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action.
  2. Whether Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act (concerning the mortgagor's right to redeem) is overridden by the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (specifically O. XXII, r. 9 and comparable provisions concerning dismissal or abatement of suits).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Shah)

  • Because both suits were for redemption they were suits on the "same cause of action" within the meaning of O. XXII, r. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; therefore, the second suit is barred by that provision since the first suit abated.
  • Relied strongly on the Privy Council decision in Thakur Shankar Baksh v. Daya Shankar, where the Privy Council held that a subsequent suit for redemption was barred when the earlier suit had been dismissed for default.

The opinion does not set out a detailed, separately attributed list of the respondents' or plaintiff's counsel's arguments in the same manner; the Court's discussion, however, advances reasoning in support of the mortgagor's continuing right to redeem under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shridhar Sadba v. Ganu Mahadu (High Court) Held that the general terms of O. IX, r. 9 (consequence of dismissal) do not override the specific directions of s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court treated this decision as directly analogous and followed its principle, stating there is no difference in principle between that case and the present matter.
Ramji v. Pandharinath (Full Bench) Considered a subsequent redemption suit after a decree nisi; held second suit not barred by res judicata (ss. 11 and 47), reasoning that the issues/cause of action differ because the amount due may differ at different times and the right to redeem is continuing. The Court relied on the Full Bench view that the cause of action in successive redemption suits is different and supports the view that a mortgagor's right to redeem continues.
Ramchandra Kolaji v. Hanmanta Observed that so long as it has not been decided that there was no mortgage, the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship exists; abandonment or withdrawal of a suit does not deprive the mortgagor of the right to redeem. The Court cited this passage (Sir Norman Macleod) to support the proposition that only a decision that there was no mortgage extinguishes the right to redeem.
Raju v. Raghavayya (Madras High Court) Division Bench held that s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act does not override provisions of O. XXXIII, r. 1, sub-r. (3) CPC (a view contrary to the present Court's consistent authority). The Court noted this decision as taking a contrary view to its own established line of authority and distinguished it from the present approach.
Thakur Shankar Baksh v. Daya Shankar (Privy Council) Privy Council held that a subsequent suit for redemption was barred where the earlier suit had been dismissed for default (treating the suits as involving the same cause of action). The Court observed that the Privy Council did not consider the equivalent of s. 60 (the right to redeem) and that the earlier decision appears to have rested on the identity of the amounts claimed; the Court did not follow it for those reasons.
Raghunath Singh v. Hansraj Kunwar (Privy Council) Privy Council held that issues in successive redemption suits are different (one concerns right and amount at earlier time; the other at later time), and that a prior decree could not be construed as extinguishing the right to redeem unless it expressly did so under s. 60. The Court relied upon this later Privy Council decision as supporting the view that the right to redeem is a statutory right which cannot be taken away except in the manner provided by s. 60; used it to conclude that abatement does not extinguish the right.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in several discrete steps, grounded in statutory interpretation and precedent:

  1. Statutory nature of the right to redeem: The Court begins with Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, which confers upon a mortgagor the right to redeem after the principal becomes due upon payment or tender. The proviso to s. 60 preserves that right so long as it has not been extinguished either by the act of the parties or by the decree (previously "order") of a Court.
  2. Conflict between general procedure and specific substantive right: The Court frames the tension as between a general procedural provision (O. XXII, r. 9 CPC, forbidding a fresh suit on the same cause of action after abatement/dismissal) and the specific substantive provision in s. 60 which creates and preserves a continuing right to redeem.
  3. Principle of specific statute prevailing over general procedural rule: The Court holds that where a specific statutory right is conferred by special legislation (the Transfer of Property Act), the general provision of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be allowed to defeat that substantive right. Consequently, O. XXII, r. 9 is, to the extent of conflict, overridden by s. 60.
  4. Application of precedent supportive of continuing right: The Court cites and applies several authorities (including Shridhar Sadba v. Ganu Mahadu, Ramji v. Pandharinath, and Ramchandra Kolaji v. Hanmanta) that treat the right to redeem as continuing and not extinguished by mere abatement or dismissal unless the decree expressly extinguishes the right.
  5. Distinguishing contrary authorities: The Court addresses contrary decisions: (a) it notes a Madras decision (Raju v. Raghavayya) taking an opposite view and characterises it as contrary to the current authority of this Court; (b) it analyses the Privy Council decision in Thakur Shankar Baksh v. Daya Shankar and points out that the Privy Council did not consider a provision corresponding to s. 60 and that the decision rested on identity of amounts and reliefs; the Court therefore finds it distinguishable.
  6. Reliance on later Privy Council authority: The Court places particular weight on the later Privy Council decision in Raghunath Singh v. Hansraj Kunwar, which (i) explained that issues in successive redemption suits are different (existence of right and amount payable at each time), and (ii) held that a prior decree should not be construed as extinguishing the statutory right to redeem unless it plainly does so. The Court quotes the Privy Council's language that the right to redeem "can only be deprived by means and in manner enacted for that purpose, and strictly complied with."
  7. Conclusion of analysis: The Court concludes that abatement of the earlier suit did not amount to a decree extinguishing the right of redemption under s. 60, and therefore the procedural bar in O. XXII, r. 9 cannot be permitted to override the statutory right to redeem.
  8. Limitation note: The Court notes (without detailed analysis) that limitation is a separate matter — the Limitation Act prescribes a 60-year period for suits for redemption — but this does not alter the analytic focus on s. 60 versus procedural bars.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the plaintiff's (the grandsons') present suit for redemption was maintainable. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower Court and dismissed the appeal with costs. The formal outcome was:

Appeal dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's suit for redemption may proceed; the lower Court's decision in favour of maintainability was sustained and the appellant's challenge failed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • Scope as to precedent and broader law: The opinion applies and reiterates the settled view followed by this High Court that the mortgagor's statutory right to redeem under s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act continues unless it is expressly extinguished by the act of the parties or by a Court's decree that plainly has that effect. The Court relied on existing authorities (including a later Privy Council decision) in support of that proposition. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel or different legal principle beyond this application of s. 60 against a procedural bar; its effect is to affirm the existing line of authority in this Court.

This summary is strictly confined to the statements and materials contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts, arguments, or precedential attributions have been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.

Opinion authored by Chagla, J.; judgment concludes with the notation "J.G.R" as in the source text.

Show all summary ...

Chagla, J.:—The facts leading up to this second appeal are that one Gamabai executed a mortgage on July 24, 1895, in favour of one Khandu. In 1903 Khandu filed a suit against Gamabai and her husband. This suit was filed on the allegation that the property had been sold to Khandu by Gamabai. Gamabai contended in that suit that, although in form it was a sale-deed, the document was really a mortgage. The Court accepted the contention of Gamabai, and a decree was passed on the 16th June 1904, by which Gamabai was declared to be entitled to retain possession of the property, if she paid a specified sum of interest to Khandu. In default, Khandu was to get possession of the property as mortgagee.

In August 1904 Gamabai filed a suit for redemption. While the suit was pending, Gamabai died, and her heirs were not brought on record, with the result that the suit abated in June 1905. The present suit was filed by the grandsons of Gamabai for redemption, and the only question that survives in this second appeal is whether this suit is barred by reason of the fact that the earlier suits for redemption abated in June 1905.

Now, under O. XXII, r. 9, “where a suit abates or is dismissed under their Order, no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action.” It is contended by Mr. Shah that, inasmuch as both the suits were for redemption, they were on the same cause of action, and as the first suit had abated, the second suit does not lie.

Now, the Civil Procedure Code deals with procedure relating to all suits. There is a special law, which deals with rights of mortgagors and mortgagees, and that law is to be found in the Transfer of Property Act. Section 60 provides that a mortgagor has the right to redeem the mortgaged property after the principal money has become due, and the mortgagor either pays or tenders the amount due on the mortgage; and the proviso to that section states that this right continues so long as it has not been extinguished either by the act of the parties or by the decree of a Court. Before the Act was amended, the expression was “order of a Court” instead of “decree of a Court”. Therefore, s. 60 confers the right to redeem upon the mortgagor, and also provides that right is to continue until one or the other of the two eventualities mentioned in the section takes place; one, the act of the parties, and the other, an order or a decree of a Court which extinguishes that right. Now, it is perfectly clear that when the suit abated there was no express order of the Court extinguishing the right of redemption. Can it be said that the mortgagor could not enforce that right, because the second suit was barred under O. XXII, r. 9? If the legislature in a piece of special legislation confers a particular right upon a party, it must intend that right should be an enforceable right. Therefore, in our opinion, the general provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as contained in O. XXII, r. 9, are to that extent overriden by the specific provisions of s. 60 of the Transter of Property Act. So long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee continues, and so long as the right to redeem has not been extinguished by a decree of the Court, or by the act of the parties, the mortgagor is entitled to go to a Court of law to enforce his right. Of course, the position with regard to limitation is different, because the Limitation Act expressly provides that the period of limitation for redemption suits is sixty years.

This High Court has consistently taken the view that so long as the right to redeem is not extinguished as provided by s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, the mortgagor can enforce that right in a Court of law.

Sir Amberson Marten, Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Crump were considering the dismissal of a suit for default, and the consequence following upon it under O. IX, r. 9, in Shridhar Sadba v. Ganu Mahadu It will be noticed that the consequence is the same as on an abatement of the suit, and that Bench held that the general terms of O. IX, r. 9, do not override the specific directions of s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. If the general terms of O. IX, r. 9, cannot override the specific directions of s. 60, equally so the general terms of O. XXII, r. 9, cannot override the specific directions of s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. We see no difference in principle between the decision in Shridhar Sadba v. Ganu Mahadu and the case we are considering now; and we are not satisfied by Mr. Shah's argument that case was wrongly decided.

Then we have a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ramji v. Pandharinath. In that case the mortgagor had brought a suit for redemption, and obtained a decree nisi, which was not made absolute, and after the execution of the decree had become time-barred, the mortgagor brought a fresh suit for redemption. It was contended that the second suit was barred on the ground of res judicata both under ss. 11 and 47 of the Code. Scott, C.J and Mr. Justice Macleod (Mr. Justice Shah dissenting) took the view that it was not so barred. Chief Justice Scott took the view that really in the two suits for redemption the issues are not the same, because what is to be decided in each case is what is the amount due which the mortgagor has got to pay in ord:r to redeem the property. Sir Norman Macleod also seems to take the view that the cause of action in a subsequent suit for redemption is different from the cause of action in the prior suit, because he takes the view that the right to redeem is a continuing right, and the only question in issue, when the assistance of the Court is invoked, is the amount due at the time when the redemption suit is filed.

In Ramchandra Kolaji v. Hanmanta, Sir Norman Macleod and Mr. Justice Heaton had to consider the consequence of a redemption suit being dismissed under the provisions of O. XXIII, r. 1, and the subsequent suit filed for redemption; and Sir Norman Macleod at page 941 says:—

“So long as it had not been decided that there was no mortgage at all then the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee existed. The law allows a particular period to the mortgagor within which he can redeem the mortgage. The mere fact that he files a suit to redeem and then either abandons or withdraws it will not deprive him of his right to redeem. It is only when there has been a decision that there was no mortgage at all that it necessarily follows that the right to redeem falls to the ground.”

Our attention has been drawn to a recent decision of the Madras High Court in Raju v. Raghavayya where in a Division Bench of that Court Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri seems to have taken a view contrary to the view taken by this court in the case I have just referred to. That Bench held that s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act does not override the provisions of O. XXXIII, rule 1, sub-r. (3), of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view seems to be contrary to the current of authority consistently followed by this Court.

Mr. Shah has strongly relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Thakur Shankar Baksh v. Daya Shankar. There the Privy Council held that the subsequent suit for redemption was barred, inasmuch as the earlier suit had been dismissed for default. In the first place, the attention of the Privy Council does not seem to have been drawn to the provisions of the law which corresponded to s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the Privy Council has not considered that section at all. Further, it also seems that the Privy Council based its decision on the fact that in both the suits the amount which the mortgagor said he was liable to pay to the mortgagee was identical, and the reliefs were the same; and the only difference between the two suits was that in the first suit the plaintiff asked for a sub-proprietary right, and in the latter for a superior proprietary right; and the Privy Council said that this difference did not make any difference as regards the cause of action.

But there is a later decision of the Privy Council, which seems to support the view taken by this Court, and that is the decision in Raghunath Singh v. Hansraj Kunwar. In that case a decree for redemption was passed in 1896, and it provided that, if the mortgagor failed to pay in accordance with the terms of that decree, his case would stand dismissed. The mortgagor did not pay the amount of the decree, and the mortgagee continued to remain in possession. In 1924 the mortgagor filed a fresh suit to redeem the property. Three contentions were taken up by the defence. The first was that the suit, though in form a redemption suit, was in reality an application to enforce an old decree, and that the execution of that decree was barred by limitation. The second was that the decision in the former suit operated as res judicata under section 11, and the third was that no payment having been made under the old decree, the former suit stood dismissed, with the result that the mortgagor's right to redeem became extinguished under s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the first place, it is important to note what their Lordships thought of the two suits. According to them, the issues in the two suits were entirely different. In the first suit the issues were (1) whether the mortgagors were then entitled to redeem; and (2) the amount then to be paid if redemption then took place; and the issues in the subsequent suit were (1) whether the right to redeem existed at the time of the subsequent suit, and (2) the amount to be paid if redemption took place at the time of the subsequent suit. Their Lordships of the Privy Council further pointed out that, unless they were satisfied that the decree in the first suit extinguished the right to redeem, no question of res judicata would arise. Therefore, what their Lordships proceeded to do was to construe the decree in order to determine whether under the provisions of that decree the right to redeem had been extinguished, and having construed that decree in their opinion, the right to redeem was not extinguished; and, therefore, no question of res judicata arose. The following passage from the judgment of the Privy Council is very pertinent:—

“The right to redeem is a right conferred upon the mortgagor by enactment, of which he can only be deprived by means and in manner enacted for that purpose, and strictly complied with. In the present case the only basis for the claim that the right to redeem has been extinguished is s. 60; but in their Lordships view the old decree cannot properly be construed as doing that which it does not purport to do—namely, as extinguishing the right to redeem.”

Therefore, it is clear from this decision that the right of redemption cannot be taken away from the mortgagor, except in the manner and to the extent provided by s. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. We are of the opinion that the abatment of the suit is not a decree of the Court, which extinguishes the right of redemption. The procedural effect of O. XXII, r. 9, cannot override the express provisions of s. 60.

We, therefore, hold that the Plaintiff's present suit was maintainable, and that the decision of the lower Court was right. The appeal, therefore, fails, and must be dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.
J.G.R