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Chandrakant Jagannath Manjrekar v. Shripad Vaikunth Naik

Bombay High Court
Jan 20, 1988
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application to review a judgment dated 24 August 1987 in relation to Revision Application No. 56/87. The impugned judgment had confirmed that the respondent (original plaintiff) had made out a prima facie case of possession of a property called "Deusum" and remanded the matter to the District Court to render fresh findings about whether the applicants (petitioners in the revision) were in possession of the house and whether they had been dispossessed as alleged. In paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment the Court observed that the term "khoti" prima facie could not be equated with tenancy rights, noting among other facts that the tenants column was blank in Forms I & XIV for the property surveyed under No. 100/1. The applicants sought review of that judgment principally on the ground that earlier decisions (including a Division Bench decision reported at AIR 1934 Bom 434 and a prior revision judgment of this Court) equate "khoti" with lease/tenancy, and that if "khoti" were treated as a lease the applicants would gain certain presumptions under the Land Revenue Code that would alter the interlocutory relief analysis. The respondent opposed the review application. The Court dismissed the review application, discharged the rule and made no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the observation in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment that "khoti" cannot be equated with tenancy or lease rights is an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review.
  2. Whether the discovery or citation of earlier decisions (including a Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1934 Bom 434 and a prior Civil Revision Application No. 163/84) that treat "khoti" as akin to a lease constitutes sufficient ground to review the impugned judgment.
  3. Whether, if "khoti" is treated as a lease, the applicants would attract the presumption under section 105 of the Land Revenue Code and thereby shift onus to the respondent in respect of the interlocutory relief (temporary injunction) then under consideration.
  4. Whether the nature of the proceedings (interlocutory order in a suit where rights are yet to be finally determined) precludes review of the impugned observations.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (Petitioners') Arguments — as advanced by Shri F. Rebello

  • The Court's statement that "khoti" cannot be equated with tenancy/lease is erroneous because it conflicts with (a) a prior judgment of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 163/84 decided 11 April 1985 and (b) a Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1934 Bom 434 which describes "khoti" as a rent-bearing grant (a lease) in certain contexts.
  • If "khoti" is equated to lease, the applicants would be lessees of the property surveyed under No. 100/1, which would alter the assessment of their case on interlocutory relief (including enabling them to rely on a presumption under section 105 of the Land Revenue Code that would shift the evidentiary burden to the respondent).
  • The applicants rely on account sheets showing payments (Rs. 300 for cashew grove and Rs. 150 for areca) which they say should be treated as rent evidence supporting leasehold status.
  • Reliance was placed on Raj Kumar v. Union of India (AIR 1975 SC 536 and a subsequent report in the same volume) to argue that discovery of an authoritative decision subsequent to the judgment may justify review (the Supreme Court had reviewed its own decision upon discovery of a retrospectively applicable amendment).

Respondent's Arguments — as advanced by Shri Usgaoncar

  • The Court must be cautious in review applications, particularly where the impugned judgment disposed of an interlocutory application and no final rights have been determined; an interlocutory observation that "khoti" cannot be equated to tenancy does not decide rights finally and therefore is not a proper subject of review.
  • The impugned observation was qualified by the word "prima facie", and a qualified/interlocutory finding is not a ground for review.
  • Several factual and documentary matters (e.g., failure to claim coconut grove, absence of any pleaded rent, documents produced by applicants styled as "rakhan", respondent's own production of extraction licences and the respondent's statement of account) support the view that "khoti" is not lease in this case; these factual bases were part of the reasoning and not merely the single linguistic observation relied upon by applicants.
  • The discovery of a High Court decision (AIR 1934 Bom 434) after judgment does not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record; authorities (including the Full Bench in Nalagarh Dehati Co-operative Transport Society Ltd. v. Beli Ram and Juli Meah v. Atar Din) establish that failure to consider a High Court decision is not the kind of error warranting review.
  • Production of an authority or ruling not brought to the notice of the Court previously is not "any other sufficient reason" under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC, as construed in Dilip Nath Sen v. Certificate Officer (AIR 1962 Cal 346).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State v. Faredoon Jijibhai Divecha, AIR 1934 Bom 434 The decision contains observations that where a grant required payment of rent it was called "khoti" or a lease; the text quoted describes distinctions among inam, khoti and rakhan and equates "khoti" with lease in the context of lease-deed interpretation. The Court observed that the AIR 1934 Bom 434 decision arose from interpretation of a lease deed and was concerned with clauses in that deed; therefore those observations may not have general application to every instance of "khoti". The Court left the question open for trial court determination on evidence rather than treating the Division Bench pronouncements as an automatic override of its own interlocutory observation.
Nalagarh Dehati Co-operative Transport Society Ltd. Nalagarh v. Beli Ram, AIR 1981 Him Pra 1 The Full Bench laid down that failure to consider an existing decision of the Supreme Court can amount to an error apparent on the face of the record, but failure to take into account a decision of the High Court does not amount to such an error. The Court relied on the principle to support the respondent's contention that discovery (or belated citation) of a High Court decision (or of this Court's own prior interlocutory observations) does not, by itself, constitute an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review.
Juli Meah v. Atar Din, AIR 1935 Rang 32 Failure to consider precedent bearing on the case is not an error apparent on the face of the record; rather it is treated as discovery of a new matter by a party who should earlier have brought the precedent to the Court's notice, and review will not lie unless the failure was excusable. The Court cited this authority to reinforce the proposition that belated reliance on an overlooked High Court precedent is not normally a ground for review unless excusable; the Court applied this reasoning in denying review based on discovery of the Division Bench decision.
Dilip Nath Sen v. Certificate Officer, AIR 1962 Cal 346 In construing Order 47, Rule 1 CPC, a production of an authority or ruling not brought to the notice of the court at the time of decision is not necessarily "any other sufficient reason" for review. The Court invoked this authority to support the view that the mere production/discovery of a High Court decision after judgment does not constitute a sufficient reason for review under the procedural provision relied upon.
Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 536 (and subsequent report in same volume) Example of the Supreme Court reviewing its own judgment where a subsequently discovered amendment to rules (which had retrospective effect) changed the legal position relied upon in the earlier decision. The applicants relied on Raj Kumar to argue that discovery of an authoritative matter may permit review. The Court considered the reliance but distinguished the present facts from Raj Kumar (which concerned discovery of a retrospective statutory amendment affecting the earlier decision) and did not allow review on that basis.
AIR 1972 SC 1487 (earlier Supreme Court decision cited within Raj Kumar's context) Referenced in the narrative of Raj Kumar as an earlier Supreme Court decision that was set aside in the light of subsequently discovered amendment. The Court noted the sequence recited in Raj Kumar but did not treat the presence of that Supreme Court decision as changing its conclusion in the present review application; it emphasized the factual differences and interlocutory nature of the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining both legal and factual dimensions raised by the review application and applied established principles concerning review jurisdiction and interlocutory findings:

  1. Interlocutory nature: The Court emphasized that the impugned judgment arose from an interlocutory stage (an order disposing of an interlocutory application) and that the final rights between the parties had not been determined. On that basis the Court considered that observations made at the interlocutory stage (including the observation in paragraph 10 regarding "khoti") did not finally decide the parties' rights and therefore were not ordinarily reviewable as final errors.
  2. Precedent relied upon: The Court analyzed the precedents cited by the applicants. It noted that the earlier decision of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 163/84 had equated "khoti" to lease only because the survey authorities themselves had distinguished between "rakhan" and "khoti" in that record; that earlier statement had been at an interlocutory stage and the ultimate character of the transaction was left for trial on merits. Concerning the Division Bench decision in AIR 1934 Bom 434, the Court observed that the passages quoted arose in the context of interpreting a lease deed that had been finally decided at trial and that the Division Bench's observations were based on that specific context; hence those observations may not have universal application to every instance of the word "khoti".
  3. Review thresholds: The Court applied authorities on review jurisdiction (Nalagarh, Juli Meah, Dilip Nath Sen) to hold that discovery of a High Court decision after the decision is not necessarily a ground for review as an error apparent on the face of the record. The Court accepted the respondent's submission that failure to consider a High Court decision is not the type of obvious error required for review relief.
  4. Factual considerations already relied upon: The Court underlined that even if the linguistic observation about "khoti" were treated as erroneous, the impugned judgment did not rest solely on that observation. The Court had also relied on several factual matters: the tenants column in Forms I & XIV being blank for survey No. 100/1; applicants' documents styled as "rakhan"; non-disclosure of rent in the pleadings; the applicants' failure to claim a portion of the suit property (the coconut grove) and production of accounts; and the respondent's statement of account and extraction licences. These factual elements formed part of the basis for confirming the interlocutory order and supported the Court's conclusion independent of the linguistic point.
  5. Evidentiary resolution at trial: The Court repeatedly emphasized that the true character of the transaction (whether "khoti" constitutes a lease in the specific factual matrix) must be determined by the trial Court after recording evidence. Practice and local usages regarding rakhan, khoti and tenancy vary by place, and therefore the trial Court should decide the issue on appreciation of evidence rather than by treating the interlocutory observation as definitive.
  6. Conclusion on review: Balancing the interlocutory nature of the observation, the cited authority on review jurisdiction, and the other factual reasons which supported the impugned order, the Court concluded that the impugned judgment was not amenable to review on the grounds advanced. The Court cautioned lower courts not to place decisive reliance on the paragraph 10 observation and reiterated that the issue is open for the trial Court to decide on evidence.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: THE REVIEW APPLICATION IS DISMISSED.

Specific orders: The rule is discharged and there shall be no order as to costs. The application is dismissed (as recorded in the concluding decretal paragraphs and by the blockquoted line "Application dismissed.").

Implications:

  • The impugned interlocutory judgment stands; the Court did not set aside its earlier order.
  • The question whether "khoti" is equivalent to a lease in the particular factual matrix of the suit remains open and is to be decided by the trial Court after recording and appreciating evidence. The Court expressly left the matter to the trial Court rather than treating the Division Bench's observations as decisive in the present interlocutory context.
  • The Court held that discovery of a High Court decision (or belated citation of such decision) does not, by itself, amount to an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review; the authorities referenced support the principle that only obvious errors that stare from the face of the record justify review.
  • No new legal precedent was laid down by this review judgment; the Court noted that mere erroneous decisions are not necessarily liable to review and confined its decision to dismissal of the application on the particular procedural and factual grounds explained above.
Application dismissed.
Show all summary ...

1. Judgment dated August 24, 1987 is sought to be reviewed by the applicants who are petitioners in the revision application No. 56/87. By the impugned judgment while confirming that the respondent/original plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that he is in possession of the property “Deusum” I remanded the matter to the District Court to render fresh findings and decide whether the petitioners were in possession of the house and that they were dispossessed as alleged in the light of the observations made, for I found that the case of the petitioners viz. the house had to be separately dealt with from that of the property (sic).

In paragraph 10 I observed that the petitioners' names having not been shown as tenants and mention to have ‘khoti’ right that too in the Other Rights column in the survey record prima facie ‘khoti’ cannot be equated to tenancy rights going by the word ‘khoti’ as mentioned in the dictionary. The fact remains that the tenants column is blank in Forms I & XIV vide the property surveyed under No. 100/1.

2. Shri Rebello, learned counsel for the applicants now says that my observation that ‘khoti’ cannot be equated with tenancy rights is erroneous as it goes against a judgment delivered by this very Court earlier in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 163 of 1984 decided on 11th April, 1985 and further having regard to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1934 Bom 434. He now urges that ‘khoti’ must be equated with lease and if the applicants are held to be the lessees in respect of the property surveyed under No. 100/1 the whole perspective would change in the matter of appreciation of the applicants' case and therefore the impugned judgment will have to be reviewed.

3. It is true that in Civil Revision Application No. 163/84 observations were made that ‘khoti’ is to be equated with lease but however it must be seen that the two survey numbers involved in that case were survey Nos. 399/6 and 397/2. The survey authorities themselves had recorded that there was ‘rakhan’ in respect of property bearing survey No. 399/6 and ‘khoti’ in respect of property bearing survey No. 397/2. Since the authorities themselves had made a distinction between ‘rakhan’ and ‘khoti’ I had perforce to say that ‘rakhan’ would amount to watch and ward duties and ‘khoti’ would amount to something alike a lease. But this was again a decision rendered at interlocutory stage and the matter as to the character of the transaction between the parties had to be decided finally in the suit on merits.

4. So far as the decision of the Division Bench reported in Secy. of State v. Faredoon Jijibhai Divecha reported in AIR 1934 Bom 434 it is observed at p. 437 thus:—

“If the grant was a rent free grant in perpetuity with the right of transfer, it was known as inam; if it was a grant either for a fixed term or in perpetuity with the condition to pay a fixed amount as rent to the Government it was called khoti or a lease and the leaseholder was called a knot.”

Having regard to these observations it is urged by Shri F. Rebello that it is clear that khoti is a lease and hence the review must be allowed for the observations in para 10 of the impugned judgment are against these two decisions and in any event the decision of the Division Bench being binding on this Court sitting singly there is no escape and in that view, of the matter the judgment is liable to be reviewed.

5. This review application is opposed by the respondent through their counsel Shri Usgaoncar. The first of the objections is that this Court ought to be doubly careful in the matter of the review. In that it is argued that the impugned judgment was made disposing of an interlocutory application taken in the suit and the rights of the parties having not been decided finally the observation in para 10 of the judgment that Khoti cannot be a lease will not amount to determination of rights finally between the parties and therefore in this type of matters no question of review arises. Mr. Usgaoncar then points out that even while holding that ‘khoti’ does not amount to a lease, the Court put itself sufficiently on guard by saying “prima facie it must be held that khoti cannot be equated to tenancy rights……”. Mr. Usgaoncar therefore urges that so long as it has been duly qualified by the words “prima facie” even on this score review is not permissible.

Insofar as the other merits are concerned is pointed out that going by the impugned Judgment there is lot to be said. In that the counsel mentions that despite that the suit property consists of cashew grove and coconut grove the applicants did not make any claim to the coconut grove and only claimed leasehold rights in respect of cashew grove although admittedly the suit property has both types of groves. According to him once lie fact remains that no right is claimed in aspect of coconut grove then what is mentioned insofar as the cashew grove is concerned showing the applicants to have khoti cannot a mount to tenancy or leasehold rights. He is supporting this contention by showing to the Court that nowhere the applicants have set out as to what rent they are paying in respect of the cashew grove as according to him the payment of the rent is an essential ingredient of any lease having regard to the definition hereof in the Transfer of Property Act. He further points out that the very documents produced by the applicants in support of their case are themselves styled as ‘rakhan’. Therefore even in this view of the matter it is not possible to equate khoti to lease. No doubt the applicants have produced cashew extraction licences, but for that matter he points out that respondent has equally produced extraction licences obtained from the very Excise Department in his own name and all this taken together goes to show against the claim of the applicants.

He next says that the applicants would have been entitled for review of the impugned judgment if this Court had solely based its decision that Khoti cannot be equated with tenancy rights, but according to him this is not the case and this Court while delivering the impugned judgment has made extensive reference to several other aspects as mentioned therein.

6. Even otherwise according to Shri Usgaoncar the discovery of a decision subsequent to the judgment sought to be reviewed is not an error apparent on the face of record. For this proposition he relies on the Full Bench decision of Nalagarh Dehati Co-operative Transport Society Ltd. Nalagarh v. Beli Ram, reported in AIR 1981. Him Pra 1. This decision no doubt lays down that failure of the Court to take into consideration an existing decision of the Supreme Court taking a different or contrary view on a point covered by its judgment would amour to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. But a failure to take into consideration a decision of the High Court would not amount to any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. In the decision of Juli Meah v. Atar Din, reported in AIR 1935 Rang 32 it is held that a failure to consider precedent bearing upon the case is not a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but is really discovery of a new and important matter by the party who ought to have brought the precedent to the notice of the Court, and therefore one cannot apply for review of the judgment unless he can show that failure to bring it to notice of the Court was excusable. In the decision of Dilip Nath Sen v. Certificate Officer reported in AIR 1962 Cal 346 while construing the provision of O. 47, R. 1 of C.P.C the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing therein it is observed that a production of an authority or ruling not brought to the notice of the court at the time of the decision was rendered is not a sufficient reason. He therefore now urges that mere discovery of these two decisions now cannot permit the court to review its own judgment and the review application must fail.

7. The counter argument by Shri Rebello is that the existence of the decision delivered in Civil Revision Application No. 163/84 was mentioned at the time of the oral arguments and before the decision was rendered, but however the citation was not available. He however concedes that the judgment reported in AIR 1934 Bom 434 was not mentioned and it was discovered later.

8. It is true that at the time of the oral arguments Shri Rebello did mention to me that I had observed in one of the judgments delivered by me that khoti has to be equated with tenancy rights. He however now says that if the legal position with regard to khoti is now clear in view of the decision of the Division Bench, having regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court it is possible to review the impugned judgment and for that purpose he relies in the decision of Raj Kumar's case. The first of the decisions, of Raj Kumar is reported in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 536. Raj Kumar succeeded before the Supreme Court. His services were terminated under rule 5(1) of the Central Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 and though his services were terminated without one month's notice in advance there was no payment made to him of pay and allowances at the same time the notice of termination of his services was served on him. The Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision reported in AIR 1972 SC 1487 had rendered that decision. The next decision of Raj Kumar the same person is reported in the same Volume at p. 1116 AIR 1975 SC). The Supreme Court had perforce to set aside its own judgment in the case cited supra as it was found that Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1965 were amended with retrospective effect from 1-5-1965. The amendment stated that payment of notice pay and allowances need not be along with service or tender of termination notice. Based on this amendment which had not been noticed earlier by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court reviewed its own decision. Mr. Rebello therefore now urges that it is open for this Court to review the impugned order based on the discovery of the Division Bench decision AIR 1934 Bom 434 referred to supra.

9. Mr. Rebello next points out that there are some account sheets on record which make a mention of Rs. 300/- for cashew grove and Rs. 150/- for the areca. He therefore says that has to be considered as rent paid by applicants. He again reiterates that when ‘khoti’ is accepted as lease then the benefit of the presumption under section 105 of the Land Revenue Code would be available to the applicants and once that happens the onus would shift on the respondent/plaintiff to rebut that presumption and entries and the entire perspective of the application for temporary injunction would change and therefore this application ought to be reviewed.

10. In the matter of the decision reported in AIR 1934 Bom 434 it must be seen that was a matter relating to the construction of a lease deed and again the matter had been finally disposed of by the trial Court. In appeal before the High Court the question related to interpretation of several clauses of the lease deed. It is indeed contended by Shri Usgaoncar that the observations extracted above from page 347 thereof are on the basis of the interpretation of lease deed involved in the proceedings and will have no general application.

In my view I need not go for the interpretation of the judgment and leave the matter open. I am in agreement with Shri Usgaoncar that whatever matter already decided in the revision application was at the interlocutory stage and the rights between the parties are yet to be determined finally having regard to the transactions inter se. Parties are required to lead evidence and based on that evidence and the nature of transaction it is open to the trial Court to come to its own findings whether the applicants are lessees as contended by them and whether khoti is a lease. The fact remains that the tenants column is blank in Forms I and XIV. Practice with regard to rakhan, khoti and terms of the tenancy vary from place to place and therefore the issue must be left at large to be decided only after recording evidence. Going by the assumption that what I said in para 10 of my impugned judgment that khoti cannot be equated to tenancy rights is an error even then having regard to what I have observed earlier there is no question of review. However, I may caution that the Courts below need not go by those observations and are free to decide the matter on appreciation of the evidence led by the parties.

11. I am also in agreement with Shri Usgaoncar, learned counsel for the respondent that while confirming the order of the trial Court qua the property surveyed under No. 100/1, I had not decided the controversy solely by the interpretation of the Marathi word ‘khoti’ holding it not to be a lease but for several other reasons including non-disclosure of rent, production of accounts/receipts by the very applicants which are themselves titled as ‘rakhan’. I also relied upon the statement of account relied upon by the respondent. This being so, going by the grievance that the statement in the impugned judgment that ‘khoti’ cannot be equated with tenancy rights is accepted to be erroneous yet I am compelled to hold that the earlier judgment is not liable to be reviewed.

It may be again observed that there are several decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court that mere erroneous decisions are not liable to be reviewed. There are also several precedents that only errors apparent on the face of the record are liable to be reviewed and such errors must stare one in the face where no elaborate arguments are necessary to pin-point those errors.

12. In this view of the matter the review application is dismissed. Rule discharged. There shall be however no order as to costs.

Application dismissed.